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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis analyses Indonesia’s foreign policy, specifically its alignment behavior, in 
the 20 years after it declared independence in 1945.  It investigates the origins of Indonesia’s 
enduring bebas-aktif (independent and active) foreign policy and its manifestation in an official 
policy of neutrality and then nonalignment during the Cold War.  It then follows the evolution 
of alignment policy via Indonesia’s interactions with the great powers of the era – the USA, 
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.  The case study period provides a detailed 
account of a series of episodes that engaged the Cold War’s great powers, including the Asia-
Africa conference, US-sponsored regional rebellions in Indonesia, the campaign to wrest 
control of West New Guinea, and the attempt to “crush” the formation of Malaysia under a 
policy of Konfrontasi.    
In trying to account for patterns in Indonesian alignment, the thesis challenges 
conventional approaches to alignment that explain changing behavior as purely a response to 
either the capability or intentions of other powers.  Instead of seeing alignment as the result of 
a balance of power or a balance of threat, the thesis finds that Indonesia’s alignment policy 
during the period is better understood as a balance of risk between competing domestic and 
international demands and objectives.  Policymakers are viewed as placing especially high 
priority on maintaining policy autonomy, which they compromise only when the objective that 
alignment serves is regarded as critical to the state. 
The analysis highlights a deep vein of Realpolitik and pragmatism in Indonesia’s 
alignment behavior, which prompted it to abandon neutrality when the international and 
domestic objectives of policymakers outweighed their commitment to the bebas-aktif policy. 
But the thesis found Indonesia’s most common approach to alignment was the use of a range 
of ‘smart’ strategies designed to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of alignment.  
The principal risks could be placed in two categories: first, the risk of losing policy autonomy 
and, second, the risk of alignment choice provoking a domestic or international backlash.  The 
thesis also reviewed methods of analysing decisions under conditions of risk.  Comparing a 
rational actor model with a psychological model of choice, it found policymakers were prone 
to depart from the precepts of rational choice under conditions of crisis and uncertainty when 
the risk of critical loss to the state was is high. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Limits of Alliance 
 
From the moment the Republic of Indonesia declared independence on 17 August 
1945, its success in navigating the years of Cold War rivalry between the great communist 
and capitalist powers, and in building a new state, largely rested on the answer it gave to a 
single question:  How would it align itself?  The choice it made would not only determine 
its place the world, but have profound consequences for the nature of its domestic politics. 
This work proposes to examine the patterns of Indonesian alignment in the first 20 
years after it declared independence with the goal of uncovering the reasons behind its 
alignment choices.  There are two rationales for such a study.  First, as a strategically 
important state, an ardently-courted ally for the great powers, and one of the founders of 
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the case of Indonesia potentially provides valuable 
insights into how and why states align.  That the Republic of Indonesia officially 
renounced security alliances soon after it proclaimed independence, and while it was 
fighting for its survival, would, according to certain traditional explanations of state 
behavior, make it an aberrant case.  Second, the alignment behavior of Indonesia presents 
an important study in itself.  Even after the end of the Cold War, Indonesia remains a 
contested ally for the great powers because of size, natural resource wealth and location.  
A deeper understanding of the origins of its alignment policies might indicate how 
Indonesia responds to a new era of great power competition with implications for the 
security of its wider region. 
At the heart of the Indonesian alignment puzzle is a foreign policy created in the 
late 1940s that in theory bound Indonesia to the principles of independence and activity in 
international relations and neutrality from competing global power blocs.  The 
independent and active, or bebas-aktif, foreign policy has in practice required Indonesia to 
abstain from all military alliances or pacts.  This self-imposed denial of one of the primary 
tools of international security has been official policy throughout Indonesia’s history as an 
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independent state.  After the creation of the NAM in 1961, Indonesia transformed 
neutrality into an official policy of nonalignment.   
The bebas-aktif policy and adherence to neutrality or nonalignment has survived 
on paper through generations of ideologically distinct political regimes and diverse 
international conditions, contrary to the common belief that alignment adjusts with a 
state’s circumstances.  It presents as an interesting test of propositions that the primary 
determinant of alignment is a combination of changing perceptions of power and threat.  It 
might provide some fresh insights into the factors that drive alignment decisions, which 
could serve to refine traditional, predominantly western-centric theoretical approaches.  
Few states, particularly those that have found themselves in such challenging strategic 
circumstances, have voluntarily relinquished as vital a tool of national security and done 
so as enduringly as Indonesia.1   
It will be argued here that the totality of the Indonesian experience is not captured 
by analytical frameworks that rely solely on the capabilities and intentions of potential 
foreign adversaries or other factors external to the state.  Instead, the Indonesia case is 
better understood in terms of the management of risk, which needs to be calculated with 
reference to both international and domestic levels of analysis.  This idea of weighing, or 
balancing risk, can help account for the wide and nuanced range of alignment strategies 
Indonesia employed to both increase its security and preserve the independence of its 
policymaking.2  These ‘smart’ strategies do not fit neatly with standard approaches that 
predict Indonesia ought to maintain security by seeking alignments to either oppose or 
side with potential adversaries.3 
                                                
1 John S. Duffield et al describe alliances as “one of the most valuable instruments for advancing a 
state’s interests… a primary tool for enhancing a state’s security in the face of external and 
sometimes internal threats”.  See, “Alliances”, in Paul D. Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An 
Introduction, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2008), p. 292. 
2 Work on the psychology of risk taking has been introduced to the study of actors and groups in 
international relations, but it remains a developing field because of conceptual and methodological 
challenges.  See, Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical 
Applications and Analytical Problems”, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 283-310. 
3 For a review of these theories see Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning”, 
in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues, New York: Pearson Longman (2005), pp. 96-103. 
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Indonesian alignment policy during the early decades of Cold War rivalry is better 
understood as the story of how international and domestic actors vied for their distinct 
objectives and policymakers sought to simultaneously preserve their autonomy and 
manage the contention on both levels.4  This was a high stakes game.  The great powers of 
the era – the USA, Soviet Union and China5 – regarded Indonesia as a critical prize in 
their global struggle.  As they strove to draw Indonesia into their strategic orbits, they 
employed a combination of covert and overt means to directly intervene in Indonesian 
politics, exacerbating already deadly tensions.  For the domestic protagonists, the contest 
over alignment with the great powers, and the desirability of the competing political and 
economic systems they represented, was equally fierce.  In the first two decades after the 
declaration of independence, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
PKI) – the biggest in the world outside the communist bloc – posed a serious challenge for 
political leadership.  This resulted in decisions about alignment becoming entwined with a 
bitter, and often violent, polemic between groups on the political left and right in 
Indonesia about the character of the state.  It reached a bloody crescendo at the end of the 
rule of Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, when conflict over the choice of alignment 
and ideology provided the backdrop to one of the biggest mass killings of the 20th 
Century.   
Alignment behavior will be investigated in a case study that has three principal 
features.  First, it will consider the broad pattern of Indonesia’s alignment behavior.  
Second, it will trace the origins and evolution of Indonesia’s bebas-aktif policy to become 
                                                
4 There are numerous works that aim to model the interplay between domestic and international 
factors in foreign policy.  Those that has been particularly influential on the approach developed 
here are Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press (1993) 
and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffery W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the 
State and Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press (2009). 
5 The most common definition of great power is the one utilized by Paul Kennedy, following 
German historian Leopold von Ranke, that a great power is “a state capable of holding its own 
against any other nation”. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: 
Random House (1987), p. 539.  John J. Mearsheimer argues a state must have “sufficient military 
assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the 
world”. During the Cold War, the USA, Soviet Union and China all fit this definition and are 
arguably the only states that do. See, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton 
(2001), p. 5 and p. 404.   
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a self-imposed prohibition on foreign military bases and participation in either bilateral or 
multilateral military alliances and collective defence agreements.  Third, the analysis of 
alignment will focus on Indonesia’s interactions with the great powers during years of 
high tension and flux in the Cold War.  The historical period of analysis stretches in 
chronological order from 1945, with the declaration of independence, to late 1965 with the 
declaration of an Indonesia-China “axis”. 
Examining Indonesian alignment behavior over this period of history allows us to 
trace the bebas-aktif policy from its origins through numerous interpretations of it during 
times of varying ideological inclinations and leadership approaches.  An examination of 
patterns of cooperation with the great powers during a time of polarised international 
politics is particularly useful because these states were usually the preferred choice of 
alliance partner or their behavior was often, if not always, the trigger for other states to 
seek security in alliance.  It also was a time when international institutions were relatively 
weak and interstate suspicions acute, producing heightened perceptions of threat.  This 
might tell us a great deal about Indonesia’s preferences and allow for some contingent 
generalisations to be made about alignment decisions.  It is worth noting that the bebas-
aktif policy and the concomitant position of neutrality were framed with specific reference 
to the main Cold War power blocs led by the USA and Soviet Union. 
Thus, this study seeks to answer one fundamental question of Indonesian foreign 
policy:  What are the causes of Indonesia’s alignment behavior?  
Beyond this basic question there are a series of other related questions that it is 
hoped can be addressed in the course of inquiry:  What explains the persistence of 
Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy and refusal to enter military alliances?  What roles 
have theories on the balance of power and the perception of external threat played in 
determining alignment? What strategies has Indonesia adopted to enhance security in the 
absence of formal alliance? 
In the following sections, this chapter will start by outlining a theoretical and 
analytical approach to the study of alignment as an exercise in managing risk.  It will then 
summarise the key arguments, locate the study within the literature on Indonesian foreign 
policy, define key terms, and describe a research design. 
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Balancing Risk in Indonesian Alignment 
 
Power, Threat and Risk in Alignment 
 
What drives states to align with each other?  This is a fundamental research 
question in international politics; an abiding preoccupation of both scholars and 
statesmen.6  But the question of what determines alignment behavior remains contested, as 
does debate over the myriad ways in which states might manifest alignment. Even the 
term ‘alignment’ can be a source of some confusion, often used erroneously and 
interchangeably with the term ‘alliance’.  The definitional problem will be assessed below.  
It is sufficient to note here that alignment is a broad concept “defined as expectations of 
states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future 
interactions”. 7  This makes alliances a subset of alignments comprising formal agreements 
between states, usually enshrined in treaties. 
That said, there are numerous theories over what drives alignment and how it is 
manifested.  According to one of the dominant schools of thought, alignment is an 
inevitable reaction to the distribution of power in the international system.8  Kenneth 
Waltz, the most frequently cited scholar on the subject, argued states are driven to align 
regardless of the deliberate designs of policymakers.  Consequently, “balances of power 
tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a 
                                                
6 A good review of the various approaches to the study of alliances can be found in Duffield et al., 
op. cit. The authors argue that “[a]lliances are one of the most significant phenomena in security 
studies and world politics more generally”, see p. 291.  But Wilkins stressed “alignment” rather 
than “alliance” is the more useful focus of analysis.  His work contains a useful review of the types 
of alignment.  See, Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘alliance’ – the shifting paradigm of 
international security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment”, Review of 
International Studies, (2012), pp. 53-76. 
7 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press (1997), p. 6. 
8 The treatment of power as the most important variable in international politics is one of the 
hallmarks of the realist school of international relations. There are several variants of realism, but 
Wohlforth identifies three basic assumptions and one scope condition that they all share.  The 
basic assumptions are the centrality of the state in international relations, rational self-interest as 
the driver of political behavior and the quest for power as the ultimate guarantor of security.  The 
scope condition is the existence of anarchy or the lack of a supra-state authority in the international 
system. William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy” in Steve Smith et al. (eds.), Oxford 
University Press (2012): 35-53.   
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balance”. 9   States are presumed to automatically align or expand their own military 
capability, and usually both, to offset preponderant power because by definition in a self-
help international system power is threatening and intentions can rapidly shift or fail to be 
accurately discerned.  It assumes the actions and motives of states are determined by the 
principles of Realpolitik.10  The collective result of this behavior is to produce a balance of 
power.11  Waltz’ influential neo-realism has spawned several variations on his theme.12 
The structural determinism of realist explanations for how and why states align has 
prompted attempts to reintroduce factors closer to the foreign policymaking process to 
explain alignment.13  One of the most well-elaborated has been “balance of threat theory”.  
In an analysis of the international relations of the Middle East, Stephen M. Walt argues 
relative power alone is insufficient to account for decisions to seek alliance.14  Instead, he 
                                                
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Long Grove IL: Waveland Press, (1979), p. 
119. 
10 The main elements of Waltz’ ideas can be found in ibid., pp. 88-99 and pp. 107-123. One of the 
key assumptions of Waltz’ theory is that states are driven by Realpolitik. Its features are: ruler or 
state interests provide the well-spring of action; unregulated competition between states provide 
the imperative behind policy; calculation based on those imperatives determines the policies that 
serve a state’s interests; and the preservation and strength of the state is the ultimate test of 
success. It is noteworthy that this interpretation of Realpolitik is predicated on a rational analysis 
of the utility of the options facing policymakers. See, ibid., p. 117. 
11 There is an extensive literature on balance of power.  Waltz noted scholars had found as many 
nine distinct meanings of the term.  See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 117.  Hedley 
Bull, quoting Emer de Vattel, described it as: “A state of affairs such that no one power is in a 
position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others.” See, The Anarchical 
Society, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (1977 [2012]), p. 97.   For good historical accounts of the 
balance of power see Brian Healey and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International 
History”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1973), pp. 33-61 and Paul Seabury 
(ed.), Balance of Power, San Francisco: Chandler (1965).  Other notable and useful reviews of 
the concept and literature are found in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, New York: The Free 
Press (1973 [1988]), Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power” in H. Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, London: Allen 
and Unwin (1966), and “Special Issue on the Balance of Power”, Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 15, No. 2 (1989). 
12 Mearsheimer argues that states are not content to simply balance the power of others, but see the 
best protection of their interests lying in obtaining a preponderance of power; as a minimum, they 
aspire to hegemony over their own regions or hemispheres. For discussion of his ideas about 
“offensive realism”, see, Mearsheimer, op. cit., pp. 4-8 and pp. 29-54. 
13 Criticism of Waltz’s theory has come from a number of perspectives.  A good summary of the 
arguments is in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Colombia 
University Press (1986). 
14 Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press (1987), pp. 21-22.  
Walt focuses on the specific category of military alliance rather than the broader phenomenon of 
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cites four factors that determine whether states chose to balance against or bandwagon 
with another state:  aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and 
aggressive intentions.  First, aggregate power – measured by metrics such as population, 
industrial and military capability and technological prowess – reflects the degree of 
potential threat a state can pose.  Second, geographical proximity can amplify the scale of 
a potential threat. 15   Third, offensive capability, comprising the type of military 
instruments required to attack and subdue the military of other states, creates the ability to 
carry out threats and makes the cost of doing so more acceptable.  And, fourth, 
perceptions of aggressive intentions are cause for alarm.16   
The precise weight put on each of these factors will be contingent on the individual 
case.  But the significant feature of the theory is the fourth condition.  It reintroduces 
human agency into the alignment equation and provides a central place for threatening 
intentions.  According to Walt, these four factors provoke one of two reactions.  Faced 
with a perceived threat states will either “balance” or “bandwagon”, depending on the 
circumstances and decision-making of each state.17 
Walt proposed to test his theory by putting forward a range of hypotheses, which 
are useful to bear in mind in the analysis of Indonesian alignment behavior.  He divided 
his hypotheses between what to expect if his four criteria motivated balancing and 
bandwagoning behavior.  He then looked at several other potential influences on 
alignment behavior other than the existence of threat.  These included ideology, foreign 
aid, and “transnational political penetration”, by which he referred to “the manipulation of 
the target state’s domestic political system to promote alignment”.18   
                                                                                                                                             
alignment.  As has already been argued, alignment is a more useful way of analysing state 
behavior. 
15 To this, one might add the qualification of favourable terrain It might be more useful to think 
about a state’s geographic accessibility rather than proximity. Mearsheimer for example highlights 
the “stopping power of water” in limiting offensive capability, see op. cit., pp. 114-128. 
16 Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 21-26. 
17 Ibid., p. 17. Balancing refers to measures taken by states to offset the power of one or more 
potential adversaries, including the acquisition of new military capabilities and forming security 
alliances.  Bandwagoning refers to alignment with a more powerful potential adversary. 
18 Ibid., p. 242 
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Walt’s propositions are briefly summarised here:19 
Balancing:  States will seek alliances when they are faced by threat, especially as 
judged by aggressive intentions; the greater the threat (measured by a state’s aggregate 
power, offensive power and geographic proximity) the greater the tendency to seek a 
balancing alliance; once a threat is resolved, an alliance should dissolve. 
Bandwagoning:  States will ally with a threatening power; the greater the threat, as 
measured by the metrics referred to above, the greater the tendency to seek alliance with 
the threatening power; if the threat appears certain to manifest in aggression the alliance 
will dissolve. 
Propensity to balance or bandwagon: Balancing is the most common reaction to 
threat; the stronger the state, the greater the probability of allied support, and the more 
certain acts of aggression are perceived to be, the greater the preference to balance; the 
preference for bandwagoning is greater when the reverse is true. 
Ideology: States with similar ideologies are more likely to ally; alliances based on 
ideologies that require adherence to a foreign centre of power are likely to be fragile; the 
greater the level of a state’s perceived security, the greater the freedom to allow ideology 
to affect alliance choices; the preference for ideological alliances will increase when 
regimes seek to bolster internal and external support; statesmen will have a tendency to 
embellish the degree of shared ideology with their allies and the degree of ideological 
difference with rivals. 
Foreign Aid: The greater the level of foreign aid from one state to another, the 
greater the likelihood an alliance will form between them and the greater control the donor 
will exercise over the recipient; the greater the threat facing a state, the greater the role aid 
will play in its alliance choices; donor’s will have greater influence when they possess a 
monopoly over a valued commodity, when a recipient is highly dependent, and the when 
the recipient values the aid relationship more highly; the weaker the donor regime’s 
control over domestic decision-making on aid disbursement, the lower the leverage it has 
over recipients. 
                                                
19 Walt’s hypotheses stated in full can be found in ibid., pp. 32-33, p. 40, p. 46 and p. 49.  The 
logic underpinning these hypotheses is described in ibid., pp. 17-49. 
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Transnational Penetration: The greater a state’s access to the political system of 
another state, the greater tendency for the two to ally; the more open the society, the 
greater propensity for penetration; the more benign the motive for penetration, the more 
likely it is to succeed; the stronger the motive for alliance based on external criteria, the 
more likely penetration is to succeed. 
Balance of threat theory appears to provide a more realistic description for the 
motives influencing the alignment and other balancing decisions of individual states than 
simply compensation for changes in relative power alone.20  Walt found that the states of 
the Middle East were more concerned to “counter a threat from another local actor” than 
they were about the global balance of power, even in the context of the Cold War.21  
Perceptions of the threat posed by proximate states were consistently the main diver of 
alliances.  Still, when it came to selecting an alliance partner in the face of external threats, 
regional powers frequently sought the support of extra-regional great powers.22   
The alliance model underpinning balance of threat made particular sense in the 
context of the zero-sum game of the Cold War, when it was assumed great powers had a 
manifest interest in defending their allies because any loss of an ally potentially weakened 
the whole global or regional alliance network and conceded advantage to the principal 
adversary.  The polarisation caused by the Cold War placed enormous pressure on states 
to choose sides.  
But there are several lines of criticism of balance of threat, which create the 
potential for alternative theoretical argument, that will be discussed here.  First, Walt 
largely ignores state responses to threat other than balancing and bandwagoning.  The 
failure to account for other potential reactions to threat is an omission Walt himself 
subsequently acknowledged.23  For example, he pays scant attention to nonalignment as an 
                                                
20 Waltz acknowledged his was a system theory aimed at describing outcomes on a world scale, 
and not a theory of the foreign policy of individual states.  See Waltz, op. cit., pp. 71-73. 
21 Ibid., p. 158. 
22 Ibid., pp. 150-151.  Nearly half the 33 alliances Walt cited as being formed in response to 
external threat between 1955 and 1979 were formed with an extra-regional great power, in almost 
all cases the USA or Soviet Union. 
23 Walt recognized that behavior including “non-alignment, free-riding on a Great Power, fighting 
alongside a Great Power, balancing with other weak states, fighting alone” offered “a more 
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option for states, despite extensive treatment of the case of Egypt during the period when 
it became one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).24  
Writing earlier, Waltz contemplated a wide definition of balancing.  When states 
engaged in balancing they could adopt a range of internal actions, including “moves to 
increase economic capability, to increase military strength, (and) to develop clever 
strategies”, or external actions, including “moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own 
alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one”.25  It is important to note that this 
definition combines internal and external actions.  It does not refer purely to forming 
alliances. 
Since then, scholars have added to the variety of potential behaviors states might 
employ to mitigate an external threat.26  Not all the strategies states use are listed here, but 
several of potential interest to this study are worth noting. 
Wedge strategies can be a form of external balancing whose purpose is to increase 
a state’s relative power over external threat, by preventing the grouping or causing the 
dispersal of threatening alliances.27 
Omnibalancing is the act of appeasing secondary threats in order to counter those 
that are more pressing.  Of particular relevance in the Third World, it involves 
accommodating states that pose lower order threats to counter more immediate and 
dangerous domestic threats.  States seek to split the alignment against them to focus their 
energies on their most dangerous (domestic) opponents. A key part of the rationale is to 
                                                                                                                                             
elaborate typology”. See, Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to 
Kaufmann and Labs”, Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1992), pp. 448–482. 
24 A.W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, Westport, Conn: 
Lawrence Hill & Co. (1986), p. 62.  The formation of NAM in 1961 was “heavily dependent” on 
the leadership of five figures, including Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Soekarno of Indonesia. 
25 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118.  Emphasis added. 
26 A convenient summary of scholarship on the variety of alignment actions open to states is 
provided in Andreas M. Bock and Ingo Henneberg, “Why Balancing Fails: Theoretical reflections 
on Stephen M. Walt’s ‘Balance of Threat’ Theory”, Lehrstuhl Internationale Politik Universität zu 
Köln, Köln: Thomas Hartmann (2013), pp. 10-17.  The following categories and citations are 
sourced from this work. 
27 Timothy W. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41”, 
Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2008), p. 3 
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align with the outside power that is most likely to keep a regime in power.  This 
sometimes means appeasing the international allies of domestic opponents.28    
Hedging is seen as a set of strategies employed when states cannot decide upon 
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.  Instead, they will calibrate 
policy to incorporate elements of each while waiting for the international situation to 
become clearer.  For example, a state might build-up its military, while sending reassuring 
signals to potential rivals and avoiding overtly hostile alliances.29 
Hiding can take various forms.  A state might ignore a threat.  It might declare 
neutrality in a wider conflict and seek a guarantee of safety from both sides to a dispute.  It 
might try to withdraw into isolation.  It might assume a purely defensive position and hope 
the crisis will pass.  It might seek protection from some other power or powers in 
exchange for diplomatic services, friendship, or non-military support, without joining that 
power or powers as an ally or committing itself to any use of force on its part.30  
Transcending is an attempt to rise above Realpolitik by establishing international 
legal, religious, moral, or procedural norms to govern international practice, with these 
norms maintained and enforced by the international community or by a particular segment 
by it.31 
Competitive bidding is an attempt to extract benefits from rival powers by playing 
them off against each other.  Although a potentially risky strategy, as it might alienate 
both, a state that is weak but strategically important could in the short-term dangle the 
prospect of alignment to get rivals to outbid each other with the offer of security, aid and 
diplomatic benefits.32 
                                                
28 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), 
p. 236 
29 Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security 
Strategies, Policy Studies No. 8, Washington DC: East-West Center Washington (2005). 
30 Schroeder, op. cit., 1994, p. 117. 
31 John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall (2003), p. 119.  This is closely associated with the strategy of “binding” in 
which states seek to “constrain or enmesh targets in institutions, agreement, or forms of 
interdependency so as to weaken their ability to pursue autonomous policies”.  See, D.H. Nexon, 
“The Balance of Power in the Balance”, World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (2009), p. 346. 
32 This strategy has not been encountered in the literature on balancing and is developed here 
specifically for the case of Indonesia. It is probably more common among nonaligned or neutral 
states because rival great powers have an incentive to make payments in cash or kind to these 
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Undisclosed alignment attempts to secure the benefits of alignment without the 
downside of inciting domestic or international opposition.  This would be the case when 
an alignment could be viewed as hostile by another power or alignment is a source of 
contention among domestic parties.  While undisclosed alignment might weaken its 
credibility, it can be useful to disguise intentions.33 
Collectively, these could be termed ‘smart strategies’.  As noted above, these 
strategies offer a means of mitigating external threat without necessarily incurring the 
obligations and constraints that come with alliances.  They allow policymakers to manage 
some of the pressures and contradictions of alignment, such as the perverse situation in 
which an alliance aimed at enhancing state security might generate new sources of 
domestic and international hostility.  They require the analysis of alignment to take into 
account the behavior of policymakers as much as the actual policy instruments they 
employ – an important distinction that will be elaborated in further detail below.  Smart 
strategies, like hedging and competitive bidding, are often designed to create a degree of 
ambiguity about a state’s alignment posture.  They usually obviate the necessity for formal 
alliance.  But they might entail the use of some formal instruments of alignment.  These 
could include the negotiation of strategic partnerships, covering defined security and 
economic cooperation activities, or agreements to consult on mutual security concerns. 
There are other common features to smart strategies.  They are not mutually 
exclusive and might be employed in concert.  They generally fit at the ‘soft’ end of the 
spectrum of balancing behavior, although they can be combined with ‘hard’ balancing or 
bandwagoning strategies.  As a rule, the more militarised the balancing option, the 
‘harder’ it can be deemed.34  They are more likely to be practiced by relatively weak states 
and at times when threat is either not specific or of a low order of magnitude.  A threat 
                                                                                                                                             
states to ensure they at minimum remain neutral rather than defect to the other side and at 
maximum accept alignment. 
33 This term is proposed here to describe Indonesia’s conduct, but it is a well-studied phenomenon, 
particularly in relation to the origins of the First World War.  See, for example, Richard F. 
Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917, Cambridge University Press 
(2004), pp. 8-9. 
34 Robert A. Pape defined soft balancing as the use of “non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and 
undermine aggressive unilateral… military policies”.  It uses “international institutions, economic 
statecraft and diplomatic arrangements”.  See, “Soft Balancing Against the United States”, 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2005), p. 10. 
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that is specific, highly likely to be carried out, and impinges on non-negotiable state 
interests, is more likely to engender a less ambiguous response, such as explicit balancing.  
At times when threat is less precise, smart strategies can be attractive for states that want 
to avoid the loss of policy autonomy that inevitably accompanies a balancing or 
bandwagoning alliance.  The above strategies provide a good idea of the range of policy 
choices that share the common thread of preserving a state’s policy independence in the 
pursuit of greater security.   
 But the variety of strategies that can be employed does highlight the importance of 
a deeper understanding of the nature of decision making over alignment.  The presumption 
is that the more a state believes a threat is likely to be carried out and the greater the cost 
imposed if the threat is carried out, the more likely it will seek to employ ‘hard’ balancing 
options, such as alliances that offer specific security guarantees.  Equally, the reverse 
should be true.   
This points to a second, and major, weakness of balance of threat theory.  Its 
explanatory power hinges on the difficult task of understanding and interpreting 
perceptions.35   But it fails to provide any guide as to what states might perceive as 
aggressive intent or how they arrive at that conclusion.  If it is impossible to codify threat, 
then balance of threat theory might simply devolve into a more elaborate version of 
Waltz’s theory about relative power, in which states have no choice other than to assume 
the aggregation of power is threatening.  The theory loses predictive power and only 
works as a rear-view mirror once threat is manifest. 
To differentiate a balance of threat analysis from a balance of power analysis, the 
treatment of human agency is critical.  The first three components of balance of threat – 
aggregate power, offensive power and geographic accessibility – are, as broad measures of 
capability, enablers of hostility.  They can be considered necessary but insufficient 
conditions.  It is only with the introduction of human agency – with intent – that threat is 
mobilised.  Leaders need to decide whether the combination of perceived capability and 
                                                
35  Robert O. Keohane argues balance of threat theory “requires so much information about 
perceptions as well as objective facts that it has relatively little theoretical power of its own”.  See, 
“Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism”, International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1988), p. 
172. 
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intent will lead to actual armed conflict.  This establishes a likelihood.  But the judgment 
of leaders does not end there.  They also make calculations over the nature of the 
grievance at the centre of dispute.36  Glenn H. Snyder casts this in terms of the “degree of 
conflict” with an adversary.  He sees alliance need in terms of two factors: “The greater 
the shortfall between a state’s own military strength and that of its opponent, and the 
deeper the conflict with the adversary, the greater the state’s need and the more the state 
will value any alliance that satisfies that need.”37 
Essentially, Snyder is pointing to the elements of a risk assessment.  At the centre of 
a standard risk assessment is the act of weighing the chances of an event occurring (its 
likelihood) and the scale of the event (the costs imposed if the event does occur), which 
are mediated by the ability to contain the event (its susceptibility to resolution by some 
form of intervention). 38   Risk assessments are usually conducted as a means of 
compensating for uncertainty.  Even if another actor is viewed as hostile, it is not always 
possible to know when or how a threat might manifest. 
Snyder’s reference to the “degree of conflict”, or what might be termed the criticality 
of the objective of a conflict, recognises an important dimension to understanding how 
risk is evaluated:  not all threats are equal.  Threats can be placed on a sliding scale.  The 
bigger the potential loss incurred if a threat is carried out, the greater the attention a threat 
is likely to receive from policymakers and the greater the precautionary measures they are 
likely to take.  It follows that the nature of alignment and other responses to the spectrum 
of possible threats are not equal either.  Snyder makes the sound point that judgements 
about alliances sometimes need to be “farsighted”; they need to take account of 
consequences in the distant, not just the immediate, future and how they affect the 
                                                
36 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 45.  
37 Ibid. 
38 A simple formula for risk assessment is that Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Criticality, where 
threat is the likelihood that an adversary will attack identified assets or interests, vulnerability 
refers to the ability to defend against or avert an attack on those assets or interests, and criticality is 
defined as the likely impact if an identified asset or interest is lost or harmed.  See, Joel Leson, 
“Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat”, Bureau of Justice Assistance, US Department of 
Justice (2005), p. 16. 
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behavior of third parties.39  In other words, decisions might be made about alignment 
beyond the horizon of foreseeable threat.  
For these reasons, it might be more useful to think of alignment behavior in terms 
of a balance of risk rather than a balance of threat or a balance of power.  When faced with 
the requirement to make a judgment under conditions of uncertainty, policymakers have 
three choices: they can leave matters to chance (proverbially toss a coin), they can trust 
their intuition (“emotional beliefs” or belief in the absence of evidence)40, and they can 
conduct a risk assessment.  Of these, the risk assessment is the rational choice, although 
rationality cannot always be assumed.  There were occasions, especially under the 
leadership of Sukarno, where intuition arguably played a big role in decision making.  But 
as we will see, it is not always easy to separate emotion from rationality under conditions 
of risk.  Still, in general, a risk assessment can be viewed as the rational way of 
compensating for the inability to know intentions of another actor.  
There are several advantages to explaining alignment decisions in terms of a risk 
analysis.  It can create room for a variety of motives for alignment other than a response to 
just power and threat.  It permits the explanation of alignments, and other strategies 
designed to enhance state and regime security, in conditions of unforeseen or speculative 
threat when they can be viewed as the insurance policies of cautious policymakers.  
Alignments can be seen as tools for serving a range of political purposes – the prevention 
of undesired events or the attainment of specific domestic or international objectives.  It 
lends itself to a more realistic scale in which states can be seen to escalate from smart 
strategies at the ‘soft’ end of the alignment spectrum all the way up to binding alliances at 
the ‘hard’ end of the spectrum.  The greater the perceived risk the firmer the alignment 
response.  In this way, the diverse array of alignment behaviors cited above can be brought 
together and explained within one analytical framework.  Moreover, from an analytical 
point of view, it might be easier to deductively ascertain the elements of a policymaker’s 
                                                
39 Ibid., p. 46. 
40 Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2nd Ed., 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1947). 
Mercer cites as an example the Bush administration’s belief in the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iran and Iraq in the absence of incontrovertible evidence. 
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risk assessment than his or her perceptions of whether another state is or is not 
threatening. 
But it still leaves unanswered questions over the range or types of risks 
policymakers might seek to balance and how they balance them.  According to Snyder, the 
decision to form or join an alliance comes down to a cost-benefit analysis in which 
“benefits are counted chiefly in terms of the increased security resulting from the partner’s 
commitment, and the costs largely in terms of the autonomy sacrificed in the commitment 
to the partner”.41  Snyder views the benefits of alliance as largely defensive; the costs in 
terms of security risks such as being drawn into the disputes of other states, or 
“entrapment”, and “general constraints on freedom of action… and perhaps (the need) to 
modify one’s preferred policy to suit the ally’s preferences”.42 
In analysing the benefits of alignments, Snyder, like Walt, sees them as largely 
defensive or reactive.  This accounts for too narrow a range of motivations.  Alignments 
could be formed for offensive reasons or to achieve a specific objective.43  That is, they 
could be intended as a means to alter rather than preserve the status quo.  As noted above, 
it might be more useful to think of the criticality of the objective in considering the 
motives policymakers have for incurring the potential costs of alignment and the level of 
commitments they make under an alignment.  There is no quarrel with Snyder’s decision 
to cast the costs in terms of the risks of entrapment in another state’s designs or of lost 
policy autonomy.  An underlying assumption is that policymakers view security 
alignments as a compromise that would not be necessary in a perfectly secure world.  But 
he places emphasis on international factors in determining the costs and benefits of 
alignment.  While this is a reasonable priority, the very real costs and benefits a 
policymaker might experience at the domestic level should not be ignored. 
                                                
41 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 43. 
42 Ibid., pp. 43-44.  Snyder lists six benefits to alliances and five costs.  The benefits include 
enhanced deterrence, capacity for defence and access to aid.  They can also include “side 
payments” unrelated to the alliance, like having a free hand in a colonial venture.  The costs 
include the risks of a state having to come to an ally’s assistance when it otherwise would not, of 
emboldening an ally to be more aggressive and of causing other states to form a counter alliance. 
Presumably, some of these costs are higher for weaker or more dependent alliance partners. 
43 For example, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that facilitated the invasion of Poland in September 
1939. 
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It follows that the balance of risk in alignment choices can be seen as working on 
two levels.  On the first level, a policymaker balances the criticality of an objective 
motivating a decision to align against the cost in lost policy autonomy.  On the second 
level, the policymaker balances the objective against the possibility of provoking domestic 
and international opposition to the state and regime.44  The objective in seeking to align 
might be defensive – the preservation of territorial integrity or regime survival, for 
example – or it might be offensive – the assertion of a claim over territory.  Decisions 
about alignment will be mediated by policymakers’ judgments over the vulnerability or 
susceptibility of the objective to resolution by the use of force and the likelihood of an 
event occurring.   
Ultimately, the alignment game comes down to the policymaker’s ability to 
maximise the benefits of cooperation with other states while minimising the potential 
losses.  This is how Indonesia managed its alignment policies and where so-called smart 
strategies played a crucial role.  Both sets of balancing acts were pertinent.  Successive 
Indonesian governments placed a high priority on policy autonomy and neutrality, even as 
they entered alignments with varying degrees of commitment.  A “sharp awareness of 
their country’s weakness” dictated Indonesian policymakers seek economic and military 
aid from abroad.45  But the experience of revolution against a European power was bound 
to make them suspicious of foreign cooperation.  It could serve as either a platform for 
interference or a doorway for neo-colonialism.46   
The question of alignment also was central to the Indonesian domestic political 
debate in the years 1945 to 1965.  The projection of at least the image of independence, 
which was integral to the bebas-aktif policy, had as much to do with convincing a 
domestic as a foreign audience that Indonesia would not accept a “lessening of 
independence and sovereignty” in exchange for the assistance it so desperately needed to 
                                                
44 There are elements of the so-called “two-level” game in this analysis.  See, Evans et al., op. cit. 
45  Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From 
Sukarno to Suharto, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1976), p. 20. 
46 Weinstein describes this phenomenon, which was especially acute in the army and towards the 
great powers.  Ibid., p. 30, pp. 43-44 and p. 57. 
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achieve “internal consolidation”.47  Shifts in alignment could add to or subtract from the 
strength of rival political forces on the left and the right.  They could strengthen or weaken 
the government of the day in relation to its domestic opponents. 
Although this provides a picture of what categories of alignment risk policymakers 
were actually balancing in Indonesia, or how they ‘framed’ the risk dilemma, it is harder 
and more complex to determine how either individually or collectively they assessed or 
evaluated alignment risks.  To provide a complete account of how policymakers managed 
risk it is necessary to go beyond an explanation of how they framed the problem to show 
how they made decisions.    
 
Explaining risky choice: A Rational or Psychological Approach? 
 
How decision makers adjust their calculations to account for risk has been the source 
of a long historical debate.48  The conventional approach for explaining decision making – 
the so-called expected utility model – has been to see problems of risky choice as a 
rational exercise where individuals seek to maximise their gains.  Decision makers, 
displaying “consistency and coherence” in their preferences, select the option available to 
them that provides greatest utility.49  The utility function could be any specific objective – 
“survival, maximisation of power, minimisation of threat” – but there is presumed to be a 
                                                
47 Mohammad Hatta, 47 Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, 
No. 3 (1953), p. 447 and p. 449. 
48  The nature of risk taking – the paradox of an individual who simultaneously engages in 
gambling and buys insurance – has been a subject of interest in the study of economic behavior for 
many decades.  See, for example, Milton Friedman and L.J. Savage, “The Utility Analysis of 
Choices Involving Risk”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1948), p. 281.  The 
foundations of expected utility were laid in the 18th century by Daniel Bernoulli.  See, “Exposition 
on the Measurement of a New Theory of Risk” Econometrica, Vol. 22, No 1. (1738[1954]), pp. 
23-36. 
49 George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky, “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of 
Political Choice”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (1986), p. 719. Several key 
assumptions underpin expected utility theory.  The main ones are: transitivity (choice options are 
hierarchical, so that “if option A is preferred to option B, and B is preferred to C, then A is 
preferred to C as well”); dominance (“if one option is better on at least one aspect, and at least as 
good on all other aspects, it will be preferred to lesser options”): and invariance (preference for 
options should not change according to how the choice problem is described). See, Rose 
McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1998), p. 17. 
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unified decision process and the actor is presumed to choose the alternative that best 
maximises his/her objectives.50  This has been used as both a normative and descriptive 
model of decision making under risk such that “all reasonable people would wish to 
obey”.51  
The pioneering work on rational choice was performed to better understand 
economic behavior.52  The payoffs were measured in money.  But it has been adapted to 
political science with necessarily less precision in calculating probabilities and the utility 
of outcomes.  There are several salient features of a rational choice analysis of 
international political decision making: there is a single actor for analytical purposes (state 
or leader); there is a clearly defined objective or set of objectives chosen in response to the 
“threats and opportunities arising in the international strategic ‘marketplace’”; policy 
options for meeting the objective and the consequences of those options are evaluated in 
terms of the “benefits and costs” to the actor; a “value-maximising” choice of policy 
option is made.53  It should be noted that both balance of power and balance of threat 
explanations of alignment implicitly rely on this rational actor model.  
But there are variants to the treatment of rationality, most importantly studies in 
cognitive psychology that show there are certain instances in which “preferences 
systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory”.54  Viewing risky decisions as 
a choice between prospects or gambles, prospect theory suggests that decision outcomes 
are significantly dependent on the context in which choices are posed or framed.  The 
basic elements of prospect theory are as follows:  Decision makers normally conceive of 
outcomes in terms of gains and losses, rather than their final asset position55; there is a 
neutral reference point for determining gains and losses, usually, but not always, the status 
                                                
50 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
2nd Ed., New York: Longman, (1999), p. 27. 
51 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 47 (1979), p. 263. 
52 J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2nd Ed., 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1947). 
53 Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 24. 
54 Kahneman and Tversky, op. cit., p. 263. 
55 Ibid., p. 277. 
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quo56; losses loom larger than gains57; and decision makers tend to be risk averse in the 
domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.58  The effect of these behaviors 
is to produce “normatively unacceptable consequences” and “inconsistencies”, that is they 
depart from what would be assumed by a rational choice analysis.59   
There are two steps to applying prospect theory to the analysis of risky decisions.60  
The first is what is described as an “editing function” in which a decision maker conducts 
a preliminary analysis of prospects with the purpose of simplifying the decision choice.61  
In translating the use of prospect theory to the study of alignment, the simplification of 
choice represented by the balance of risk scenario described above could be regarded as a 
method for modelling at least some significant components of the editing phase.  By 
identifying the generic options available to a policymaker, it can help fill a vital gap in the 
application of prospect theory to the complex realm of international alignment choice.62  
The laboratory experiments in cognitive psychology that were used to establish prospect 
theory focused on preferences when subjects were presented with defined probabilities 
and payoffs.  The question of exactly how an individual constructed or framed a choice 
problem was left open.  But for prospect theory to be of value to the study of international 
                                                
56 Ibid., p. 274. 
57 Ibid., p. 279. 
58 Ibid., p. 268. 
59 Kahneman and Tversky, op. cit., p. 277. 
60 Prospect theory was developed via laboratory experiments that used monetary units to evaluate 
attitudes to risk taking.  But Kahneman and Tversky argue the theory is readily applicable to 
choices with other attributes, such as lives lost or saved as a consequence of policy decisions.  See 
Ibid., p. 288. The main findings of prospect theory have been borne out in studies of political 
choice.  See, Quattrone and Tversky, op. cit., pp. 719-736. 
61 The elements of the editing phase are described in Kahneman and Tversky, op. cit.,, pp. 274-
275. 
62 However, as Tversky and Kahneman point out, how choice problems are edited is difficult to 
predict because “framing is controlled by the manner in which the choice problem is presented as 
well as by norms, habits and expectations of the decision maker”.  See, Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions”, The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, 
No. 4 (1986) p. S257.  Levy places particular emphasis on the issue of how choices are framed in 
order for prospect theory to be effectively translated to the study of international relations.  See, 
Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations”, pp. 292-296. 
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relations phenomena the editing phase “requires far more theoretical and empirical 
attention”.63 
The second step in applying prospect theory is the evaluation phase.64  The key to 
evaluation is the establishment of a reference point that is used by the decision maker to 
determine prospective losses or gains.65  Although the reference point is normally the 
status quo, it can shift so that it can become “an expectation or aspiration level”.66  
Clearly, close attention needs to be paid to the question of what represents the 
decision maker’s point for determining gains and losses.  It is in the evaluation phase that 
patterns of choice are seen to depart from the normative expectations of expected utility 
theory and risk aversion and risk seeking behavior is witnessed in the face of gains and 
losses respectively.  Interesting influences on evaluation include the phenomena of “sunk 
costs”67 and the “endowment effect”68.   Sunk costs can lead a decision maker to take ever 
riskier gambles to recover losses; the endowment effect leads a decision maker to quickly 
accommodate to gains, thus setting a new reference point for what represents a gain or a 
loss.  It is necessary to pay close attention to how a decision maker sets a reference point, 
and particularly how it might shift, for it “determines not only where the decision maker 
perceives himself to be but also the perceived nature of his options”. 69   During 
Confrontation against Malaysia, for example, Sukarno found himself in a position of 
constantly mounting losses that in turn repeatedly constrained his options if he wanted to 
avoid to admitting defeat. 
Despite the greater complexity of employing prospect theory rather than expected 
utility theory to model decision making over alignments, there are likely to be 
considerable advantages in explaining decisions that would otherwise appear anomalous 
                                                
63 Jack S, Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory”, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(1992), p. 180. 
64 Kahneman and Tversky, op. cit., pp. 277-280. 
65 The reference point is based on the decision makers perceived “asset position”, which allows for 
variations on magnitude to be evaluated.  See, ibid., p. 277. 
66 Ibid., p. 286. 
67 Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion” Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(1992), p. 190. 
68 Levy, “Introduction to Prospect Theory”, p. 175. 
69 Eldar Shafir, “Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective”, Political 
Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), p. 315. 
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or irrational.  In the case of Sukarno’s unwavering pursuit of Indonesia’s claim over West 
New Guinea, for example, the status quo of the continuation of Dutch occupation 
represented the realisation of such a critical loss that it justified extraordinary measures to 
ensure the territory’s incorporation within the Republic.  From the American perspective, 
it was difficult to comprehend why West New Guinea was worth fighting over – the image 
at the time was that it was populated by a primitive people and of little economic or 
strategic worth.  Neither threat as a causal account nor value maximisation as an account 
of decision process can explain Indonesia’s decision to align with the Soviet Union to 
pursue its claim to West New Guinea.  It is difficult to construct the framing of 
Indonesia’s grievance in terms of overt threat.  The Dutch had neglected the development 
of West New Guinea and did not have a substantial military garrison there.  As for the 
decision-making process, Indonesia’s expectation or aspiration levels were built to the 
point where continued Dutch rule was viewed as a critical loss.  Consequently, Indonesia 
was prepared to take risks that could not be predicted by a pure cost-benefit analysis.  
 There are caveats attached to the application of psychological analysis to risky 
choice.  Prospect theory provides insights into the decision-making behavior of 
individuals.  It loses explanatory power if it is aggregated to groups.70  Nonetheless, this is 
sometimes done when groups are viewed as a single purposeful risk taker.71   In the 
Indonesian case, two factors compensate somewhat.  First, foreign policy, and particularly 
the orientation of alignment, was often dictated by one or two individuals.  Sukarno was 
the undisputed orchestrator of Guided Democracy foreign policy, but even under 
constitutional democracy the big foreign policy initiatives frequently reflected the 
personal judgments of prime ministers and foreign ministers rather than the outcome of 
bureaucratic and political party consultation.  Second, there was a pronounced similarity 
of worldview among Indonesian political elites on basic features of international politics 
that colored how alignment problems (and foreign policy problems in general) should be 
framed. 
                                                
70According to Shafir, research has shown that decisions by groups tend to differ from the average 
of individual members decisions prior to group discussion. See, ibid., 313. 
71 See, for example, Audrey McInerney, “Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards Syria, 1966-
1967”, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 265-282. 
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A second limitation of prospect theory is that its main conclusions are based on 
simple tests of choice under defined experimental conditions.  They cannot easily be 
translated to the complexity of international politics where policymakers face an array of 
choices that potentially present the prospect of simultaneous losses and gains regardless of 
the option they chose.  The choices political leaders face “rarely involve one riskless and 
one risky option, but rather two risky options”. 72  In addition, the utilities of outcomes are 
highly subjective.  Their value is subject to political contention and is shaped by the 
international environment.  These are illustrative of the analytical challenges that make 
prospect theory a more complex method of analysis than a rational actor model.  In some 
instances, a rational choice explanation might suffice.  In that case, it would be preferred 
because of its greater parsimony.  Therefore, part of the task of psychological analysis is 
to show how it provides a superior explanation to the alternative.73  To stress this point, 
this thesis is neutral on the question of whether rational choice or prospect theory offers a 
more satisfying explanation for any given risky choice.  The value of prospect theory must 
not be judged in “absolute terms, but relative to a rational choice model based on a 
straightforward expected-value calculus”.74  The value of prospect theory emerges only 
when the simpler explanation of rational choice proves inadequate or anomalous. 
 
Testing the Balance of Risk in Alignment 
 
If predictions that Indonesian policymakers primarily balanced risk in deciding on 
alignment posture are correct, then it should be possible to reduce their behavior to a 
series of testable propositions.  The first four hypotheses proposed below deal with the 
anticipated role of risk under given external and internal conditions.  Three additional 
motivations for alignment then are proposed.  These adapt Walt’s hypotheses in relation to 
                                                
72 Levy highlights the problem of state choices being influenced by the choices of others and by 
“random shocks”.  Current choices also have “future consequences which are themselves risky or 
uncertain and which need to be incorporated into one’s current risk calculus”.  Levy, “Prospect 
Theory and International Relations”, p. 293. 
73 Ibid., p. 297. 
74 Ibid., p. 298. 
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the separate roles of ideology, aid and transnational political penetration in influencing 
alignment behavior.  
 
1. When the prospect of critical loss to the state or regime is perceived to be high75, 
states should prefer hard or offensive policies, including building their own 
military strength and balancing alliances.  This should be the first preference in the 
event of a high risk of high loss.  
 
2. When the prospect of critical loss to state or regime is perceived to be high, yet it 
has no recourse to ‘hard’ balancing policies, it should prefer a variety of ‘smart’ 
alignment strategies or, as a last resort, to bandwagon with a threatening state.  
This should apply only if balancing options are unavailable. 
 
3. When the prospect of critical loss to the state or regime is perceived to be low, 
states should prefer alignment strategies that support domestic group or individual 
preferences and interests in foreign policy.  At such times, states are more likely to 
adopt soft or defensive policies such as various ‘smart’ alignment strategies that 
aim to maximise the benefits of international cooperation while minimizing the 
loss of policy autonomy.  They should prefer to avoid hard strategies like 
expansion of military capability and overt balancing and bandwagoning options.   
 
4. The strength of a state’s balancing response should escalate in tandem with the 
prospect of incurring loss.  This should manifest in a tightening of alignment 
commitments and attempts to grow state power. 
 
                                                
75 This is measured as a high probability of a dispute erupting that has the potential to harm critical 
national interests and that is susceptible to resolution by coercion.  The definition of criticality will 
vary from state to state, although it is likely to have some common definitions.  All would regard 
loss of territory and existential threats to the state and regime as critical.  But it is a subjective 
classification – the erosion in influence over a region of interest, a change to an international 
regime, denial of access to vital markets or resources, and decline of national status and prestige 
might all be regarded as critical losses by policymakers. 
  
25 
5. States should prefer alignment partners that share the same ideology.  The 
ideological preferences of a state, or the effects of domestic political competition, 
are more likely to be reflected in alignment when external risks are low, that is, in 
the absence of existential threat to state or regime. 
 
6. Aid should increase the propensity for alignment and increase the influence of the 
aid donor on the policies adopted by the recipient.  The same should be true of 
access to commercial opportunities via trade and investment. 
 
7. The higher the transnational political penetration of one state by another state, the 
more likely the states are to seek alignment. 
 
Explaining Indonesian Alignment: Smart Strategies and Managing Risk 
 
Two somewhat contradictory themes pervaded Indonesian foreign policy thinking 
in the decades after it won independence, each with specific implications for decision-
making about alignment.  The first was a Realpolitik wariness of great powers meddling in 
the internal affairs of Indonesia, compromising its independence and destabilising the 
country and its immediate region.76  This produced an acute sense of the significance of 
power in international politics and the vulnerability of the state, both of which contributed 
to how policymakers interpreted the risks posed by international politics.  The second was 
a strong ideational foundation for the appropriate conduct of external relations that is 
reflected in the Constitution and bebas-aktif principles.  These ideological commitments 
are presumed to guide and temper the conduct of foreign policy.  The two themes of 
Realpolitik and foreign policy ideology will be examined separately here to elucidate the 
main arguments of this thesis.   
By the time Indonesia won its independence in 1949, it had a long and bitter 
experience with the exercise of state power in an international system that imposed few 
                                                
76 This was sometimes expressed in the “pretty girl” analogy, whereby Indonesia was seen as a 
vulnerable young woman constantly approached by men trying to take advantage of her.  See 
Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 42-44. 
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restraints on its most powerful constituents.  After independence, it learned how to use 
power to attain its own international and domestic ambitions.  Power, seen as both a threat 
and opportunity, was central to elite perceptions of Indonesia’s international place.   
The idea of power as threat had its roots in the experience of 300 years of Dutch 
rule, Japanese occupation during the Second World War and the behavior of the USA, the 
Soviet Union and other European powers during the struggle for national independence 
and in the early decades of independent statehood.  In the words of a former Indonesian 
ambassador to the USA and presidential adviser, these “bitter experiences with foreign 
powers prior to, during and after (the struggle for) independence” have left an indelible 
mark on Jakarta’s policy elites.  He notes “each of the major powers has at one time or 
another been engaged in hostile acts against the country” which was “bound to have an 
impact on the policymakers’ perception of these powers”.77   An appreciation of the 
sensitivity of Indonesian elites to the presence and suspected hostile intentions of extra-
regional great powers in Southeast Asia is an essential point to comprehend about 
Indonesia’s international outlook.  But the flipside of power as threat is its utility as a tool 
of the state.  From the late 1950s, under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, Indonesia 
embarked on a program of building its own military capabilities to address an historic 
imbalance.  This arms build-up allowed it to pursue its longstanding grievance over 
continued Dutch occupation of West New Guinea, to claim its status as a regional power 
and to protect the state from foreign incursion. 
Indonesia’s uses of alignment need to be seen in the context of these perceptions of 
power as both threat and opportunity.  It reflects a deep vein of pragmatism in the conduct 
of foreign policy that was evident at the time the bebas-aktif policy was cast, but which is 
frequently neglected in portrayals of that policy.  That pragmatism is seen in an 
apprehension of the practical outcomes of policy as opposed to its ideological purity.  It is 
not to say decision-making was always objectively rational, free of risk-taking or lacking 
idealism.  At times, policymaking could seem rash, grandiose or idealistic, as will be seen 
in several episodes recounted in the coming chapters.  But foreign policy, and specifically 
                                                
77 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Policy, Jakarta: Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (1996), p. 102.  Dino Patti Djalal was Ambassador to 
Washington from 2010 to 2013. 
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alignment, served as valuable tool to further the interests and ambitions of individual 
policymakers and navigate the promise and peril of great power politics during the Cold 
War.  
Still, in a divided polity, pragmatic politics often counselled caution.  It is 
generally accepted that states seeking to enhance their security by military means have 
two options – they can either grow their armed forces or they can enter military alliance 
with a state or states who share the same security interests.  Usually, states concerned 
about their security or seeking to pursue international ambitions will do both.  Indonesia 
for the entire period of this study disavowed formal alliance.  Indeed, actions that might 
implicate Indonesia in alliance with a foreign power fractured domestic politics and 
brought at least one government down.  This did not mean Indonesian policymakers were 
willing to forsake all the benefits of cooperation with other states to enhance the country’s 
security and pursue its international ambitions.  Instead, it employed a range of strategies 
of collaboration or resistance designed to do just that. 
How then can Indonesian alignment behavior be explained?  According to 
common realist explanations, states adjust their alignments respond to either changes in 
the capabilities or the intentions of other states or a combination of both.78   This is 
captured by the concepts of a balance of power and a balance of threat.  But neither 
changing international structures of power nor the emergence of threatening intentions 
among sufficiently powerful states can consistently account for the alignment choices of 
Indonesia’s policymakers during the period studied here.  One of the main findings of this 
work is that the nature and scale of issues in an interstate dispute, and how they are 
perceived by policymakers, are essential to the analysis of alignment decisions.  By 
incorporating assessments of the importance of the grievance to both parties and its 
susceptibility to resolution by force, whether military or economic, we get a better idea of 
what the stakes might be in a potential conflict and what range of options are available for 
the resolution of conflict.  This is particularly relevant to a rules-based international order 
                                                
78 Kenneth Waltz argues this is true only in aggregate at the international system level.  The 
behavior of individual states cannot be captured by such generalisations.  See, Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, pp. 121-122.  But Walt’s balance of threat approach also seeks to explain 
individual alliance decisions rather than alliance purely at the system level.  See Walt, Origins of 
Alliances, pp. ix-x and 1-5. 
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when a territorial dispute might be settled by quasi-judicial processes rather than a resort 
to arms, which would implicate external alignments. Likelihood, criticality, vulnerability 
provide the ingredients of a classic political or security risk assessment.  Rather than 
balancing power or threat, policymakers can be seen as balancing risk.  
This places alignment by balancing or bandwagoning on the extreme ends of a 
continuum of behaviors that include a range of ‘smart’ strategies short of formal alliance 
that enhance security while preserving policy independence.  The strength of alignment 
policies is determined by weighing the value attached to an objective at one end of the 
scale, which might be framed as the attainment of gain or avoidance of loss, and the 
prospect of sacrificing policy autonomy or inciting opposition to the state and regime at 
the other.  The more decision makers value an objective, the more likely they are to prefer 
a hard alignment. The aim of avoiding losses would outweigh the aim of making gains. 
Indonesia appeared to exhibit this pattern of decision making over alignment in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  It included a range of policies such as what has been termed here ‘competitive 
bargaining’ – playing rival powers off against each other to obtain benefits from both.  
The significance of these strategies is that they allowed Indonesia to maintain an official 
policy of neutrality or nonalignment while obtaining many of the benefits of alignment.   
Risk management occurred simultaneously at the domestic and international 
levels. 79   At the domestic level, a fundamental goal was to preserve the image of 
independence for a domestic polity fiercely divided over the governing ideology of the 
state.  It was axiomatic that alliance with either the West or the Communist bloc would tilt 
the domestic debate in favor of one ideological position or another.  It meant actual 
alignment arrangements were frequently managed in secret to hide the truth of Indonesian 
policy from domestic audiences – ‘undisclosed alignment’ was one of the key ways of 
minimising risk.  It also meant alignment in practice frequently shifted during the period 
studied here simply because there was a change of Prime Minister, of regime type, or 
President.  It demonstrated that alignment served functions at both a strategic level for the 
state and a tactical level for rival political factions.  It accentuated the difference between 
what political scientist Herbert Feith famously described as the “solidarity makers” and 
                                                
79 Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations”, p. 286. 
  
29 
“administrators” in Indonesian politics. 80   Politicians who wanted to strengthen their 
appeal could use the politics surrounding alignment choices as a domestic tool to excite 
popular fervor; economists, businessmen and soldiers would support alignment strategies 
as an international tool to gain access to foreign resources.   
The ascendancy of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime offered one of the most 
powerful examples of regime type affecting alignment policy.  Given a free hand in 
foreign policy, Sukarno effectively abandoned the bebas-aktif policy to embrace an 
increasingly close alignment with the Soviet Union.  The access this provided to large 
quantities of modern weapons enabled Indonesia to pursue its territorial claim to West 
New Guinea.  Later, Sukarno switched his attention to forging a de facto alliance with 
China as Confrontation against Malaysia deepened.  It culminated in the declaration of a 
proposed “axis” with the People’s Republic of China and several other Asian countries.   
Less dramatic, but no less pronounced, were shifts in alignment policy as 
governments rapidly rose and fell during the constitutional democracy period between 
1950 and 1959.  Often the consequence of intense competition between nationalists, 
Muslims and communists, alignment shifts promised both domestic advantage and 
partisan access to international resources.   
At the international level, there was a separate set of calculations.  An important 
rationale for neutrality and the bebas-aktif policy was to maintain policy autonomy.  
Policymakers did not want to be dragged into foreign conflicts – especially those driven 
by old-world rivalries – because of formal alliance commitments.  It was a matter of pride 
for Indonesians after the predations of colonialism that sovereign independence should 
have its reflection in foreign policy.  They desired influence, perhaps leadership, in the 
immediate strategic neighborhood and stature and prestige on the world stage.  Formal 
alliance might have entailed subjugating these interests to the interests of a great power 
partner.  But official neutrality presumably was viable only as long as Indonesia did not 
face either an existential threat or a threat to regime survival.  Those extreme scenarios 
never arose, although US-sponsored internal rebellions in the 1950s might have threatened 
the regime had they gained momentum.  This goes some way to explaining Indonesia’s 
                                                
80 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
(1962), p. 25. A contemporary terminology might be “nationalists” and “technocrats”. 
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ability to maintain neutrality and the bebas-aktif policy.  If neutrality and the assertion of 
policy independence helped to manage international and domestic tensions in the absence 
of a direct external threat, it could be assumed that Indonesia would have sought security 
in more overt alignment arrangements had an existential challenge actually arisen.  
Indeed, there was ample evidence of the flexibility with which the bebas-aktif 
policy was imbued.  Indonesia confronted a range of foreign policy challenges in the early 
post-independence period that touched on what it regarded as core, non-negotiable 
interests.  Two in particular brought Indonesia into alignments that stretched the 
credibility of claims to either neutrality or independence in foreign policy.  The first was 
the push to incorporate the last Dutch territory in the archipelago, West New Guinea, into 
the Republic of Indonesia.  The second was the attempt to prevent the creation of the state 
of Malaysia, which eventually conflated with a broader agenda to oppose colonialism and 
imperialism. These diplomatic-military campaigns that Indonesia dubbed Confrontation 
brought it into increasing alignment with the Soviet Union in the first instance and China 
in the second.  In the case of China, the alignment was so pronounced as to be an alliance 
in all but name. 
In neither case could it be said that Indonesia was presented with a shift in the 
structure of regional power or an objective threat to its own security.  The forces arrayed 
against Indonesia were too modest.  And neither the Netherlands nor Britain could be 
accused of signalling overt aggression against Indonesia, although the relationships were 
far from good.  It was, in fact, Indonesia’s actions in backing its demands with threats and 
demonstrations of force on both occasions that resulted in escalation of the military 
posture on the other side.   
The two episodes point to another driver of alignment that is not explained in an 
unambiguous way by treating threat in a strict security sense.  As ‘threat’ was perceived in 
these instances, it was not so much objective physical threat as threat to state identity and 
international role.  The failure of the mission Indonesia had set itself in the first decade 
after obtaining independence – territorial consolidation and eradication of colonialism on 
its periphery, among various others as we shall see – challenged the nation’s status and 
idea of its place in the world.  Indonesia’s aspirations had created a new ‘status quo’ in 
which a decision to relinquish its claims to territory and regional influence would have 
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manifested as an acceptable loss of fundamental interests. Indonesia’s determination to 
achieve what it saw as critical national objectives prompted it to turn to states that would 
help provide the means to accomplish them.  But the choice of allies was controversial and 
risky.  Deepening alignments with communist states constrained foreign policy choice, 
aggravated domestic tensions and jeopardised important relations with the West. 
It follows that Indonesia’s alignment strategies and their use to fulfil foreign policy 
goals over West New Guinea and Malaysia are better understood again as an elaborate 
calculation of risk.  The risk of losing policy freedom, of prompting an external backlash 
that Indonesia might not be able to resist, and of provoking internal conflict over its choice 
of partners, had to be weighed against the risk of diminishing national stature and 
permitting foreign powers to dictate the post-colonial settlement of the immediate region.  
It was the perceived size of the loss if Indonesia did nothing that made the risk worth 
taking.81   
In the West New Guinea case, acceptance of the status quo would have required 
Indonesia to sacrifice what it regarded as its basic rights as the sovereign successor to the 
Dutch East Indies.  A similar logic applied to the formation of Malaysia.  Indonesia 
believed the post-colonial settlement should be determined not in London, but in the 
region directly affected.  It could not accept as the status quo a situation in which the will 
of European and other Western powers continued to prevail in Southeast Asia.  
Challenging this state of affairs via Confrontation or diplomatic stratagems like the 
creation of a new regional body of Malay states was viewed as necessary regardless of the 
growing consequences.  The depth of the emotions involved resulted in Indonesia 
persisting with its campaign, and deepening an alignment with China, beyond a point that 
could be predicted by a rational cost-benefit calculation.  It is better explained by the idea 
of sunk costs and an escalation of risk-taking in parallel with a rising expectation of 
losses, as predicted by prospect theory.  The premise that decision makers are risk-seeking 
in the domain of losses also better explains Indonesian policy over West New Guinea. 
                                                
81 This kind of risk calculation appears to accord with the expectations of prospect theory that 
states are risk acceptant in the face of sure losses, see Kahneman and Tversky, op. cit., p. 263 and 
268. 
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Thus, a theory of risk, in terms of both the framing of choice and the evaluation of 
choice, can help identify a broader range of impulses for alignment.  It is able to account 
for decisions by states to use alignments to pursue their own aims rather seeing those 
decisions as solely a reaction to the state of the international system or the aims of a rival.  
It deals with another weakness of balance of power and threat approaches – that alignment 
decisions are essentially reactive.  It suggests that alignment choice, seen purely as a 
function of threat perception, is likely to be a special case in which a clear and present 
danger exists to state sovereignty or regime survival. 
Nonetheless, it leaves the question of how to determine what objectives a state will 
perceive as significant enough to require a change to alignment policy.  In other words, 
how do policymakers decide what risks are worth taking? 
The solution offered here suggests there is a limit to the viability of formulaic 
answers.  Rather, it is necessary to seek clues in a detailed account of foreign policy 
history from domestic and international perspectives.  The aim is to offer a rich account 
that includes disparate influences such as history, geography, international conditions, 
regime type, institutional arrangements, societal beliefs, and values and norms. 82   
In examining how these factors bore on Indonesia’s worldview, certain non-
negotiable national interests emerge:  first, assertion of territorial control over the territory 
of the Dutch East Indies, which was paramount to Indonesia’s ideas of nationhood and 
transcended all political divides; second, consolidation of centralised political control over 
the archipelago or, in other words, the imposition of a shared national identity and 
resistance to separatism; third, prevention of interference in the conduct of internal affairs 
by foreign powers or the perceived agents of foreign powers; fourth, opposition to foreign 
bases, lodgements or enclaves on Indonesia’s periphery that are used to launch territorial 
incursions, influence domestic affairs or constrain Indonesia’s regional authority; fifth, 
promotion of national economic, social and political development free from foreign 
interference; and, sixth, recognition of Indonesia’s status and rights within its immediate 
                                                
82 The question of how policymakers frame or determine what changes in a state’s circumstances 
represent a gain or a loss is considered to be an especially difficult component of a risk-based 
analysis.  Levy notes this is difficult to predict because the process is influenced by “norms, habits, 
and expectancies of the decision maker”.  See, Levy, “Introduction to Prospect Theory”, pp. 179-
180. 
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region and the international system, including its ability to participate on at least equal 
terms with all other states.  The domestic risks to Indonesian leaders of conceding any of 
these fundamental interests was likely to outweigh the international risks of resistance.  
The manipulation of alignment policy could allow Indonesia to proactively pursue those 
interests or to resist external challenge to them. 
The combination of explanations at both the domestic and international levels of 
analysis in the Indonesia case shows there is no simple formula for predicting alignment 
behavior.  Indonesian alignment was a complex story with multiple domestic and 
international factors influencing decisions at different times.  It reinforces the value of the 
contingent application of methods of analysis, especially in the case of a single state.  
In summary, the most common form of alignment behavior for Indonesia was the 
conduct of so-called ‘smart’ strategies that avoided explicit and formal security 
commitments.  Indonesia eschewed overt “balancing” or “bandwagoning” strategies.  This 
enabled it to maintain an official commitment to neutrality or nonalignment and the bebas-
aktif policy.  But when alignments were strengthened, as in the case of the campaigns over 
West New Guinea and Malaysia, the principal Indonesian motive was less a perception of 
changing power balances or emerging external threat than a desire to gain support for its 
own foreign policy ambitions.  Indonesia did not face an existential threat in the years of 
formal statehood after the revolution.  But there are indicators from the record that 
Indonesia would have been open to overt alliance in the event of such an extreme 
scenario.  Indeed, Indonesia did move into de facto alliance with China towards the end of 
the Sukarno era amid growing isolation over its confrontation of Malaysia and its 
increasingly strident anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism agenda, which it shared with 
Beijing.    
 
Unchallenged Doctrine: Literature on Indonesian Foreign Policy  
 
In the writing on Indonesian foreign policy, neutrality or nonalignment and the 
bebas-aktif policy have been subject to little critical analysis.  For the most part, they have 
been treated as either starting points for analysis or essential dimensions of its 
international identity.  It has resulted in a lack of systematic examination by both scholars 
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and practitioners of the assumptions underlying the basic tenets of Indonesian foreign 
policy, why the bebas-aktif policy was formed, and how it survived as official guidance 
for decades beyond its birth.  Interest has been largely satisfied by the general observation 
that it identified where Indonesia stood internationally and “was intended to mitigate 
domestic rivalry among competing elites”.83 
Franklin B. Weinstein reflected the mentality of Indonesian political elites when he 
referred to the bebas-aktif principles as the “unchallengeable doctrinal basis of Indonesian 
foreign policy”.84  Weinstein noted this might have been due to the fact what was meant 
by neutrality “proved amenable to frequent redefinition”, but he found a common thread 
to all the definitions of bebas and aktif.  It was that they reflected the “basic assumptions 
of a hostile world view”.85   Weinstein, who carried out an extensive survey of elite 
opinion, argued the preference for neutrality or nonalignment was heavily influenced by a 
distrust of foreign powers – the threat came not just from enemies; allies too evoked the 
danger of domination.   
But, in general, the major works on Indonesian foreign policy have looked to the 
role of domestic political competition in defining state preferences and interests.  The 
origin of neutrality and the bebas-aktif policy was seen to lie in the contest between 
secular nationalists, Muslims and communists during the revolution against Dutch rule.  
The assumption is that domestic political dynamics sustained it through various regimes 
and changing international conditions.  Typical of this analysis is an observation by 
Michael Leifer, the author of the most influential study on the topic, that Indonesia’s 
circumstances in the first few decades after independence meant foreign policy had to be 
“tailored to domestic requirements”.86  This analytical bias is common to the majority of 
seminal works.  In his study of the Sino-Indonesian relationship, Rizal Sukma argues the 
history of the troubled relationship between Jakarta and Beijing illustrates the “primacy of 
                                                
83  Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy and the ‘security agreement’ with 
Australia, Australian Journal of International Affairs, No. 51, Vol. 2 (2008), p. 232. 
84 Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 161.  Weinstein devoted a chapter to exploring the 
meaning of an independent foreign policy.  See ibid., pp. 161-205. 
85 Ibid., p. 161. 
86 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Indonesia’s domestic politics in foreign policy making”.87  Others like Jon M. Reinhardt 
have looked for deeper currents by exploring the pre-independence experience to find 
historical and cultural antecedents to Indonesian foreign policy behavior.  He assesses 
Indonesian neutrality and nonalignment in the context of its “anticolonial confrontation”.88 
But the work in the vein of domestic causes generally has been implicitly rather 
than explicitly theoretical, derived inductively from historical analysis.  Some authors 
have explicitly rejected theory in favor of a “checklist of items”, which privilege domestic 
influences, including political culture and leadership.89  Others have focused on various 
dimensions of the domestic environment, arguing explanations for Indonesia’s 
international behavior can be found in the idiosyncrasies of leaders, domestic structures, 
political competition and contending national identities.90   
The emphasis on the domestic origins of policy arguably has created a lopsided 
literature in which the significance of the interplay between domestic and international 
forces is underestimated.  This is likely to bias work in favor of either finding continuity in 
foreign policy or attributing disruption only to domestic events.  It ignores the scenario in 
which external shocks might have a profound influence on the course of foreign policy.   
This work aims to address that bias by modelling Indonesia’s alignment behavior as a 
function of the dynamic interplay of both domestic and international variables.  
Another gap in the literature is that the focus on domestic drivers has tended to 
overlook the phenomenon of Indonesia as an international actor.  Instead, it favors 
description and analysis of episodes of domestic contention over ideologically ‘correct’ 
                                                
87 Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship, London: Routledge 
(1999), p. ix. 
88 Jon M. Reinhardt, Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia, Monograph 
Series No. 17, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, (1971), p. 74. 
89  Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International 
Leadership, Singapore: Times Academic Press (1996), p. 1.  Suryadinata takes the view that 
theory is of little use in studying Indonesian foreign policy because it is presumed to be a special 
case beyond the scope of theory. 
90 Examples of studies with a domestic emphasis include H. Warshawsky, “From Confrontation to 
Cooperation: The Influence of Domestic Forces on Indonesian Foreign Policy, PhD thesis, 
University of Virginia (1974), Gordon Robert Hein, “Soeharto’s Foreign Policy: Second 
Generation Nationalism in Indonesia”, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley (1986), and 
J.H. Sullivan, “The United States and the ‘New Order’ in Indonesia”, PhD thesis, The American 
University (1969). 
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foreign policy positions.  There have been far fewer works that examine how Indonesia 
interacts with, and affects, other states.  This might be in part because Indonesia adopted a 
low international profile after the high drama of the Sukarno years.  As Gordon Hein 
notes: “Indonesia itself made a conscious decision at the start of the New Order to reduce 
its foreign policy role significantly, as it devoted priority attention to the more immediate 
goals of domestic political stabilisation and economic recovery and development.”91  The 
foreign policy reserve of the Suharto years possibly contributed to reduced interest in 
historical survey of the topic in the Sukarno years.  General political works on the Sukarno 
years do pay attention to foreign policy, but the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the 
consequences for domestic political dynamics.92  
Despite the absence of major theoretical treatments that combine analysis at the 
international and domestic levels, Weinstein, who wrote on the foreign policies of the 
Sukarno and early Suharto regimes, and Leifer, who wrote the major published narrative 
account of Indonesian foreign policy from independence up to the point of the middle 
New Order, did pioneer some important thematic ideas that informed the work of 
subsequent generations of students and analysts.  Weinstein introduced the idea of an 
essential paradox in the Indonesian worldview:  He recognised a “sense of weakness that 
prevails in Indonesia” coupled with an elite opinion that “their country is the natural 
leader of Southeast Asia”.93  Weinstein focused his work on the relationship between 
underdevelopment and foreign policy, exposing a central dilemma between the aspiration 
for Indonesians to be in command of their own affairs and the reality it was mendicant, 
depending on foreign aid, investment and expertise.94 
                                                
91 Hein, op. cit., p. 1. 
92 Feith devotes several passages to foreign policy in the constitutional democracy period. See, The 
Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 155-165, pp. 192-206, pp. 384-394, 450-461, pp. 507-
520.  George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press (1952[2003]) describes the significance of foreign policy to the independence 
struggle for independence.  Other examples include Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian 
Communism: A History, New York: Praeger (1963) and The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, 
New York: W.W. Norton (1969), Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: 
Ideology and Politics 1959-1965, Singapore: Equinox (1974[2006]) and Ulf Sundhaussen, The 
Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, Oxford University Press (1982). 
93 Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 27.  
94 Ibid. 
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Later, Leifer further refined the notion that Indonesian foreign policy was born 
with contradictory impulses.  After winning independence, the new state enjoyed a sense 
of confidence or conviction, but was also prone to diffidence.  The struggle for 
independence exposed the “weakness and vulnerability” of the state and “an apprehension 
of external powers”.  On the other hand, its leaders and political class felt a “proprietary 
attitude” towards the region, a conviction “Indonesia was entitled to play a leading role in 
the management of the regional order within Southeast Asia”.95   
Of specific relevance to this work, there has been little analysis of Indonesia’s 
pattern of alignment and how it relates to the status of the bebas-aktif policy on either a 
theoretical or empirical basis.  The closest in spirit to the current work are Juwono 
Sudarsono’s study of “de facto alliance” between Indonesia and the USA under Suharto 
and Bilveer Singh’s study of Soviet-Indonesian relations from the time of the Russian 
revolution until the early Suharto years. 96   Sukma studied the Sino-Indonesian 
relationship, but the focus was on the New Order period.97  These works do not examine 
in detail the origins of Indonesia’s attitudes to alignment and the bebas-aktif policy; they 
also are limited to the relationship with one state.  An extensive review of the literature 
fails to turn up any major work that has the explicit purpose of analysing Indonesian 
alignment behavior from its origins and placing it the context of the competition for 
influence between the great powers.98  Yet it is almost axiomatic that alignment is best 
understood in terms of great power competition.  Discussion of alignment behavior is 
                                                
95 Leifer, Michael, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, London: Allen and Unwin (1983), p. xiv. 
96 Juwono Sudarsono, “Indonesia and the United States, 1966-1975: An Inquiry into a De Facto 
Alliance Relationship”, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (1979).  
Bilveer Singh, Bear and Garuda: Soviet-Indonesian Relations from Lenin to Gorbachev, 
Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University (1994). 
97 He devotes a chapter to the relationship between 1950 and 1967.  Sukma, Indonesia and China, 
pp. 16-43.  For an Indonesian language works on the relationship with China under Guided 
Democracy see, Muliadi, L., Peranan Republik Rakyat Cina Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin 
Dalam Politik Indonesia (1959-1965), Makassar: FEIS UNM (2003) and Soyomukti, Nurani, 
Soekarno & Cina, Jogjakarta: Garasi, (2012). 
98  Daniel Novotny offers a contemporary analysis of competition for influence in Indonesia 
between the USA and China using the elite survey methodology employed by Weinstein.  See, 
Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy, Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing (2010). 
  
38 
touched on in several other book-length works, but it is in the context of the relevance of 
alignment to other themes of study or specific episodes.99   
On a purely historical level, the account of Indonesian foreign policy during the 
two decades of great upheaval after the declaration of independence could arguably 
benefit from some refreshing.  There has been a paucity of writing in general on 
Indonesian foreign policy and the best general histories were produced some time ago.100  
Certain historical records, unavailable at the time, have since become available.  In the 
                                                
99 Good examples of this are Jamie Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-
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Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965, The Hague: Mouton & Co., (1973), Hasnia, Pelaksanaan 
Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ujung Pandang FPIPS IKIP 
(1995), Sulfachriadi, Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Pada Masa Pemerintahan Soekarno (1949-
1966), Makassar: Fakultas Ilmu Sosial, Universitas Makassar (2015) and Leifer, op. cit.  Examples 
of other general studies include Eduard Quiko, “The Role of Foreign Minister Subandrio in 
Indonesian Politics: An Analysis of Selected Indonesian Foreign Policies, 1957-1965”, PhD thesis, 
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Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia 1949-1967, Singapore: Equinox (2007[1976]), Hong 
Liu, China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965, Singapore: NUS Press (2011), Larisa M. 
Efimova, Stalin and Indonesia: Soviet Policy towards Indonesia, 1945–1953, Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations (2004), Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, 
London: RoutledgeCurzon (2003), Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian 
Development and US-Indonesian Relations 1960-1968, Stanford University Press (2008), Paul F. 
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Howard Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1971), 
John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie; or, Allison Wonderland, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin (1973), and Marshall Green, Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968, 
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Brisbane: University of Queensland Press (1985), Hatta, Mohammad, Demokrasi Kita, Bebas 
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course of this research, it has become apparent that some standard historical accounts need 
to be reassessed, including the commonly accepted understanding of the origins of the 
bebas-aktif policy itself.  Several other key historical episodes have either escaped the 
notice of previous writers or have been misinterpreted because of the absence of sufficient 
evidence at the time.   
 
Research Design 
 
 
Defining Cooperation: Alignment and Alliance 
 
In the broadest sense, this thesis aims to explain Indonesian foreign policy in the 
first two decades after it declared independence.  The term foreign policy is used here to 
describe the full range of diplomatic, economic, cultural and military tools a state uses to 
pursue its national interests.101  But the specific behavior being analysed relates only to 
those aspects of foreign policy that implicate alignment.  The focus on alignment, in turn, 
brings in a dimension of foreign policy referred to as “grand strategy”, or the actions a 
state takes so that “it can ‘cause’ security for itself”.102  It follows that particular weight is 
usually placed on military power in any discussion of alignment.  The use or the threat of 
the use of force in international relations or “how the instruments of force influence 
relations between states” is also the realm of strategy or strategic studies.103  When the 
term foreign policy is used here it relates to the application of all the tools of state or the 
widest level of interaction between states; references to strategy or the strategic dimension 
of foreign policy relate to the use of military power, perhaps in conjunction with other 
                                                
101 A more technical definition is that it is the “sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”.  Christopher Hill, The Changing 
Politics of Foreign Policy, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan (2003), p. 3. 
102 Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 2. 
103  Craig A. Snyder, “Contemporary Security and Strategy”, in Craig A. Snyder (ed.), 
Contemporary Security and Strategy, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan (1999), p. 3.  
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tools, to allow states to “gain their political objectives”.104  A reference to an event or 
geography as “strategic” is a reference to its significance in the narrow military sense. 
But this common emphasis on the role military power in creating security means 
that alliances rather than alignments have tended to be the topic of most interest to writers 
in the field.  One of the shortcomings of a focus on alliance is that it fails to capture the 
full array of state behaviors aimed at enhancing security.  Given the centrality of the terms 
alliance and alignment to this study, it is important to provide clear definitions of what 
they mean.  Alliances are agreements between states primarily designed to enhance mutual 
security.  They are “formalised by an explicit agreement, usually in the form of a 
treaty”.105  Among the features of alliances is that they contain a “degree of specificity, 
legal and moral obligation and reciprocity”.106  The sense of obligation that comes with an 
alliance is underscored by two qualities – first, they are legal documents that often 
undergo some process of ratification, which can involve parliaments and the public, and, 
second, they also usually are invested with considerable ceremony and the imprimatur of 
leaders.107  This does not mean alliances cannot be disavowed or abrogated.  But it offers a 
degree of surety to the parties. 
Alignments lack this precision.  One important distinction is that they shift the 
focus of analysis away from the purely instrumental to the behavioral.  Alignments are not 
characterised by formal treaties, “but [are] delineated by a variety of behavioral 
actions”.108   In consequence, there are “degrees of alignments in political, economic, 
military and cultural spheres” that lead to a “multifaceted sculpture of national and 
supranational postures”.109   Alliances, therefore, are “simply one of the behavioral means 
to create or strengthen alignments.110  The behavioral dimension is captured by the general 
                                                
104 Ibid.  For example, Indonesia’s use of Confrontation in the 1960s could be terms a strategic 
policy because it employed military, diplomatic and economic tools in concert.   
105 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 8. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
108 Michael D. Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, University of Denver (1982), p. 7. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 8.  Emphasis added. 
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definition, repeated here, that alignment can be “defined as expectations of states about 
whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions”. 111 
Previous attempts to develop a taxonomy of “alignment archetypes” have 
classified them instrumentally – alliance, coalition, security community, strategic 
partnership, and sundry others.112   But an analytical emphasis on instruments fails to 
capture the full range of behaviors that represent alignment.  Nonalignment, for example, 
is a conscious decision that represents an alignment choice too.  More generally, this 
thesis has noted a range of smart strategies in the alignment literature that meet the 
conditions of a behavioral definition of alignment, but not necessarily an instrumental 
definition. 
Theory in the main has failed to describe the conditions under which alignment 
behavior shifts beyond suggesting power or threat induce states to do one of two things – 
bandwagon with the state or states of relevance or balance against them.  As described 
above, balance of risk is an attempt to provide an explanation for the wider range of 
behaviors observed in the Indonesian case.  Seeing alignment as a behavioral rather than 
an instrumental phenomenon is central to the accommodation of a much wider range of 
alignment policies and outcomes.  From the perspective of a work on Indonesia’s patterns 
of cooperation or non-cooperation with the great powers, a focus on alliance as opposed to 
alignment would be too narrow. Indonesia eschewed formal security pacts.  But, as will be 
argued, it did not eschew the manipulation of international relationships, or alignments, to 
enhance its security.  
 
Methodological Issues: 
 
The use of a narrative case study lends itself to the technique Alexander George 
termed “process tracing”.113  It is an approach “closely analogous to traditional historical 
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methods” and to “methods of developing and testing explanations of individual cases”.114  
It marries analytical concepts of political science with empirical study of history, seeking 
to link observed political and social phenomena to their presumed causes via historical 
description.  
Process tracing draws attention to the underlying mechanisms at work in producing 
political outcomes.  As a result, it requires historical accounts that are detailed, selective 
and episodic.  In the words of David Collier, process tracing “focuses on the unfolding of 
events or situations over time” but needs to be able to “adequately describe an event or 
situation at one point in time”.  This requires “taking good snapshots at a series of specific 
moments”.115  Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow argue longer streams of events can be 
chopped up “into segments for the purposes of systematic observation, comparison, and 
explanation”. 116 
 It does not mean process tracing is limited to occasions where decision making can 
be minutely described by reference to contemporary records.  George and Bennett argue 
process tracing can support an account “at a higher level of generality and abstraction”.  
This allows it to be applied to “the explanation of macro-phenomena” as well as the 
“individual decision-making level of analysis”.117  The ability to apply process tracing to 
the development of both macro and micro accounts is one of its strengths.  It provides a 
consistent way to examine the mechanisms at work in individual episodes of crisis or 
routine decision-making and in the pattern of state behavior over time.  
 Still, data requirements for effective process tracing can be onerous.  Bennett and 
George emphasise that its effectiveness in providing causal inference depends on 
establishing “an uninterrupted causal path linking the putative causes to the observed 
effects”. 118   This is particularly difficult in the case of Indonesia.  Contemporary 
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documentary sources are scarce and notoriously unreliable.  Reading the historical record 
necessarily calls on a degree of judgment built on familiarity with the subject.  But 
poverty of data can limit the strength of conclusions and this has to be borne in mind when 
conducting research in Indonesia, especially on a topic where many important decisions 
were necessarily discussed and made in confidence.  
 For this reason, it is necessary to draw on as wide a range of sources as possible, 
placing particular emphasis on primary source material or accounts derived from it. This 
includes official archives and records, policy documents, speeches, and accounts by 
insiders or contemporary observers in articles and memoirs.  In many instances, archival 
records and confidential accounts of meetings are available.  The most abundant source of 
this material comes from US sources.  Some valuable Soviet and Chinese foreign policy 
documents have become available through independent research projects in Moscow and 
Beijing.  The large volume of material that has been declassified in recent years has been 
especially valuable. These records make up for the paucity of Indonesian records by 
conveying the private views Indonesian policymakers expressed at the time to their 
foreign counterparts.  The historical time frame means preference has been given to 
interviews carried out closer to the time of events as part of oral history projects.  The 
events are too long passed and the surviving senior policymakers too few to make 
contemporary interviews of value. 
 There are several limitations and difficulties to the approach adopted here.  There 
are restrictions on the extent to which generalisations can be drawn from a single case 
study.  The best that can be suggested of conclusions is that they represent a special or 
contingent case.  But a single case does somewhat compensate by allowing for much 
greater detail.119  It also remains difficult to measure variation in alignment.  Because 
alignments are not always accompanied by written agreements it is necessary to draw 
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judgments from the sum of interactions rather than a specific instrument.  This requires a 
careful reading of the public and private evidence of the intentions of policymakers.  It is 
harder still to separate individual factors bearing on alignment decisions when multiple 
intersecting influences might be at work.  The depth of detail permitted by the use of 
single case can help distinguish the preponderance of influences, but it will still leave 
room for debate.  Wendt argues the problem of accounting for numerous, unobservable 
mechanisms can be addressed by asking whether it is “reasonable to infer the existence” 
of a phenomenon.   This requires the researcher to make an “inference to the best 
explanation”.120  Still, any conclusions arising from the Indonesia case need to be seen as 
contingent on its particular circumstances. 
 
Chapter Outline: 
 
 This study consists of two parts.  The first part covers the period of constitutional 
democracy in Indonesia and the second part the period of Guided Democracy. 
 Part One of the theses starts with an overview in Chapter Two of the international 
and domestic context in which foreign policy was set under constitutional democracy.  
Chapter Three covers the revolutionary years and the foundations of Indonesian foreign 
policy; Chapter Four the early constitutional democracy period; Chapter Five the late 
constitutional democracy period and US-sponsored regional rebellions against Jakarta.   
Part Two of the thesis will start with an overview of the international and domestic 
context of the Guided Democracy period in Chapter Six, which includes the US entry into 
the Vietnam war and the growth in rivalry between the great powers.   Chapter Seven 
covers the early Guided Democracy up until the start of Confrontation; Chapter Eight the 
Indonesian campaign to wrest control of West New Guinea; Chapter Nine the 
Confrontation against Malaysia, Sukarno’s downfall, and the start of the transition to 
Suharto’s New Order.  Each of the case study chapters will conclude with an analysis of 
Indonesia’s patterns of alignment and an assessment of the main drivers of alignment. 
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The two main periods of the case study reflect a division between the types of 
government – an early experiment in democracy and the later adoption of an authoritarian 
system.  But the two periods also reflect a change in the orientation of alignments and the 
way decisions about alignments were made. 
Chapter Ten will draw the conclusions of the study and assess the causes of 
Indonesian alignment and the persistence of the bebas-aktif policy.  It will analyse the 
efficacy of the proposed balance of risk model against balance of power and balance of 
threat.  It will then present the potential relevance of these findings for understanding 
patterns in Indonesian foreign relations, particularly with the great powers, and for future 
scholarship on its foreign policy. 
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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REVOLUTION 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Revolution and Democracy: The International and 
Domestic Context of Foreign Policy 1945-1958 
 
 
 The end of the Second World War created the conditions for Indonesia to escape three-
and-a-half centuries of foreign occupation.  But it would require a four-year revolution that 
cost tens of thousands of Indonesian lives and thousands of Dutch lives before Indonesia could 
secure its independence.1  While the revolution and subsequent attempts to establish an 
independent state bound Indonesians in a shared mission, they also exposed domestic fault 
lines.  Disputes over the system of government and ideological complexion of the state would 
have enormous ramifications for foreign policy.  Perhaps a more profound influence on foreign 
policy was an equally divisive international environment.  The descent into Cold War, dividing 
the world into US-led capitalist and Soviet-led communist blocs, set the outlines of a foreign 
policy dilemma.  Even before they had won independence, Indonesians would have to make a 
fateful decision on whether to take sides.  The choice would require the leaders of the fledgling 
Republic of Indonesia to balance domestic sensitivities with the reality that they would need 
international support to first prevent the reimposition of Dutch colonial rule and second 
establish a viable successor state. 
 This chapter describes the general international and domestic conditions Indonesia 
faced in the years from 1945 until 1958.  It will cover the years of revolution, the founding of 
the state as a constitutional democracy, and events leading to the shift to Guided Democracy.  
It will provide the necessary context for understanding the pressures politicians faced on both 
levels as they attempted to chart a course for foreign policy and manage the perils of alignment. 
																																																						
1 The loss of life during the revolution, especially on the Indonesian side, is difficult to estimate.  As 
many as 100,000 combatants might have been killed.  The civilian toll is believed to have reached 
between 25,000 and 100,000.  The number of Dutch military dead is more accurately put at 5000.  See, 
Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950, Melbourne.: Longman (1974), p. 58 
and pp. 119-120. 
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Enter the Cold War 
 
The Opening Phases, 1945-1949 
 
In a speech on 6 March 1946 in the small Missouri town of Fulton, wartime British 
prime minister Winston Churchill, then out of office, warned of an “Iron Curtain” descending 
across Central Europe dividing the continent into communist and non-communist blocs.2  
Several events in the ensuing three years – the christening of the emerging conflict as the Cold 
War in April 1947, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948, the formation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949, and the detonation of the first Soviet 
nuclear weapon in August 1949 – would make that description prophetic.3   
 Although the main arena for conflict was Europe, East Asia too quickly became of 
increasing importance to the global struggle.  The Second World War had shattered the image 
of invincibility that had shrouded the European colonial powers, breathing new life into old 
nationalist ambitions.  The Germans had overrun the metropolitan centres of the French, Dutch 
and Belgian empires in Europe; the Japanese had defeated and imprisoned the colonial 
overseers of the British, French, Dutch and even Americans in Asia.  The inexorable process 
of decolonisation unleashed by the war’s end, as former subject peoples resisted the 
reimposition of the pre-war order, was bound to draw in the USA and Soviet Union, the main 
Cold War protagonists.  The superiority of power that European colonial powers still exercised 
in comparison to the ill-equipped forces of revolution, even after the devastation of the war, 
meant nationalists would look to one or both of the dominant global powers for relief.  In the 
flush of allied victory, the USA and the Soviet Union still espoused ideologies of liberation 
and anti-imperialism. 
High-minded ideology was one thing; the power calculus of the Cold War was another.  
While the USA and Soviet Union rejected imperialism rhetorically, neither wanted to see 
liberation from colonialism come at the cost of ceding a relative advantage to the opposing 
side.  The US diplomat, George Kennan, in a famous “Long Telegram” sent from Moscow in 
February 1946, foresaw the coming struggle for influence in the colonial world.  He warned 
Washington: 
																																																						
2 Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, New York: Plume (2001), pp. 810-813. 
3 For a comprehensive account of the Cold War’s origins from a US perspective, see John Lewis Gaddis, 
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, New York: Colombia University Press (1972).  
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On [an] unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken [the] power 
and influence of Western Powers [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On 
this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial 
administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited.  Liberal opinion in Western 
countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies.  Resentment among dependent 
peoples will be stimulated.  And while [the] latter are being encouraged to seek 
independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be 
undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when 
independence is achieved.4 
  
The broad thrust of Kennan’s analysis – that a winner-take-all contest was brewing with 
the Soviet Union and needed to be challenged on multiple fronts – proved enormously 
influential in determining US Cold War policy.  Less well known is the Soviet reply to Kennan 
– both Joseph Stalin, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, were among the readers of the 
supposedly top-secret Kennan telegram.  An assessment of US strategic ambitions sent in 
September 1946 by the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Nicolai Novikov, argued a strategy 
of dividing East Asia between the USA and Britain was already evident in Indonesia where 
“the United States facilitated this British imperialist policy, handing over American weapons 
and equipment to the English and Dutch troops in Indonesia” and helping the deployment back 
to Indonesia of Dutch naval personnel from the United States.5 
Fears that colonised and decolonising countries would become early battlegrounds in 
the Cold War grew out of a mix of great power policy and of events on the ground.  In early 
1946, the Netherlands had taken advantage of the cover of British occupation to return troops 
to Indonesia.  The French followed suit with the official outbreak of the first Indochina War in 
December against the Viet Minh (the League for the Independence of Vietnam).  British, 
French and Dutch attempts to resume authority over pre-war colonies in Southeast Asia lost to 
the Japanese presented the USA with a dilemma.  It contradicted America’s publicly-stated 
principles.  In March 1947, in response to the Greek civil war and Britain’s withdrawal from 
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that theatre, President Harry S. Truman had pledged a new doctrine to “support free people 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”.6   But the 
re-occupation of colonial possessions increasingly became seen as a necessary bulwark against 
communist takeover and an indispensable foundation for responsible (pro-Western) statehood. 
The launch of the Truman Doctrine had followed the grant of independence to 
America’s Pacific colony, the Philippines, in July 1946.  Yet, elsewhere in Asia, as Secretary 
of State, George Marshall, admitted, the USA was “in the same boat” as the European colonial 
powers.  In a telegram to several Asian ambassadors, he wrote: 
 
Following [the] relaxation [of] European controls, internal racial, religious, and 
national differences could plunge new nations into violent discord, or already apparent 
anti-Western Pan-Asiatic tendencies could become [the] dominant political force, or 
communists could capture control.  We consider as best safeguard against these 
eventualities a continued close association between newly autonomous peoples and 
powers which have long been responsible [for] their welfare.7   
 
These were prescient, but fraught observations.  US fears of the regional encroachment 
of communism would grow in tandem with the success of communist movements in Vietnam 
and China.  At the end of a bitter civil war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would seize 
power in October 1949.  The idea that China had been “lost” to the USA would haunt American 
policymakers for decades to come. 
Elsewhere in the developing world, the Soviet Union perceived an opportunity to force 
the USA to choose between its European allies and the movements for decolonisation.  This 
was manifest in the official Soviet policy of dividing the world into “two camps” – a 
progressive one headed by the Soviet Union and an imperialist one headed by the USA.  The 
influential CPSU secretary for ideological affairs, A.A. Zhdanov, in enunciating this policy in 
Poland on 22 September 1947 specifically mentioned Indonesia and Vietnam.  One 
consequence of the two-camp doctrine was to relegate for a time the idea of creating united 
fronts against imperialism embracing national bourgeoisie, workers and the peasantry in the 
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decolonising states.8  Instead, national communists and left-wing sympathisers were directed 
to take charge of liberation movements.  Another consequence was to encourage the resort to 
violence.  The targets were not just the colonial powers, but ‘bourgeois’ nationalists who were 
leading independence revolutions. 
 
Containment in Action in Southeast Asia, 1950-1958 
 
By the start of the new decade, as the lines of hostility hardened across Europe, Asia 
became the feared battleground for the Cold War rivalry.  In June 1950, North Korea invaded 
South Korea.  In November, communist Chinese forces entered the conflict on the side of the 
North.  On the orders of Stalin, Soviets pilots secretly started flying combat sorties under 
Chinese and North Korean markings.9  US-led forces of the United Nations, fighting to defend 
South Korea, would face the first serious armed test against the communist powers.  Elsewhere 
in Asia, the atmosphere of crisis grew as the remnants of the nationalist Kuomintang forces 
fled communist-controlled China to Taiwan and to northern Burma, from where they 
conducted periodic incursions back into the mainland.  Indigenous communist movements rose 
across Southeast Asia, especially in Indochina, stoking fears that communism was on the march 
in the region. 
But even before the Cold War took on the menacing complexion of the 1950s, the USA 
was envisaging strategies to confront the global challenge posed by its new post-war enemy.  
In 1947, Kennan, writing anonymously in the journal Foreign Affairs, christened a policy that 
would become the cornerstone of American efforts to defend the “free world” from feared 
communist expansion.  “Containment”, or the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force 
at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to shifts and 
manoeuvres of Soviet policy”, would endure for decades, but at a price.10  It would cast US 
policy in Manichean terms, evoking deep suspicion of regimes that appeared to vacillate in the 
face of Washington’s absolutism. 
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Containment began to take shape as official policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s in 
a steady stream of memoranda, studies and presidential directives, which circulated inside the 
national security establishment.  Typical of the thinking in Washington was NSC-68, sent to 
Truman in April 1950 just weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War.  Portraying the Soviet 
Union as a “despotic oligarchy” bent on the “complete subversion or forcible destruction” of 
government and society in the non-communist world, it endorsed a policy of containment with 
four dimensions:  block further expansion of Soviet power; expose the falseness of Soviet 
doctrines; induce a retraction of the control and influence of the Kremlin; and “foster the seeds 
of destruction within the Soviet system”.11  The aim to achieve this  by “all means short of war” 
created the conditions for a long era of security-centred aid programs and covert intelligence 
interventions in third states that would lead the USA into numerous tactical disasters in the 
field and into moral ambiguities. 12  
As Asia was then populated by new states, weak states and states in the grip of anti-
colonial struggle, it was viewed as particularly vulnerable to communist influence.  NSC 48/1, 
which apprised the President of the US position in Asia, warned nationalist tumult and 
revolution made the dangers of communist expansion and Soviet influence there especially 
acute.13  Containment took on increasing urgency as the war in Korea headed for stalemate and 
armistice in July 1953.  Any sacrifice of territory to communism was viewed as unacceptable 
because of the principle at stake, the material losses entailed, and the risks that the fall of any 
one state could precipitate the fall of a succession of others.  The next front in this campaign 
of ideological attrition would be Southeast Asia.  
In December 1946, a communist Viet Minh army had launched a rebellion against 
colonial French Union forces in Tonkin, one of three French-ruled protectorates making up 
modern Vietnam.  Within four years, insurgency escalated into conventional war.  Despite no 
appetite for committing troops, the USA did a great deal to bolster the French position.14  In 
the process, American aid to France sacrificed one principle to promote another.  For the USA, 
this first Indochina war was about resisting communism; for the French, it was about rescuing 
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a crumbling colonial empire, something inimical to US post-war idealism.  The higher priority 
placed on fighting communism was not lost on newly-decolonised or decolonising states.   
Although Indonesia was distant from the conflict, the NSC feared “relatively swift 
submission or an alignment with communism” there, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, should 
Vietnam fall to the Viet Minh.15  The loss of British-ruled Malaya and Indonesia to communism 
would deny the West “the principle source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of 
petroleum and other strategically important commodities”.16  Reverberations would spread. 
First, economic and political pressure in Japan would make it hard for Tokyo to avoid an 
accommodation to communism.  Second, America’s primary defensive line along the offshore 
Pacific island chain would be rendered precarious.  But the policies the administration crafted 
to stem this feared wave of communist takeover carried the risk of losing the people the USA 
was trying to save.  They included strengthening propaganda and cultural activities, supplying 
aid and technical assistance to support non-communist regimes, engaging in covert operations, 
encouraging overseas Chinese communities to “organise and activate anti-communist” fronts, 
and bolstering a “spirit of resistance” among regional governments.17  They would have direct 
consequences for Indonesia throughout the Sukarno years. 
Despite the massive flow of US funding, materiel and technical assistance, the French 
position in Tonkin proved untenable.  Accords signed in Geneva in July 1954 temporarily 
demarcated Vietnam along the 17th parallel and allowed France to exit.  But the peace required 
the unpalatable acceptance for the USA of communist control of the north and sowed the seeds 
for future US intervention.  As the inevitable French defeat loomed in Vietnam, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, elected to the presidency in 1952, drew a fateful line on the map.  In a seminal 
public comment on the American strategic rationale in East Asia, Eisenhower warned a press 
conference on 7 April 1954 that further losses to communism in Indochina would create a 
“falling domino”.18 To Winston Churchill, three days earlier, he wrote: “It is difficult to see 
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how Thailand, Burma and Indonesia could be kept out of Communist hands” if Indochina were 
lost.19 
The perceived gravity of the situation led the USA to contemplate measures that had 
previously been considered too hard or undesirable, including the creation of a collective 
security arrangement in Southeast Asia and the commitment of substantial ground forces in the 
region’s defence.  It invested considerable energy in negotiating the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty, which eight states signed in Manila on 8 September 1954.20  Yet the founders 
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) included only two Southeast Asian states 
– the Philippines and Thailand.  Burma and Indonesia, the other sovereign states in the region, 
clung to neutralism and branded SEATO neo-colonialist.  It underscored the American 
dilemma as it tried to resist communism.  The establishment of independent, democratic 
governments was seen as a vital component of resistance.  But the USA supposed it needed the 
support of the fading colonial powers in SEATO to avoid communist China sweeping into 
Vietnam and onwards through Southeast Asia.  
The irony of American anxiety over communism in Southeast Asia was that the region 
was not a great priority for the Soviet Union until at least the second half of the 1950s, and 
China lacked the offensive power to act as anything more than an ideological beacon for 
indigenous communist movements.  Certainly, neither the Soviet Union nor China valued the 
conquest of communism in the region enough to risk provoking war, contrary to US fears.21   
If Southeast Asia as a whole was a low priority for the Soviet Union, Indonesia in its 
early independence period barely registered.  “During my many years of interaction with Stalin, 
I don’t remember a single conversation about Indonesia, not even one reference to it,” Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs.22  Under Stalin, the strategy originally had 
been to “provoke communist uprisings” in the Third World.23  But several failures, including 
the collapse of a communist rebellion in Indonesia in 1948, prompted a reassessment of the 
viability of violent confrontation.  When Khrushchev assumed the leadership after the death of 
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Stalin in 1953, he confirmed a trend already in motion to a less doctrinaire interpretation of the 
two-camp thesis.  Khrushchev recalled it was not until 1955 that Indonesia was first discussed 
at the level of the Central Committee Presidium.24  This coincided with a conference of Asian 
and African states in the West Java mountain city of Bandung.25  
Soon after, a rift emerged between the Soviet Union and China over Khrushchev’s 
conduct of the CPSU’s twentieth party congress in 1956.  In his official report to the party, 
Khrushchev proclaimed a desire for “cooperation” with Western social-democrats and 
“friendship” with the USA in the interests of preventing war.26  Then, in secret session, 
Khrushchev launched  an extraordinary attack on the “cult” of personality that had enveloped 
Stalin’s leadership, branded his predecessor as “capricious, irritable and brutal”, and denigrated 
his record in the war against Germany.27  The first of these declarations challenged, without 
consultation, Beijing’s ideas over foreign policy and the state of the world; the second was an 
affront to Mao Zedong, whose own highly-personalised leadership style made him the subject 
of great “official adulation”.28 
In the years following this turning point, the acrimony and competition between the 
two biggest communist powers became more intense. 29  Moscow decided to court Jakarta, and 
the nationalist leaderships of some other neutral Asian states, as much to blunt Chinese as 
American influence.  Indeed, the desire for stronger relations with Indonesia coincided with a 
broader shift in Soviet foreign policy strategy, which reflected a redefinition of Moscow’s 
international purposes under Khrushchev.  There were three notable features to this strategy:  
First, Moscow chose to relax tensions with the USA in East Asia and avoid being dragged into 
a war; second, it entered more directly into competition with China for friends and allies among 
Asian and Third World countries as the Sino-Soviet split deepened; and third, it cultivated non-
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communist nationalist forces that espoused neutralism in their foreign policies as a 
counterweight to Western influence.  
In the first half of the 1950s, China took a keener interest than the Soviet Union in 
exercising influence in Indonesia.  Policymakers and practitioners in China believed Southeast 
Asia was ripe to emulate their own revolution.  As the largest state in Southeast Asia, Indonesia 
“was accorded the highest priority” in the region.30  Beijing’s motives for activism in Southeast 
Asia were two-fold:  first, communist Chinese foreign policy was imbued with a deep anti-
imperialism, in which communism was seen as the natural antidote and the states of Asia and 
Africa as the primary battleground; and second, China wanted to negate the threat of 
encirclement by the USA and, as time wore on, increasingly the Soviet Union.31  The second 
motive took on greater significance with the military stalemate in Korea, resulting from the 
failure of Chinese forces to dislodge the American-led coalition from the peninsula, and 
growing bitterness between Beijing and Moscow from the mid-1950s.32 
But the strategic tools Beijing had at its disposal were limited.  At the end of the civil 
war with the Kuomintang, the Chinese communist party commanded a weak economy and a 
military with insufficient technological sophistication or firepower to compete with either the 
USA or Soviet Union.  China could only hope ideological affinity or shared opposition to 
colonialism would allow it to form alliances that compensated for the greater material power 
of its rivals.  In the countries of Southeast Asia, it could try to appeal to three domestic 
constituencies – nationalists with shared anti-imperialist convictions, communists or leftists, 
and ethnic Chinese, many mainland-born, but sympathetic to the Kuomintang.  This would pit 
clever diplomacy and propaganda against the brute strength of China’s rivals in the 
manoeuvring for allegiance. 
The great power rivalry of the opening decades of the Cold War created the essential 
international framework for Indonesia’s foreign policy and the orientation of its alignment.  
The juggling act inherent in neutrality was harder to maintain in practice than to conceive.  The 
support Indonesia sought for its development could not be obtained without compromise with 
international partners of which the most able to contribute lay in the West.  The political goals 
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Indonesia set itself, even the fulfilment of its own definitions of what it meant to be 
independent, called for the acquiescence or active support of the big powers.  Moreover, foreign 
policy was framed in the midst of volatile and intense domestic political competition in which 
positions adopted by the state in the international sphere stood to advantage one or another 
faction or aspirant to power. 
 
The Cold War Comes Home  
 
From Revolution to Statehood, 1945-1949 
 
Indonesians had aspired to independence and organised for its attainment since the first 
decade of the 20th Century.  Western-educated secular nationalists formed organisations that 
set the goal of a state built on a “shared experience” of colonialism rather than on the solidarity 
of race, religion or geography.33  Islamists founded their own organisations that cast the anti-
colonialist struggle in terms of religious solidarity and pan-Islamism.34  The different pathways 
to national identity formation contributed to different conceptions of the future state.  Western 
education in the Netherlands and secular education within Indonesia produced Marxist-
Leninists and social democrats; Islamic education in Indonesia and the Middle East and the 
experience of the haj pilgrimage encouraged a vision for a state with a strong non-secular 
foundation.  But importantly these strands of thought contributed to the idea of a shared 
Indonesian identity regardless of conflicting conceptions over the content of the state. 
The pluralism that would later become evident in the practice of national politics 
existed too in the ethnic and religious mix of the Netherlands East Indies.  Although 
predominantly Muslim, there were large pockets of Catholics and Protestants, particularly in 
the east of the archipelago.  The island of Bali was largely Hindu.  More than 300 different 
indigenous ethnic groups lay within the borders of the Indies.  Chinese Indonesians, divided 
between totok (Chinese born or speaking) and peranakan (locally assimilated), were important 
because of their economic power, although they represented less than three per cent of the 
population.35  Forging the spirit of nationalism among such a diverse population was the first 
great achievement of pre-war leaders. 
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But the pre-war independence movement lacked a clear or unified strategy for inducing 
an end to Dutch rule.  Rebellion, in the case of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in 1926, ended disastrously.  It awaited the three-year Japanese 
military occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War to provide a “catalytic” effect 
to Indonesian demands for independence.36  Under the Japanese, Indonesian nationalists 
obtained two significant opportunities denied by Dutch rule.  They were able to organise 
politically and they were trained in military tactics.  Moreover, the Japanese wartime 
administration nurtured hopes of independence among nationalist elites and established 
mechanisms for Indonesians to debate the future of the state, notably the Investigating 
Committee for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Persiapan Kemerdekaan) in 
March 1945.  
By the time Japan surrendered, nationalist leaders believed the spirit of liberation that 
prevailed across Asia with the war's end might enable a peaceful transition to nationhood.  But 
if this were not possible they were trained and armed for revolution.  An estimated 62,000 
Indonesians had undergone military training with the two Japanese militias and tens of 
thousands of others had been given a rudimentary introduction to martial skills.37  On 17 
August 1945, two days after the surrender was announced in Tokyo, nationalist leaders 
Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, under pressure from impatient youth leaders, issued a 
declaration of independence.  Sukarno was named President and Hatta vice president of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
The initial hopes of a peaceful transition were shattered by the policies of the allied 
forces that started to arrive in Indonesia in October to disarm and repatriate the Japanese and 
free POWs and civilian internees.  Due to a last-minute change at the Potsdam conference of 
allied leaders, the task of demobilising the Japanese in Indonesia switched from US forces to 
the British Far East Forces under Lord Louis Mountbatten.38  The Netherlands used the cover 
of British Commonwealth deployment to reassert its claim as the legitimate governing power.  
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The consequence was to set the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia and the returning 
Dutch administration on course for a violent confrontation.   
If the new republic was to survive, it had to overcome several challenges.  It needed to 
secure itself against Dutch military force.  It had to demonstrate skills of negotiation and 
diplomacy in managing relations with the Dutch and in winning foreign allies.  And it had to 
prove it could govern its own affairs.  The need to wage an armed revolution provided a 
unifying force for the republic.  But the essential plurality of Indonesian society was manifest 
in its internal politics.  After the establishment of a 135-member Central National Committee 
(Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP) to advise Sukarno and Hatta, a younger generation 
of democrats soon asserted themselves.  They applied pressure through the KNIP for the 
presidential system to be changed into a parliamentary system of government.  In October, the 
KNIP was converted, with the assent of Sukarno and Hatta, into a legislature and a prime 
ministerial cabinet was appointed to replace the presidential cabinet.  Sutan Sjahrir, one of the 
leaders of the underground resistance to Japanese occupation, was appointed the first prime 
minister.  A multi-party system soon followed.  A permanent representative council to replace 
the KNIP was to be inaugurated once elections could be held.  This put an end to a brief period 
in which the pre-war Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) occupied the 
role of sole state party.39 
The emergence of democratic, multi-party politics, although an obvious way of 
managing the immense diversity of Indonesia, would be a double-edged sword for the 
Republic.  It projected a favorable image to the West of a new state committed to democratic 
pluralism – a move which would help blunt concerns among observers like George Marshall 
that the new state would be destabilised by internal discord.  But it also would open up the 
domestic political scene to intense competition.  Democratic and secular nationalist parties 
would vie for ascendency with leftist parties, especially a resurgent PKI, and religious parties, 
most importantly the Muslim party Masyumi.  Robert Elson captured the prevailing milieu: 
“[S]ecular and inclusivist concepts of Indonesia rubbed against emerging Islamist ones; 
egalitarian and broadly democratic impulses endured alongside elitist/conservative and 
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pseudo-fascist ones; and modernist understanding of what it meant to be Indonesian jostled, 
mostly gently, with nativist/traditionalist ones”.40   
The Republic’s foreign policy would bring those internal contradictions to the surface.  
For the political parties, particularly those whose ideological settings were borrowed directly 
from, or significantly influenced by, one of the two power blocs of the Cold War, foreign policy 
would be a vital battleground even before Indonesia had won its independence.  The principles 
the Republic set for its foreign policy and the allies it sought to cultivate were likely to have a 
partisan impact on the course of the domestic political contest.  Thus, navigating the perils of 
foreign policy would be a crucial test for the Republic’s leaders – one which would play a 
determining role in the success of the revolution. 
 
The Politics of Constitutional Democracy, 1950-1958 
 
 If the revolution brought competition over the ideological basis of the state into the 
open and institutionalised it, the task of nation building entrenched it as a feature of daily 
politics.  The governing model adopted by the leaders of the independence movement reflected 
the Western education and democratic liberal biases of several of the most influential among 
their number.  But their vision of a state mixing Western modernity with the political, social 
and cultural heritage of the archipelago could not be universally embraced.  The 1950 
provisional constitution allowed for cabinet government, headed by a prime minister, and 
formed by the parties in the parliament.  The president was placed in a “figurehead position”.41  
The choice of a parliamentary system, with the promise of free elections in due course, was a 
practical way of accommodating the assortment of Indonesian political and social interests.  
But it also sowed the seeds of governmental instability – shifting allegiances and a string of 
policy crises resulted in seven cabinets in the little more than seven years between December 
1949 and March 1957. 
 The conduct of foreign policy was implicated in that contention, in many ways shaped 
by it, and then complicated by it.  There were three broad themes around which domestic 
political conflict coalesced and pushed and pulled at foreign policy.  The first was ideology.  
Political parties covered a spectrum from the Islamic, usually referred to as the right of national 
																																																						
40 R. E. Elson, “Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World”, in Anthony 
Reid (ed.), Indonesia Rising: The Repositoning of Asia’s Third Giant, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing 
(2012), p. 179. 
41 Herbert Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 97. 
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politics, to secular nationalist and to communist.  The Islamic parties and nationalist parties, 
despite sharing a mercantilist or socialist orientation towards managing the economy, were 
generally well disposed to the West and tolerant of markets.  The PKI naturally favored 
alliances with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and other communist states.  
Among other ideological divides to affect foreign policy was the question of whether the state 
should have a separate Islamic identity.  One of the biggest ideological debates in foreign policy 
was whether Indonesia should become a status quo state that operated within established 
global, or Western, rules and institutions or a revisionist state that brought the values of its own 
revolution into foreign policy.  Protagonists on either side of this disagreement could not be 
grouped neatly by party affiliation, although PKI cadres certainly belonged to the revolutionary 
mindset.   
The second theme was the matter of how state resources and foreign transfers should 
be allocated.  This conflict played out in various struggles in which geography, political party 
and elite affiliations divided proponents.  At its heart lay the question of how Indonesia should 
integrate economically with the world and the role Indonesians should secure for themselves 
in national economic life.  A key demand was for “Indonesianisation” of the economy.42  The 
aim was as much to secure opportunities for elite patronage as to reduce the dominant role of 
national Chinese, Dutch and other Western business interests in the economy.  The orientation 
of foreign economic policy would determine winners and losers too.  The commodity 
producing centres off Java stood to gain from access to global markets and had a vested interest 
in retaining open trade relationships and taxation arrangements that ensured they were fairly 
rewarded.  The industrial and services centres on populous Java, with their need to soak up job 
seekers, benefited from wealth transfers from the outer islands to pay for imports, and desired 
state intervention to ensure expanding industrial production.  Disputes over wealth transfers 
from the outer islands to the centre were to become a source of growing political unrest.43  
The third theme was national status or prestige.  After the humiliation of colonial rule, 
Indonesians were eager to claim and assert the attributes of sovereignty and a sense of national 
dignity.  The form this took varied according to the character of the administration.  But there 
was general agreement among all parties that the failure of negotiations on the final terms of 
																																																						
42 Howard Dick, “Formation of the Nation State, 1930s-1966”, in The Emergence of a National 
Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000, Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. 
Thomas Lindblad and Thee Kian Wie, Allen & Unwin; Sydney (2002), p. 183 
43 Ibid., pp. 179-182. 
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independence to incorporate West New Guinea in the territory of Indonesia had left an 
incomplete sense of sovereignty.44 
Despite these ideological and policy disputes that dragged in foreign policy, the 
governments of the constitutional democracy period overwhelmingly had a domestic 
preoccupation.  The main political parties – the PNI, the Muslim-oriented parties Nahdatul 
Ulama (NU) and Masyumi, the small but influential Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Socialis 
Indonesia, PSI) and the PKI – all tended to see foreign policy as an element of their internal 
political contest rather than as an end in itself.  The appeal of the parties was either one of the 
head or of the heart:  they sought legitimacy from either their administrative competence or 
their command of the symbols of nationalism and revolution.  But the failure of the parties to 
fulfil the popular expectations of the revolution, particularly to create new economic 
opportunities, and their increasing indulgence in the politics of patronage and cronyism caused 
constitutional democracy to falter.45  The divisiveness of politics was evident in the outcome 
of the national parliamentary elections of 1955.  The political map drawn by the elections 
revealed an electorate split along ideological, ethnic and geographic lines.46  
At this point, Sukarno enjoyed “unquestioned prestige” with the people, as Hatta 
privately acknowledged.47  The combination of Sukarno’s stature as a revolutionary leader and 
his command of the symbols of statehood accorded him enormous latitude in his political and 
personal life, such that he “remained a source of legitimacy in himself”.48  The President, who 
had started out in 1950 in an inferior position of power to Hatta, saw his personal writ in 
political life grow in tandem with the decline of constitutional democracy.49  In the wake of the 
1955 elections, sensing widespread disenchantment with Western-style democracy, Sukarno 
methodically accrued power by the concoction of stratagems to manipulate political difference 
																																																						
44 West New Guinea was the term commonly used outside Indonesia at the time to describe the western 
half of the island of New Guinea, then under Dutch rule.  Indonesians named the area West Irian and 
later Irian Jaya.  In 2003, Indonesia divided the area into the provinces of Papua and West Papua.  To 
avoid confusion, the term West New Guinea will be used for the period of colonial rule.  Thereafter, 
the area will be referred to collectively as Papua. 
45 For an analysis of the factors involved in the decline of constitutional democracy see Feith, Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 556-608. 
46 Kevin Raymond Evans, The History of Political Parties and General Elections in Indonesia, Arise 
Consultancies: Jakarta (2003), pp. 13-15. 
47 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XXII, 
1955-1957, document 212. 
48 J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography, Singapore: Archipelago Press (2003), p. 349. 
49 On the relative power of Sukarno and Hatta at the time see Feith, Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy, p. 51. 
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and exploit chance opportunities.50  He started work on a new Konsepsi for the system of 
government that aimed to create a more consensus-driven politics and reduce feuding between 
the parties.   
Unveiled in late February 1957, it was the first step along a path to authoritarianism. 
This was the start of a transition to what Sukarno termed Demokrasi Terpimpin or Guided 
Democracy and the end of constitutional democracy.51  The shift in the political basis of the 
state coincided with the re-emergence of the PKI as a powerful political party – 
organisationally the most powerful – and Sukarno’s advances towards the Soviet Union and 
China.  The combination of these developments was to have a profound impact on perceptions 
of Indonesia in the USA and largely shape the course of Indonesia’s foreign relations into the 
following decade. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ideological conflict that divided the international politics of the late 1940s and 
1950s had a profound effect on Indonesia’s birth as a nation and how it would develop in its 
first years of independent rule.  Even before Indonesians had completed their revolution, they 
would see their aspirations for statehood embroiled in the contest between the US-led capitalist 
and Soviet-led communist blocs.  At the international level, the politics of the emerging Cold 
War ensured the moral justifications for decolonisation were clouded by Realpolitik.  As 
European powers sought to resume their empires in Southeast Asia, the critical question for 
Washington and Moscow was how would the outcome of various independence struggles affect 
the global balance of power.  At the domestic level, the global conflict found its reflection in 
sometimes-bloody contention over state ideology and foreign policy.  The two became 
entwined as vehicles for seeking domestic political advantage. The consequence was to 
contribute to often confused and seemingly contradictory foreign policy stances.  
The demands on Indonesian policymakers could be reduced to a central contradiction.  
The revolution had been fought to allow Indonesians to take charge of their own destiny.  The 
implied payoff was that Indonesians would supplant foreigners, which to many included ethnic 
Chinese regardless of their national status, in the nation’s economic life and public 
administration.  When Indonesians could command the wealth of the nation, there would be 
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greater prosperity for all.  There was a symbolic meaning to independence too.  Indonesians 
would be treated as equals.  Their second-rate status as colonial subjects would be cast off and 
they would take their rightful place in the international community.  Both these beliefs – greater 
prosperity and status – turned out to be illusory.  Independence did not mean an end to 
dependency.52  In economics and international politics, Indonesians found it difficult to assert 
autonomy.  Access to foreign aid, capital and markets were essential requirements for 
development that came with strings attached.  Many of the great business enterprises and 
estates remained in foreign hands after the transfer of sovereignty.  National weakness left 
Indonesia susceptible to foreign pressure. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, the direction of foreign policy and alignment 
in the early years Indonesian statehood would be shaped by multiple conflicts between 
aspirations for independence and the reality of dependency; between domestic political forces 
that for reasons of their own advancement advocated for one of the Cold War camps; and 
between the great powers themselves seeking to impose their own strategic interests on the 
new state.  Balancing these contradictory forces would be the great test for the first generation 
of Indonesian leaders. 
 
																																																						
52 This is the central theme explored by Weinstein in Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of 
Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto. 
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      CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The Origins of Nonalignment 
 
 
The period between 1945 and 1949 marks the birth of Indonesia as a state.  
Indonesian nationalists proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia immediately following the 
Japanese surrender in the Second World War before allied forces could land on Java and 
Sumatra.  From then until December 1949, the Republic was locked in a military, 
political-diplomatic struggle against the attempt by the Netherlands to reimpose colonial 
rule.  A major factor in the success of the revolution was the ability of the Republic’s 
leaders to convince other countries, especially the permanent members of the newly-
formed United Nations, of the validity of their claims.  The conduct of foreign policy was 
therefore critical to the foundation of the Indonesian state. 
During the course of the revolution, and the months leading up to the declaration 
of independence, the future basis of the Indonesian state was set in a series of critical 
political decisions.  Nationalist leaders determined the geographic boundaries of the state, 
crafted a state ideology, framed a constitution, decided on a system of government and 
made a commitment to political, social and religious pluralism.  Despite significant 
interruptions, partisan interpretations and, at times, violent disagreement, belief in the 
state code established at that time proved remarkably enduring.  A vital part of that body 
of ideas about the appropriate conduct of the state was the bebas-aktif foreign policy and 
the simultaneous decision to stay out of the Cold War.  
This chapter maps the origins of Indonesian foreign policy from the ideational 
milieu that existed prior to the declaration of independence, its evolution through the 
travails of revolution and its eventual manifestation in neutrality and the bebas-aktif 
policy.  In doing so, it provides a more expansive account of the purposes of that policy 
than contained in previous works, incorporating previously neglected or unavailable 
historical detail.    
The chapter concludes by showing that the decision to adopt the bebas-aktif 
foreign policy and Cold War neutrality cannot be understood without reference to the 
pressures the republican government faced at both the international and domestic levels 
of analysis.  Neither an international nor a domestic account alone suffices to explain the 
critical alignment decisions.  The chapter finds that alignment decisions in the 
revolutionary period are generally better understood as an exercise in balancing risk 
rather than threat.  The critical decision to adopt neutrality was made to avoid fracturing 
support for the Republic among countries at the UN and within Indonesia itself.  Other 
options would have entailed unacceptable risk.  Nonetheless, the chapter highlights the 
conceptual difficulties in assessing the risk calculations of leaders who face multiple 
policy choices in a multi-layered risk environment.   
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An Independent and Active Foreign Policy 
 
Intellectual Foundations of Foreign Policy: An Emerging World View 
 
 
The conception Indonesia’s founders held of their place in the world rested 
largely on a set of imported and irreconcilable beliefs.  Although the campaign for 
independence was almost entirely indigenous, receiving mostly moral rather than 
material help from abroad, it was profoundly shaped by ideas of foreign origin.  Elites 
educated in European languages, history, culture and politics in Indonesia and Europe 
under Dutch colonial rule could not fail to be drawn to great debates in Western societies 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  The backdrop to Indonesia’s own struggle 
for nationhood was the intense and at times explosively violent battle in the Western 
world over the proper ideological basis of the state.  In the years between the First and 
Second World Wars, free market and mercantilist capitalists, social democrats and 
democratic socialists, communists and fascists jostled for intellectual and political 
ascendency.1  Europe was the amphitheatre of this contest.  Indonesians educated there 
during those years, many of them future nationalist leaders, and those educated under the 
Dutch system in Indonesia were aware, and to varying degrees disciples, of the opposing 
ideological camps. 
Running parallel to, and at times intersecting with, the Western debates was an 
older and deeper preoccupation with the place of Islam in political and social life.  For 
devout Muslims, the purpose of the nationalist struggle was “national freedom on the 
basis of Islam”.2  Imbued with a growing spirit of global religious fraternity, Indonesia’s 
Muslim leaders saw themselves as “a local manifestation of a broader pan-Islamic 
international movement”.3   National independence was a necessary pre-condition for 
according Islam its true place in Indonesian political and social life.  Islam would then 
provide the glue for nationalist unity and the principles for a future state. 
The Islamic current of thought overlapped and at times conflicted with other 
historic beliefs.  Indonesians adopted several other foreign faiths - Christianity, 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.  And religious conviction of all types blended 
with older indigenous animist traditions in singular syncretic mixes.  In the 20th century, 
religion increasingly competed with modern social ideas and philosophies by virtue of the 
exposure to the mostly European, ideological debates. 
Thus, despite being united in the common purpose of overthrowing colonial rule, 
the Indonesian nationalist movement was weakened by the lack of shared ideological 
conviction.  Unlike other revolutions that Indonesian nationalist elites might take lessons 
from, theirs did not benefit from shared liberal democratic, communist or theocratic 
                                                
1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991, London: Abacus (1994), p. 6. 
2 This is the objective set by Partai Sarekat Islam at its 1927 congress, cited in Elson, Idea of 
Indonesia, p. 81. 
3 Ibid., p. 81. 
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principles to rally the nation. 4   Moreover, the divisions between secular nationalist 
democrats, communists and Muslims were further complicated by other profound 
differences based on ethnicity, geography and economic interest.5   The diversity of 
beliefs and allegiances posed challenges to the unity of the independence movement 
during the struggle to prevent the reimposition of Dutch rule between 1945 and 1949 and 
to the cohesion of a future state.  The conflicting visions for the kind of state and society 
an independent Indonesia should become weighed heavily on the policies it adopted to 
the outside world over many decades.  It served to define from the very beginning the 
nature of the threats and opportunities posed in the arena of foreign relations.  Because 
foreign policy could be employed as an instrument to advantage one ideological faction 
or another it was inevitably contested ground in domestic politics.  Yet it also meant the 
first priority for nationalist leaders in foreign policy would be to find a formula that could 
unite the diverse Indonesian population. 
This is not to deny the existence of “indigenous and particularistic rather than 
modern, rational criteria” in framing Indonesian foreign relations.6  Unique experiences 
of history and culture played important roles too.  Various Indonesian leaders 
mythologised the per-colonial empires and their geographic reach to justify territorial 
claims. Most strikingly, early Indonesian leaders, divided by positive ideology, were 
joined in the shared negative of the humiliation of colonial subjugation.  A mission to rid 
the world of colonialism, to assert independence in foreign relations as much as in 
domestic affairs, and suspicion over the motives of great powers were all legacies of 
colonial history.  The consequence was that Indonesian leaders, like those of many new 
nations, were in greater agreement on what they stood against than what they stood for. 
 
Founding the State: The “New Science” of Geopolitics 
 
   In a historic 1 June 1945 speech setting out the principles of Indonesia’s future 
state ideology, the Pancasila, nationalist leader and later first president, Sukarno, spoke 
approvingly of a “new science called geopolitics”, which he utilised to give credence to 
the idea of a unitary state of Indonesia.  The term added a modern, Europeanised, 
authenticity to the debates about the shape of the state that nationalist leaders were 
aspiring to build.  As Sukarno cast his eye at the map, the “science” of geopolitics gave 
                                                
4 Communists obviously had a template for revolution in the October revolution of 1917 in 
Russia and leaders like Sukarno and Hatta made occasional references to the lessons of the 
French and American revolutions.  Muslims could look to the emergence of religiously 
homogenous independent states in the Middle East.  But at that time there were few examples of 
successful nationalist revolutions against a colonial power to follow.  The main exceptions being 
the American revolution and the South American revolutions against Spanish rule, which were 
not indigenous in character. 
5 Good overviews of this phenomena can be found in Elson, op. cit., Merle Ricklefs, A History of 
Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300, 2nd Ed, London: Macmillan, (1993), Mortimer, op. cit., Anthony 
Reid, To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century, Singapore: NUS Press (2011), and 
Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing (2003). 
6 Ann Ruth Willner, “The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of 
Indonesia”, in Lucian Pye (ed.), Cases in Comparative Politics, Boston: Little Brown and Co. 
(1970), p. 242. 
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an objective and undeniable quality to the idea of an Indonesian state built on colonial 
borders.   
 
Even a child if he looks at a map of the world can point out the Indonesian 
archipelago forms one unity.  On the map, there can be shown a unity of the 
group of islands between two great oceans, the Pacific Ocean and Indies Ocean, 
and between two continents, the continent of Asia and the continent of 
Australia… And so, what is it that is called out native land, our country?  
According to geopolitics, Indonesia is our country.  Indonesia as a whole, 
neither Java alone, nor Ambon alone, nor Sumatra alone, nor Borneo alone, but 
the whole archipelago ordained by God Almighty to be a single unity between 
two continents and two oceans – that is our country.7 
 
One of the founders of the state, and drafters of the 1945 Constitution, 
Muhammad Yamin, also employed the term geopolitics during preparatory meetings 
leading to the creation of the Republic of Indonesia to justify an even grander notion:  a 
“Greater Indonesia”, which incorporated lands outside the colonial borders of the 
Netherlands East Indies.8  Rather than maps, Yamin drew on history.  Sukarno’s friend 
and adviser proposed an Indonesian state built on what he claimed were the borders of 
the Majapahit Empire.  The land included the “colonies of England, Portugal and 
Australia”, meaning the Malay peninsula, Borneo, East Timor and the entire island of 
Papua New Guinea.9  Yamin displayed a strong awareness of the strategic realities of 
geography.  He was particularly concerned Indonesia should possess the Malay Peninsula 
because of its strategic significance, warning that it “serves as a bridge for any power in 
Indo-China to proceed toward Indonesia” and he was worried about the existence of any 
foreign “enclaves” in the archipelago, including East Timor and northern Borneo.10  The 
Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence, a Japanese-sponsored body, 
approved the idea of this Greater Indonesia by a two-thirds majority, with some dissent 
over the precise borders.  The idea died because it was rejected by the Japanese military 
command.11 
If maps and history confirmed a sense of Indonesian destiny, they also shaped 
perceptions of the dangers and opportunities facing the state.  The geography that 
Sukarno saw as naturally forming a state could be a blessing and a curse.  From the 
moment the state was born, the view that Indonesia occupies a crossroads, or posisi-
silang, between the Indian and the Pacific oceans and the Asian and the Australian 
                                                
7 Sukarno, “The Birth of Pantja Sila”, Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of 
Five Speeches by President Sukarno, Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs (1961), p. 11. 
8  Muhammad Yamin, “Unity of Our Country and Our People”, in Herbert Feith and Lance 
Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
(1970), p. 440. 
9 Bakri Siregar, “Muhammad Yamin Sang Pujangga”, in Yanto Bashri and Retno Suffatni (eds.), 
Sejarah Tokoh Bangsa, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Bangsa (2005), p. 440.  The territorial reach 
of Majapahit is disputed.  Jon M. Reinhardt maps the borders of the Sriwijaya and Majapahit 
empires according to several historical accounts, see Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 17. 
10 Yamin, “Unity of Our Country”, p. 440. 
11 Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 30 and 128-131.   
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continents became a central feature of the risk calculations of its policy elite.  The vast 
exposed coastline and the constant traffic through the archipelago left Indonesia “open 
and ‘porous’, which makes it relatively easy for foreign subversion and the intrusion of 
smugglers, drug dealers, pirates, poachers and terrorists, which may also upset 
Indonesian domestic stability”.12  The notion of lying at a crossroads, of being susceptible 
to impulsion from abroad, was concisely expressed in a 1953 article by Mohammad 
Hatta: 
 
When one considers that the territory of Indonesia extends for more than 3000 
miles and is composed of thousands of islands, large and small, the magnitude 
of the problem of maintaining the security of the country is apparent; so 
extensive an area cannot be defended purely by military strength.13 
 
Hatta was conscious of Indonesia being “bounded by the British Navy and the 
American Navy, which control the Indian and Pacific Oceans”.14  The idea that Indonesia 
was at a crossroads, occupying a strategically important though vulnerable position, had 
“the most significant imprint on the mental map of Indonesian policymakers”.15  While 
ideas grounded in geopolitics were key to arguments about the formation of the state, 
they continued to be prominent in understandings about the defence of the state as it 
matured. 
Another fundamental influence of geography is the role it has played in raising 
concerns over the state’s internal cohesion, and hence its vulnerability to centrifugal 
forces or to unwelcome outside intrusion.  The combination of vast scale, scattered 
populations and ethnic and linguistic diversity has long been a source of anxiety in 
Jakarta over the risks of national disintegration.  Fears of separatism or societal conflict 
have been exacerbated by differences over identity, particularly religious, ethnic and 
ideological beliefs.  Fragmented geography made it harder to contain those forces and 
easier for separatist movements to sustain a claim and for foreign powers to intervene in 
internal affairs if they were inclined to do so.    
Sukarno labored this point when he advocated the Pancasila as the basis of the 
state in his famous 1 June speech.  The very essence of the Pancasila was a desire to 
forge unity among the diverse population that occupied the archipelago.  But the idea of 
the national unity Sukarno espoused was not unity of the population alone, but unity 
between “men and place”.  This meant any single defection by a constituent part was a 
challenge to the viability of the whole.  The difficulty of maintaining cohesion among 
                                                
12 Hasjim Djalal, “Indonesia’s maritime challenges and priorities”, in Joshua H. Ho and Sam 
Bateman, Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia: Implications for regional security, 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2012), p. 69. 
13 Hatta, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, p. 450. Later, the government’s five-year state policy 
guidelines would cast the crossroads position as a basic asset, or modal dasar, of the nation, listed 
second after independence and sovereignty. This observation was contained in four successive 
versions of the guidelines.  See, MPR, “Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly of the 
Republic of Indonesia, No. II/MPR/1983 on the Guidelines of State Policy”, Jakarta: Department 
of Information (1983). 
14 Ibid., pp. 450 and 445. 
15 Ibid., p. 101. 
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Indonesia’s diverse population contributed to the development of a concept of security 
that was “inward looking”.16  Fears of foreign intervention that exploited internal division 
were evident even before the course of events was to give Indonesian elites sound reasons 
for such anxiety.  Sutan Sjahrir cautioned his countrymen against attacks on foreign 
property and people, which had broken out with the Japanese surrender.  “[M]any of our 
people are acting and behaving as though they were inviting foreign intervention,” he 
wrote.17  Importantly for the future of foreign relations the fears of Balkanization served 
to create an imperative of policies that would serve the goal of national unity, if not 
always actively, at least by avoiding unnecessary domestic political disharmony.   
 
The United Nations and the Opening Salvos of Revolution 
 
Soon after declaring independence, Indonesia’s leaders were faced with a harsh 
reminder of the vulnerability of the state they were trying to create.  The British Far East 
Command was inclined to leave the resolution of the nationalist question to the Dutch 
and Indonesians to resolve themselves.  It did not stand in the way of Dutch attempts to 
reoccupy the country.  Its formal instructions were to ensure law and order until the 
“lawful government” – presumably the Netherlands – could restore administration.  This 
edict betrayed a complete lack of understanding of the situation on the ground.  In the 
months following the Japanese surrender, and before the arrival of allied forces, the 
Republic had either established or assumed control of an extensive apparatus of 
government.  It might not have been recognised as a state by most foreign powers, but it 
exhibited many of the attributes of one.  It had determined putative borders and asserted a 
state identity, it had a cabinet, headed by Sjahrir as prime minister, it had a prototype 
parliament in the advisory KNIP pending planned elections, and it had a military built out 
of former Japanese and Dutch militia units that gave the Republic control of a coercive 
power.18  The allies were surprised to find “civil administration was operating at a level 
of efficiency that quite amazed the Allied forces”.19 
Although the implication that there was no functioning administration already in 
place proved false, the allied powers, including the USA, appeared ambivalent about the 
Republic's fate.  In late 1945, Dutch troops started to arrive in small numbers and 
proceeded to engage in highly provocative actions.  The disappointment of nationalists at 
the attitude of the allies soon resulted in outbreaks of bitter fighting across Java and 
                                                
16 This was former president Suharto’s description, quoted in Leifer, Indonesian Foreign Policy, 
p. 161. 
17 Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle, (Translated with an Introduction by Benedict R. O’G. Anderson), 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project (1968). 
18 The Japanese had established the Volunteer Army of the Defenders of the Fatherland 
(Soekarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, or Peta) and the Dutch had established the Royal 
Netherlands Indies Army (Koniklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger, or KNIL).  These 
militias provide a nucleus for the Indonesian army.  See, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution 
in Indonesia, p. 109 and p. 145. 
19 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 142. 
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Sumatra.20  The chagrin of the Republic was compounded by the British use of Japanese 
troops to quell mounting unrest.21  
The severity of the fighting, which peaked with the Battle of Surabaya in 
November, awoke the British and the wider world to the determination of Indonesia's 
nationalists. 22   Recognising the need for international support, the Republic made a 
number of appeals to foreign governments, including the Soviet Union, for diplomatic 
intervention.23  This resulted in the airing of Indonesia's grievances in the UN Security 
Council in January 1946.  In what would be the first of many UN debates on Indonesia 
during the course of the revolution, Ukraine, acting on instructions from Moscow, 
condemned events in Indonesia as a threat to peace and security.  The Western powers 
blocked a resolution calling for a UN delegation to investigate the situation in Indonesia.  
But Soviet motives were far from pure.  Moscow used the British occupation of 
Indonesia to fend off attacks over its occupation of northern Iran. 24   The Soviet-
orchestrated intervention was a fillip to the anti-colonial movement, and not just in 
Indonesia.  Although it won kudos for the Soviet Union, it showed the UN to be an 
ineffective forum for adjudicating the Indonesian conflict.   
This must have been a great disappointment to the nationalists.  From the outset 
of the revolution, Sukarno and other leaders had invested hope in the new world 
organisation and the sincerity of its founders, especially the USA.  The initial contact the 
Republican leadership had with the USA after the war was with the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), the wartime forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency.  The first 
meeting occurred in late September where OSS officers raised the sensitive question of 
wartime collaboration with the Japanese.  The Dutch had used Sukarno’s record of 
collaboration to undermine the credibility of the Republic.  In reply, Republican leaders 
demonstrated their pragmatism by declaring they were willing to work with any country 
that supported Indonesian independence. 25  At a second meeting in October, Sukarno told 
OSS officers that he hoped the British would act on Indonesia’s behalf in raising 
concerns at the UN over Dutch attempts to reimpose colonial rule.26  The OSS, there to 
gather information, could provide no comfort.  US policy on Indonesia remained 
ambiguous.  At the end of 1945, official policy cast the USA as a concerned bystander.  
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 143. 
21 Ibid., p. 144. 
22 For a comprehensive study of the Battle of Surabaya see, Francis Palmos, “Surabaya 1945: 
Sacred Territory, Revolutionary Surabaya as the Birthplace of Indonesian Independence”, PhD 
thesis, University of Western Australia (2011) 
23 The Republic sent a telegram to the Soviet Union on 13 November, in the midst of the Battle of 
Surabaya asking for diplomatic intervention to help end British and Dutch military action against 
nationalists. See, L.M. Efimova, “Towards the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between 
the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia, 1947-1948”, Indonesia and the Malay World (2007), 
p.185. 
24 For a discussion of Soviet diplomacy on this issue see, L.M. Efimova, “New Evidence on the 
Establishment of Soviet-Indonesian Diplomatic Relations, 1949-1953”, Indonesia and the Malay 
World, Vol. 25, No. 85 (2001), pp. 219-220. 
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There were three main elements to US policy: the Netherlands should have “primary 
responsibility” for arriving at an agreement with the Republic; the mandate of allied 
forces should be limited to demobbing the Japanese and repatriating military and civilian 
prisoners; and any solution of the conflict should be in accord with the principles of the 
UN Charter.27  This fell far short of an endorsement of Indonesian independence.        
The strength of armed resistance to the return of the Dutch administration 
provided what diplomacy alone lacked.  The British fearing a conflict they could not 
resource, over a claim of no material benefit to them, pressured the Dutch to negotiate a 
settlement with the Republic.  This resulted in the so-called Linggadjati agreement of 
November 1946, in which the Netherlands recognised the Republic as de facto authority 
on Java and Sumatra.28  It agreed to grant independence within a Netherlands-Indonesia 
Union by January 1949, with the Dutch Queen serving as head of the union.  Although 
the agreement provided a pretext for British forces to withdraw from Indonesia, its 
circumstances ensured the Dutch had only a superficial commitment to its terms.   
Negotiations over the creation of what was to be called the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia (RUSI) – a federation of the Republic on Java and Sumatra, a state of 
Borneo and the Great Eastern State – finally broke down in July 1947 over differing 
interpretations of the Linggajati agreement.  Sutan Sjahrir resigned as prime minister, 
after failing to obtain support from his own cabinet for a series of concessions to forestall 
the threat of Dutch military action.  His successor, Amir Sjarifuddin, belonged to the 
same party as Sjahrir – the small Socialist Party (Partai Socialis).  But the pair came 
from different factions.  Sjahrir was a moderate with some free market inclinations; 
Sjarifuddin’s convictions were strongly left-wing.  Yet in dealing with the Dutch, 
Sjarifuddin proved even more conciliatory than Sjahrir.  The change of leadership and the 
continued efforts at appeasement left little impression on the Dutch, who appeared to 
have a predisposition to resolve the challenge from the Republic by force.   
On 20 July, the Netherlands launched a military offensive.  Notwithstanding the 
use of tanks and aircraft, the invasion of Republican territory was euphemistically 
referred to as a “police action” in an attempt to portray it as a purely domestic affair.  By 
then, the Republic was not so internationally friendless.  Australia and India quickly 
brought the issue to the UN Security Council.  Australia, claiming a breach of the peace, 
on 30 July submitted a resolution calling for an end to hostilities and third-party 
arbitration based on the terms on the Linggadjati agreement.29  From an Indonesian 
perspective, the lasting significance of the debate within the UN was to reinforce an 
unfavourable impression of the USA.  In response to the Australian resolution, the USA 
simply offered the parties its “good offices”.  The weak US response fed an impression 
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that had grown since the first months of the revolution that it was more sympathetic to the 
Dutch.30   
This perception was probably compounded by the unfortunate choice of Walter 
Foote as US consul general in Batavia, as Jakarta was then known.  Foote, a garrulous 
Texan, who liked to be called “Uncle Billy”, had mellow recollections about colonial life 
in the Netherlands East Indies, where he had lived before the war.31  His telegrams to 
Washington, sprinkled with patronising references to docile and happy natives, argued 
strenuously against a Republican leadership he characterised as an ill-disciplined rabble.  
Following the Dutch offensive, he claimed 95 per cent of Indonesians were “sick of [the] 
Republic and its terrorising tactics”.32  Harnessing this misleading reporting, he urged the 
USA to avoid any attempt to embroil itself in the conflict by offering good offices, which 
would “surely result [in] burned fingers” for the USA.  Washington eventually adopted a 
policy, with presidential approval, that was in large part designed to “guide the tone of 
UN discussion and lessen the attack on the Netherlands”.33 
In contrast to the equivocation in Washington, the Soviet Union saw the UN 
debates as an opportunity to promote its credentials as the true great power advocate of 
decolonisation and self-determination.  The Security Council debate coincided with the 
development of the two-camp doctrine in Soviet foreign policy, which had the central 
purpose of establishing a Soviet-led coalition of Asian and African countries in 
opposition to the capitalist West.  At the UN, the Soviets backed the Australian initiative. 
But in the face of opposition from the USA and the Netherland’s West European allies 
the Security Council on 1 August adopted a compromise calling for the cessation of 
hostilities and a settlement by arbitration or other peaceful means.  A Soviet amendment 
calling on the parties to retreat to the military starting line was defeated. 
 As would be demonstrated often in the coming years, the Soviet Union could 
embarrass the USA by forcing it to choose between its rhetorical commitment to self-
determination and its defence of colonial regimes whose only virtue in American eyes 
was ardent anti-communism.  In the UN debates over the Dutch military offensive, the 
USA, not for the last time, would find itself on the wrong side of historical currents in 
Indonesia.  The spectre of America’s UN representative trying to soften pressure on the 
Netherlands for the sake of preserving the anti-communist front in Europe would not be 
easily forgotten by embattled Indonesian nationalists.  It would fuel suspicions that the 
old industrialised West acted as an elite club that served the mutual interests of its 
members at the expense of the aspiring new states of Asia and Africa.   
Beyond contributing to a perception of international politics as a crude 
transactional activity, the contrast between the positions of the USA and Soviet Union 
would reverberate in domestic politics.  The broad front of left-wing political parties, led 
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by the People’s Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat or FDR), of which the PKI 
was then a part, could enhance its legitimacy against political opponents on the right.  
Although Indonesia’s democratic nationalists could not be said to be pro-American or 
pro-Western, they certainly were opposed to doctrinaire communism.  The confluence of 
international and domestic politics would have profound repercussions for the future of 
the Republic and the future basis of Indonesian foreign policy.    
 
The Madiun Rebellion and the Ideological Basis of Foreign Policy 
 
During the opening phase of the Cold War, Indonesia was geographically far 
removed from what was then the crucible of great power conflict in Europe.  But the 
manoeuvers within the Security Council over the Republic’s attempts to lead Indonesia to 
independence ensured the Cold War did intrude on the struggle in a complex interplay 
between international and domestic events.  Under siege on Java and Sumatra, the 
Republic desperately needed the recognition of other states to establish its legitimacy, 
and to obtain relief from the political, economic and military degradations imposed by the 
Dutch. 34   At the same time, the Cold War would play out in miniature between 
communists and democratic nationalists in the Republic’s domestic affairs, amplified by 
the starkly different levels of support offered for the cause by the USA and Soviet Union.  
It was of no small significance to the domestic power struggle over the ideological basis 
of a future independent Indonesian state that communist countries offered the Republic 
generous support in contrast to the parsimony of the US-led West.  The differing 
approaches were amplified by the refusal of the Security Council to accept the Soviet 
resolution calling for the withdrawal of forces to positions occupied before the 20 July 
offensive.   
With increasing vigor from late 1947, the left-wing FDR-PKI alliance would push 
“the necessity of the Republic’s alignment with the Soviet bloc”. 35   Indonesian 
communists were cognisant of the implications of the two-camp doctrine and the 
deepening of the Cold War.  Others of less ideological conviction would simply calculate 
that one great power was supporting the Dutch, leaving the Republic “no alternative but 
to ties themselves more closely to the other great power”.36  Non-communists worried not 
only about what communist policies would mean for the character of domestic politics, 
but whether overt alignment with the Soviet Union would eliminate what remaining 
prospects there were of obtaining the support of the USA.  The USA was still regarded as 
the key to favorable Security Council decisions and to maximising pressure on the Dutch.  
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In these circumstances, it became “impossible to say where the domestic power struggle 
ended and the international one began”.37 
After the equivocal stance of the Security Council in August towards the Dutch 
military offensive, the international diplomacy stumbled through a series of 
unsatisfactory compromises over the following months that would exacerbate these 
trends.  A US proposal for the establishment of a Good Offices Committee to facilitate 
negotiations was accepted.38  In the analysis of its own chairman, American educator 
Frank Graham, the GOC was a flawed entity that lacked the power to produce a durable 
settlement.39  Still, it did succeed in forging an expedient agreement on 19 January 1948 
between Dutch and Indonesian negotiators aboard the troop ship USS Renville anchored 
off Batavia to replace the failed Linggadjati agreement.  The Renville agreement 
produced a respite from hostilities, although the Dutch continued to “mop up” pockets of 
Republican troops behind the new frontline established by the July offensive.  The 
agreement itself was unpalatable for the Republic, reflecting its precarious position 
following Dutch military advances.  Its two principle features were recognition of Dutch 
sovereignty throughout Indonesia pending the creation of the RUSI in 1949 and 
agreement to a series of plebiscites to determine the area the Republic would occupy 
within the federal system of the RUSI.  
The compromises required of the Republic to conclude the Renville agreement 
made it deeply unpopular.  It exacerbated the ideological splits in government, with the 
Muslim and nationalist parties deserting Amir Sjarifuddin, who could count only on the 
support of the FDR, PKI and his own left-wing Socialist Party faction.  Five days after 
the Renville agreement was signed, Sjarifuddin resigned as prime minister. A presidential 
cabinet was appointed under Hatta as vice president and prime minister.  The Republic 
had its third prime minister in as many years in what would become a familiar pattern in 
the years ahead.   
The fractious, ideologically-riven party politics, the antagonistic interactions with 
the Dutch over the implementation of the Renville agreement and the competition 
between the USA and Soviet Union to control the course of events in Indonesia would all 
intersect in the task of framing the Republic’s foreign policy.  This would be a fraught, 
high-risk exercise that might not only jeopardise the stability of government, but even 
threaten the success of the revolution.  Republican leaders started to conclude the only 
safe course was, in a sense, to make no policy decision at all – in other words, do their 
utmost to stay out of the Cold War.  The idea that Indonesia might avoid entanglement on 
the side of either the USA or the Soviet Union started to take shape in late 1947.  In a 
speech to the Indian World Affairs Council in New Delhi on 25 November, Sjahrir, then 
several months out of the prime minister’s office, refused to accept that the exigencies of 
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international politics required the Republic to be corralled into one of the camps in the 
rivalry that had been christened as the Cold War only a few months earlier.   
 
The world seems to force us to make a choice between the existing antagonistic 
powers: between the American bloc and the Soviet Russian bloc.  But we rightly 
refuse to be forced.  We are seeking international coexistence, which is in 
harmony with our internal life and we don’t wish to be captured in systems that 
do not fit us and certainly not into systems that are hostile to our cause.40 
 
Sjahrir’s host in New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, who had become India’s first 
prime minister when it gained independence three months earlier, had for decades been 
an advocate of a foreign policy for newly independent states that emphasised the capacity 
to “stand on our own feet” and the avoidance of power blocs.41  Nehru was an influence 
on both Sjahrir and Hatta.  Sjahrir was a repeated houseguest of Nehru after Sjahrir had 
attended the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947.  Sjahrir had 
been feted at the conference as one of the leaders of a new wave of nationalism.  Hatta 
knew Nehru from the 1920s after meeting in Europe.42   
Sjahrir returned from India convinced of the necessity of Cold War neutrality and 
acutely conscious of the implications of his views for the conduct of domestic politics.  In 
December, he wrote a letter to demand Sjarifuddin, then still prime minister, decide 
whether he was first a nationalist or first a Communist.43  The challenge was on two 
levels.  Sjahrir disagreed that classic Marxist analysis, focused on the class divide, could 
be translated from Europe to the Indonesian case.  He also believed Indonesian foreign 
policy should follow an independent course based on the country’s own interests 
determined by the international situation at any given time. 44   This latter position 
represented something of a departure from Sjharir’s thoughts when he assumed the prime 
ministership in late 1945.  In an important pamphlet entitled, Our Struggle, Sjharir argued 
Indonesia might position itself “in harmony with the political ambitions of the Giant of 
the Pacific, the United States” as a means of securing independence. 45  He also had 
advocated Indonesia fell within “the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and 
imperialism” because of its geography and must accommodate that reality.46  
Whether coincidence or the consequence of earlier debates, the sentiment that the 
Republic should strike its own direction in foreign policy was shared far afield.  
Soedjatmoko, one of the Republic’s observers to the UN at Lake Success, New York, 
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sent a letter to a colleague in the Republic’s capital, Yogyakarta, on 16 December 1947 in 
which he argued “we should avoid very carefully any possibility of our being dragged 
into the middle of the American-Soviet conflict”. 47   His prescient solution to this 
dilemma was to suggest “cooperative action among the Southeast Asian countries” to 
coordinate an end to colonial rule and “provide the possibility for a global policy keeping 
ourselves out of the growing American-Soviet antagonism”. 
It would be almost a year before this thinking found its way into a formal 
declaration of foreign policy.  The seminal statement of foreign policy principles is 
commonly attributed to then prime minister Hatta in a speech on 2 September 1948 to the 
working group of the KNIP.  On this occasion, Hatta laid down the guiding philosophy of 
foreign policy, a construct that was to survive, at least in name, until the present day.   In 
one of the most frequently quoted passages, he said: 
 
Should we the people of Indonesia, who fought for the independence of the 
nation and our state, simply have to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-
American? Is there no other position that we should take in pursuit of our ideals? 
The government holds the opinion that Indonesia should not become an object in 
the international political contest, but rather we permanently have to become a 
subject with the right to determine our own attitude, the right to struggle for our 
own goals – that is, a completely independent Indonesia.48  
 
Subsequent interpretations of Hatta’s speech have found three main strands to the 
concept of foreign policy he unveiled.  First, it should be practiced in an independent 
(bebas) manner, which was interpreted as the freedom of Indonesian governments to 
choose policies in the interests of the state.49   Secondly, it should be active (aktif), 
meaning Indonesia should promote decolonisation, social justice and peaceful interstate 
relations.  Thirdly, Indonesia should avoid joining either of the two Cold War ideological 
blocs.  Hatta famously described this last point as akin to the perils of “rowing between 
two reefs” (mendayung antara dua karang), the title given to his 2 September speech.  In 
fact, Hatta did not explicitly use the term bebas and there is some dispute over whether 
he used the term aktif.  He did not refer to non-alignment, as his speech pre-dated the 
coining of this latter term by Indian diplomat V.K Krishna Menon in 1953.50  He did not 
specifically reject the idea that Indonesia might join any military alliances.  He also did 
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not mention the acceptability of foreign military bases in Indonesia’s immediate region.  
These would be later embellishments to the bebas-aktif policy.  
In fact, Hatta’s appeal was for a pragmatic foreign policy that adapted to the 
circumstances.  Subsequent accounts of his speech have overlooked this other dimension.  
He told the KNIP that the Soviet Union’s practice of foreign policy provided useful 
instruction.  The key lesson was that “international politics cannot be faced with mere 
sentiment, but with reality and with rational logic”.51  He praised Soviet tactics in signing 
a non-aggression treaty with Germany before the Second World War, which bought time 
for Stalin to build Soviet military strength.  “A rational weighing (of the facts) forced 
Soviet Russia to enter an agreement with its enemy,” Hatta said.  “And if politics are only 
based on sentiment, such a thing of course is impossible.”52  He appealed to Indonesians 
to put their own struggle for independence, and their country’s own interests, ahead of all 
else, including ideological differences.  “Our struggle should be fought on the basis of 
our old motto: to believe in ourselves and struggle with our own capabilities,” he said. 
“This does not mean that we will not take advantage of upheaval in international politics. 
Certainly, in order to achieve a position of state strength politics makes use of existing 
international contradictions to achieve national purposes.”53 
Despite Hatta’s appeal for realism and flexibility in foreign policy to take 
advantage of international conditions, his advocacy of Cold War neutrality and self-
reliance in the fight for independence were the two messages that endured.  Shorn of the 
subtleties, those messages became the basis of the bebas-aktif foreign policy and Hatta 
was crowned its author.  Sjahrir’s earlier contributions go unrecorded or are dismissed.54  
Hatta certainly assigned himself credit.  In his 1953 Foreign Affairs article, he cited this 
as the founding statement of Indonesian foreign policy principle.  It was at least the first 
statement on the topic by a serving official and, if for that alone, was due recognition as 
the moment the bebas-aktif policy was formalised. 
By the time Hatta addressed the KNIP, almost a year after Sjahrir’s New Delhi 
speech, the question of a suitable foreign policy had attracted greater urgency because of 
a combination of international and domestic pressures.  In early 1948, Suripno 
Wirjokarto, a special envoy of the Republic sent to Prague, had approached the Soviet 
Chargé d’Affaires in the city to propose the establishment of diplomatic relations and a 
mutual assistance agreement.  He carried a letter from Sukarno and acting foreign 
minister Tamzil authorising him to “negotiate and sign agreements” for friendly relations 
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with the Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries. 55  The letter had been issued while 
Sjarifuddin, then a secret member of the PKI, was prime minister.  It became an 
unpopular initiative after Hatta, who if not pro-Western was certainly anti-communist, 
replaced Sjarifuddin at the end of January 1948.  But by the time Hatta became aware of 
Wirjokarto’s activities the terms of a consular agreement to secure diplomatic recognition 
had already been negotiated.  Hatta’s attitude was to ignore the agreement and withhold 
an exchange of representatives.  His chagrin increased when Moscow unilaterally ratified 
the agreement on 22 May, putting his government in “an extremely embarrassing 
position”.56  The disclosure of the agreement after Soviet ratification provoked concern in 
the US State Department over whether the republican government was deliberately tilting 
towards the Soviets and in the process adopting Moscow’s hard line over a negotiated 
settlement with the Dutch.57   
The consular agreement controversy coincided with rising tensions between the 
republican government and forces allied to the left wing over reform of the revolutionary 
army.  Plans hatched by Hatta and several army leaders for rationalisation and 
demobilisation of the vast, ill-disciplined and loosely organised military, comprised of 
regular and irregular units and localised militias, conflated with ideological divisions 
between communists and non-communists, and with communal tensions in Java.  The 
army was roiled throughout 1948 by kidnappings, murders and firefights, pitting units 
loyal to the Republic against units opposed to organisational reform.  Resistance to 
rationalisation was particularly strong in Central and East Java among forces associated 
with the FDR and PKI.  
Another element of uncertainty was injected into this volatile environment when 
the exiled PKI leader, Musso, unexpectedly returned to Indonesia with a plan for 
reorganising the Republic government into a united front.58  His goal was to ensure 
communists took over the leadership of the revolution.  Musso’s reappearance from his 
refuge in Moscow on 11 August heightened the domestic political competition and 
refocused attention on a simmering question about the international allies Indonesia 
should seek to enlist in its on-going struggle to oust the Dutch.  Musso had quietly re-
entered Indonesia on the same aircraft as Suripno Wirjokarto, who had been recalled 
from Prague. 
This confluence of events contributed to the eruption on 18 September of a full-
scale rebellion centred on the city of Madiun in Central Java, which drew in the FDR-PKI 
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leadership and became popularly branded as a communist uprising. 59   The Madiun 
rebellion was quickly and brutally supressed by army units that remained loyal to the 
Republic and local Islamic militias exacting revenge on communists.  The political and 
military leadership of the rebellion was decimated, some killed in fighting and others 
executed after capture.60  Among those killed were Sjarifuddin and Musso.61  Surviving 
communist leaders were forced into hiding or fled abroad.  The rebellion forever would 
stigmatise the PKI in the eyes of many Indonesians.  It “marked the beginning of an 
enduring legacy of army hostility toward communism”, which would add to the ferocity 
of later anti-communist purges.62  The Madiun bloodshed also engaged religious and 
communal differences, sharpening future hostility between Muslims and communists.63 
At the time of the Madiun revolt, the diplomatic strategy of the Republic’s leaders 
heavily rested on American goodwill.  Hatta had invested considerable “faith in the 
possibility of using US support to gain the Republic’s independence”.64   The quick 
suppression of the Madiun uprising bolstered that ambition, proving the Republic’s anti-
communist credentials to Washington.  The USA long feared a leftist or communist 
takeover in Indonesia.  To officials in Washington, Hatta was a sentinel against 
communism; his fall would “almost certainly result in a left wing government”.65  Hence, 
even before Madiun brought conflict between Hatta’s government and the FDR-PKI to a 
head, the USA began pressing the Netherlands to reach a settlement for the establishment 
of a “free, sovereign and independent United States of Indonesia” with equal status in a 
union with the Netherlands and in the United Nations.66  Simultaneously, US Secretary of 
State, George C. Marshall, authorised US diplomats in Batavia to inform Hatta that the 
USA would offer all practical assistance to help him “successfully resist communist 
tyranny”.67 
The action of the rebels at Madiun hardened US resolve.  Hatta was left in no 
doubt the USA welcomed the emergence of a “cleavage” between “genuine nationalists” 
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and the FDR-PKI.  Moreover, Washington was happy for Hatta to be made aware that he 
would receive generous support if the communist threat was “isolated and disposed of”, 
but that this support would be jeopardised if the Republic’s government considered 
“temporizing” over the matter.68  In the event, the message sent ten days after the launch 
of the rebellion might not have been passed on because of the speed with which 
republican forces disposed of the communist leadership.  This would have confirmed to 
Americans the assessment that “the overwhelming sentiment within the Republic is pro-
Western and pro-American”.69   
All this raises the question, why did Hatta not simply seek to align the prospective 
independent state of Indonesia with the USA and the West?   
On 2 September, when Hatta outlined his approach to foreign policy, it appears 
the immediate concern was to avoid fractures in the revolutionary forces and stave off a 
concerted push for the Republic to side with the Soviet Union by accepting diplomatic 
recognition.  Moscow had been forthright in support of the republican cause, probably 
with the aim of either driving a wedge between Washington and The Hague or hiving 
Indonesia away from the West – a disruptive and low-cost tactic that would be repeated 
in later years.  Hatta told the KNIP that alignment with the Soviet Union would entail the 
subjugation of the independence aspirations of Indonesians to the greater global 
communist cause.  He warned the view from Moscow was that “in the interest of 
strengthening Soviet Russia’s position any other interests except those of the Soviet 
Union will be sacrificed”.  Hatta’s policy alternative was not to align with the West, but 
to appeal to the spirit of revolutionary independence by projecting an international stance 
in which Indonesians demonstrated “confidence in ourselves” and the competence to 
“struggle on our own strengths and abilities”.  The unqualified aim of foreign policy was 
to serve the goal of attaining independence in the “shortest possible time”, which took 
“all-out precedence”.70  
Thus the middle way that Hatta fashioned is best defined by what was commonly 
known at the time as “neutralism” – “disassociation from the Cold War”.71  As Hatta was 
to later express it, the policy “plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and 
follows its own path through various international problems”.72  In the ideal, this meant 
Indonesia would be “free from the influence of the United States bloc or the Communist 
bloc, whether the influence be of capital or of ideology”.73  The ideal would remain 
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beyond Indonesia’s grasp.  But this was a message for its times; a pragmatic response, 
offering several advantages to overt alignment.   
First, it permitted the nascent Republic to remain aloof from the Cold War 
conflict in the year it was hardened by the Berlin Blockade, although free to adopt a 
position that favored either the USA or the Soviet Union when it suited Indonesia’s own 
preferences or interests.  The Republic was a weak entity in danger of being stillborn.  It 
could ill-afford to antagonise one of the world’s two big powers – both permanent 
members of the UN Security Council – at a time when the UNSC was one of Indonesia’s 
only means of international appeal against aggressive Dutch tactics.  In 1948, the USA 
had become vital to wringing concessions from the Dutch.  But at earlier times, it was the 
USA that appeared ambivalent and it was the Soviet Union that had backed Indonesia in 
the UNSC.  In this climate, Indonesia might have been able to play impartiality to its 
advantage by allowing foreign powers to compete for its favor and, by deft management, 
give each side enough to avoid outright antagonism from either.   
Second, the middle-way foreign policy avoided a rancorous domestic debate 
about foreign policy at a time when the energy of the Republic was appropriately devoted 
to ousting the Dutch from Indonesian soil.  From this perspective, a declaration in support 
of the West was no more tenable than an embrace of the communist bloc.  The 
ambivalence of the USA and West European countries to Indonesian independence after 
the Second World War had been a deep disappointment for those who believed in the 
commitment of the victorious powers to self-determination.  Hence, alliance with the 
West was potentially a source of contention for non-communists too.  In essence, the 
policy served the domestic purpose of preventing “rivalry between Washington and 
Moscow from aggravating acute political differences within the country’s political elite” 
and thus helped to “cultivate national unity”.74 
Third, Hatta’s mid-course captured the spirit of the times, for the Indonesian 
people were in the midst of a struggle to rid themselves of domination by a foreign 
power.  The expression of foreign policy independence was an attractive aspiration for a 
people determined to be sovereign, as reflected in Sjahrir’s earlier call for “international 
coexistence” rather than division into ideological blocs.  Only three years after the end of 
the Second World War, they rightly saw themselves as victims of an era of great power 
politics, which was also closely associated in their minds with imperialism and 
colonialism.   
 
The Hard Road to Independence 
 
The equivocation evident in the official foreign policy of the Republic aside, the 
swift destruction of the communist leadership following the Madiun rebellion served to 
reassure the Americans it could deal with the nationalist government.  It was an 
especially poor time for the Dutch to take advantage of the instability of the Republic to 
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launch its second and most decisive military offensive.  This it did on 19 December.  The 
Dutch excuse – a deadlock in negotiations with the Republic under the Renville 
agreement over the maintenance of security in republican-controlled areas – won no 
sympathy in the USA.75 
Despite Washington’s desire to maintain the strength of allied forces in Europe, 
and the general Euro-centric disposition of the State Department at the time, it became 
increasingly hard to justify support for the Netherlands in the face of its blatant 
aggression.  The Dutch assault on the republican capital Yogyakarta had led to the 
capture and detention of Sukarno, Hatta and other prominent independence leaders.  
American irritation was compounded by the Dutch army’s use of US-manufactured 
equipment, particularly aircraft, to rout the republican army.  Global opinion started to 
turn sharply against the Dutch, fuelled by The Hague’s defiance of a resolution of the UN 
Security Council on 24 December calling for the release of their famous captives, the 
restoration of the Republican government and resumption of direct negotiations.  The 
anger was mirrored in US congressional and public opinion.  One of the obvious points of 
pressure was the large US aid vote to support post-war reconstruction in the Netherlands.  
A good part of this money was permitted to flow to the East Indies where it helped secure 
the continued Dutch presence.  Demands built in the US Congress to sanction the 
Netherlands by cutting off aid.   
The larger foreign policy costs of supporting the Dutch also were starting to occur 
to Washington elites.  One senator questioned the benefits of the Atlantic alliance in the 
event US support for the Dutch forced “a billion Orientals to look elsewhere for 
friendship and trade”.76  Dean Acheson, who replaced Marshall as Secretary of State on 
21 January, became a forceful advocate for direct negotiations between the Netherlands 
and the Republic.  In a meeting with Dutch foreign minister Dirk Stikker on 2 April, 
Acheson warned there was “no chance” the Congress would authorise military aid to the 
Netherlands if there was no settlement with Indonesian nationalists.77  The stakes were 
underlined by Stikker’s reply that the Netherlands might in that case reconsider the logic 
of joining the NATO pact, due to be inaugurated two days later.  Although Acheson was 
the one of the principal architects of NATO, he insisted the USA needed “tangible 
evidence” the Netherlands would negotiate a settlement and time was running out.78 
The US intervention had a salutary effect on Dutch policy.  Within two weeks, the 
republican leadership was released and returned to Yogyakarta.  A ceasefire was put in 
place. The Netherlands agreed to initiate direct negotiations with the Republic and the 
other federal states of the proposed RUSI.  What was termed the Round Table 
Conference opened on 23 August in The Hague.  The negotiations over the following 
weeks would be arduous.  Indonesian negotiators would be forced to accept unpalatable 
compromises.  The two hardest to bear were Dutch insistence that the RUSI assume debts 
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incurred by the Netherlands East Indies government and that West New Guinea undergo 
a separate process of decolonisation after a period of Dutch guardianship.  Weeks of hard 
bargaining over the terms of Indonesian independence resulted in the compromise that 
the RUSI would adopt USD 1.1 billion in debt, which the Indonesian delegation believed 
was tantamount to paying for Dutch military actions to supress independence.  The status 
of West New Guinea was left unresolved.  It deserved separate treatment, according to 
the Dutch, because it was less developed and racially and culturally different from the 
rest of Indonesia.  Its status was to be determined by negotiations within one year.  The 
unsatisfactory compromises of the Round Table Conference left Indonesians with 
lingering resentment, but the negotiations concluded with an agreement that the RUSI 
would be founded as an independent, sovereign state on 29 December 1949.  The RUSI 
would have 16 federated states, of which the Republic would be one.  Sukarno would be 
the first president of the RUSI and Hatta its first vice president and prime minister. 
President Truman sent his best wishes, complimenting Sukarno, Hatta and other 
nationalist leaders on the “splendid” settlement of The Hague.79  US influence had proved 
decisive in the ultimate outcome.  But the failure of Washington to explicitly support 
Indonesian independence sooner meant the USA probably did not reap the anticipated 
diplomatic dividend.  Indonesians were left with the impression that US sympathy for a 
European ally had out-weighed rights to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter.  
It was only when Dutch actions stirred widespread outraged that the USA found it could 
no longer justify the actions of its ally. 
Soviet reaction to Indonesian independence was less enthusiastic.  After the 
Madiun rebellion, Moscow became openly hostile to the Republic’s leadership.  Terms 
like “agents” of imperialism and “bourgeois-nationalist traitors” were used to describe 
the government that had vanquished the communists.80  The recommendation from the 
Southeast Asia Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry was to ignore requests from 
the Netherlands and RUSI for recognition of the new state.  The RUSI was deemed to be 
“the result of a bargain struck by Indonesian feudals and Dutch reactionaries with the 
active cooperation of USA ruling circles”.81  The Soviets suspected the RUSI was likely 
to ally with the West in the Cold War because it was “fully dependent” on the USA and 
the Netherlands.82  For reasons that remain a mystery, the preference of Foreign Ministry 
officials to ignore the creation of the RUSI was overruled by Stalin.   There is the 
possibility Communist China’s paramount leader Mao Zedong, who was visiting Russia 
at the time, influenced Stalin’s decision.83  In any case, the Soviet Union granted official 
recognition to the RUSI on 25 January 1950.  
In the context of the Cold War, the attainment of Indonesian independence looked 
like a victory for US foreign policy.  Notwithstanding Indonesia’s official neutrality in 
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the Cold War, the USA was confident that the leaders of the RUSI were strongly anti-
communist and “regarded as a dangerous enemy by world communism”.84  Within days 
of the transfer of sovereignty, Truman approved a military aid package aimed at making 
sure Indonesia stayed out of communist hands.  “As the Communist gains on the Asiatic 
mainland increase, the importance of keeping Indonesia in the anti-Communist camp is 
of greater and greater importance,” Acheson advised the President. “The loss of 
Indonesia to the Communists would deprive the United States of an area of the highest 
political, economic and strategic importance.”85  But Indonesian leaders had their own 
ideas about foreign policy that would ensure the country would not be the unproblematic 
ally the USA hoped. 
 
Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
The leaders of the putative Indonesian state received a harsh baptism in the 
realities of Realpolitik at the end of the Second World War.  There is no question the 
threat posed to the Republic by the Dutch was existential.  There was no ambiguity about 
the source of the threat.  The Republic was subject to two major military offensives and 
constant political and economic pressure.  The Dutch possessed overwhelming offensive 
power, including control of the air and sea, physically surrounded the Republic, and 
could count on a certain level of sympathy, if not active support, from Britain and the 
USA, the only two great powers with the capability to directly intervene.  With the 
Republic facing a threat to its survival, the assumption of theories focused on the level of 
threat alone predict the Republic should have sought to offset the danger posed by 
predominant Dutch power by seeking to align with outside powers.86  It did not.   
The first hypothesis of a risk-based analysis also predicts that hard policies, 
including building military strength and forming balancing alliances, would be adopted in 
the event of a high likelihood of critical losses.  Militarily, the Republic did offer firm 
resistance, but its army was outgunned and outmanned, leaving it “little chance to 
achieve military victory”.87  One of the few ways it could build strength was tactical and 
strategic innovation, which it strived to do through the guerrilla methods expounded by 
one of the army’s leading thinkers, A.H. Nasution, in a doctrine of “total people’s 
resistance”.88  On the diplomatic front, the Republic theoretically had the capacity to 
appeal to foreign powers for their assistance.  But in practice it lacked external hard 
balancing options in part because those states sympathetic to the Republic lacked the 
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ability to directly intervene and those with the capacity to intervene were either opposed 
to the Republic or undecided in their sympathies.  Domestic and international conditions 
combined to limit balancing options.  On this basis, it would appear the first hypothesis 
does not adequately capture the nature of the Republic’s response to the Dutch threat.  It 
suggests the necessity of attaching the precondition that hard balancing options need to 
be available.  This is consistent with the second hypothesis that smart strategies or 
bandwagoning are to be preferred in the absence of hard balancing options.   
It will be argued here that to understand the Republic’s alignment choices a 
balance-of-risk analysis, as an elaborate calculation on multiple levels of analysis, offers 
a superior explanation during the revolutionary period to either a balance of threat or 
balance of power model.  The Republic’s military options were limited, but it had raised 
a sufficiently large army based on earlier Japanese and Dutch militias to put up a credible 
fight.  Still, the decision to offer armed opposition to the Dutch could be viewed as no 
more than necessity.  The alternative for the Republic was to accept the reimposition of 
Dutch rule and its own annihilation.  The aims of the revolution were regarded as too 
important to abandon despite the overwhelming superiority of Dutch forces.  A 
determined resistance, coupled with an effective negotiating strategy, might have made 
the price of victory sufficiently high for the Dutch to reach a compromise.  It also would 
buy the Republic time to allow its diplomacy to work. 
The diplomacy the Republic undertook was multifaceted.  Although it did not 
seek explicit alignment with any great power, it sought to nurture good ties with both 
Cold War camps.  It cultivated relations with states supportive of its cause, especially 
India.  It appealed to the UN to uphold its newly-proclaimed principles on the rights of 
people.  And it matched its armed resistance of the Dutch with generous concessions at 
the negotiating table.  In this way, its strategy combined hard and soft elements, which 
minimised the prospect of military capitulation and maximised the prospect of diplomatic 
salvation.   
The key to interpreting the Republic’s strategy is recognition of its inherent 
weakness.  Despite an elaborate administration, its claims to statehood were nascent. 89  
The lack of foreign recognition meant openly taking sides in the Cold War might have 
been seen as no more than a hollow gesture that delivered few tangible benefits.  Its 
military and negotiating strategy with the Dutch did not contemplate the likelihood of 
settling the issue of independence by force.  The best that could be hoped for was that the 
will of the Netherlands might be sapped by losses in blood and treasure, prompting it to 
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give de facto recognition to the Republic’s territorial claims and accept a process leading 
to statehood.  This is what in effect happened in the Linggadjati and Renville accords, 
although in both cases they were breached by the Dutch. 
From the perspective of this dissertation, the critical decision the Republic made 
was the declaration of neutrality between the Cold War antagonists.  The international 
and domestic repercussions of that decision will be examined below. 
Internationally, the crux of the problem for the Republic was this:  at the time then 
prime minister Hatta made neutrality official foreign policy, the Republic had little to 
gain from explicit, unilateral alignment with either the USA or the Soviet Union.  To 
choose one, automatically meant to lose the other.  The USA was the state best able to 
pressure the Dutch to negotiate.  It was the biggest power in the Western Pacific and it 
supplied indispensable economic aid to the reconstruction of the Netherlands.  Although 
repeated attempts by the Republic of Indonesia to convince the USA to offer explicit 
support to the cause of independence had failed, the USA remained a potential ally at 
least in the activity of moderating Dutch actions.   On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
had either led or supported pro-republican resolutions at the UN.  Its interventions, while 
not sufficient to prevent Dutch attempts to eliminate the Republic as a political force by 
military means, were useful in keeping Indonesian aspirations and Dutch actions in the 
international spotlight.  The Soviet Union was critical to ensuring resolutions from other 
Indonesian supporters, like Australia and India, had some degree of backing in the UN 
Security Council.   
But neutrality was not solely an international policy.  Hatta’s declaration of 
neutrality and foreign policy independence was aimed as much, if not more, at a domestic 
audience.  In fact, observed from a domestic angle, it is clear that Hatta only faced two 
serious options – neutrality or alignment with the West.  Alignment with the Soviet 
Union would have contradicted his political and social values and given an advantage to 
his opponents on the left.  Alignment with the West would have more closely fitted his 
democratic leanings, but contributed to the growing cleavage between the left and right in 
the republican movement that already risked fracturing the revolution.  A call for 
neutrality in international politics potentially would act as an appeal for domestic unity.  
Ultimately, the strategy of simultaneously managing the international and 
domestic risks failed.  The Madiun rebellion brought the tensions within the Republic to a 
head and the Dutch launched a second military offensive.  But the quick suppression of 
the communist rebellion by forces loyal to the republican government did by action what 
could not be done by official statements about alignment policy.  The West was given 
clear evidence that the republican leadership, particularly Sukarno and Hatta, were anti-
communist.  This garnered increased sympathy for the republican cause and an escalation 
of pressure on the Dutch to agree to a transition of sovereignty.  The outcome was more a 
matter of good fortune than design. 
Indonesia then was able to carry official neutrality into statehood, while obtaining 
more explicit US backing.  Immediately after conclusion of The Hague agreement on the 
transfer of sovereignty, President Truman launched what would be one of the USA’s 
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most enduring aid programs with a grant of military assistance aimed at strengthening the 
Republic against further communist attacks.  Despite the setback for the communists at 
Madiun, Stalin overruled his advisers and eventually granted official recognition to the 
new state in January 1950.  The Soviet Union thus decided to stay in contention for 
Indonesian favor.  But Madiun and subsequent US support for independence set the scene 
for a generally pro-Western neutrality in the early days of the new state.  The apparent 
confirmation that the Republic was led by anti-communists was received in Washington 
as an early Cold War victory. 
American enthusiasm was premature.  This period also marks the beginning of the 
Republic’s exploration of smart alignment strategies.  The pursuit of neutrality at a time 
when both the USA and Soviet Union were vying for influence in Indonesia allowed the 
Republic to play the game of competitive bidding – turning neutrality into a positive by 
attracting support, or at least nullifying opposition, from both Cold War powers.  At the 
same time, Indonesia could preserve its policy autonomy.  This and other smart strategies 
would become a feature of future diplomacy.  The conditions that allowed them to be 
employed will be explored further in the next chapter. 
It is clear from this period that the Republic’s alignment behavior cannot be 
understood purely as an automatic response to external power or threat.  The Republic’s 
strategy is better understood as the balancing of risk on multiple levels aimed at 
forestalling a Dutch military victory, ensuring maximum international support from 
mutually antagonistic great power blocs for Indonesian independence, and maintaining 
foreign policy independence to ensure cohesion within an ideologically-riven 
independence movement.   
This then leaves the question of what method of analysis better explains the 
decision-making process itself – a rational choice or psychological analysis.  
From the point of view of risk-taking propensities suggested by prospect theory, 
the key to an explanation is identification of the point of reference Republican leaders 
adopted to frame potential gains or losses.  At a minimum, the Republic should have 
valued the status quo (that is, de facto recognition and its continued survival within 
defined borders) and would have been prepared to postpone, or play for time, in relation 
to its real goal of a united, independent Indonesia.   
Under one scenario, the Republic would have seen the status quo as manifesting a 
net gain, following the establishment of a separate de facto government on Java and 
Sumatra.  In the domain of gains, its leaders would have been risk averse.  Assuming 
resistance of an enemy bent on one’s complete destruction is consistent with risk-
aversion or put another way, the prospect of suffering probable loss versus certain loss, 
the Republic’s armed action could be seen in the first instance as directed at no more than 
preserving the status quo.  Indeed, the extent of the concessions the Republic offered to 
the Dutch speak to its desire to avoid the dispute being decided on the battlefield.  The 
policy of neutrality could then be seen as one further dimension of a cautious approach 
aimed at not alienating foreign powers or aggravating internal tensions.  The neutral 
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policy was announced just before the Madiun rebellion when republican leaders hoped to 
avoid a climatic showdown. 
But an alternative scenario is that the objective conditions the Republic faced in 
late 1948 entailed significant losses.  The goal of the independence movement had been 
to forge a single country out of all the territory of the former Netherlands East Indies. It 
had fallen well short of that ambition.  Even before the outbreak of internal rebellion, the 
Republic faced constant military and economic pressure from the Dutch.  Its survival 
remained in doubt.  This scenario suggests there should have been a willingness for risk 
taking, including the possibility of seeking a hard alignment to balance Dutch power.  A 
unilateral declaration of allegiance to the West might have undercut one of the key Dutch 
arguments for US and other Western support.   
The two separate scenarios illustrate the complexity in applying prospect theory’s 
psychological analysis to decisions entailing political risk.  Different interpretations of 
the reference point of policymakers can produce starkly different predictions or 
explanations of behavior.  It is not possible to know whether the Republic’s leaders saw 
themselves in the domain of gains or of losses – quite likely it was a mix of both.  
Arguably, for those reasons, a rational choice analysis offers a simpler and more direct 
explanation in this case.   
The record suggests the Republic might have been open to a hard alignment with 
the USA had it been possible.  Sutan Sjahrir had written of Indonesia lying within a US 
sphere of influence in his manifesto Our Struggle, written just as he was about become 
prime minister.  But the international context meant the option of hard alignment was 
simply not available.  There was no state willing or able to deploy coercive force to 
restrain the Dutch.  In the absence of any material support from a great power, and facing 
internal divisions between supporters of Western and communist values, neutrality was 
the position least likely to undermine internal solidarity and most likely to preserve 
existing levels of foreign support.  The balance of risk required that it avoid alignment 
commitments likely to generate either domestic or international opposition, which in turn 
might undermine the primary objective of attaining independence.  Moreover, neutrality 
could be portrayed as a virtue – a reflection of the values of the independence movement.  
It was a logical option for policymakers who faced few good choices.   
The outcome is consistent with the second hypothesis that when a state has no 
recourse to hard balancing policies, it should prefer smart alignment strategies or, as a 
last resort, to bandwagon with a threatening state.  The Republic took the only alignment 
course open to it at the time to ensure its survival. 
There is little evidence from this period to provide firm conclusions about the 
other hypotheses proposed – the roles of aid, transnational penetration and ideology in 
affecting alignment.  Until Indonesia obtained its independence, aid did not figure as a 
significant feature of the Republic’s foreign relations.  It is premature to draw 
conclusions on its influence.  The most significant transnational penetration was historic 
interaction with the Dutch.  But it acted as a negative influence.  Although many 
Indonesian elites were educated under the Dutch system, spoke Dutch and had close 
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personal associations with the Dutch, the experience of colonialism and the intransigent 
attitude of the Dutch government meant that familiarity gave no advantage to the 
Netherlands.  In fact, the behavior of Dutch administrators and soldiers during the 
revolution might have tainted images of Westerners in general.  Certainly, the hardships 
of colonialism would leave a lasting impression. 
Ideology potentially had more significance in determining alignment.  It was 
certainly relevant for the communists.  Communism was seen as an international 
structure and, therefore, communist dominance of the revolution would have come with 
automatic international commitments.  But there is less evidence that democratic 
nationalists were attracted to alignment with the West because of their admiration of 
Western systems of political or economic governance.  Indeed, the prevailing view 
among this group appears to be support for accommodation with the West rather than 
alignment.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter portrayed the alignment decisions of the Republican government 
during the revolution as an elaborate exercise in balancing risk.  In a state of inherent 
weakness as it struggled for independence, the Republic was forced into a foreign policy 
compromise: it needed to simultaneously maintain good relations with the great powers 
that could help determine the outcome of the revolution and avoid splitting the 
revolutionary movement.  The answer was a policy of Cold War neutrality that later 
formed the basis of the bebas-aktif foreign policy.  It was a policy that represented the 
path of least risk.  But neutrality could be cast as a virtue; the Republic could not hope to 
obtain effective intervention against the Dutch from any of the great powers, so it 
portrayed neutrality as a manifestation in foreign policy of a principled desire to assert 
Indonesian independence. 
Faced with an existential threat from Dutch forces, the logical impulse should 
have been to seek a hard alignment that could have given the Republic additional military 
options and brought direct diplomatic pressure on the Dutch.  A valid conclusion is that 
the Republic’s leaders did not adopt this course because they could not.  No great power 
was either willing or able to play that role.  Moreover, a decision to side with either the 
US-led capitalist camp or the Soviet-led communist camp would have ruptured the fragile 
alliance of domestic revolutionaries.  The outcome was consistent with the second 
hypothesis that a state will adopt smart alignment strategies aimed at maximising its 
policy autonomy or bandwagon with a threatening party as a last resort.  Bandwagoning 
was no more of an option than a hard-balancing alignment because the Dutch were intent 
on extinguishing the Republic.  This left Indonesia to pursue the strategy of competitive 
bidding – playing to both great powers to obtain the maximum diplomatic assistance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Foreign Policy Collides with Democracy 
 
In the years after the Netherlands formally relinquished its claims in Indonesia on 27 
December 1949, the new state experienced a short-lived period of constitutional democracy. 
This chapter deals with those first heady years of Indonesia’s life as an independent state, when 
a freewheeling political environment and the economic rollercoaster of Korean war boom and 
bust served up hope and anxiety for the future of the state in equal measure.  It concludes as 
Indonesia basks in the kudos of its arrival on the international stage as host of the Asia Africa 
conference. 
The chapter traverses a number of historical episodes that reveal the stresses 
governments faced in building a consensus on policymaking and the division of state resources.  
This was especially evident in the volatility of foreign policy decisions.  Shifting parliamentary 
allegiances, and frequent changes in prime ministers and cabinets, resulted in poor policy 
execution and frequent policy reversals.  The alignment, and general orientation of foreign 
policy, changed in tandem with regime as Indonesia grappled with the reality that the 
international politics of the Cold War presented few choices that could be easily reconciled at 
home.  The events covered in the following sections include negotiations over an American-
led peace treaty with Japan, the signing of a security agreement with the USA, the convening 
of a conference of Asian and African states, and the forging of relations with Communist China.  
The chapter draws on archival records to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
machinations surrounding these events than available in published accounts. 
Each episode either caused or exacerbated pre-existing internal strains over the nature 
and future direction of the state.  They produced significant upheaval in relations with the USA 
and the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.  These episodes underscore the 
dominant influence of great power relations in shaping Indonesia’s international outlook and 
their ability to penetrate Indonesian domestic politics for both good and ill.  They highlighted 
the strains and trade-offs implicated in the bebas-aktif foreign policy and the consequences for 
alignment. 
The chapter concludes by arguing Indonesia carried the habits of international and 
domestic risk management into its decisions about foreign policy and alignment during the 
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early years of statehood under constitutional democracy.  The shape of the balancing act 
followed a similar pattern to the revolution, in which policymakers simultaneously sought to 
obtain support from foreign powers for national development and remain within the boundaries 
established by the bebas-aktif policy in order to maintain domestic harmony.  Reflecting the 
right-wing leanings of the early cabinets of the 1950s, Indonesia initially adopted an 
interpretation of neutrality that tended to favor links to the West.  This was driven by both a 
pragmatic assessment of the sources of aid, trade and investment and the anti-communism of 
Muslim politicians in government.  It carried with it some peril because of the sympathy many, 
including non-communist nationalists, expressed for the anti-imperial stances of the Soviet 
Union and China. 
As Indonesian leaders grew in confidence, foreign policy increasingly became a vehicle 
for asserting national pride and independence.  This reflected a desire to address some of the 
historical legacies of colonialism, especially the claim to West New Guinea and the influence 
of foreign capital.  Within three years of securing independence, Indonesia started to embrace 
a stricter form of neutrality between the great powers, which was widely viewed as 
downgrading ties with the West.  It reflected a range of factors, including a genuine belief in 
the virtues of independent foreign policy, frustration at the lack of Western support over the 
West New Guinea claim and the slowness in securing national control over the economy. 
It is clear the shifts in alignment throughout this period do not correlate with changes 
in the external balance of power or threat.  Instead, alignment patterns are better understood as 
reflecting policymakers’ determination of critical preferences and interests, and how foreign 
powers could serve those interests, at a time when Indonesia did not feel directly threatened 
despite significant tensions within its region.  Alignment posture changed when policymakers 
judged the significance of the interests in question outweighed the risks of provoking a hostile 
reaction both internationally and domestically.  
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The Limits of Alliance: The Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy on Trial  
 
Warming to the West: the Sukiman Crisis 
 
 The first three Cabinets of the constitutional democracy era shared several common 
traits.  They were of an “understated, businesslike” character.1  Each was committed for the 
most part to the creation of a modern framework for government, built on viable state 
institutions and parliamentary democracy.  Their democratic orientation made them generally 
sympathetic to the West, even as they were reluctant to formally ally with the West.  They were 
staunchly anti-communist.  And they were all short lived, built on unstable coalitions.   
Of the three cabinets of this period – under prime ministers Mohammad Hatta, 
Mohammad Natsir and Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo2 – it was the last that most stridently, and in 
the consequence for domestic politics, most painfully, demonstrated anti-communism and 
Western sympathy.  Three episodes in the short life of the Sukiman cabinet illustrate its 
ideological convictions and the boundaries of acceptable foreign policy.  The first was a 
crackdown on political opponents – most of them communists or communist sympathisers – 
and the activities of the Chinese Embassy; the second, the signing of the US-sponsored peace 
treaty with Japan; and the third a crisis over an economic and military aid agreement with the 
USA, which entailed ambiguous commitments to the defence of the “free world”.  These three 
episodes were critical to parliament’s loss of confidence in the Sukiman cabinet and its 
resignation after 11 months.  The third in this series of controversies was the proximate trigger 
for Sukiman’s downfall.  Together they highlight the salience of foreign policy in the domestic 
debate of the era and the perils of being seen to depart too far from the founding precepts of 
independence and activism.  
 The signs of re-emerging tensions with the PKI came before the installation of the 
Sukiman cabinet on 23 April 1951.  Both Sukiman and his predecessor, Natsir, were from 
Masyumi, known for its antagonism to communism.  From late 1950, the government and army 
began to restrict the activities of the PKI and its affiliated union federation.  Labor strikes were 
banned and communist political rallies were forbidden.  Hatta, then Vice President, had 
accused the PKI of being a tool of the Soviet Union.  The tempo of anti-communist policies 
picked up under the prime ministership of Sukiman, resulting in a cycle of provocation through 
																																																						
1 Elson, Idea of Indonesia, p. 154. 
2 Hatta served from December 1949 to August 1950, Natsir from September 1950 to March 1951 and 
Sukiman from April 1951 to February 1952.  
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the course of 1951.  It culminated in Sukiman alleging communists were plotting to overthrow 
his government.  His evidence was weak and circumstantial.  It included incidents such as an 
armed attack by a mob displaying hammer and sickle banners on a police station in the Jakarta 
port neighborhood of Tanjung Priok on 6 August.  But it served as a pretext for Sukiman to 
launch the first major attempt to supress the PKI since the Madiun uprising.   
 Several days after the Tanjung Priok incident, Sukiman, without consulting the army 
or most of his cabinet, gave orders that led to the arrest of thousands of the government’s 
political opponents.  The majority of those detained were members of the PKI or their 
sympathisers, other leftist activists and ethnic Chinese.  The young troika that had taken over 
the leadership of the PKI in January – Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Muhammad Hatta Lukman and 
Njoto – were forced into hiding for several months.3  The arrests were to have a chilling effect 
on leftist politics.  The PKI was forced to operate “almost like an underground party for the 
rest of the period of the Sukiman cabinet”.4 
As Sukiman was supressing domestic dissent, his government took action against the 
Chinese embassy.  Already under Natsir there had been tensions because of the adventurism of 
Wang Renshu, Beijing’s first ambassador to Jakarta.  Wang had been repeatedly warned about 
anti-American speeches and contacts with Sino-Indonesians.5  An advocate of a united front of 
overseas Chinese, Wang had led a vigorous effort by the Chinese mission to coax Sino-
Indonesians away from the Kuomintang with considerable success.  This activism in the 
Chinese community conflated with a citizenship registration exercise in which approximately 
1.5 million Indonesian-born Chinese, out of a total diaspora of 2.1 million, were required to 
make a declaration if they preferred not to become Indonesian citizens. If they made no 
declaration, they would automatically become citizens.  Indonesian authorities feared the 
activities of the embassy and its four consulates in promoting allegiance to the People’s 
Republic would test the loyalties of peranakan Chinese and encourage them to declare against 
citizenship.6  Sukarno then shared the concerns about the activities of the Chinese communists, 
																																																						
3 An account of the Sukiman crackdown can be found in Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of 
Indonesia, 1951-1963, Berkley: University of California Press (1966), pp. 52-54 
4 Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 191. 
5 Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p. 98.  
6 Results released by the government in 1953 showed in fact 390,000 Indonesian-born Chinese refused 
citizenship.  This meant 1.1 million out of 2.1 million resident ethnic Chinese were not citizens. See 
Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, pp. 104-105.  
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complaining privately about their aggression in Indonesia and rumors they were importing gold 
to fund their propaganda.7 
The degree of Indonesian displeasure with the perceived Chinese interference in 
internal affairs was driven home on 22 July, three months after Sukiman took office, when the 
government refused entry to 16 Chinese consulate officials.  Less than a month later, amid the 
wave of arrests of communists, the Chinese embassy gave refuge to Alimin Prawirodirjo, the 
former PKI chairman, further straining relations between Jakarta and Beijing.  In an effort to 
calm the situation, the Indonesian-born Wang was recalled to China in late 1951. 
The sharpness of the Sukiman government’s dealings with domestic and foreign 
communism had a salutary effect on the PKI.  Aidit, who was 28 years old at the time of the 
August crackdown, emerged from several months in hiding having reached two conclusions:  
first, the PKI needed to cooperate with other political parties in a united front and, second, it 
needed to develop its own mass base of support.  Aidit’s conception of a viable united front 
was one in which the PKI would, at least temporarily, restrain its leadership ambitions and 
cooperate with what it viewed as more progressive forces to prevent hard line anti-communists 
coming to power, mainly any future Masyumi-led coalitions.8   
The second major controversy to have both domestic and foreign repercussions for the 
Sukiman government centred on the position Indonesia would adopt on a US-drafted peace 
treaty with Japan, designed to restore Tokyo’s political independence.  After months of 
negotiations over a draft, conducted primarily between the USA and Britain, a conference of 
allied powers was convened in San Francisco in September 1951 to finalise and sign the treaty.  
The Soviet Union, although highly critical of the treaty, agreed to attend; neither the People’s 
Republic nor the Kuomintang’s Republic of China were invited because the USA claimed the 
issue of who legitimately ruled China was still ambiguous. 
There were two practical questions before the Sukiman cabinet – whether Indonesia 
should attend the conference and whether it should sign the treaty.  Sukiman ruled the first 
government that was a coalition between the Muslim Masyumi and the secular PNI – a 
combination many observers regarded as the most inclusive, and therefore stable, to be drawn 
from the querulous parliament.  Debate over the Japan Peace Treaty was to expose 
irreconcilable divisions in the cabinet and contribute to Sukiman’s eventual downfall. 
																																																						
7 Telegram, The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State, 26 October 1950, FRUS, 
Vol. VI, 1950, p. 1091.  
8 Hindley, The Communist Party, pp. 54-55. 
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Opponents of either sending a delegation to San Francisco or to signing the treaty 
objected on the grounds an unshackled Japan might resume an aggressive posture and 
Indonesian support for the US-led treaty initiative would impugn the bebas-aktif policy.  The 
treaty was viewed as instrumental to the hub-and-spokes security network the USA was 
building with several countries in the Asia-Pacific to contain communism.  But with Hatta 
actively pressuring Masyumi members of the cabinet to support attendance in San Francisco, 
the argument that the independent policy would be violated lacked a vital source of credibility.9  
Cabinet decided on 24 August to send a delegation headed by foreign minister Achmad 
Subardjo.  Nevertheless, Subardjo’s instructions were clear:  he was to report to Jakarta daily 
on proceedings at the War Memorial Opera House and leave a final decision on whether to 
sign to cabinet. 
Once a decision to attend had been made, the minds of Sukiman and Subardjo turned 
to what Indonesia could expect to obtain from the treaty.  The principle concern was that 
Indonesia should receive economic benefit.  It would seek reparations for the losses sustained 
during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 and an agreement to end recent incursions 
by Japanese fishing vessels into waters claimed by Indonesia.  Subardjo enunciated a range of 
other reservations about the treaty, which related to matters of foreign policy principle.  He 
wanted the treaty to clearly recognise the sovereignty of Japan over its land and waters and to 
commit signatories to plebiscites of the populations living on islands to be seized from Japan.  
He also sought the right to open debate and amendment of the treaty at the San Francisco 
conference and an invitation to communist China “in the interests of lessening tension”.  Of 
these demands, the USA accepted only the explicit recognition of Japanese sovereignty.10 
Still, Subardjo conducted himself with “skill and energy” in the negotiations 
surrounding the treaty.  A Dutch-educated lawyer, he successfully pursued the case for 
reparations and a fishing agreement, extracting promises from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
to reach bilateral agreements on both issues.  This meant Indonesia achieved its core 
negotiating priorities. Subardjo’s achievement in securing the promise of early reparations and 
fishing protections should have been lauded at home.   Instead, the Sukiman cabinet faced a 
																																																						
9 Hatta’s activities and the reason for objections to the treaty among politicians are described in several 
cables to Washington from US Ambassador Merle Cochran based on discussions with the principles. 
See, Telegram from the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State, 24 August 1951, 
FRUS, Vol. VI, 1951, Part 1, pp. 1296-1297 and Telegram from the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) 
to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1951, ibid., pp. 1265-1266. 
10 K.V. Kesavan, “The Attitude of Indonesia Towards the Japanese Peace Treaty”, Asian Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 3 (1972), p. 410. 
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critical test of its unity over whether the treaty should be signed.  This time the debate centred 
almost entirely on whether Indonesia’s signature on the US-inspired treaty would compromise 
the bebas-aktif foreign policy. 
When a vote came in the Indonesian cabinet on the evening of 7 September, the two 
main parties in the coalition split both internally and across party lines.  After two days or 
rancorous internal debate, Masyumi decided to back Sukiman and Subardjo, both Masyumi 
men.  PNI too was split, but decided to vote against signing.  The final vote in cabinet was 10 
to 6 in favor of signing and Subardjo endorsed the treaty on behalf of Indonesia the next day 
along with 47 other countries.  
In both the Masyumi and PNI camps, the positions taken related as much to rivalries 
over control of party and government as differences over policy.  Nevertheless, PNI argued 
signing the treaty amounted to a breach of the principle of foreign policy independence.  There 
was briefly the risk parliament might censure the government.  But rather than bring Sukiman 
down after only four months a typically pragmatic compromise was found.  Members of 
Masyumi and PNI absented themselves from the floor of parliament when it came to vote on a 
minor party motion opposing Indonesian endorsement of the treaty.11  Without a quorum, the 
resolution was left in limbo.  Parliament never ratified the treaty, but the crisis had passed and 
agreements were reached with Japan on reparations and fisheries paving the way for a bilateral 
peace treaty in January 1958.   
Proponents of signing the peace treaty dismissed the arguments that it was contrary to 
the policy of independence.  But criticisms Indonesia had compromised its standing as a neutral 
state by signing the Japan Peace Treaty were not without substance.  India and Burma, two 
other neutral states in the Cold War, both refused to send representatives to San Francisco.  A 
US State Department assessment later found: “The Indonesian government’s decision to sign 
the Japan Peace Treaty in San Francisco despite Indian abstention and Soviet opposition is 
considered the most significant step which the Indonesian government, historically jealous of 
its policy of ‘independence’, has taken toward aligning itself with the free world.”12  
Despite the contention generated by the signing of the treaty and the absence of cabinet 
solidarity over foreign policy directions, Sukiman and Subardjo were prepared to seek closer 
																																																						
11 An account of parliamentary maneuvers can be found in Telegram from the Ambassador in Indonesia 
(Cochran) to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 1, 1951, p. 1342-1343. 
12 Telegram from the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to the Embassy in Jakarta, 8 
September 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 1, 1951, p. 1343, n. 5. The language has been corrected to remove 
abbreviations in the original cable. 
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relations with the USA at the risk of being accused of abandoning the bebas-aktif policy.  This 
partly was driven by their anti-communism and partly by a pragmatic assessment of the 
contribution Western powers could make to national development.  The lengths they would go 
to accommodate the USA would become evident just weeks after the Sukiman cabinet survived 
the storm over the signing of the Japan Peace Treaty.   
The seeds for the third foreign policy crisis were sown when President Truman signed 
the Mutual Security Act (MSA) into law on 10 October.  The goal of the MSA was to bind 
recipients of US military and economic aid more tightly to the American policy of containing 
communism.  Its enactment meant the supply of US aid would be conditional on states making 
broad commitments about their international conduct.  There were two categories of 
commitment.  States wishing to receive military aid would be required under Section 511 (a) 
of the Act to concur with a series of innocuous statements such as “promoting international 
understanding and goodwill” and fulfil “military obligations” under any treaties it had with the 
USA.  More problematically, it required recipients of military aid to make a contribution 
consistent with its capabilities to the “maintenance of its own defensive strength and the 
defensive strength of the free world”.  For states receiving only economic aid and technical 
assistance, a less explicit commitment was required under Section 511 (b).  In this instance, 
recipients could satisfy the requirements of the legislation by “furthering international 
understanding and goodwill” and helping to abolish international tensions. 13 
Indonesia had been lobbying the USA for supplies of military equipment for some 
months before the enactment of the MSA.  It had also received equipment and training for the 
police from the USA, under an aid deal concluded in August 1950 that both sides were trying 
to keep secret.  The existence of aid to the police alone was deemed sufficient to require the 
application of 511 (a) commitments.  But, surprisingly, given previous evidence of Indonesian 
sensitivity over the sanctity of foreign policy independence, no US official foresaw Indonesian 
difficulty with the idea of contributing to the defence of “the free world”.14  Even more 
surprisingly, Subardjo did not raise objections to this terminology when he met the US 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Merle Cochran, on 11 December to receive a note spelling out the 
terms for future military, economic and technical assistance.  Earlier, Cochran had advocated 
a cessation of all aid because of the prosperity brought by the Korean War boom and Jakarta’s 
embarrassment at depictions it was reliant on a “great friend”.  From Sukarno down, Cochran 
																																																						
13 The full text of the MSA conditions can see found in Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State 
(Webb) to the Embassy in Indonesia, 23 November 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 1, 1951, pp. 732-733. 
14 Ibid., p. 733. 
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had been advised aid should be kept low key and modest to avoid the USA being seen to 
“supplant the Netherlands as a colonial power”.15  Cochran’s advice was not accepted and 511 
(a) assurances were sought from Indonesia, albeit with substantial modifications of the original 
text of the document.  The MSA set a deadline of 90 days – 8 January 1952 – for all aid 
recipients to accept the new assurances. 
Not until early January did Indonesian officials express disquiet about signing up to an 
agreement that would count the country as part of the free world – a widely used euphemism 
for non-communist.  Four days before the deadline was due to expire Sukiman registered his 
reservations about these words, which he believed would cause trouble with parliament.  
Indonesian officials now proposed to substitute the phrase “peace-loving world”.  The late 
intervention ruffled Cochran who complained he had discussed the text with Subardjo “many 
times” over the previous month, most recently on the night of 3 January, without concern being 
raised over a phrase that the Americans “regarded as vital” to the agreement.  He rejected a late 
change and refused an invitation to speak to Sukiman directly by telephone about the matter.16   
In the face of implacable American opposition to further changes to the wording, 
Sukiman promptly relented.  On 5 January, Foreign Ministry officials told Cochran that 
Subardjo had signed.  A letter from Subradjo arrived at the Embassy two days later in which 
the Foreign Minister declared his government accepted the US proposal and stated the letter 
constituted a formal agreement between the two governments.17  But Sukiman’s wariness over 
how Indonesia’s agreement might be perceived found justification in the response of US 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.  In a message to Cochran, Acheson congratulated the 
ambassador on overcoming Indonesia’s “acute and continually jealous regard for its policy of 
independence”.  He added: “The Department considers that by your action you have been 
responsible for persuading the Indonesian Government to take an additional step toward 
alignment with the West.”18 
The buoyant reception over news Indonesia had been swung closer to the Western camp 
was soon deflated when the actions of Sukiman and Subardjo leaked out.  The pair had done 
their best to keep the agreement, and its terms, quiet.  The State Department had decided against 
																																																						
15 Telegram from the Ambassador in Jakarta (Cochran) to Secretary of State, 5 December 1951, FRUS, 
Vol. VI, Part 1, 1951, p. 742. 
16 An account of these events is recorded in Telegram from the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to 
the Department of State, 7 January 1952, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1952-1954, document 179, p. 246. 
17 Ibid., p. 247. 
18 Telegram from the Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Embassy in Indonesia, 8 January 1952, ibid., 
document 180, p. 248. 
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releasing details of the agreement unless legally obliged.  But it was inevitable Sukiman’s 
political competitors would eventually discover the concessions accepted in exchange for 
access to US military aid.  This happened in early February, although initially only to the rest 
of the 20-member cabinet.  At this point, the demand from cabinet critics was purely for 
Subardjo’s resignation.  But the stage was set for a full-blown crisis over the government’s 
mandate on 5 February when the story broke in the newspaper Abadi.19 
Problematically, Sukiman had chosen not to air the contents of the agreement earlier to 
cabinet colleagues.  Once the terms of MSA aid had been fixed and become publicly known, 
the strategies left to Sukiman and Subardjo for placating cabinet, parliament and the political 
public were limited.  In an effort to take pressure off the government, the State Department 
agreed to provide some wiggle room in the form of an “interpretive note” in which the 
contentious term “free world” was given to mean “independent, sovereign nations”.20  This 
contrivance was not sufficient to mollify the government’s opponents.  On 14 February 
parliament passed a motion that it reserved the right to ratify treaties, in effect reminding the 
government of Article 11 of the 1945 and interim 1950 constitutions.21  On 21 February, 
Subardjo was forced to resign when cabinet declared its disapproval of how he had handled the 
MSA negotiations.  By this time, the prime minister had also lost the support of his colleagues 
in Masyumi and of his major coalition partner, PNI.  Deserted by the cabinet and political party 
allies, an inevitable vote of no confidence in the government loomed in a parliamentary 
interpellation scheduled for 25 February.  Rather than face further humiliation, Sukiman 
resigned two days before the parliamentary debate.   
With the demise of this government, an era of overtly anti-communist and pro-Western 
rule in Indonesia was over.  The Hatta and Natsir governments had shared the general tenor of 
foreign policy of the Sukiman government, although neither of Sukiman’s predecessors had 
been as explicit in their orientation towards the West.  As Mozingo noted: “The MSA crisis 
																																																						
19 Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 200. 
20 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 19 February 1952, FRUS, Vol. 
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21 Whether the MSA agreement could be classified as a treaty and would require parliamentary 
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marked the passing from the scene of the last flagrantly pro-American government Indonesia 
was to have until the overthrow of Sukarno in 1966.”22    
But the standard accounts of the fall of the Sukiman government, and of the foreign 
policy of his predecessors, largely overlook the role of Sukarno and many of the ambiguities 
that beset policymaking during this period.  In a revealing interview with Cochran many 
months before the MSA crisis unfolded, Sukarno confided a different perspective on 
Indonesia’s neutrality in the Cold War and the independent foreign policy.  He told Cochran to 
convey to the State Department that the “Indonesian Government’s neutrality is one of form 
while [its] sentiment is on our side”.  Sukarno said Indonesia wanted military aid, albeit 
provided “behind a screen which would not provoke Communist antagonism and allegations 
that Indonesia’s policy of neutrality is a sham”.23 
Unfortunately, the USA failed to heed the advice to find a suitable screen when it 
framed the granting of military aid under the MSA.  Moreover, the Indonesian desire for the 
true nature of relations to be obscured from public view was a source of persistent frustration 
for US diplomats.  When Cochran saw Sukarno again in the midst of the MSA crisis on 12 
February 1952, he complained he had “never heard one friendly reference in a statement by 
any official of the Indonesian government towards the USA, which had been so importantly 
responsible for Indonesia achieving sovereignty and which had been one nation to take 
leadership in aiding the young sovereign state.”24 
Reminding Sukarno that they were meeting on the birthday of Abraham Lincoln, a US 
President the Indonesian leader professed to admire, Cochran made an entreaty for some 
positive statement on the relationship.  He told Sukarno there had never been an attempt by the 
USA to ensnare Indonesia in a mutual defence alliance – a somewhat disingenuous comment 
given the accolades he had received recently from Washington for drawing Indonesia closer to 
alignment with the West.  Cochran himself recorded in a retrospective analysis that he was 
aware of the risks being taken in attempting to seal an MSA agreement with Indonesia, but he 
considered the risks worth taking if the outcome was to “draw Indonesia one step nearer to the 
‘free world’ and prevent backsliding to the level of Burma”.25   
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But Indonesia was steadfast in wanting to maintain public perceptions of its neutrality 
and independence, even as the necessity of obtaining the support of a great friend entailed 
compromise.  Subardjo, a “pragmatic thinker” as well as a sophisticated diplomat, largely 
avoided discussion of the MSA debacle in his memoirs.26  But in private conversation with 
Cochran, he justified his actions for meeting US terms for military aid as in the national interest.  
Indonesia needed the equipment and training the USA provided to overcome domestic 
insurgency and resist foreign intervention at a time of strategic uncertainty.  His real mistake 
was probably not the acceptance of American military aid, but to do it in a way that publicly 
challenged popular notions of foreign policy independence and, by extension, notions of 
nationalism.  There is a good argument that Sukiman’s ultimate failing was symbolic – in the 
eyes of his compatriots, the MSA agreement represented “a formal ideological surrender” to 
the ideas of the US Congress about the nature of the world struggle.27 
 
Interpreting Independence: From Sukiman to Wilopo 
 
Whatever the nature of Sukiman’s trespass, his misadventures in foreign policy had a 
sobering effect on his successor Wilopo.  Following Wilopo’s ascension as prime minister in 
April 1952, his first major statement on foreign policy signalled the caution that would 
characterise his 14-months in office.  He was far more explicit than his predecessors in setting 
the boundaries of Indonesia’s relations with the great powers.  Indonesia would neither “align 
itself to any of the conflicting blocs” nor “become involved in any conflict which is the 
consequence of the confrontation between the two conflicting blocs”.  Speaking to parliament, 
he noted that the term “independent” had been a source of confusion both abroad and within 
Indonesia.  His interpretation assessed independence in foreign policy by two standards:  
adherence to the United Nations charter and service to the interests of the state and its people.  
This latter constituent was taken to mean the government would “safeguard the freedom and 
sovereignty of the nation”, ensure it is not “endangered or involved in an armed conflict” and 
“endeavor to enhance the position of the country and to protect its people”.28 
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Yet foreign policy was to play a minor role in the affairs of the Wilopo government.  
Indeed, it was “placed last among the points of the cabinet’s program”.29  Wilopo and his 
foreign minister Mukarto Notowidigdo, both members of the PNI, made halting efforts to 
renegotiate US aid to replace the MSA section 511 (a) agreement with a section (b) agreement.  
Although it eventually won US approval for this in January 1953, the Wilopo government 
avoided all mention of MSA aid because of the fear of antagonising parliament and 
complicating ratification.30  Mukarto told Dean Acheson he could not agree to any aid 
provisions that subjected the government to attacks in parliament that it was not neutral or was 
aligned against Communist powers.31 
The most significant foreign policy initiative came not from the government but the 
parliament.  A parliamentary motion tabled in February 1953 called for the opening of 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by the end of the year as a concrete manifestation 
of Indonesia’s neutrality.  Despite mutual recognition in January and February 1950, Indonesia 
had dissembled in the years since over the matter of exchanging ambassadors.32  Mohammad 
Roem, foreign minister in the Natsir government, had told Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrey 
Vyshinsky, in November 1950 the main reason no ambassador had been sent was that 
Indonesia could not find a suitable candidate. 33  Soon after taking office, Wilopo had declared 
the time was still not right.  Regardless, the parliamentary motion passed on 9 April 1953 with 
the support of four government parties, including Wilopo’s PNI.   Masyumi, another member 
of the governing coalition, warned a Soviet Embassy in Jakarta might act as a Trojan Horse 
and threatened to withdraw its four ministers if ambassadors were exchanged.  An embassy 
was not finally established in Moscow until after Wilopo’s departure in March 1954.34   
But the Wilopo era was significant for a domestic political development that would 
have long-term implications for foreign policy.  The crackdown launched by Sukiman against 
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leftists and communists had induced a new moderation in the PKI leadership.  It was under 
Wilopo that this new PKI thinking became manifest.  The opposition the party expressed to the 
Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman governments was dropped in favor of conditional support for 
Wilopo.  Thus the period of the Wilopo government is rightly considered a political “turning 
point” for Indonesia, particularly in relation to foreign policy.35  Despite Wilopo’s modest 
accomplishments in foreign policy, his government marked the transition from “the anti-
communist, Western-oriented foreign policies that had been dominant since 1950 to a greater 
degree of autonomy in foreign affairs”.36  The moderation of the PKI leadership – an attempt 
to recast the party’s image after the alleged betrayal of Madiun – contributed to a steady 
improvement in relations between Indonesia and the Communist states. 
 
A New Balanced and Activist Foreign Policy 
 
 In the trajectory of foreign policy, 1953 was an inflection point for Indonesia.  It marked 
the coming to power of the most activist prime minister of the constitutional democracy period.  
In July that year, Ali Sastroamidjojo, a PNI leader and former ambassador to Washington, 
formed the first government to seek to give Indonesia a regional and global presence.  Other 
governments, including Sukiman’s, had actively pursued certain issues.  But no government 
was as consistent, confident or ambitious in its embrace of a foreign policy mission for the 
state.  At ease in the world of diplomacy, Ali grasped the significance of Indonesia’s history, 
size and strategic role and proved more capable than his predecessors in fashioning a foreign 
policy to suit the times and the nation’s values.37  The formulation of foreign policy to give 
Indonesia a distinct voice resulted in a more balanced posture between the Western and 
communist blocs.  In the zero-sum calculations of the Cold War, this equated for many 
observers in both Washington and the Communist capitals as a downgrading of relations with 
the West.    
 The common analysis of the politics of Indonesia under the Ali government is that it 
“veered to the left”.38  This was certainly the view from Washington.  The Ali government was 
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the first to exclude the anti-communist Masyumi and, as a consequence of the alignments in 
parliament, was perceived to be reliant on the support of the PKI for a legislative majority.39  
US diplomats in Jakarta concluded the government would be “strongly leftist in both domestic 
and foreign policy and probably hostile to US interests”.40  A subsequent analysis for the NSC 
estimated eight of the 20 members of the cabinet were either Communist sympathisers or 
susceptible to PKI influence.41  CIA director Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, told President Eisenhower that the Ali government as a “Popular Front”.42    
In Moscow and Beijing, similar conclusions were being drawn, encouraged by the 
PKI’s pledge to support the government.43  Indonesia’s new cordiality towards Communist 
states was evident in steps to normalise relations, which were readily reciprocated.  A Soviet 
embassy was finally opened in Jakarta in April 1954.  The following September, Subandrio, a 
diplomat, medical doctor and Sukarno favorite, became the first Indonesian ambassador to 
Moscow.  Within days of the Ali government being sworn in, Indonesia also sent its first 
ambassador to Beijing, Arnold Mononutu, a distinguished PNI figure who had been Minister 
for Information in the Hatta, Sukiman and Wilopo cabinets.  A year later, China took the 
opportunity to heal some of the wounds inflicted during Sukiman’s crackdown on leftists and 
the activities of the Chinese embassy by sending a respected revolutionary leader to Jakarta.  
Huang Zhen was a Long March veteran, senior general in the People’s Liberation Army and 
former ambassador to Hungary.44  His revolutionary credentials made him a good choice to 
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implement in Indonesia the new goodwill policy China had adopted towards its non-
Communist Asian neighbors. 
 Despite the diplomatic opening to Communist states, and anxiety in Washington that 
Indonesia had made a sharp turn to the left, it was inaccurate to depict Indonesia as suddenly 
adopting an anti-Western posture.  Ali, who had served in Washington from the formal transfer 
sovereignty until his appointment as prime minister, was not anti-American or unwelcoming 
of engagement with the USA where he felt it benefited Indonesian interests.  He had been an 
advocate of the signing of the Japan Peace Treaty and of obtaining US military aid.45  On 1 
April 1953, shortly before becoming prime minister, Ali approached the State Department 
“personally and informally” over the possibility of sending a US military training mission to 
Indonesia.46  
The Indonesian request was received with quiet enthusiasm in Washington.  The State 
Department immediately set to work on drafting a proposal to send about 200 American 
military advisers to Indonesia.47  Although memories of the MSA debacle were fresh in the 
minds of policymakers, the ill-conceived nostrum that American aid might draw Indonesia 
closer to formal or informal alliance proved dangerously hard to kill.  The assessment of the 
State Department was that the establishment of a US military mission in Indonesia would be 
“widely interpreted as evidence that Indonesia considered its ‘independence’ required 
alignment with the United States”.  Moreover, an American presence was seen as likely to have 
a “bracing psychological effect” on other countries in Southeast Asia.48  But the idea foundered 
after Ali came to power.  The nationalist complexion of his government and his desire to retain 
Communist votes precluded such an open collaboration with the USA, although the USA 
remained the preferred partner for military training.49  
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While the Ali government was not prepared to risk the criticism that was likely to arise 
from a display of affinity with the USA, there were frequent private reassurances to US officials 
from national leaders.  The 1950 constitution vested the executive power of the state in the 
prime minister and his cabinet.  Sukarno was constrained and bridled at the limitations imposed 
on him.  But he used his prestige and popularity to shape both government decisions behind 
the scenes and the temper of national politics in public.  On several occasions, Sukarno directly 
and indirectly conveyed to the Americans that he was on their side.   The chief of the president’s 
secretariat, A.K. Pringgodigdo, pulled Cumming aside at the Dutch National Day reception in 
April 1954 to say Sukarno was “leaning more and more towards the US, partly because of a 
real liking for Americans and American ways and partly because of distrust of PKI activities”.50  
The purpose of Pringgodigdo’s approach was to sound the ambassador out over the possibility 
of Sukarno making a visit to the USA before the 1955 parliamentary elections.  But US 
diplomats were frustrated at Sukarno’s refusal to say publicly what he was telling them in 
private.51  His stature with the public meant his endorsement of relations with the US would 
have been a significant fillip for both the bilateral relationship and non-communist political 
parties in Indonesia.  
The Ali government and Sukarno had a variety of international and domestic reasons 
for wanting to avoid an explicit expression of partiality towards the USA.  Internationally, there 
were rewards to be had from consolidating the nascent opening to the Communist states, 
including access to new markets for Indonesian commodities.  This reflected the underlying 
pragmatism, summed up by Sukarno in his autobiography with the comment that “[a] nation 
engaged in surviving must take help from all sides, accept whatever is useful and throw away 
the rest”.52   
In any case, within weeks of the approach to Cumming, Sukarno had cooled on the idea 
of a visit to Washington.  The reason for caution was justified by Dulles’ own assessment that 
the visit would indicate a “basic preference for free world countries over the Communist 
bloc”.53  On 10 June, Pringgodigdo conveyed the message that Sukarno now felt he could only 
visit the USA after the elections and, then, only if there was a “good result” – meaning a victory 
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by the PNI and leftist parties.54  Pringgodigdo noted Sukarno had increasingly isolated himself 
from parties other than the PNI and its leftist associates and had steadily softened his views of 
the Communists over the previous 18 months.  By exercising restraint and refraining from 
personal attacks on Sukarno, the PKI had “somewhat weakened the President’s mental 
defences against the communist infiltrators”.55  Domestically, Sukarno was confident that he 
had the PKI under control and, internationally, he did not perceive communism to be quite as 
menacing to Indonesian security as the USA claimed.  Sukarno did tell Cumming in one 
exchange at the Presidential Palace after the signing of the Geneva Accords that Indochina was 
“now lost”.56  But, as he saw it, the direct danger was to Southeast Asia in general, and 
especially Thailand, rather than Indonesia. 
What did cause Indonesian leaders immediate disquiet was the failure of the USA to 
support Indonesian claims over West New Guinea.  The USA had adopted a position of 
neutrality between Jakarta’s demand to incorporate West New Guinea in the new Indonesian 
state and the refusal of The Hague to relinquish the last Dutch outpost in the old Netherlands 
East Indies.  In the years before the ascension of the Ali government, Indonesia had persevered 
with fitful and inconclusive negotiations with the Dutch.  The goal was to implement the part 
of the Round Table agreements that required “within one year after the date of the transfer of 
sovereignty” the settlement of the political status of West New Guinea through negotiations 
between the parties.57   
The Ali government took a more assertive attitude towards West New Guinea than its 
predecessors.  In Ali, Sukarno found a prime minister who shared his views on the need to back 
diplomacy with actions to demonstrate Indonesia’s resolve.  On advice from Sukarno, the 
government launched limited military incursions on the fringes of West New Guinea in 1954 
and broadened the diplomatic campaign by taking the dispute to the United Nations General 
Assembly.58  At the UN, Indonesia dropped its resolution in the committee stage when it was 
obvious it would not win the two-thirds majority necessary to have the issue inscribed on the 
general assembly agenda.  Simultaneously, government leaders took every opportunity to point 
out to US officials that the lack of progress on West New Guinea was providing the PKI with 
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an opportunity to exploit nationalist sentiment and portray itself as the party of anti-
imperialism.  
Despite the entreaties, the USA was not prepared to risk relations with Cold War allies.  
Europe was still seen as the primary theatre of Cold War conflict and the Netherlands was a 
key link in the chain of NATO alliances.  In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, allied with the USA 
under the 1951 ANZUS treaty, objected to Indonesian occupation of West New Guinea out of 
a fear that Indonesia might in due course turn Communist and under either nationalist or 
Communist rule seek to annex the Australian-administered territory of Papua New Guinea.  As 
US officials repeatedly reminded their Indonesian counterparts, they faced an invidious choice 
between the positions of a friend in Indonesia and allies in the Netherlands and Australia.  
Neutrality was a vexed compromise.  None of the parties were happy with Washington’s 
equivocation.  But if the USA were to have succumbed to pressure to take sides, the result 
would not have been a happy one for Indonesia.  Dulles took the view that the inhabitants of 
West New Guinea would be more assured of political self-determination under Dutch rule.59  
Dulles also was more sympathetic to Australian strategic concerns than he was to Indonesian 
claims to natural ownership of the disputed territory.  He reassured Australian Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies at a meeting in Washington in March 1955 that in the event of a showdown 
over West New Guinea “right or wrong” the USA would back Australia.60 
But the Eisenhower administration failed to fully appreciate the visceral nature of 
Indonesian feeling over the incorporation of West New Guinea.  Indonesia’s claims were cast 
as irredentist and were not simply a matter of coolly calculated national policy.  They reflected 
a psychological need for a society newly freed from the bonds of colonialism to see the last 
vestiges of that reviled national servitude expunged.   The depth of Indonesian feeling was 
expressed by Sukarno when he referred to West New Guinea “as part of our body”, and asked, 
“would anybody allow one of his limbs to be amputated without putting up a fight?”61   
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The Road to Nonalignment: Convening the Nations of Asia and Africa 
 
It was against the domestic backdrop of frustrated ambitions over West New Guinea 
and disappointment over the willingness of the West to respond to the interests of a poor, newly 
decolonised state that the Ali government launched the signature foreign policy initiative of 
the period.  It would ultimately lead to Indonesia formalising its status as a non-aligned state.   
At a meeting of leaders from Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan in the Ceylonese 
capital Colombo at the end of April 1954, Ali launched the idea of convening a conference of 
heads of government from Africa and Asia, including the Middle East.  He hoped that by 
uniting this geographically arbitrary collection of the disdained and the downtrodden in 
international affairs a voice could be given to the interests of the silent majority of peoples then 
living outside the superpowers and their allies and satellites.  Still, the plan was ambitious and 
its rationale not obvious.  Beyond shared objections to imperialism, albeit not all of the 
potential attendees were former colonies, and fears of being embroiled in Cold War conflict 
not of their making, there were few obvious commonalities of interests between the states to 
be invited to Ali’s proposed Asia-Africa conference.   
The meeting of the smaller and more cohesive Colombo powers demonstrated the 
hurdles to achieving common identification.  Individual interests, such as the competing claims 
of India and Pakistan to Kashmir, were as salient as collective interests.  Fortuitously for the 
Colombo Five, their meeting coincided with the Geneva conference on the fate of Indochina, 
allowing them to express a view on a regional problem of global significance.  This became 
the main focus of the gathering, with the leaders agreeing to a set of proposals from Nehru for 
a ceasefire, the handover of complete sovereignty in Vietnam to an unspecified, and 
problematically determined, national entity and the withdrawal of the great powers from the 
area to enable the Vietnamese to get on with deciding what that entity might be.  The fact that 
a ceasefire was eventually agreed in Geneva produced an exaggerated sense of the influence 
of the Colombo meeting, which was to feed into later assessments of the potential of the smaller 
powers of the post-colonial world to influence global events. 
But initially Ali encountered a tepid response from his counterparts in Colombo to his 
proposal for a conference of African and Asian leaders.  Nehru, whose opinion was crucial 
because of his personal stature and India’s size, worried that bringing such a disparate group 
together risked their collective purpose becoming lost in parochial disputes.  Ali records the 
reaction of his Colombo partners was unenthusiastic, although they agreed in their joint 
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communiqué to allow him to “explore the possibility” of convening a conference.62  One 
consolation was that the Colombo Five delivered a strong statement of support to Indonesia’s 
claim to incorporate West New Guinea – a significant domestic motivation for the decision to 
seek an Asia-Africa conference.63 
The idea of such a conference was very much Ali’s own initiative.  More than any 
Indonesian prime minister, Ali had a restless desire to give Indonesia relevance and status in 
international affairs.  “The Republic of Indonesia did not want to be regarded as of no 
significance in the world,” Ali later recorded, pointing to the size of its territory and population, 
its abundance of resources and its strategic location.64  To him, the attainment of national 
independence and these great natural endowments impelled Indonesia’s leaders to ensure the 
terms of the state’s international engagement were not dictated by the same foreign powers that 
had been responsible for the iniquity of colonialism.   The pride instilled by international 
recognition would serve as recompense for the humiliation of colonisation and swell the morale 
required for nation building.  But the lack of material power required Indonesia to pursue its 
aspirations for international stature through diplomatic innovation, harnessing the ideological 
power of states with similar histories, interests and circumstances. 
Despite the initially ambivalent response from Ali’s Colombo partners, international 
events turned in favor of convening the Asia-Africa conference.  Nehru’s reluctance was 
overcome by several international developments following the Colombo meeting.  These 
included the First Taiwan Strait crisis – Communist China’s shelling of the Nationalist-held 
island groups of Kinmen and Matsu in 1954-55 – fears of US intervention in support of the 
embattled French in Vietnam, the founding of a US-led collective defence arrangement in 
Southeast Asia, and the signing of an agreement between India and China on peaceful 
coexistence, the so-called Five Principles or Panch Shila.65  The last two of these developments 
had a critical bearing on Nehru’s attitude to the desirability of convening a conference of Asian 
and African states, with one viewed as a threat and the other as an opportunity. 
The Southeast Asia defence arrangement grew out of the French troubles in Vietnam.  
The fall of Den Bien Phu on 7 May 1954 spelled the end of the French effort to militarily defeat 
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the Viet Minh.  Viewing the advance of France’s communist enemy with alarm, John Foster 
Dulles called for “united action” to prevent all of Indochina falling into communist hands.66  
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had no desire to extend his country’s already 
excessive obligations in Southeast Asia, rejected Dulles call to arms.  But to appease the 
Americans, Eden proposed the formation of a collective security arrangement binding the USA 
and its regional allies with Britain and some members of its Commonwealth.  Negotiations 
over this arrangement were finalised in Manila in September, creating the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) as the military arm of the regional security group.67  
Efforts to convince other regional countries to join SEATO failed, with Indonesia, India 
and Burma refusing to compromise their neutral status.  In response to a letter from Eden on 
20 July formally inviting Indonesia to sign up to SEATO, Ali insisted “any one-sided defence 
arrangement in the South West Pacific should be avoided, since it would add a new element to 
the causes of tension in that area, which eventually could lead to war”.68  In Ali’s view, SEATO 
jeopardised the progress made on Indochina at Geneva and reawakened the idea of great power 
“spheres of influence” in the region. Moreover, it was “an instrument for United States and 
United Kingdom domination in the Southeast Asian region”.69 
Just as the USA and its allies set out to institutionalise the containment of communism 
in the region, India and China reached their historic détente.  The Panch Shila served to ease 
fears over the intentions of Communist China, nurturing the image foreign minister Zhou Enlai 
had started to craft as a conciliator at the Geneva conference.  Following agreement on the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, Nehru sought opportunities to bring China into the 
mainstream of international affairs.  In the face of strong American resistance, he particularly 
wanted China to join the United Nations and assume the Chinese seat on the Security Council.   
Suddenly, the idea of a conference of Asian and African states offered new appeal.  It 
could be a venue to assert regional independence from Cold War divisions, thus countering the 
perceived destabilisation caused by SEATO, and it could provide a platform to introduce the 
idea of a moderate Communist China to the world.  An organising committee comprising the 
Colombo Five met on 28 and 29 December to draw up a list of 30 states to be invited, including 
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China and North and South Vietnam.  They agreed Indonesia would chair the conference and 
host it at a location of its choosing in April 1955.  Ali chose Bandung.70 
For the organisers, the overriding goal of the Bandung conference was to demonstrate 
unity on common global concerns, among which the risk of war between the great powers and 
the persistence of colonialism were regarded as paramount.  There was a well-founded fear that 
in the event of great power war states on the ‘periphery’ would become theatres of conflict, 
regardless of how remote they were from the main belligerents.  The insight Ali and Nehru 
shared was that the lack of material power among the Asian and African states to attend 
Bandung could be offset by the power of ideas and the moral suasion of former colonies whose 
conviction in the justice of their cause had helped overcome superior European power.  
Moreover, the 29 states that accepted invitations to attend the conference had a combined 
population of 1.45 billion, then more than half the world.   
These themes were evident when the Asia Africa conference opened on 18 April 1955. 
Speaking in slow but clear English, Sukarno told delegates in his opening address:   
 
The peoples of Asia Africa wield little physical power.  Even their economic strength is 
dispersed and light.  We cannot indulge in power politics.  Diplomacy for us is not a matter 
of the big stick.  Our statesmen, by and large, are not backed up with serried ranks of jet 
bombers.  What can we do?  We can do much!  We can inject the voice of reason into 
world affairs.  We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of 
Asia and Africa on the side of peace.71 
 
Having issued a call for what he termed “the moral violence of nations in favor of 
peace”, Sukarno retired to his residence at Bogor, leaving the conference to be run by Ali, as 
conference chairman, and Roeslan Abdulgani, the secretary general of the Foreign Ministry 
who was placed in charge of the conference secretariat.  The limited role played by Sukarno 
both before and during the conference is interesting in view of the way he later became strongly 
associated with the ethos and accomplishments of the conference – what has been referred to 
over the years as the “Bandung spirit”.  Still, by all accounts, Sukarno’s rousing speech at the 
opening helped to set the tone for the conference.  
But the problem the organisers faced from the outset was that there was no unanimity 
among the leaders on the Bandung guest list as to the correct position to adopt in the Cold War.  
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There were allies of the Soviet Union, allies of the USA and advocates of nonalignment.  The 
issue of alliance status was set to be one of the dominant themes of the Bandung conference, 
one that threatened to divide the meeting and render it a failure.  The issue arose indirectly 
early in the conference in debates about colonialism.  Several delegates from countries with 
close ties to the USA were not prepared to accept colonialism was purely a Western evil.  They 
depicted the Soviet Union’s control over the states of Central and Eastern Europe as a modern 
form of imperialism.   The contribution to this debate that caused most controversy came from 
the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, who referred to the colonialism evident in 
“those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe”, equating 
it with the colonialism historically experienced in Asia and Africa.72   
The differences over alliance politics could not be easily resolved.  They remained 
central to debates in the conference’s political committee.  The fundamental disagreement was 
between those states, in particular SEATO members, who believed their preservation depended 
on collective security, and those who believed that if the region of nonaligned states were larger 
the risk of war would be lower.  The most vocal proponent of this latter position was Nehru.  
He warned that security pacts had only “brought insecurity and not security to the countries 
which have entered into them”.73  Indonesia too voiced the suspicion of European models of 
security.  Foreign minister Sunario argued the idea of a balance of power underlay the Cold 
War, which might soon become an actual war.74   Abdulgani, who played a key role in the 
conference by keeping track of the various drafts and smoothing conflicts, found the issue of 
alliance status to be the toughest in reaching an agreement on a final statement from the 
political committee.75  Members of SEATO and the 1955 Baghdad Pact, later named the 
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), favored acknowledgement of the right of collective 
self-defence.  There were anxious hours on the last day of the conference in which Ali feared 
his great diplomatic initiative was on the verge of collapse.76 
Ultimately unity was preserved at the expense of intelligibility.  On the issue of 
alliances, the final communiqué was internally contradictory.  The so-called dasasila, or ten 
principles of Bandung, attached to the final communiqué respected “the right of each nation to 
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defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations”.  But 
it simultaneously called on states to abstain from collective defence arrangements that served 
“the particular interests of any of the big powers”, even as the big powers formed the core of 
these arrangements. Cracks in conference unity over colonialism were also papered over with 
a declaration that it was evil “in all its manifestations” and should be brought to a quick end.77  
Despite the awkward compromises, the Asia Africa conference ended with a unanimous 
call for peaceful co-existence.  In an ideologically polarised world, the solidarity exhibited by 
the Asia Africa conference in seeking restraint from interstate aggression, negotiation to 
resolve disputes, recognition of equality among peoples, and respect for global norms and the 
integrity of states, struck a chord, even among great power adversaries.  Khrushchev recorded 
that the Soviet leadership found the Bandung principles to be “impressive”, especially the call 
for peaceful co-existence, in view of the prevailing world situation.78  Even Dulles, ever 
vigilant for signs of communist subterfuge, told a meeting of the Eisenhower cabinet the final 
communiqué “was a document which we ourselves could subscribe to”.79   
Yet both sides had tried to influence the course of the conference.  Dulles, fearing its 
non-communist allies would be drawn into common purpose with the Communist bloc, had 
initially opposed the convening of a conference.  Eventually, the USA urged partners such as 
the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey to send their ablest people and take opportunities to 
frustrate Communist propaganda.80  For its part, the Soviet Union saw some tactical advantage 
to be gained in its relations with Jakarta by openly supporting the conference while heightening 
fears in Indonesia over the purpose of SEATO.  On 24 March, in the lead up to the conference, 
the Soviet ambassador D.A. Zhukov met foreign minister Sunario and warned him a meeting 
called in Bangkok in February to formally establish SEATO had intended to drive a “wedge” 
between conference participants by sending a message of support to the “free countries” 
attending.81 
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The intrigues aside, the conference succeeded in providing a reminder that the interests 
and opinion of the Asian and African states, and their huge populations, could not be ignored 
by the great powers.  In doing so, the Asia Africa conference left a number of legacies, of which 
the most significant was its role in laying the foundations for a new stream of international 
politics.  It was the direct instrumental progenitor of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  
Although this organisation did not formally come into existence until the Belgrade meeting of 
1961, Bandung bestowed legitimacy and respectability on the idea of neutrality.  The 
conference also served to bring Communist China to the forefront of regional politics at a time 
when it was still unable to take up a seat in the UN because of objections from the USA.  After 
Bandung, China appeared less threatening to the region and US depictions of an inherently 
aggressive China appeared less plausible. 
The legacies of Bandung for Indonesian foreign policy were just as important.  Five 
years after the formal transfer of sovereignty, the Asia Africa conference put Indonesia on the 
map.  This is evident in the recollection of Khrushchev that the Asia Africa conference resulted 
in Indonesia being talked about in the politburo for the first time.  “At that time, the whole 
world’s attention was riveted on Indonesia, and the name of its President, Sukarno, began to 
appear regularly in the Soviet press,” Khrushchev recalled. 82   
The conference proved Indonesia was capable of staging a major world event and 
influencing the course of big foreign policy debates.  It served to validate the key themes of 
foreign policy.  It legitimised the bebas-aktif formula in an international forum after years of 
US efforts to disparage Indonesian neutrality as evidence of a lack of conviction and to corral 
it either formally or informally in the “free world” alliance system.  It promoted the cause 
against colonialism, another staple theme of Indonesian foreign policy, and it anticipated future 
North-South debates on race, poverty and economic development.  In a specific win for Ali, it 
agreed to insert a clause in the communiqué calling on the Dutch to reopen negotiations on 
West New Guinea. 
The tragedy of Bandung was that peaceful coexistence was a chimera.  It survived only 
in theory for many of its participants.  Within several years of Bandung, several conflicts 
erupted between Asia-Africa states.  Most strikingly, given their place in the Bandung story, 
India and China clashed on their border in the Himalayas.  And Indonesia was to have its own 
troubles with China as contradictions emerged between domestic and international priorities. 
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The China Factor  
 
 The Asia Africa conference was the setting for a remarkable blossoming of the Sino-
Indonesian relationship after the mutual displays of hostility of the early 1950s.  It represented 
a “turning point” in diplomatic relations between the two biggest countries in East Asia by 
geography and population size.83  Zhou arrived in Indonesia with the explicit intention of 
placating the Southeast Asian states, and particularly the conference host.  It was a pragmatic 
gesture from a state still excluded from the institutions of the new global order and possessed 
of few reliable friends.  Aside from the moderation exhibited in Bandung and the pledges of 
peaceful coexistence, Zhou offered a concrete demonstration of China’s benign intent towards 
the region.  He did this by agreeing to a formula to solve the so-called Dual Nationality 
problem.84   
 China’s citizenship policy was then based on the idea that any person of Chinese 
ethnicity was entitled to the same rights as a person born in China, the principle of jus 
sanguinis.  Given the large Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, this caused considerable 
anxiety to governments in the region that clung to a range of old suspicions and stereotypes 
about their Chinese minorities.  One of the most enduring of these was a belief that the Chinese 
were not committed to their adopted land or, in the case of the peranakan Chinese, land of their 
forebears.  In the crudest sense, they represented a potential fifth column.  During his visit to 
Indonesia, Zhou addressed the deeply ingrained diffidence about Chinese intentions with 
surprising candor.  He was conscious of the potential liability the diaspora could become for 
stable relations between China and the new states of the region.  He acknowledged this in a 
later speech in Beijing: 
 
The new China has stood up, but also become increasingly stronger as a major power 
in Asia.  People are afraid of dual nationality, and we have come to realise this after 
visiting countries such as India and Burma.85 
 
In a deal negotiated between Beijing and Jakarta over many months leading up to the 
Asia Africa conference, China agreed to drop the principle of jus sanguinis and embrace a 
formula in which dual national Chinese in Indonesia would have two years in which to choose 
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either Chinese or Indonesian citizenship.  The Dual Nationality Treaty, announced during the 
Asia Africa conference on 22 April, contained several undertakings that were just as important 
to the resolution of the ‘Chinese problem’ as the mechanism of national determination itself.  
In a statement noted by all the Southeast Asian delegations at Bandung, China called on 
Chinese resident in Indonesia to refrain from participating in political activities and to abide 
by the laws and customs of Indonesia.  This was taken as a signal that China would not seek to 
meddle in the internal affairs of regional states by utilising the Chinese minority.  In return, 
Indonesia pledged to protect the rights and interests of its Chinese residents. 
The Dual Nationality Treaty solved another problem for Indonesia.  It superseded an 
agreement negotiated with the Dutch on the same question and included in the Round Table 
Conference agreements.  This agreement allowed Indonesian Chinese to be automatically 
conferred citizenship within two years unless they specifically chose to opt out.   Indonesia was 
never happy with the idea its resident Chinese might gain citizenship passively because it spoke 
of a lack of commitment to the nation.  In the end, the processes of ratification in Indonesia 
and China led to the treaty not coming into force until January 1960 and in the meantime 
tensions were to resurface over the Chinese question. 
But in April 1955 the signing of the Dual Nationality Treaty by Zhou and Sunario 
attested to China’s wish for peaceful coexistence with the region.  It produced an outpouring 
of laudatory statements about the Communist Chinese leadership from Ali and other public 
figures.  In his enthusiasm, Ali on 28 April agreed on a joint statement with Zhou in Jakarta 
aimed at broadening the bilateral reconciliation represented by the Dual Nationality Treaty to 
other issues of concern to both parties, in particular the status of Taiwan and West New Guinea.  
The fourth paragraph of this statement caused particular alarm in Washington.  It stated that 
the two prime ministers recognised the “inalienable right of the people of any country to 
safeguard their own sovereignty and territorial integrity” and they went on to offer support to 
each other’s efforts to do so.  Although the sentiments would seem unexceptional, the statement 
was viewed in the context of the time as tacit endorsement of the use of force for either country 
to press its claims over disputed territory.86  Meeting Indonesian journalists in Beijing in June, 
Zhao confirmed that the target of paragraph four was Taiwan and West New Guinea, but the 
support envisaged was “political and moral”, not military.87  
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The view from Washington was that Indonesia had made a “demonstrative step towards 
closer relations with [Beijing] and toward a leftist foreign policy” with the signing of the Dual 
Nationality Treaty and the Ali-Zhou joint statement. 88  The analysis of US diplomats was that 
the Dual Nationality Treaty and the joint statement were simply propaganda tools for Beijing. 
Even Khrushchev doubted the sincerity of Chinese pledges of good conduct.  He observed the 
Chinese were at one moment in favor of peaceful co-existence and “the next minute they are 
against it”.89 
The success of Zhou’s diplomacy in Indonesia prompted a sharp increase in diplomatic, 
economic and cultural exchanges.90  It also prompted the two countries to more readily identify 
with each other’s international concerns.  On his visit to China in late May and early June, Ali 
had declared China’s claims over Taiwan were “purely a matter of internal affairs” – a strong 
endorsement of Beijing’s position on the issue.91  The opposition press in Indonesia viewed 
this open support for Chinese sovereignty as an unnecessary concession, which jeopardised the 
independent foreign policy.92  It certainly represented a dramatic turnaround in the character 
of the relationship in the three years following the end of the Sukiman cabinet.   
But even for Ali and many other promoters of the overtures to Beijing the new warmth 
in ties undoubtedly reflected a commonality of interests rather than sentiment.  The historic 
wariness Indonesians felt towards China, and the role of the ethnic Chinese minority, would 
not change because of perceived commercial and diplomatic gains or the signing of treaties.  
There remained a realist dimension to Indonesian calculations over the advantages and risks of 
closer cooperation with China.  A US National Security Council assessment in May 1955 was 
almost certainly correct when it found: “Indonesians feel protected from external aggression; 
they have an inherent fear of China as a power, but do not regard it as an immediate threat.”93  
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Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
 Indonesia acquired statehood at a time of considerable uncertainty in its wider region.  
Conflicts that unsettled East Asia – the Korean War, the First Indochina War and the Taiwan 
Strait – demonstrated the fragility of peace soon after the end of the Second World War.  These 
flashpoints were far enough away, and of a nature, not to directly threaten Indonesian security.  
Indeed, perversely, the Korean War, which increased prices for Indonesian commodities like 
oil, tin and rubber, was a boon to Indonesia.  But in Southeast Asia, the formation of SEATO, 
the US strategy of containing communism and the continuing presence of European colonial 
powers captured more attention in Jakarta.  They risked exacerbating Cold War tensions and, 
possibly, provoking a hot war within the region that could impinge on Indonesian interests.  
Still, the new state of Indonesia was relatively secure within its borders, its early prime 
ministers were themselves anti-communist and the economy was benefiting from strong 
commodity markets.  Neighboring states possessed neither the motive nor the offensive power 
to directly endanger Indonesian territory – a perception confirmed by Sukarno’s somewhat 
sanguine view of the French defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh. 
 Under these circumstances Indonesia could count on having policy space to focus on 
its paramount challenge: nation building.  The two principal features of that task were to, first, 
create a national economy that benefited Indonesians and, second, forge cohesion among the 
disparate political and cultural elements of Indonesian society.  The former required access to 
foreign markets and capital on terms that benefited Indonesia and the latter required equitable 
economic progress to be accompanied by a combination of nationalist conviction and armed 
coercion to defeat a range of insurgencies.  These were the critical interests for the first 
administrations after the transfer of sovereignty.  Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman all to a greater or 
lesser degree appreciated those interests were better served by increasingly close relations with 
the West, especially the USA.   
  The critical alignment decisions were made easier by the weakness at the time of 
domestic communist forces and the mutual suspicion and neglect that characterised relations 
with communist states.  The combative political campaigning of Chinese ambassador Wang 
Renshu was reflective of the poor state of relations between Jakarta and the communist capitals.  
But even Sukiman, the most overtly pro-American prime minister, and his foreign minister 
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Subarjdo were aware that they needed to pay obeisance to the bebas-aktif policy.  Their 
diplomacy with the Americans, where possible, was conducted in secret.  The gap between 
public and private diplomacy was strikingly demonstrated by Sukarno’s private assurances that 
the bebas-aktif policy was a matter of form; Indonesian sentiment was with the USA.  These 
were clear cases of what has been termed undisclosed alignment.  But when the terms of MSA 
aid were disclosed it was clearly a step too far.   
 In this phase of foreign policy, the priority interests that determined alignment were 
associated with national consolidation.  The advocates of signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty 
insisted their motive was the promotion of Indonesia’s national interests rather than preference 
for alignment with the USA per se, although their anti-communism made this an obvious 
choice.  It is apparent that a focus on the capabilities and intentions of neighboring states does 
little to explain Indonesia’s alignment posture.  Rather, the outcome of policy is consistent with 
expectations that in an environment where the prospect of loss is perceived to be low 
policymakers would feel free to pursue alignment strategies that reflect domestically-derived 
preferences and interests while seeking to retain policy autonomy.  The first three governments 
can be seen to be balancing the risk of domestic censure over the sacrifice of policy autonomy 
against the benefits that might accrue from partisan international engagement.  Sukiman’s 
misjudgement proved his downfall. 
There were calculated risks in the Sukiman-Subardjo foreign policy.  But they 
represented a rational evaluation of costs and benefits.  The USA was a natural partner, given 
the market access and resources it offered to assist Indonesian development.  The logic of 
engagement was reinforced by Masyumi’s anti-communism.  Working closely with the USA 
allowed the government to serve both domestic and international goals.  The outcome showed 
that Sukiman and Subardjo had overreached.  But there were signs it was caught by surprise 
by the extent of the hostility to its foreign policy.  The left was on the defensive and communist 
states had adopted a hostile tone after Sukiman’s anti-communist campaign.  The policies were 
misjudged but they were a rational choice. 
The experience of the Sukiman government lends some support to the hypothesis that 
states confident about their security – that is, facing a low prospect of loss – will pursue their 
own preferences and interests in foreign policy.  This is true too of both the Wilopo and Ali 
periods.  
Wilopo asserted the priority in foreign policy should be to stay out of the Cold War 
conflict.  He judged stricter neutrality as the best form of security protection.  The policy also 
enabled Indonesia to begin exploring a wider market for its products with the slowing of the 
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Korean War boom. Moreover, he had learned the lesson of his predecessor. His calculations 
about foreign policy represented a rational evaluation of the government’s domestic and 
international situation. 
 The emphasis in alignment changed again when Ali Sastroamidjojo took office.  Ali, 
who was the most experienced prime minister in foreign policy, and who was very familiar 
with US politics, adopted a more adventurous and activist foreign policy.  Again, this affected 
alignment.  Ali had a strong conviction that Indonesia was not playing the independent role in 
international affairs that would be suggested by its size, strategic importance and historical 
struggle against colonialism.  Foreign policy could be a vehicle for increasing national prestige, 
even as the country remained inherently weak.  Ali believed a lack of material power did not 
automatically equate to a lack of international significance.   
 Ali’s rebalancing of foreign policy included initiatives such as the exchange of 
ambassadors with Moscow and Beijing and greater pressure on the Dutch over the unresolved 
status of West New Guinea.  But the Asia Africa conference was the principal manifestation 
of his vision.  It was an ambitious scheme whose purpose was most passionately encapsulated 
by Sukarno in his opening address in Bandung calling for the Asian and African states to 
overcome material weakness by injecting “the voice of reason into world affairs”.   
Ali was dissatisfied with the status quo – the acceptance of a situation in which 
Indonesia because of a lack of material power should be a taker of international rules rather 
than a maker of them.  But he made a rational calculation of the risks when he decided to launch 
a more assertive form of neutrality and policy independence.  His risk taking was not excessive 
and was commensurate with the value he attached in the goal.  As a former ambassador in 
Washington, he based his judgements in part on the calculation that relations with Indonesia’s 
major economic and security partner would not be severely damaged by a greater display of 
policy autonomy.  His decision making was certainly assisted by the fact Indonesians felt 
largely “protected from external aggression”, as the US concluded at the time.  It presumably 
relieved Indonesia of the need for hard alignments.  Domestically, Ali’s PNI-led government, 
enjoying the quiet support of the PKI, felt it had the domestic latitude to strike a bold foreign 
policy direction – one more defensible within the confines of the bebas-aktif policy. 
The alignment strategies that Wilopo and Ali adopted were at the soft end of the 
spectrum and designed to maintain policy autonomy. They combined smart strategies such as 
“transcending” (the attempt to rise above Realpolitik by seeking to use the Asia Africa 
conference to boost norms of peaceful dispute resolution), “hiding” (reconfirming neutrality to 
try to guarantee safety from both sides to a dispute) and “competitive bidding” (encouraging 
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the great powers to vie for Indonesian favor).  For Ali, who was the prime minister to most 
extensively use these strategies during the constitutional democracy period, there were several 
direct benefits to Indonesia.  First, they would increase its status.  Second, they could position 
it to secure economic opportunities in the communist countries. Third, they could widen 
diplomatic support for national interests such as the incorporation of West New Guinea.  And, 
fourth, they could ease regional tensions and thus enhance national security.  A key outcome 
of the Asia Africa conference was to reduce China’s international isolation and to lessen 
concerns over its intentions.  
In relation to the three other hypotheses proposed, the evidence offers moderate 
support.  It is clear that ideology played a role in the preference of Masyumi leaders for 
alignment with the West.  But this was dictated more by religiously-inspired anti-communism 
than a specific commitment to Western political or economic values.  Ali also was partially 
inspired by ideology in his policies in so far as anti-imperialism and a belief in the principles 
of the bebas-aktif policy represented ideology.  He saw a natural affinity between the Asia 
Africa countries based on a shared desire not to be caught in the crossfire of great power 
disputes and to be free to take their own development paths.  Shared ideology with the Asia 
Africa partners might have made them obvious partners, but many were divided along Cold 
War lines.  It makes ideology a less convincing explanation than Ali’s desires to put Indonesia 
on the world stage. 
Aid, market access and investment also played a role in encouraging good relations 
with the West.  Clearly, in the 1950s Western economies, including a rebuilding Japan, offered 
the greatest source of development assistance and commercial opportunity.  For supporters of 
a market economy, albeit adjusted to Indonesian characteristics, good relations with the US-
led West were an obvious preference.  But there is still evidence aid and commerce provided 
considerable US influence over early Indonesian governments.  Sukiman was probably the 
most susceptible to pressure, agreeing to the controversial terms of MSA aid.  The record 
suggests he felt pressured to accept despite belatedly realising the potential for a domestic 
backlash.  For Sukiman’s successors, there is little evidence they would succumb to US 
pressure to declare a firmer alignment in exchange for economic benefits. 
Finally, transnational penetration proved to be a negative in the only case where it was 
a significant factor.  In the case of the Indonesian-Chinese population, there were questions 
about their loyalty to Indonesia, exacerbated by the competition between factions in the 
community that lined up between the Communists and Kuomintang and the perceived 
interference of Beijing in Indonesian internal affairs.  This was temporarily resolved by the 
	 124	
Dual Nationality Treaty and Zhou’s appeal to Chinese in Southeast Asia to avoid political 
activity and abide by local law.  The evidence of goodwill in Zhou’s willingness to resolve this 
thorny problem, rather than the presence of a commercially successful Chinese minority in 
Indonesia, possibly encouraged Ali to deepen relations with China to the point where he 
appeared to take its side in the dispute over the status of Taiwan. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The early post-revolutionary governments adopted a firm pro-Western bias in foreign 
policy. This reflected a combination of ideological and practical preferences – they were 
staunchly anti-communist, committed to Western-style democracy, and attracted to the 
economic opportunities only Western economies could offer.  The most ardent believers in this 
paradigm were leading members of the cabinet of prime minister Sukiman, a Masyumi 
politician.  But in pursuit of the opportunities they saw in the West, and in their desire to stamp 
out domestic communism, they misread the mood of Indonesian democracy.  Sukiman fell 
victim to over ambition in foreign policy.  Sukiman’s successor, Wilopo, learnt this lesson.  
His government charted a cautious path in foreign policy and took Indonesia back to a truer 
version of Cold War neutrality.  Under prime minister Ali, the false starts in foreign policy in 
the first years of constitutional democracy, gave way to genuine innovation.  Ali launched a 
truly independent foreign policy by imagining and convening the Asia-Africa conference as an 
alternative voice in international politics.  In doing so, he launched Indonesia on the 
international stage. 
All three governments, in their own way, understood that preserving Indonesia’s 
foreign policy autonomy was a vital task of government.  They balanced this with their own 
definitions of state and individual political interest in choosing alignment strategies.  Of the 
three, the contribution made by Ali to foreign policy was the most important and enduring.  Ali 
believed Indonesia should enjoy higher international status, commensurate with its size and 
strategic weight.  He was sufficiently dissatisfied with Indonesia’s role to take the risk of 
upsetting its most important international partner.  He combined a range of smart strategies to 
achieve his goals, including transcending via the Asia Africa conference, hiding and 
competitive bidding to achieve his objectives. 
Despite the variation in priorities, Sukiman, Wilopo and Ali made rational decisions in 
accord with their reading of the domestic and international situation. That Sukiman 
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miscalculated makes his decision making no less rational.  Wilopo absorbed the lessons and 
was cautious in foreign policy.  Ali was the greater risk taker.  But he too made a realistic 
assessment of the latitude he enjoyed in foreign policy.  The alignment policies of all these 
governments were predicated on the assumption the policy risks were manageable and the 
objectives desirable. This was partly enabled by the absence of any serious external security 
challenges to Indonesia in the period.  The record lends some support to the hypothesis that 
policymakers, when faced with a low prospect of loss, should be free to exercise their own 
preferences and interests. 
 
	 126	
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The End of a Democratic Foreign Policy 
 
The highest practical expression of Indonesian democracy and its precipitous decline 
occurred over the course of barely two years between 1955 and 1957.  The 1955 parliamentary 
elections were a triumph of form.  But within one year Sukarno was expressing doubts about 
the viability of Western-style democracy and within two he had started to lay the institutional 
foundations for his Guided Democracy.  In time, this would lead to power becoming 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the President. 
As the fortunes of domestic politics wavered, so did Indonesia’s foreign relations.  The 
pattern of new governments changing the orientation of foreign policy persisted.  But more 
than ever the collision of domestic politics with Cold War international politics produced a 
high-octane mix that policymakers were ill equipped to control.  The phenomenon most 
tragically manifested during the course of 1958 when disaffected military and civilian leaders 
in the so-called outer islands launched rebellions against the centralisation of political and 
economic power in Jakarta.  A succession of American intelligence failures and misjudgements 
served to convince Washington policymakers that the rebels were a bulwark against a drift to 
communism on Java.  It culminated in an effort to covertly sponsor the rebels that became 
America’s greatest policy debacle in Indonesia. 
This chapter follows the changing course of foreign policy from the fall of the first Ali 
government and the appointment of another moderate Masyumi-led government to the crisis 
of the rebellions and the failure of democratic politics.  Foreign policy shifted from pro-
Western sympathies and respect for international norms to a radical turn against international 
niceties and growing suspicion of the USA.  But throughout, there were policy ambiguities.  
The value attached to US military assistance and its capital and markets created preferences 
and dependencies that prompted even Ali in his second government to exhibit greater 
friendship than under the nationalist foreign policy of his first term.  The backroom manoeuvres 
over foreign policy, especially the extent of secret diplomacy with the USA, revealed in 
contemporary records highlight the extent of those ambiguities.  It encapsulates the dilemma 
of governments trying to project an image of policy autonomy, as much for public consumption 
as for its own sake, while obtaining the singular material benefits that America could offer.  
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But the real dilemma in foreign policy came not from the balancing of risk in alignment politics 
at the international level.  It came from the inability of successive governments since 
independence to reach a consensus over equitable access to power and opportunity and the 
form of the state.  Domestic conflict and instability was bound to invite foreign intervention in 
a state whose loyalties were regarded as vital to the wider power struggle of the Cold War. 
The chapter concludes by arguing Indonesia managed alignment politics by the use of 
a range of smart strategies that are consistent with a balance of risk approach.  Risk minimising 
strategies, including hedging, hiding, undisclosed alignment and omnibalancing, all figured in 
Indonesia’s repertoire of alignment behavior.  The use of these strategies was aimed at 
managing pressures at both the domestic and international levels, which was evidenced clearly 
in negotiations over the status of West New Guinea, Sukarno’s personal great power diplomacy 
and US intervention on the side of rebels in Indonesia’s outer islands.  Alignment behavior was 
not purely a function of events either level, but of their interaction; specifically, reference to 
foreign threats alone does not account for Indonesian policies.   Critical to decisions affecting 
alignment was the calculation of the prospect of gains and losses facing the regime and the 
state and their potential scale.   
 
Foreign Policy from Internationalism to Rebellion 
 
Indonesia Turns to the West, Again 
 
 Before the flush of international success at Bandung had faded, Ali Satsroamidjojo was 
finished as prime minister.  A dispute with the army over the appointment of a new Chief of 
Staff plunged the government into a final crisis.  Faced with defiance from senior officers over 
the choice of a new army leader, the defence minister was forced out, support in the parliament 
for the government crumbled, and on 24 July 1955 Ali resigned.1  The crisis had its roots in a 
deeper conflict over the proper relationship between military and civilian authority, which had 
been left unresolved since the end of the revolution.  But observers also recognised other 
contributors to Ali’s demise. In the months before the government’s downfall, Ali had 
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concentrated on foreign policy at the expense of a deteriorating economy.2   For one of 
Indonesia’s most skilled diplomats, the international stage offered the prospect of easier, and 
more glorious, wins than managing intractable economic problems.  
The end of the Ali government brought another sharp turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
With Sukarno absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca, Hatta, as Vice President, could commission a 
new government.  He turned to Masyumi’s parliamentary leader, Burhanuddin Harahap, to lead 
a raft of smaller parties.  The PNI was excluded.3   The Burhanuddin government set to work 
overturning many of Ali’s initiatives.4  A Hizbu’llah militia leader during the revolution and a 
firm anti-communist, Burhanuddin, and his foreign minister, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 
steered Indonesia back towards the West.  Diplomats quickly noticed the change. US 
ambassador, Hugh S. Cumming, who had arrived in Jakarta soon after Ali’s appointment, 
recorded Agung’s statement to him that it was “his policy and that of the prime minister to 
build warm relations with the US without departing from the independent foreign policy”.5 
Thus, the Burhanuddin government confirmed the pattern established since 
independence of Masyumi-led governments adopting a relatively pro-Western attitude.  This 
undoubtedly reflected both the fierce Islamic opposition to the irreligious doctrine of 
Communism and the convictions of Masyumi and several other minor parties over the virtues 
of the democratic system.  It also reflected the pragmatic, problem-solving disposition of these 
governments, and an understanding that Western markets and investment offered the best 
prospect for economic development, just as democracy offered the best path for political 
development. 
The renewed openness to the West under the Burhanuddin government was reflected 
in several initiatives.  First, Agung, who had served as director of the US division in the Foreign 
Ministry, requested the resumption of discussions with the USA on a “treaty of friendship, 
commerce and navigation”.  Washington had proposed the treaty to Ali in March 1954, but he 
had requested the word “friendship” be dropped from the title and preamble.  At Washington’s 
																																																						
2 One of the criticisms was that Ali moved too fast in cultivating relations with China.  For an appraisal 
of the political forces behind the Ali government’s downfall see Telegram from the Ambassador in 
Indonesia (Cumming) to the State Department, FRUS, Vol. XXII, 1955-1957, document 103, p. 176. 
3 For a description and analysis of the cabinet see Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 418-
419. 
4 This included earlier attempts to stack the bureaucracy with allies. The appointment of ambassadors 
based on party affiliation had caused tensions in the ministry.  See Johan Boudewijn Paul Maramis, A 
Journey into Diplomacy, Memoirs of an Indonesian Diplomat, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, p. 19. 
5 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 16 August 1955, 
FRUS, Vol., XXII, 1955-1957, document 107, p. 181.  
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suggestion, it was replaced by the word “amity”.  Even so, discussions had proceeded slowly.  
When Agung asked for talks to resume, he smilingly repeated the word “friendship” to 
Cumming to underscore his point.6  Second, the government sent a series of “goodwill” 
missions to US allies in the region and beyond, including Australia.  Australia and Indonesia 
remained at loggerheads over the status of West New Guinea, with Australia backing Dutch 
sovereignty over the territory almost more vehemently than the Dutch themselves.7  Third, it 
decided to adopt a new policy towards the Dutch on West New Guinea, dropping the overt 
antagonism that had characterised the approach of its predecessor in favor of moderation and 
a search for a negotiated settlement.   
Of these, the decision to go back to the negotiating table was undoubtedly the most 
important foreign policy initiative of the Burhanuddin period.  In addition to the infiltration of 
troops into West New Guinea, Ali had attempted to stir popular sentiment in Indonesia by 
creating a “Bureau of West Irian Affairs” in the office of the prime minister to coordinate mass 
action.8  He had not entirely abandoned diplomacy.  He sent a delegation in mid-1954 under 
foreign minister Sunario to try to negotiate with Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns over both 
the status of West New Guinea and the dissolution of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union.  But 
this initiative ended largely in failure.  Luns had refused to consider relinquishing sovereignty 
over West New Guinea except by an act of self-determination at some unspecified future date.  
The Sunario-Luns Protocol, signed on 10 August, dissolved the Union, but on unsatisfactory 
terms and Ali refused to submit the protocol to parliament for ratification.  
Still, Ali government policy on West New Guinea had succeeded in one important 
respect:  the dispute was internationalised.  In April 1954, it was placed on the agenda of the 
Colombo Five meeting and, at the end of the year, it was inscribed on the agenda of the ninth 
UN General Assembly.  A draft resolution calling on the Dutch to negotiate in accord with the 
terms of Round Table Conference agreements was drawn up, but dropped when it became 
obvious it would fail to obtain a two-thirds majority.  Despite having an ostensibly “neutral” 
stance on the question of rightful sovereignty over West New Guinea, the USA found subtle 
ways of supporting the Dutch.  When the issue was brought before the General Assembly, US 
Representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, insisted on West New Guinea being treated as an 
																																																						
6 Ibid. 
7 Agung, Twenty Years, p. 115-116. The great fear in Canberra was of a PKI takeover in Indonesia, 
leading to the creation of a shared border between Australian-administered Papua New Guinea and a 
Communist-controlled western half of the island. 
8 Ibid, p. 101.  “West Irian” was the term Indonesia used for West New Guinea at the time. 
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“important” question under UN rules, requiring a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple 
majority, for passage.9    
The Burhanuddin government was locked into pursuing a resolution again at the tenth 
UN General Assembly in 1955 because of domestic political expectations and the support 
Indonesia had received at the Asia Africa conference.  But the government realised a 
continuation of Ali’s policies would only entrench the resistance of the Netherlands and its 
Western allies.  The goal was to have the issue inscribed on the General Assembly agenda, but 
to avoid acrimonious commentary and simultaneously try to restart negotiations.  If 
negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were well advanced by the time it came 
to a vote on a resolution at the UN, the two sides might agree to defer the issue.  
Within three weeks of being appointed, Burhanuddin and Agung took their proposal to 
Sukarno.  Sukarno had become the most powerful advocate for Indonesia’s claims to West 
New Guinea.  His support was therefore essential if the new approach was to work.  
Burhanuddin and Agung wanted Sukarno to refrain from inflammatory commentary about the 
Netherlands, and the West in general, while efforts were underway to negotiate with the Dutch.  
Although Sukarno had not participated in the appointment of the Burhanuddin government, 
and was no friend to it, he agreed.  
For several weeks the Dutch resisted, but after arduous negotiations about negotiations, 
it was agreed the two sides would meet to discuss a variety of issues impeding good relations.  
The two main items on the Indonesian agenda were once again the future of the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union, in particular the economic and financial provisions of the Round Table 
Conference, and the West New Guinea problem.  However, discussion of the latter item was 
to be conducted on the basis of an “understanding that each party will maintain its own position 
regarding the question of sovereignty over West New Guinea”.10  The large Indonesian and 
Dutch delegations headed by their foreign ministers convened on 10 December against a 
backdrop of political dissension in both Indonesia and the Netherlands.11  As the talks in 
																																																						
9 Telegram from the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of 
State, 30 November 1954, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1952-1954, document 300, p. 477-478.  During the debate, 
Lodge was acting President of the UNGA making it easier for him to manage the procedural issues. 
Dulles at the time was “very strongly” opposed to Indonesia gaining control of West New Guinea, 
unless there was a change in the character of governments there. Memorandum of a Conversation, 
Department of State, Washington, 24 August 1955, ibid., document 108, p. 182. 
 
10 Cited in Agung, Twenty Years, p. 131. 
11 The ensuing negotiations were long and complex.  For extensive accounts see, ibid. pp. 109-177. 
See also Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 450-461. 
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Geneva proceeded, both sides faced increasingly severe limitations on what was deemed to be 
an acceptable outcome because of pressure from political elites and publics at home.  Agung 
and his colleagues were caught between the desire to maintain their posture of pro-Western 
international moderation and a vociferous campaign from the PNI and PKI opposition for the 
talks to be abandoned.   
The key to the rising tide of opposition in Indonesia to the talks was the outcome of 
national elections for parliament held on 29 September.  These were Indonesia’s first 
parliamentary elections and the first test of the true strength of the political parties who had 
occupied the appointed parliament.  As the results trickled in through early October, it was 
clear the PNI and the PKI had strengthened their positions and Masyumi and the Indonesian 
Socialist Party (PSI), the backbone of the Burhanuddin government, had suffered unexpected 
reversals.12  The result of the elections had profound consequences for the negotiations with 
the Dutch.  By mid-November, Sukarno had abandoned his promise of restraint and joined the 
opposition parties at public rallies, calling for the cancellation of the talks.  He attacked the 
Dutch for refusing to discuss the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian control.   
The domestic hostility to Agung’s endeavors, and the likelihood the PNI would head 
the next government, strengthened the Dutch bargaining position.  Dutch foreign minister Luns 
prevaricated, using the pretext that the next Indonesian government might overturn any 
agreement reached.  Indonesia did receive something of a fillip when the General Assembly 
agreed by majority vote to consider the West New Guinea problem over Dutch objections.  
Then on 16 December, the General Assembly unanimously accepted a resolution expressing 
the hope the West New Guinea issue would be resolved peacefully and that the Geneva talks 
would be fruitful.  Indonesia had avoided a repeat of the defeat of 1954. 
After a fitful start, the delegations reached a tentative agreement by 7 January on some 
issues on the agenda relating to the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, which was referred back to 
the two capitals.  Then, as the negotiators awaited advice from their governments, Sukarno 
used his political influence to convince two parties in the ruling coalition to withdraw their 
ministers from the Burhanuddin cabinet and their support in parliament.  From this point on, 
the negotiations were doomed.  Amid defections from the government and growing public 
																																																						
12 PNI defied the predictions of pundits to emerge as marginally the strongest party with 22.3 per cent 
of the vote.  Masyumi, which was widely expected to lead the count, won 20.9 per cent. Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), built on traditionalist, Java-centric ideas of Islam, won 18.4 per cent of the vote.  The PKI 
startled observers by claiming fourth spot with 15.4 per cent of the vote. Evans, The History of Political 
Parties, p. 14. 
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outcry in Indonesia, the talks in Geneva staggered to a close on 11 February.  The point of 
breakdown came when Indonesia refused to accept Dutch demands to establish a right of final 
appeal to the International Court of Justice in bilateral disputes that arose after the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union statutes were rescinded.13 
With no agreement having been reached, the Burhanuddin government took a step that 
was completely out of character with the spirit of its foreign policy.  It decided at a cabinet 
meeting on 13 February to unilaterally abrogate the Union and the accompanying economic 
and financial agreements, which had given Dutch capital a privileged position in Indonesia.  
Ironically, the PNI and the PKI, the two most ardent critics of the Union, opposed a law to 
enact abrogation, which was a necessary requirement of the Indonesian constitution.  The PNI 
instead proposed a no-confidence motion in the government for mishandling foreign policy as 
it tried to head off the passage of the abrogation law.  The motive appears to have been to deny 
the opportunity for the Masyumi-led government to outperform the opposition on ground it 
regarded as naturally its own – radical nationalism.  The Burhanuddin government won the 
parliamentary battle on 28 February with the passage of the abrogation law.  But it was a 
pyrrhic victory because Sukarno refused to sign the law in an act of apparent sympathy for the 
PNI and the PKI.  The Burhanuddin government resigned on 3 March 1956, allowing the 
President to commission a representative of the PNI, as the winner of a plurality in the 
parliamentary elections, to try to form a government. 
The worldview of Burhanuddin and Agung, which was generally shared by Masyumi 
and its allies, had been evident in the strategy underpinning the decision to try for a negotiated 
settlement with the Netherlands.  The pair hoped the Netherlands might at least declare 
readiness to discuss a formula for resolving Indonesia’s territorial claims over West New 
Guinea at some point in the future.  By opening the door to Indonesia’s claims, the Netherlands 
would vindicate the path of moderate diplomacy.  In turn, this would undercut radicalism, 
particularly attempts “by the increasingly militant Indonesian Communist Party to rally 
national support and to create anti-Western sentiment among the Indonesian people”.14  All 
this meant it was in the interests of the USA and other Western powers to encourage the 
Netherlands to conciliate.  Although Washington clung to neutrality, officials there fully 
understood this point.  The verdict of the head of the State Department’s Southeast Asian affairs 
																																																						
13 Agung provides a first-hand account of these events.  See Twenty Years, pp. 147-157.  Indonesia was 
not then a signatory to the ICJ Statute, although all UN members states were regarded ipso facto as 
parties to the Statute. 
14 Agung, Twenty Years, p. 123. 
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office, Kenneth T. Young, was that both the USA and the Netherlands would suffer because of 
Dutch stubbornness.   According to Young, the moderate elements in Indonesia had been 
“discredited and weakened, and the chauvinists and extremists have been strengthened”.15 
In the end, the Burhanuddin government was overwhelmed by feelings of frustration at 
the failure of the Dutch to appreciate the benefits of responding to Indonesia’s aspirations.  
Weakened by the outcome of the elections and facing a wave of public hostility over the 
conduct of the negotiations in Geneva, the government allowed domestic political dynamics to 
dictate its behavior.  Acting contrary to the very principles it had tried to uphold, it unilaterally 
cancelled the Netherlands-Indonesia Union and the accompanying economic and financial 
accords.  The Netherlands claimed the decision to walk away from the obligations of an 
international treaty demonstrated a disregard for international laws and standards.  One lasting 
consequence of the failure to reach an agreement with the Netherlands was that many 
Indonesians concluded a willingness to negotiate would be received as an act of weakness. 
 
Disneyland and Dim Sum Diplomacy: Sukarno Goes Abroad 
 
With the fall of the Burhanuddin government and the conclusion of the parliamentary 
elections, Indonesia faced the prospect of resetting national politics in accord with the will of 
the people for the first time and, in doing so, recasting its foreign relations.  The problem was 
to discern what was being willed from the divided and fairly evenly balanced polity revealed 
by the parliamentary elections.  The elections at least promised to bring some unfamiliar 
stability to domestic politics and might equally promise the same in foreign affairs.  Moreover, 
having emerged on the world stage via the Asia-Africa conference, Indonesia might under a 
government with a strong mandate find the confidence to be an active and constructive 
contributor to solving regional and global problems.   
Viewed from the capitals of the great powers, the Asia-Africa conference had offered 
something for everyone – communist states could be pleased with the defiance of the West 
evident in the strong stance against colonialism and western states could be satisfied with the 
acceptance of the collective security arrangements of their allies.  In light of this, Indonesian 
neutralism seemed somewhat less problematic, if not optimal.  Despite the relatively minor 
role Sukarno had played at Bandung, all the powers vying for favor with Indonesia understood 
																																																						
15 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), 17 February 1956, FRUS, Vol. 
XXII, 1955-1957, document 137, p. 231. 
	 134	
Sukarno’s central importance to Indonesian politics.  He was rightly regarded as the lodestone 
of national political life and became the target of vigorous cultivation by all the great powers.  
The Chinese ambassador, Huang Zhen, even went to the trouble of ensuring a steady supply of 
dim sum to Sukarno’s table, one of the President’s favorite foods.16  The logical next step was 
for each of Indonesia’s suitors to secure a visit from the President.  This was to become 
something of a beauty contest between the Western and Communist blocs in 1956, the winner 
being the state able to most impress Sukarno with the superiority of its system and way of life.  
Sukarno too had been initially encouraged by the prospect of domestic political stability 
arising from the elections and the success of the Bandung diplomacy to start thinking beyond 
the problems at home to what he could bring to, and retrieve from, the international community.  
But the first task he faced after the resignation of Burhannudin was to authorise the formation 
of a new government.  In recognition of the narrow plurality obtained by PNI in the elections, 
he turned once more to Ali Sastroamidjojo.  Sukarno lobbied publicly for this new government 
to include the four big winners from the elections, meaning the PKI would for the first time 
officially be able to claim cabinet seats.  Even so, he might have been playing a double game.  
He privately assured Cumming on 20 February that he was “positively certain” the PKI would 
be excluded from the next government and the party would continue to be shut out as long as 
he was president.17  In any case, all the other major parties were strongly opposed to its 
inclusion.  When the Ali government was sworn in on 20 March the PKI was yet again denied 
a place at the cabinet table.  The PNI, Masyumi and NU formed the mainstay of the coalition, 
although the PNI was in the lead.18 
 Ali began his second term with an ambitious policy agenda and a strong mandate.  For 
the first time, parliament voted unanimously to give the government the opportunity to carry 
out its program.  As far as Ali’s previously prickly relations with the USA were concerned, his 
second term as prime minister started on an equally promising note.  Between late 1955 and 
early 1956, the USA intensified efforts to foster better relations with Indonesia’s political elite.  
																																																						
16 Zhu Lin, Dashi Furen Huiyilu: Xunyali, Yinni, Faguo, Meiguo [Memoirs of an ambassador’s wife: 
Hungary, Indonesia, France and the USA], Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe (1991) p. 41, quoted in 
Liu, op. cit., p. 211. 
17 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 20 February 1956, 
FRUS, Vol. XXII, 1955-1957, document 138, pp. 232-233.  Feith, in the most authoritative version of 
these events, maintains that Sukarno continued to place pressure on Ali to accommodate PKI members 
or sympathisers in the cabinet.  Feith claims that eventually the non-party figure, Djuanda, was included 
as a face-saving solution for the President. See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia, p. 469. 
18 For an account of the formation of the cabinet see Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia, pp. 462-473. 
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Despite the cool, and at times hostile, attitude Ali had adopted during his first term in office, 
there were hopes his nationalist-Muslim coalition government would be more amenable to a 
cooperative relationship with Washington.  In mid-March 1956, Secretary of State Dulles came 
to Jakarta, bearing an invitation to Sukarno to visit the USA, an offer that elicited “visible 
evidence of pleasure” from the President.19  This followed the signing on the last day of the 
Burhanuddin government of an agreement to release USD 97.7 million in surplus American 
agricultural commodities to Indonesia.  At this time, the US also was giving sympathetic 
consideration to requests for loans and grants for military and civilian purposes, including a 
highly confidential Indonesian army request to equip and train a regimental combat team.  
Although the discussions on military aid had to be largely conducted in secret to avoid domestic 
criticism in Indonesia, the flurry of activity engendered some uncharacteristic gestures of 
goodwill from Ali.  It raised hopes among American officials that his government might “not 
lean so heavily away from the United States”.20 
 The possibility of a more stable government following the elections and one that might 
even try to “warm up” the bilateral relationship led the USA to adopt a surprisingly 
accommodating and lenient attitude to Indonesia.21  The view held by Cumming, successfully 
implanted in thinking in Washington, was that the USA was more likely to win influence with 
Sukarno and the Ali government by avoiding the heavy handed tactics of the past aimed at 
corralling Indonesia into a tougher stance against communism and closer relations with the 
West.22  Washington clung to this tolerance throughout 1956, even as its hopes of a new 
moderation in foreign policy proved premature.   
In a series of decisions, the Ali government strained the niceties of international 
relations.  Among its first acts was to draw up and pass its own legislation to unilaterally 
abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesia Union and the Round Table Conference agreements as a 
whole – an act that was viewed as symbolically more radical than that of its predecessor.23  
Then, in August, the government declared its intention to repudiate USD 171 million in debts 
owed to the Dutch government, which had been incurred by the Netherlands Indies government 
																																																						
19 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 14 March 1956, 
FRUS, Vol. XXII, 1955-1957, document 144, p. 242. 
20 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 1 May 1956, ibid., 
document 153, p. 261. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 30 June 1956, ibid., 
document 163, n. 2, p. 282. 
23 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 474. 
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and assumed by Indonesia at the Round Table Conference.24  Despite Dutch outrage and some 
internal disagreement over the risk of encouraging bad behavior, the USA reasoned it was 
important to keep on Jakarta’s good side while the Soviet Union circled with rival offers of 
aid.25    
For this reason, Sukarno was greeted in a sympathetic atmosphere in Washington on 
14 May.  It was the start of a long visit to the USA and Europe that would last until 3 July.  The 
visit was of significance more for its symbolism than its substance.  Sukarno spoke to a joint 
sitting of Congress on 17 May, where he received a “spontaneous” standing ovation, and the 
National Press Club the following day.26  In these addresses, he issued an appeal for Western 
sympathy as Indonesia underwent the growing pains of nationhood.   But he struck a note of 
defiance too.  Indonesia would not compromise its independence for the sake of foreign aid.  
He also predictably dwelt on the vestiges of colonialism and Indonesia’s dispute with the 
Netherlands over the status of West New Guinea.   
Sukarno was an admirer of American political traditions.  His trip included a tribute to 
Thomas Jefferson at the Jefferson Memorial in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he spoke of the 
author of the Declaration of Independence as “my teacher”.27 Disneyland, department stores 
and the rows of automobiles outside factories in Detroit that belonged to the very workers who 
made them beguiled him.  Cumming told a closed door briefing a few months after the visit 
that Sukarno had departed the USA with enduring positive impressions and ideas.28  Certainly, 
the presidential tour of the USA ended on an amiable note:  Foreign Minister Roeslan 
Abdulgani told Cumming at a meeting in Salt Lake City that Indonesia wanted to revive 
discussions on a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 29  The success of the visit 
																																																						
24 The sum was equal to USD 1.5 billion in 2015 dollars.  The abrogated debt was the unpaid portion 
of USD 1.1 billion in Netherlands Indies debt assumed by Indonesia under the Round Table agreements. 
25 The disagreement within the State Department was evident in complaints from the US Embassy in 
The Hague over leniency towards Indonesia encouraging “lawlessness”.  See Telegram from the 
Embassy in The Netherlands (Matthews) to the Department of State, 2 October 1956, FRUS, Vol. XXII, 
1955-1957, document 180, p. 307. 
26 The full text of both speeches can be found in The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, No. 
884, 4 June 1956, pp. 928-939 
27 Tillman Durdin, “Sukarno Homage Paid to Jefferson”, The New York Times, 20 May 1956. 
28	Hugh S. Cumming, “The Situation in Indonesia”, 20 May 1957, Council on Foreign Relations Digital 
Sound Recordings, Box 734; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, 
Princeton University Library.  Sukarno referred to the lasting favorable impression left on him in a 
parting letter to Eisenhower on 5 June.  For the full text of the letter, see The Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, No. 886, 18 June 1956, pp. 1005-1006 
29 Memorandum of a Conversation between Foreign Minister Abdulgani and the Ambassador to 
Indonesia (Cumming), Salt Lake City, Utah, 3 June 1956, FRUS, Vol. XXII, 1955-1957, document 159, 
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appeared to be confirmed when Sukarno, on his return to Indonesia, delivered a speech that 
was seen as a “virtual eulogy” of the USA, walking into the crowd at the conclusion to shake 
Cumming’s hand.30 
The visit to the USA marked the start of an era in which Sukarno spent considerable 
time abroad.31  He returned to Indonesia briefly before he departed again to travel to the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe and China.  He would be away from 28 August to 16 October.  These 
visits to the Communist bloc would be of far greater significance for the future course of 
Indonesian domestic politics and its international relations than his visit to the USA.  
Conceived as an overt demonstration of balance in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the visit to 
Communist countries had a deep influence on Sukarno’s perception of how Indonesia should 
develop both politically and economically.  He found more in the Soviet Union and China of 
relevance to his own country’s development path than he had found in America.  It was on this 
journey, particularly on the China leg, that ideas Sukarno had been formulating for some time 
about a native political system started to take shape.   
It also was while traveling in the Communist countries that Sukarno demonstrated a 
tendency to treat foreign policy as a realm in which he could exercise executive power in 
defiance of constitutional constraints.  In the Soviet Union, Sukarno ordered Abdulgani to sign 
an Indonesian-Soviet Joint Statement on 11 September without referring the decision to the 
cabinet.  Sukarno’s testing of the boundaries of executive power caused tensions with Ali and 
stirred controversy among political elites at home.  The joint statement touched a nerve because 
it declared, “the existence of military pacts does not promote the efforts to reduce international 
tensions”.32  Although this was generally consistent with Indonesia’s own foreign policy, it 
went beyond the terms of the Bandung communiqué and was seen as an implicit criticism of 
US-led pacts in Asia and Europe.  Strangely, the statement came a year after the formation of 
the Warsaw Pact as a counter to NATO.  But of most importance to Ali was that it was an 
encroachment by a ceremonial president on a field of special interest to him as prime minister.33 
																																																						
30 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State, 2 August 1956, 
ibid., document 167, n. 3, p. 288.  The speech was broadcast throughout Central Java. 
31 Prior to 1956, Sukarno’s only overseas travel as president had been on a pilgrimage to Mecca, which 
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visiting 41 countries.  See Liu, op. cit., p. 214. 
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In the unlikely event Sukarno was troubled by the ruckus at home, he could take 
satisfaction from the favourable impression he left on his hosts in Moscow.  Sukarno struck 
Khrushchev as “an educated man and above all an intelligent man”.34  A shrewd judge of 
character, whose formal education was limited to four year’s schooling in the Russian 
countryside, Khrushchev felt he quickly established a good rapport with Sukarno and “liked 
him”.35  He listened approvingly to Sukarno describe Indonesia’s policy of neutrality – a 
position which suited Soviet strategy because it denied the Western powers the company of 
Indonesia in SEATO.  Like the Americans, the Soviets played the aid game, attempting to win 
favor in Jakarta with a bigger blandishment than the USA was prepared to offer, some $100 
million.36  But Soviet sympathies for Sukarno might not have been fully reciprocated.  A 
diplomat who travelled with Sukarno saw no sign of the president warming to the Soviet system 
or position in world affairs.37  
Indeed, in regard to the European sector of Sukarno’s tour of communist states, it was 
his time with Josip Tito and travels in Yugoslavia that most affected the Indonesian president.  
He found the example of Yugoslavia, the pragmatic soft communism of Tito, to be more 
appealing and more relevant to Indonesia’s circumstances than Khrushchev’s avowed attempts 
to pursue authentic Marxist-Leninist doctrine.  In Khrushchev’s view, Sukarno’s character 
inclined him towards Tito.  “There were more freedoms in Yugoslavia,” Khrushchev noted.  
“That’s why Tito’s line impressed Sukarno more than ours.”38  Given Sukarno’s growing 
propensity to play the great powers off against each other to Indonesia’s advantage, particularly 
over the vexed issue of West New Guinea, he might have found inspiration in that aspect of 
Tito’s self-styled nonalignment too. 
Yet of all Sukarno’s travels in 1956, China left the greatest lasting impression.  It was 
during his 17 days in Beijing and touring 10 other Chinese cities that Sukarno’s inchoate ideas 
about a new system of rule for Indonesia found a functioning model.   The scale of the welcome 
surpassed anything Sukarno had previously experienced.  Hundreds of thousands of cheering 
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	 139	
people lined the road from Beijing airport, pandering to Sukarno’s ego and tugging at his 
emotions.39  Beyond the fanfare, Sukarno was struck by three aspects of the political and 
economic conditions he encountered in China:  the degree of control and stability achieved by 
the Communist Party leadership, the discipline and self-sacrifice exhibited by a highly 
mobilised population, and the economic accomplishments the country had recorded in the few 
years since the formation of the People’s Republic.  In this, communism did not loom large in 
Sukarno’s perceptions of China.40  Instead, both he and his hosts sought to accentuate 
commonalities founded on experiences of revolution, colonialism and Asian identity.  Thus, 
Sukarno’s time in China affected him viscerally, in a way neither the USA nor the Soviet Union 
could. 
This probably was due in part to the historical understanding Sukarno brought with him 
to China.  He had studied the lessons of Chinese nationalism in the formative stages of 
Indonesia’s own nationalist struggle.  Sukarno frequently cited the writings of Chinese 
revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, especially The Three Principles of the People, as an 
important influence on his thinking about the ideological foundations of the independence 
movement and future state.  The three principles – democracy, nationalism and socialism – are 
commonly cited as the forerunner of the five principles of the Pancasila.  Sukarno claimed he 
first encountered Sun’s writings in 1918.  “Ever since then, nationalism has been implanted in 
my heart, through the influence of the Three People’s Principles,” he said in the 1945 speech 
in which he enunciated the Pancasila.41  Sukarno was also attracted to Sun’s exposition of the 
idea of pan-Asianism, specifically Sun’s 1924 call in Kobe, Japan, for the Asian peoples to 
unite in overthrowing imperialism.42  Sukarno’s disposition to focus on shared characteristics 
was probably assisted by the advice and attention he received from Chinese officials.  Mao and 
Zhou are said to have suggested to Sukarno that he should emulate Sun Yat-sen’s goal of 
unifying all political factions rather than adopt communism.43  Although the advice to eschew 
communism was somewhat gratuitous, the personal and policy gestures, such as the conclusion 
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of the Dual Nationality Treaty, could only have helped to give Sukarno a favorable view of 
what he witnessed in China. 
Certainly, Sukarno returned to Indonesia from China more buoyed and invigorated by 
his time there than in any of the other countries he visited that year.  The example of China 
validated Sukarno’s ideas about the weakness of constitutional democracy and the 
destructiveness of political party competition.  He repeatedly drew on it to justify his domestic 
agenda.  It became a metaphor for all that was wrong with the state of Indonesia and what could 
be done to get it right.44  All of this was injected into an increasingly fraught domestic 
environment, which had far-reaching implications for the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign 
relations.  Thus, Sukarno’s China experience was to be of singular consequence for the 
orientation of Indonesian domestic and international politics.  
 
Rebellion and Democratic Decline 
 
While Sukarno travelled, Indonesia’s domestic political cohesion disintegrated. The 
promise that the first parliamentary elections had offered for stable democracy proved illusory.  
Indonesia progressively fell victim to a series of internal conflicts with ramifications for foreign 
policy as profound as they were for domestic policy.  These conflicts, which spanned political, 
geographic, economic, religious, internal military and civil-military divides, were to test the 
basis of the state.  They eventually proved a calamity for Indonesians who had hoped after 
independence to create a modern state founded on democracy by paving the way for an era of 
authoritarian rule.  In the interim, they weakened Indonesia and exposed it to the most 
significant episode of foreign intervention since the departure of the Dutch.   
The roots of the problem lay in the task Indonesia’s founders had set themselves in 
forging a nation from immense geographic and human diversity.  The necessary compromises, 
which had formed the basis of a strained national consensus, started to openly unravel in 1956.  
If the results of the previous year’s elections demonstrated the splintered nature of the polity, 
then the experience of Ali in trying to govern in such an environment revealed the inadequacy 
of state institutions.   
In addition to confirming a relatively even level of popular support among the main 
currents of Indonesian political thinking – secular nationalist, communist and Islamic 
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modernist and traditionalist – the elections pointed to a significant political-geographical 
division.  Masyumi gained most of its support from off Java, while the other three main parties 
obtained most of their support on Java.45  This outer islands-Java divide was underpinned by 
grievances over the lack of regional economic and political autonomy and a legitimate 
complaint that the wealth and power of Indonesia was accumulating in Jakarta and elsewhere 
on Java.  During the 1950s, central government economic policies favored populous and 
import-consuming Java over the commodity-producing export regions off Java.  The 
perception was that income was being siphoned off from the productive, foreign exchange 
generating regions “to fund the expansion of the bureaucracy and luxury consumption in 
Jakarta”.46  Institutionally, this state of affairs had arisen in part because of the decision to opt 
for centralised rule under a unitary state concept and reject federalism.47  In time, this 
institutional weakness would conflate with another: The absence of cohesion in the military 
and of agreement over the proper role for it in politics and society. 
It was not very far into Ali’s second term in office before the combination of political 
grievance and institutional failings started to manifest in challenges to government authority.  
In the months after his appointment, a series of actions related to either internal army or army-
civilian disputes would erode confidence not only in the government but the entire system of 
parliamentary democracy.  There were two principle strands to the conflicts embroiling the 
army.  The first was the result of regional army commanders acting in defiance of central 
government economic policies that disadvantaged the outer islands.  On the islands of Sulawesi 
and Sumatra, army commanders openly conducted large-scale commodity smuggling and 
barter trade, ostensibly to improve the welfare of the soldiers under their commands and of 
local citizens.  Complaints over economic injustice mixed with underlying political and ethnic 
tensions, in which Jakarta and the Javanese were depicted as running Indonesia.  The second 
strand of army-related conflict arose from attempts by chief of staff Abdul Haris Nasution48 to 
professionalise the officer corps, centralise command and reduce the tendency for long-serving 
regional commanders, who usually came from a dominant local ethnic group, to create personal 
fiefdoms.  Nasution’s orders to rotate regional and headquarters commanders who had done 
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long tours of duty caused internal dissension even as they were resisted or ignored.  At one 
point his own deputy, Zulkifli Lubis, hatched a coup plot to remove him and the Ali 
government.  The plot failed, but the military defiance provided a core around which civilian 
disaffection in the outer islands could also coalesce.  The two strands of conflict were to merge 
and increase in intensity during 1956 and 1957 and ultimately lead to the most profound 
challenge to the state since its formation.49 
Amid army intrigue, an underperforming economy and growing popular complaints 
that the elections had failed to deliver better government, Sukarno returned to Indonesia from 
China.  Two weeks later, on 28 October, he gave a speech in which he distilled his longstanding 
complaints against the political system and the lessons he had taken from his extensive overseas 
travel.  The speech will always be remembered for one simple message: “Let us act together 
now to bury all the (political) parties.”  Sukarno then returned to an idea he had been ruminating 
on for a long time.  He declared his preference for “a democracy with leadership”, or a “guided 
democracy”, something akin to the system he claimed to have observed in China. 50  He 
promised to reveal his concept, or konsepsi, in more detail at a later time.  For now, it was 
enough to soften the public and political elites.51   
Sukarno’s experience in the communist countries gave his thinking impetus; the chaos 
of domestic politics he confronted on his return gave it credence.  On arrival home, Sukarno 
spoke of his “tremendous sense of amazement” at the accomplishments of the Soviet Union 
and China.  In contrast, he complained over the “wrangling” between political factions in 
Indonesia and the twin diseases of political parties and ethnic and regional loyalties.52  A 
surprising numbers of political parties, including the PKI, supported Sukarno’s proposal, given 
what they stood to lose.  Nasution too was in favor, having long held the view that the 1945 
constitution was preferable because it would simplify the management of civil-military 
relations and restore power to Sukarno “taken by party men with far less authority”.53  
Sukarno’s ideas were the antithesis of what had been advocated for Indonesia by Sjahrir 
in Our Struggle and by other democrats like him.  But they too were wearied by the years of 
political infighting and discouraged by the outcome of the parliamentary elections.  The 
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incapacity to resist Sukarno’s bid to put a brake on democracy was demonstrated by the actions 
of Hatta.  One of two qualified economists in Indonesia, Hatta was among a small number of 
“sober, Dutch-trained, (and) pragmatic social-democrats”.54  He also had been a vigorous 
supporter of allowing parliamentary democracy time to mature.  But rather than fight Sukarno, 
he formally resigned as Vice President on 1 December, declaring he would pursue his goals 
“from below as an ordinary person, free of any position”.55   The loss of the West Sumatra-
born, ethnic Minangkabau Vice President was a cause for alarm in the regions where Hatta was 
perceived as a champion in the fight against the political and economic inequities of the unitary 
state system. 
Following the resignation of Hatta, regional defiance of Jakarta transformed into open 
rebellion.  Between late December and early January, military commanders in Sumatra 
announced a series of military “councils” to takeover civil authority.56  All the councils made 
similar demands:  Changes to the military and civilian leadership in Jakarta and the creation of 
a new system of government that accorded the regions increased autonomy over finance and 
government.  Although all the rebel councils expressed loyalty to Sukarno as president, they 
demanded the reinstatement of the Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate, or dwitunggal.  At this stage, 
the rebellions were more political than militarised.  There was little or no bloodshed and the 
focus of activity was the search for a negotiated settlement.  Sukarno insisted the rebels were 
not traitors, probably because of their personal loyalty to him. 
But from the time of the military revolt on Sumatra, democracy and national unity took 
a downward spiral following separate but related pathways.  Soon after the New Year of 1957, 
Masyumi took its ministers out of the cabinet, leaving it in the hands of the PNI and the NU, 
and relying on PKI support in the parliament.  Then, on 28 February, Sukarno in another speech 
revealed more about what he meant by his so-called konsepsi for an Indonesian-style 
democracy.  It had two essential features:  first, the creation of a National Council under the 
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president, comprising all the political parties and a range of occupational and interest groups, 
to provide non-binding advice to the cabinet and parliament, and second, the appointment of a 
presidential working cabinet, in which the four main political parties would be represented. 
Controversially, this also meant the inclusion of the PKI in cabinet for the first time.57  It set 
Indonesia on the path to ending parliamentary democracy. 
Sukarno’s model implied more, not less, centralization of power in Jakarta and did 
nothing to address the complaints of the outer islands.  Sukarno received an answer of sorts to 
his proposal on 2 March when the military commander in eastern Indonesia joined his 
Sumatran colleagues in rebellion.  Placing the islands of Sulawesi, Maluku and the Lesser 
Sundas under martial law, Sumual announced a “total struggle” movement (Perjuangan 
Semesta or Permesta). 58   This additional rejection of central government authority, coupled 
with Sukarno’s advocacy of a new form of democracy, finally tilted the scales against the Ali 
government and the prime minister was forced to resign on 14 March.  At the urging of army 
chief of staff Nasution, Sukarno declared martial law throughout Indonesia. 
 
Seeds of Conflict: Communists, Rebels and the Eisenhower Boys 
 
The signals from Sukarno that he wanted to limit the scope of democracy, combined 
with the incipient army revolt on Sumatra, contained the seeds of a growing conflict with the 
West.  These events would increasingly estrange Indonesia from the USA, in particular, as the 
conflict became inaccurately portrayed as battle between anti-communist outer islands army 
units and a government sympathetic to the PKI on Java.   
The inclination in Washington to fear the growth in influence of the PKI on the central 
government was driven by several factors.  The embassy had been reporting for some time that 
the PKI had succeeded in infiltrating the lower ranks of the army, had control of the largest 
trade union federation and had sympathisers in various government institutions.59  This 
positioned the PKI to take advantage of the disarray caused by the regional rebellions and the 
split in the army.  Moreover, Sukarno’s idea for an inclusive National Council and cabinet 
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would bring the party closer to the centre of power and create a system amenable to the PKI’s 
long-term political strategy. 
At first, Washington did not quite know what to make of the outer islands rebellions – 
“an interesting revolt”, Secretary of State Dulles had called it.60  Although Dulles and his 
advisers were in no doubt the rebels were solidly anti-communist, they were eager to keep their 
options open in Jakarta.  Even as the rebellions expanded from Sumatra to eastern Indonesia, 
a military sales package remained under active discussion.  Before resigning as prime minister, 
Ali had been particularly anxious to purchase light weapons and transport and communications 
equipment as quickly as possible.  But, as the then Foreign Ministry secretary general 
Subandrio reminded his American counterparts, memories of the MSA debacle under the 
Sukiman cabinet were still fresh.  Indonesia agreed to US legal restraints on the non-aggressive 
use and third-party disposal of weapons on the condition the existence of these assurances was 
“kept top secret until such a time as the two governments agree to disclosure, if that should 
become necessary”.61   
At the same time, Sukarno had been anxious to keep the USA informed of the progress 
of thinking on a new political system, signalling the importance attached to maintaining US 
sympathy.  Sukarno, in his personal gestures to Cumming, went further than he had done with 
any foreign diplomat, inviting the ambassador and his wife to tea at the cottage in the Bogor 
palace grounds occupied by Hartini, the President’s socially ostracized fourth wife.62  
Underlying the geniality was Sukarno’s desire to send a clear message to the Americans that 
he was not a threat to their interests.  He told Cumming that he could inform Eisenhower of 
“his ‘solemn oath’ that he was not a communist”.  Sukarno added, “no action or policy of his 
would be hostile to the US and if, at any time, the PKI departed from its nationalism he would 
crush them as he did at Madiun”.63 
Yet as 1957 wore on, the window for goodwill between Washington and Jakarta 
steadily closed.  Sukarno’s choice of a cabinet to replace Ali had some merit, with the 
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appointment of several ministers with relevant expertise and no party affiliation, including the 
prime minister, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, a man the Americans regarded as a friend.  Sukarno had 
bowed to pressure to exclude the PKI from the cabinet.  But the cabinet still contained several 
members who were considered either radically left wing or PKI fellow travellers.64 
The inflexion point came with the outcome of regional elections held between June and 
August 1957.  The elections for provincial and municipal assemblies on Java and South 
Sumatra convincingly demonstrated a huge surge in popularity for the PKI since 1955.65  While 
a setback for rival parties, the proof of PKI’s organisational ability created a dilemma for 
Sukarno.  He had to be wary of the communists gaining too much power and challenging either 
the balance of Indonesian politics or his own authority.  Yet he could ill-afford to alienate the 
PKI.  He might even take advantage of its impressive organisational ability.  In the face of 
these conflicting motivations, Sukarno equivocated.  He continued to insist he was not a 
Communist, yet he maintained the PKI had earned a legitimate place in national politics. 
The combination of the PKI’s electoral triumph and Sukarno’s accommodation of the 
party caused alarm in Washington that Indonesia, or at least that part of it under central 
government control, was steadily slipping into the hands of the communists.  It affirmed the 
idea of a dichotomy between a Communist Java and a non-Communist outer island chain.  One 
of the consequences was that in the internal debate in Washington high officials increasingly 
started to talk about Indonesia in terms of its component parts, with Java being referred to 
almost as if it were a separate country.  In August, the National Security Council commissioned 
an inter-agency committee to conduct a detailed study of the conditions and options it 
confronted in Indonesia, although there was already a clear presumption that US interests were 
best served by avoiding any reconciliation between Jakarta and the outer island dissidents that 
weakened their resistance to communism.  Eisenhower himself framed the debate with an 
assertion that the line should be held at Sumatra in the event Java fell to the Communists.66   
Thus, when the inter-agency committee distributed its “Special Report on Indonesia” 
on 3 September, its recommendation for direct US intervention was unsurprising.  In essence, 
the committee argued the US should “employ all feasible covert means to strengthen the 
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determination, will and cohesion” of the outer islands rebels and to unify the non-communist 
and anti-communist forces on Java.67  The aim would be to establish an anti-communist 
stronghold in the outer islands should Java succumb to PKI control.  The NSC met to consider 
the report on 23 September and the recommendation to intervene was approved.  Although 
parts of the report remain censored, including a paragraph dealing with military options, it 
appears the NSC was happy to leave the precise method of intervention to individual agencies 
to elaborate at a later date.  The Departments of Defence and State had been split on how far 
to go in spelling out the military scenarios in Indonesia.  The most controversial 
recommendation from Defence and the JCS was for a formal NSC decision to commit US 
forces to fight in Indonesia in the event Java fell to communism – opening the door to what 
could have been another Vietnam.  The State Department rejected this stunning eagerness to 
resort to military force and argued the NSC at that stage should do no more than plan for such 
a contingency.68 
The debate in Washington over the correct US response to the rebellions and the growth 
of PKI support was disturbingly disconnected from the advice of the embassy in Jakarta.  As 
the new ambassador John M. Allison later argued, the insistence on establishing a line of 
defence against communism in the outer islands ignored the reality that the demands of the 
dissidents had been for economic and political autonomy.69  Their strong anti-communism was 
a secondary, not primary, motivation.  The clear desire of the colonels leading the rebellions, 
and their civilian supporters, was to maintain a unified Indonesia, albeit one with a fairer 
distribution of wealth and power – a position that the USA had effectively set itself against.  
By seeking to bolster the resistance of the outer islands, the USA threatened to escalate the 
conflict beyond the preferences of the disputing parties themselves. 
Another key assumption of the special report was that the army on Java had become 
less reliable because of the removal of anti-communist officers from positions of authority.  
This conclusion was flatly rejected by the US army attaché in Jakarta, who had regular access 
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to senior Indonesian officers.  Allison underscored the point, reminding Washington that the 
war planning of the Indonesian army assumed “Commie China as a potential enemy and the 
United States as Indonesia’s ally under certain circumstances”.70  The flawed assessment of the 
reliability of the central command of the army resulted in one recommendation that the USA 
should try to prevent the growth in the capability of the army on Java.  In fact, the army 
command was overwhelmingly anti-communist and should have been seen in Washington as 
an ally.  The large cadre of US-trained officers referred to themselves as the “Eisenhower 
boys”.71 
Two days after the NSC meeting, Allison wrote to the assistant secretary of state for far 
eastern affairs, Walter Robertson, complaining of his exclusion from the preparation of the 
special report and its recommendations to the NSC and offered to resign if his advice was no 
longer going to be heeded.72  Allison’s messages were undercut by tendentious and often 
inaccurate CIA field reports. The agency’s reporting from Indonesia painted an almost 
irredeemable picture of communist encroachment.  In late August, CIA officers reported 60% 
of soldiers and police had voted for the PKI in the regional elections, which pointed to the 
“gains made by the communists in penetrating army units in Java”.73  Elsewhere, they asserted 
Sukarno was “a secret communist”.74   
The alarming accounts fed the hawkish disposition of Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, and his brother, Allen, the Director of Central Intelligence.  Secretary Dulles had long 
entertained the possibility of partitioning Indonesia between Communist and non-Communist 
areas.   In 1953, he had told Cumming prior to his posting as ambassador to Jakarta: “As 
between a territorially united Indonesia which is leaning and progressing towards Communism 
and a break up of that country into racial and geographical units, I would prefer the latter…”75   
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Breaking Point: The Failure of Covert Intervention  
 
Fearing the rise of communism in Indonesia, and firmly set on a strategy of turning the 
islands surrounding Java into a line of anti-communist defence, the CIA launched one of the 
most poorly executed and indiscreet “covert” operations in the chequered history of its 
clandestine service.76  The Indonesian operation was a dismal failure almost from the start. It 
was to do lasting damage to Indonesian perceptions of the trustworthiness of the USA as a 
foreign policy partner. 
There were two main components to the US intervention – military and political support 
to strengthen the outer island rebellions and political support to non-Communists on Java.  The 
first component saw increasing amounts of money and arms channelled to the rebels from late 
1957.  Modern US weapons and ammunition were delivered aboard commercial freighters and 
submarine to ports and beaches on Sumatra.  US bases in the Philippines and the Pacific became 
command centres to coordinate the growing CIA-controlled operation and operated as training 
facilities for key rebel personnel.77 
Simultaneously, the CIA handed funds to anti-communist politicians in Indonesia and 
orchestrated disinformation and propaganda campaigns to erode support for the PKI.  By 1957, 
this was well-trodden ground.  Starting in 1955, the CIA had run an operation to maximise 
voter support for non-communist political parties and to damage the PKI.  To this end, the NSC 
had authorised the CIA to engage in activities such as vote buying and secret campaign 
financing. Masyumi had received about USD 1 million from the CIA.78  The interference in 
the electoral process of Indonesia also had been a State Department mission.  In the months 
leading up to the 1955 elections, the Operations Coordinating Board, established by 
Eisenhower to coordinate and implement national security policy for the NSC, considered a 
State Department paper on courses of action to achieve “a favourable outcome in the 
Indonesian elections”.79  
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77 For details of the US operation see Conboy and Morrison, Feet to the Fire, pp. 31-74, Kahin and 
Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, pp. 120-121 and Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, pp. 146-148. 
78 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p. 143. 
79 Memorandum of a Meeting of the OCB Working Group on NSC 171/1, OCB Conference Room, 
Washington, 8 March 1955, FRUS, Vol. XXII, 1955-1957, document 89, p. 142. 
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As the appetite for covert activity grew, the NSC and the OCB insisted all effort was to 
be made “to avoid the appearance of interfering in Indonesia’s internal affairs”.80  But the 
planners in Washington did not anticipate either the adventurism of the CIA or the difficulty 
of concealing any political-military operation in a country as densely populated or as captivated 
by intrigue as Indonesia.  One delivery of small arms and equipment for 8000 men near Padang, 
South Sumatra, drew a crowd of onlookers, “dashing any hope of this being a clandestine 
undertaking”.81  Later, weapons and equipment would be delivered equally indiscreetly by 
airdrop, as arms shipments spread from Sumatra to the Permesta rebels in North Sulawesi.82   
As the supply of weapons and money to the rebels grew, the declared and undeclared 
parties to the conflict adopted increasingly intransigent positions.  An atmosphere of suspicion 
and antagonism descended on the affair, nourished by a combination of overlapping domestic 
and international occurrences that unfolded in late 1957. 
First, Indonesia failed for the fourth time to win a two-thirds majority to have the 
dispute over the future status of West New Guinea debated in UN General Assembly.  For 
months, Indonesian politicians had been warning of dire consequences if Indonesia was again 
rebuffed.  Foreign Minister Subandrio had warned Allison: “Sukarno’s whole attitude is 
colored by the West Irian (West New Guinea) question.  Anyone who supports him on that is 
a friend, anyone who opposes is an enemy.”83  Allison understood the depth of feeling in 
Indonesia on the issue and proposed a compromise aimed at removing the single greatest 
obstacle to closer relations between Indonesia and the West.  In attempting to balance a variety 
of competing interests, Allison’s compromise contained some bold suggestions.  One idea was 
to extend the ANZUS pact between Australia, New Zealand and the USA to cover any hostile 
acts directed against West New Guinea.  This attempt to alleviate Australian security fears over 
the transfer of sovereignty flew in the face of Indonesia’s objection to formal military alliances.  
But to Allison’s surprise Indonesians he consulted did not entirely rule out the possibility.  As 
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81 Conboy and Morrison, Feet to the Fire, p. 34. 
82 Such was the lack of secrecy that among the evidence Indonesia collected were crates of arms with 
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from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 15 July 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 
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Subandrio later commented, the fact the Indonesian government had not contemplated a 
military alliance with Australia “does not mean that Indonesia is not prepared to ally itself with 
Australia if there is a threat from the north”.84  Allison’s diplomacy failed because of trenchant 
opposition from Secretary Dulles to any concessions that might strengthen Sukarno.   
Second, in response to the defeat on West New Guinea at the UN on 29 November, 
Indonesia unleashed a fierce campaign against Dutch interests.  Whipped by politicians into a 
state of agitation, Indonesian workers seized Dutch companies.  The act of expropriation, 
actively encouraged by the PKI-controlled labor federation, was formalised by decisions of the 
government and military to take over the management of companies.  
Third, on the very day the crisis inspired by the West New Guinea dispute started to 
unfold, an attempt was made on the life of Sukarno.  Would-be assassins hurdled hand grenades 
at the President while he was in the company of two of his children at their school in the Cikini 
neighborhood of Jakarta.  Sukarno and his children survived the attack physically unhurt.  But 
the experience severely affected his health and resulted in him taking a sojourn overseas 
carrying out light official duties at a critical period for the fate of the country.85  The suspected 
mastermind of the attack was Lubis, the former army deputy chief of staff.  But for years 
afterwards Sukarno believed the CIA had a hand in the plot.86  The immediate impact of the 
assassination attempt was to harden the attitude of Sukarno and the government to dealing with 
the outer island rebels, especially after Lubis was given the protection of the rebels in West 
Sumatra. 
																																																						
84 The comment was made to Secretary of State Dulles during a meeting in Washington on 18 
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In this deteriorating political climate, and fortified by a seemingly bottomless well of 
covert US support, Colonel Ahmad Husein, the rebel commander in West Sumatra, acted 
hastily to announce the creation of a rival administration, the Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI).  In declaring a 
formal split with Jakarta on 15 February 1958, the rebels overestimated their own strength and 
underestimated the capability and resolve of central government forces.  The day after the PRRI 
was formed to cover the breakaway regions of Sumatra and North Sulawesi, Sukarno returned 
from a six-week absence abroad.  He brought with him a new determination to defeat the rebels 
militarily, his resolve possibly hardened by the attempt on his life.   
Many in the Jakarta government and, most importantly, the overall commander of 
military operations, Nasution, had initially vacillated over the use of armed force to quell the 
rebellions.  There was little stomach for killing comrades of the revolution.  But when the time 
came to use force Nasution displayed intelligence, determination and organisational mastery 
as a commander, startling his opponents with an effective and unexpected manoeuvre that 
knocked them off balance.  On 12 March, government forces launched an operation to take the 
Riau area of Central Sumatra from the rebels, seizing a vital airfield and port and an American-
operated oil field, the economic lifeblood of the region.  Nasution’s attack came days earlier 
than the rebels had anticipated, and from the opposite direction.  Over the coming weeks, the 
rebels suffered a series of military reversals.   On 17 April, the rebel stronghold of Padang, in 
West Sumatra, fell and, on 4 May, the nearby PRRI capital of Bukkittingi surrendered to central 
government troops, forcing the transfer of the PRRI seat of government to Manado in North 
Sulawesi.  The conflict then entered a prolonged guerrilla phase, but the main centres of 
population and economic activity one-by-one returned to central government control.87 
The rapid collapse of the main body of rebel forces on Sumatra created an acute 
dilemma for Washington.  It had been left abruptly without a client for its clandestine 
insurgency in Sumatra.  The only viable forces still resisting Jakarta, who Dulles had lately 
been referring to in high-level policy meetings as “the patriots”, were the Permesta group in 
North Sulawesi.88  Until the fall of the rebel strongholds on Sumatra, the USA had 
contemplated the options for direct military intervention.  The Dulles brothers had on several 
occasions discussed the legal, or at least politically justifiable, triggers for the deployment of 
																																																						
87 The military campaign is described in detail in Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, pp.  
152-155 and pp. 163-166. 
88 See, for example, a conversation between Dulles and Eisenhower.  Memorandum of Conversation 
with President Eisenhower, 15 April 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 62, p. 109. 
	 153	
force in aid of the rebel position.89  But, short of a communist takeover of Java, they struggled 
to find a legitimate excuse.  In the event Java did fall to the communists either by vote or by 
coup, it appeared legal niceties were deemed irrelevant.  Even the usually cautious Eisenhower 
at the time held the view that “we would have to go in if a Communist takeover (of Java) really 
threatened.”90   
As US hopes of establishing a bastion of anti-communism in Sumatra vanished, the 
architects of the covert mission in Indonesia switched their attention to North Sulawesi and the 
only viable remaining rebel force.91  The location of this last major redoubt permitted the USA 
to offer extensive air support, something that had been denied the rebels on Sumatra because 
of the lack of suitable local airfields and long flying distances from the nearest useable foreign 
bases.  From mid-April, CIA-supplied aircraft piloted by Filipinos, Poles and Americans 
carried out an increasing tempo of bombing and strafing missions from Mapanget airfield in 
North Sulawesi.  The aircraft – World War 2 vintage fighters and ground-attack bombers – 
were provided in small numbers and had all insignia and markings removed to permit 
deniability.  But the presence of two American pilots and a larger American ground crew 
stationed in Manado exposed the CIA mission to the risk of discovery.92  
Even as the CIA widened the covert military campaign in support of the rebels, 
numerous officials in Washington and at the embassy in Jakarta were voicing misgivings over 
whether America’s operational means matched its ultimate political goals.  In March, Howard 
P. Jones had replaced Allison as ambassador.  Allison’s removal after 11 months in the post 
was motivated in large part because he rejected the strategy of isolating both Sukarno and the 
central military command as counterproductive.  Now, a new ambassador was reaching similar 
conclusions.  Two days before the fall of Padang, Jones cabled the State Department to advise 
“the time may have arrived to make some positive gesture of support to the Indonesian military 
if we are to preserve pro-American anti-Communist loyalties among the top officer group 
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here”.93  By the time the rebels on Sumatra had retreated into the jungle to wage guerrilla 
warfare, Jones had concluded the USA should “put the brakes on (the) rebel military effort”.  
Failure to restrain the rebels risked forcing Indonesia to seek weapons from the Communist 
bloc and “pushing the GOI (Government of Indonesia) to breaking point and alignment with 
(the) Soviet bloc”.94   
Although John Foster Dulles wanted to keep rebel forces intact as a failsafe, he too was 
starting to wonder whether the USA had backed the wrong horse.  In a telephone conversation 
with his brother, the Secretary of State responded to the observation that the rebels on Sumatra 
had “no fight in them” by floating the idea of “switching around” and backing the 
government.95  Allen Dulles found it to be “a very strange war” – each side was so thoroughly 
penetrated by the other that they knew the opposition’s next moves in detail.96 
One of the primary causes of the shift in thinking was mounting anger in Jakarta 
government and military circles over foreign military aid to the rebel forces.  Politicians and 
military officers were increasingly convinced the USA was either directly supplying the rebels 
or complicit in allowing weapons shipments to be made.  Jones argued the master narrative of 
the conflict was in danger of being transformed from anti-communism and regional autonomy 
into anti-foreign interference.  His fears were underscored by reports from pro-American army 
officers that they were coming under intense pressure because of their known sympathies.97   
It was tempting for many in the Indonesian government to play down the allegations of 
US intervention.  As Subandrio admitted in a meeting with Jones on 3 May, Indonesia was 
faced with a serious dilemma – America offered the main hope of aid in resisting the tide of 
domestic and international communism, yet Indonesians were convinced America was actively 
helping the rebels.98  But the strength of the evidence implicating the USA in arms supplies 
was hard to ignore.  Three days later, Djuanda warned bilateral relations were at a “crossroads”.  
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He queried whether the purpose of US policy was to “split Indonesia in two” to ensure at least 
one part remained non-communist.99  For the communists, the cache of captured American 
equipment was manna from heaven.  In late April, PKI chairman D.N. Aidit wrote to Jones 
threatening a communist orchestrated campaign against American economic interests in 
Indonesia, reprising the previous November’s campaign against the Dutch, unless weapons 
deliveries were stopped. 
Public disavowals from Eisenhower and Dulles of any involvement might have 
reassured some Indonesians, and most Americans, that the presence of US manufactured 
weapons did not necessarily mean it was US policy to supply them.  Asked at a press 
conference on 30 April about claims Americans were flying rebel aircraft on bombing missions 
in eastern Indonesia, Eisenhower replied the USA steadfastly followed a policy of “careful 
neutrality and proper deportment”. 100  Three weeks later, this statement simply proved to be 
an embarrassment.  On 18 May, a US-supplied B-26 Invader was shot down on a mission over 
Ambon.  The pilot was Allen L. Pope, an American veteran of the Korean War, contracted by 
the CIA.  When Indonesian sailors captured Pope and his Indonesian radio operator, they found 
in Pope’s flight suit US military identification papers, after-action flight reports and a 
membership card to the officer’s club at the US-operated Clark Air Force Base in The 
Philippines.101  Pope’s capture ended whatever pretence remained over the extent of American 
support for the rebels.   
Secrecy had been paramount to the success of the CIA operations in Indonesia.  The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had been alert to the likelihood of a sharp reaction from Indonesia to any 
disclosure of US interference because of entrenched anti-colonialism and a concomitant 
“suspicion of Western motives”.  “For this reason, covert activity must be extremely 
circumspect and by its nature must be limited in size and scope,” the JCS advised the NSC.102  
The bungled operations in support of the rebels had dealt a severe blow to the USA’s 
overarching strategy of fighting communism in Indonesia.  It arguably was the biggest failure 
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for the CIA since its inception, only to be surpassed later by the Bay of Pigs debacle.  In a post-
mortem, the CIA recognised the size and scope of the operation meant it “could not be 
conducted as a completely covert operation”.103  With an American pilot in Indonesian custody, 
the Dulles brothers swiftly shut the operation down.104   
The USA could at least be grateful that the Indonesian government deliberately delayed 
releasing the news of Pope’s capture and then took several steps to play down its impact on 
bilateral relations.105  As chagrined as the government felt over US intervention and deception, 
it was unwilling to jeopardise a vital source of foreign aid.  If Indonesia at this point made a 
decisive break with the USA, its only alternative sources of support were the Soviet Union and 
China.  
In early April, Indonesia received delivery of the first Soviet-designed fighter aircraft 
and bombers it had purchased in Czechoslovakia.106  But this did not reflect an underlying 
preference for Soviet weaponry.  The purchase pre-dated the outbreak of the rebellions.  Jakarta 
would rather have had American weapons.  It had simply given up hope of the USA agreeing 
to repeated requests for military sales.  Indonesia did not share American fears over the 
consequences of engagement with the Communist bloc, yet it certainly did not want to become 
dependent on aid from this source.   
The biggest legacy of US involvement in the rebellions proved to be an abiding and 
deep distrust of its motives in Indonesia.  It gave the PKI and the Communist bloc a moral 
victory, validating their claims that the USA was an agent of imperialism.  Indonesians too 
were given an object reminder of the vulnerability of their new state to foreign interference and 
the ability of foreign powers to exploit internal conflict.  This would offer a powerful motive 
for vigilance against internal challenges to the state in years to come. 
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Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
 Following the Asia Africa conference, with its appeals to peaceful coexistence, and the 
signing of accords to end fighting in Vietnam and Korea, the mid-1950s produced a relative 
pause in the Cold War, at least for Southeast Asia.  The first Taiwan straits crisis, marked by 
communist China’s shelling of islands occupied by the Republic of China, was a reminder that 
conflict was never far away.  Still, from Jakarta, the centres of conflict appeared comfortably 
distant.  Events in Indonesia’s immediate region posed no immediate danger. 
 International conditions permitted Indonesia’s policymakers to focus on their priorities 
of national development and consolidation of sovereignty.  Once again, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy orientation and alignment choices were set by reference to those internally-generated 
goals and constraints rather than by calculations of external power configurations or threat.  
This largely remained the case until the regional rebellions in 1958 when Indonesia was forced 
to make tough choices about how to deal with mounting evidence that the rebels were being 
actively aided by the USA.  Even then, the internal priority of defeating the rebellions, and 
uncertainty about what level of US authority lay behind support for the rebels, resulted in 
Indonesia initially appeasing the USA.  
 Before the outbreak of the rebellions, and with a Masyumi government back in office 
in 1955, this time without any PNI participation, Indonesia adopted a friendly tone with the 
USA.  In this, prime minister Burhanuddin remained true to the longstanding inclinations of 
his party.  Presumably, once again, the Masyumi bias against communism played a role; it was 
an outlook shared by many of the parties that made up the coalition.  Alongside the pro-
American slant to foreign policy, Burhanuddin pursued negotiations with the Netherlands over 
the transfer of West New Guinea and better economic and financial terms under the Round 
Table Agreement.  Burhanuddin judged that a conciliatory policy to the West in general, and 
the Netherlands in particular, was more likely to win support for Indonesia’s claims.  A non-
threatening Indonesia might be more able to win Western support for the incorporation of West 
New Guinea, alleviating US and Australian fears. 
 The actions of the Burhanuddin government were consistent with the hypothesis that 
low levels of external threat would allow states to pursue alignment strategies that are 
consistent with domestic group or individual preferences and interests.  Even so, Burhanuddin 
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was constrained to use the strategy of undisclosed alignment in managing relations with the 
USA.  The government did not broadcast its plans to pursue a “friendship” treaty with the USA 
and was at pains to keep military cooperation strictly secret.  The exercise in balancing risk 
had two main components: The government had to avoid giving the nationalist and left-wing 
opposition of PNI and PKI an issue on which to attack its foreign policy credentials and it had 
to invest its faith in the idea a friendly attitude to the West and constructive approach to 
negotiations with the Dutch would support its key priorities of a settlement of the West New 
Guinea and Netherlands-Indonesia Union issues.  
 The policy was a failure because the Burhanuddin government miscalculated the degree 
of Dutch intransigence.  Dutch foreign minister Luns found every opportunity to frustrate 
Indonesian aspirations, especially on the question of West New Guinea’s sovereignty.  With 
the collapse of the Netherlands-Indonesia talks in Geneva, the Burhanuddin government 
suffered the double humiliation of the failure of its foreign policy and its electoral strategy, 
with Masyumi coming second to PNI in the parliamentary elections.  It shifted the 
government’s reference point from one of prospective gains to actual losses.  The unilateral 
cancellation of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union and its accompanying economic and financial 
accords was a high-risk gambit.  
By then, the balance of risk shifted in favor of asserting a more independent, nationalist 
foreign policy.  Masyumi, until then the party of reason and moderation in international affairs, 
took a more radical nationalistic stand than had been dared by Ali.  Although the unilateral 
cancellation of a foreign treaty sent a negative message about Indonesia’s respect for the rules 
of international relations, it was deemed a risk worth taking, such were the emotions over West 
New Guinea.  It is likely the Burhanuddin government did not calculate the impact on relations 
with the USA in making the decision.  As it transpired, there was some sympathy in 
Washington.   Still, the government’s decision making does not fit with a rational choice 
explanation. 
 The next government to take office – the second Ali government – doubled down on 
Burhanuddin’s anti-Dutch policy.  This included a campaign to confiscate Dutch assets and 
expel many Dutch residents, adding to the unilateral actions that attracted international 
consternation.  But Ali simultaneously adopted a more moderate stance in regard to the USA 
than in his earlier term.  The first, and most obvious, reason for this would appear to be that 
Ali had learned from experience that there were advantages to keeping the USA on side, 
especially as Indonesia was ramping up pressure on Washington’s NATO ally.  Ali found it 
was not necessary to alienate the USA, and deprive Indonesia of the benefits of US support, in 
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pursuing a genuinely neutral foreign policy.  One of the factors that played out in Ali’s downfall 
the first time around was the speed with which he had fostered relations with China and the 
time and energy he invested in foreign affairs rather than fixing the economy.  The second 
reason was that this time the Ali government included several Masyumi ministers and others 
from the right.  His deputy was Mohammed Roem, who had served as foreign minister in the 
Natsir government.  Moreover, Ali did not rely on the PKI to bolster support for the government 
in the parliament.  These arrangements provided both the incentive and the space to avoid 
signals that Indonesia was antagonistic to the USA.   
 In contrast to his first term, Ali invested more time and energy in a domestic agenda.  
His big foreign policy initiative was to confront the Netherlands.  He moved beyond 
Burhanuddin’s Dutch policy by abrogating the Round Table Agreements and repudiating 
sovereign debt.  Although these actions were bound to be enormously popular at home and Ali 
worked to mollify US opinion, there were dangers on the international side.  It was possible 
Western powers, or powerful lobbies within them, might back the Dutch, if only for the sake 
of upholding international conventions.  As in his first term, Ali could calculate any move by 
them to censure Indonesia would be offset by a desire not to give an advantage to the PKI or 
enhance the status of the Soviet Union and China.  It meant Ali could act with a reasonable 
degree of confidence in adopting policies that were important to Indonesian perceptions of the 
national interest, but that challenged Western norms of international conduct.   
 Complicating Ali’s foreign policy was a President increasingly inclined to escape his 
domestic figurehead status and drawn to the international stage to do so.  It was with Sukarno’s 
intervention that the ambiguities of Indonesian foreign policy were most pronounced.  There 
appears to have been genuine uncertainty over how Sukarno wanted to position Indonesia as 
he set off on his extended travels in 1956.  Despite the success of the Asia-Africa conference, 
or perhaps because of it, Sukarno appeared to go on a study tour, determined to make friends 
for Indonesia wherever he went and ignoring the Cold War divide.  One of the few concrete 
measures he had for judging the value of foreign partnerships was the level of support offered 
to Indonesia’s claims over West New Guinea.    
In the USA, he made a number of symbolic gestures that reassured his hosts that 
Indonesia’s neutrality would be soft pro-Western in character.  In the Soviet Union, Sukarno 
tilted the other way by agreeing to a joint policy statement without bothering to check with his 
prime minister and securing a large aid deal.  In Yugoslavia, he was given an object lesson in 
how to retain autonomy by playing the great powers off against each other and was attracted 
to Tito’s pragmatic socialism.  But it was in China that Sukarno witnessed conditions that 
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would have the most profound influence on the course of Indonesian politics.  While observers 
trying to interpret Indonesia’s foreign policy direction could only be confused by Sukarno’s 
erraticism, the China leg of his travels demonstrated that there was more to alignment politics 
than treaties or pledges of cooperation.  Sukarno returned to Indonesia with the inspiration for 
a more disciplined system of national rule.  The significance of China for Sukarno was not its 
ability to compete by measures of material power but the example it set to another developing 
country with a historic grievance against colonial powers.  In time, this would influence 
Indonesia’s attitude towards China as an international partner. 
There is no simple characterisation of Indonesian alignment policy during this period.  
The official policy of neutrality does not capture the reality of Indonesian behavior.  In their 
pubic positions, both the Burhanuddin and Ali governments arguably practiced a combination 
of hiding, competitive bidding and even wedge politics (trying to prise the USA away from the 
Netherlands).  But in the repeated private reassurances of sympathy to the USA, and especially 
the desire to obtain US military assistance, these strategies played out in part via undisclosed 
commitments for most of their time in office.  The first set of strategies served to maximise 
security and access to foreign assistance without the risk of compromising policy autonomy.  
The second strategy minimised the risk of a domestic backlash.  In the midst of this, Sukarno 
explored his own ideas about how to position Indonesia internationally and domestically 
without revealing any definitive answers.  Nonetheless, the behavior is consistent with the type 
of strategies to be expected from a state enjoying the space to explore its own preferences and 
interests in foreign policy. 
 The foreign policy picture changed again dramatically with the eruption of regional 
rebellions, the fall of the Ali government, and the implication that constitutional democracy 
was failing.  These events also proved fortuitous for Sukarno’s plans to adopt a more 
authoritarian form of government.  But the confluence of the rebellions and Sukarno’s attempts 
to establish Guided Democracy presented a complex scenario for foreign policy.  The fall of 
Ali brought to power a pragmatic problem solver in Djuanda just as Indonesia faced the biggest 
test of its short history.  It was ironic that Djuanda also was an official who Washington’s 
emissaries regarded as sympathetic to the USA, given that the problem he had to solve was one 
fuelled by US actions.  The focus of government activity turned inward as Indonesia 
simultaneously sought to tackle a deteriorating security and economic climate.  Despite 
growing evidence of US complicity in the regional rebellions, the Indonesian government 
played down its knowledge of US actions and sought to reassure the USA it was not 
antagonistic to US interests.  Sukarno made a number of important symbolic gestures to the 
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US ambassador to confirm Indonesian goodwill, insisting at one point no action or policy 
would be hostile to the USA.  
Indonesian policy then was to simultaneously defeat a US-sponsored rebellion by force 
of arms while maintaining the USA as a partner in economic development and security 
assistance.  This act of Omnibalancing continued until the USA finally realised the rebellions 
were failing and that the army leadership was in any case anti-communist and moderately pro-
Western.   There was no evidence that the external threat posed by the USA in sponsoring the 
rebels resulted in immediate and explicit balancing by Indonesia via a strengthening of 
alignment with the communist powers.  Feelers had gone out to the Soviet Union and eastern 
bloc countries on the acquisition of arms before the rebellions and after the USA proved 
reluctant to supply the kind of weaponry Jakarta wanted.  But it was only in the year after the 
rebellions that Indonesia started to strenuously pursue an arms build-up from the Communist 
bloc.    
The pattern of behavior lends some weight to the hypothesis that states lacking recourse 
to hard balancing policies should prefer smart alignment strategies.  Omnibalancing was an 
intermediate response that aimed to minimise the contemporary threat until Jakarta was in a 
better position to balance US power and influence.  The fact Indonesia did not explicitly 
balance raises a problem for a decision-making analysis based on the predictions of prospect 
theory.  There is no doubt that policymakers in Jakarta saw themselves in the domain of losses 
after the rebellions.  But Omnibalancing as a policy response is ambiguous.  It could be 
characterised as either a risk acceptant or a risk averse option.  A rational choice analysis is 
more direct and simpler.  An open breach with the USA might have prompted it to step up 
support for the rebels.  By appeasing the USA, Indonesia might have at least bought time and 
created the opportunity to drive a wedge between the rebels and their main foreign sponsor. 
Other hypotheses also were given modest support by events during this period.  The 
USA was seen as an important source of economic support, a factor that undoubtedly 
contributed to Indonesian restraint before and during the crisis of the regional rebellions.  
However, aid and commerce were not decisive factors when it came to what were viewed as 
critical foreign policy interests.  When Indonesia faced Dutch intransigence over the union 
agreements and West New Guinea, it was prepared to take radical action that was sure to raise 
questions over its reliability among Western partners.  It also was ready to shop around for aid 
when it could not satisfy its needs from Western sources, as with the acquisition of communist 
bloc arms.  
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There is insufficient evidence to assess the significance of transnational penetration.  
The USA invested heavily in the cultivation of Indonesian political elites.  But the efforts were 
more successful in reinforcing existing beliefs than changing minds.  Soviet efforts at 
penetration were at best modest and relied heavily on the relative influence of the PKI.  Chinese 
penetration was of minimal significance too – other than as a potential negative given the 
persistent suspicion over the loyalty of Sino-Indonesians.   
Shared ideology offers a more plausible explanation for alignment preferences than 
either economic interests or national penetration.  Masyumi and others on the right continued 
to exhibit strong anti-communism, which made them more amenable to the West.  And the PKI 
naturally wanted to strengthen alignment with the communist states.  The PNI under Ali’s 
prime ministership were more determined to make neutrality a viable alternative to siding with 
one of the great powers.  In contrast to his first term as prime minister, the second Ali 
government was less strident in its attempts to assert a balance between Western and 
communist interests.   But his policies during both terms were certainly freighted with ideology, 
as a reflection of a commitment to Indonesian nationalism and independence.  Sukarno was 
both pragmatic and equivocal.  He saw alignment politics as a tool to obtain benefits that 
advanced Indonesia’s developmental and political priorities.  His travels in 1956 sought to win 
friends where he could in accord with his belief that a weak country should obtain help 
wherever it was available.  But the journey he went on in 1956 also was one of discovery for a 
president who had travelled little prior to taking office.  The experience of seeing communist 
states at work, particularly China, had a profound influence on him even as he disavowed 
communism itself.  Thus, Indonesia’s alignment preferences were often influenced by the 
ideological leanings of whoever exercised power at a domestic level, although, as stated earlier, 
this was conditional on the extent of external and internal pressures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The final years of constitutional democracy generated significant doubt over how 
Indonesia would position itself as an international actor.  With a new Masyumi-led government 
in power from August 1955, it initially shifted back to a pro-Western outlook.  Even a second 
Ali government adopted a friendlier face to the USA than it had previously.  The reassurance 
this gave Western governments was undermined by the unilateral actions taken after the failure 
of Netherlands-Indonesia negotiations.  But it was possible for the USA to portray Indonesia’s 
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action towards the Dutch as conditioned by the specific circumstances of the dispute, rather 
than reflecting a wider disposition.   
The initial behavior of the Burhanuddin government is consistent with the third 
hypothesis that an environment of low risk should encourage policymakers to pursue alignment 
strategies that reflect domestic group or individual preferences and interests.  When 
negotiations with the Netherlands failed and losses to Indonesia on a critical issue were 
crystallised in the form of an unsatisfactory union agreement and indefinite Dutch sovereignty 
over West New Guinea, Indonesia demonstrated a willingness to adopt hard policies.  Although 
the primary audience was domestic, the significance of the losses was such that the government 
was prepared to accept the risk of potentially alienating its preferred international partners in 
the West.  This again is consistent with the expectations of a balance of risk model.  The Ali 
government confirmed the hard line with the Dutch and, symbolically, toughened it.  It could 
not expect to obtain US support against a NATO ally.  But it minimised the prospect of isolation 
by quietly signalling to the USA that it wanted better relations than during its first term.   
The emergence of the regional rebellions and evidence of covert US intervention should 
have prompted Indonesia to seek foreign allies, according to balance of threat theory.  Instead, 
as stated earlier, it engaged in Omnibalancing – directing its energies to defeating the rebellions 
while appeasing the rebels’ principal ally.  The absence of overt balancing action is consistent 
with a balance of risk calculation.  Indonesia lacked immediate and effective balancing options 
and many in government were so surprised by US actions that they were reluctant to believe 
the White House had authorised them.  Fighting the rebels, while appeasing the US, offered at 
least a short-term solution to try to contain the prospect of the conflict escalating and the US 
providing overt aid to the rebels.  This fits with the second hypothesis that in a situation where 
the prospect of loss is perceived to be high but balancing options are unavailable a state should 
pursue alternative strategies.  Omnibalancing was a means of minimising the risk to regime 
survival while Indonesia could build internal strength and perhaps forge suitable balancing 
alignments.  This is precisely what it did, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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                          CHAPTER SIX 
 
To Authoritarian Rule:  The International and 
Domestic Context of Foreign Policy 1959-1965 
 
If the years of Constitutional Democracy represented a vibrant, and often chaotic, 
political awakening for Indonesia, the acceptance of authoritarian Guided Democracy 
confirmed the reality that no easy solution existed to the divisions that wracked politics and 
society.  Sukarno was gradually able to impose Guided Democracy, or Demokrasi Terpimpin, 
because of the disappointment and fatigue felt by elites and public alike at the lack of national 
progress under the democratic experiment.  This had been starkly demonstrated by the tragedy 
of the regional rebellions and the spectre of full-scale civil war.  The political parties, 
discredited by their failure to establish stable government in the 1950s, could offer few 
objections.  But Guided Democracy, while it served to control political divisions, could not 
extinguish them.  The rivalries of the earlier period continued to play out; they were simply set 
in a different context.  The critical divide was between communists and anti-communist 
Muslims and nationalists.  It provided the central plot line in the political story of Guided 
Democracy.   
The sharpening of the contest between communist and anti-communist forces in 
Indonesia mirrored a growth of intensity in hostility between the great powers.  This was 
largely coincidental.  But it elevated the significance to the Cold War protagonists of the 
choices Indonesia made.  As great power confrontations like the Cuban Missile Crisis raised 
fears of global calamity, and Asia again became a battlefield with the deployment of US forces 
to Vietnam, the West and Communist powers viewed Indonesia as a vital component in their 
individual strategic designs.  The USA, Soviet Union and China stepped up their lobbying in 
Jakarta with the aim of swinging Indonesia into alliance or, at least, negating the efforts of 
rivals to do so.  The growing split between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China ensured this was a three-way contest rather than a simple matter of whether Indonesia 
was in the communist or non-communist camps.   
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This chapter will review the major international and domestic political developments 
between 1959, when Guided Democracy was consolidated, and late 1965, when Sukarno made 
a fateful decision to align Indonesia with China and events were set in train that would 
ultimately lead to his downfall.  It provides an important backdrop to understanding the 
pressures on policymakers, principally Sukarno himself, during the most adventurous and high-
risk period in the history of Indonesian foreign policy.  It will begin with a description of 
international conditions directly and indirectly bearing on Indonesian foreign policy, especially 
alignment behavior.  It will then follow with a description of domestic political conditions 
under Guided Democracy. 
 
A Deepening Ideological Divide 
 
The Growth of the Cold War, 1959-1966 
 
The Guided Democracy years coincided with a rollercoaster in relations between the 
capitalist and communist blocs.  Fears of a violent showdown were interspersed with glimmers 
of hope as the great powers toyed with détente.  But the general trends were adverse at both 
the global and regional levels.  Arsenals of nuclear weapons grew in destructive capability and 
sophistication as the USA and Soviet Union added to their stockpiles and new states joined the 
nuclear club.1  In Europe, the shooting down of a US spy plane over the Soviet Union in May 
1960 became emblematic of the distrust on both sides, wrecking a planned East-West summit.  
A year later, the Iron Curtin went from being metaphoric to material with the construction of 
the Berlin Wall.  In the Western hemisphere, the Cold War came closer to the USA with the 
Cuban revolution of 1959.2  The USA plotted the removal of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, 
leading to the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, when an invasion of Cuba in April 1961 by US-
sponsored Cuban exiles and mercenaries was repulsed.  The stationing of US intermediate 
range nuclear missiles within striking distance of Moscow and the subsequent standoff between 
																																																						
1 In 1960, France tested its first atomic bomb in the Algerian desert.  A year later, the Soviet Union 
tested the biggest thermonuclear bomb.  The People’s Republic of China tested its first bomb in October 
1964. 
2 For a summary of the events of this period see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone 
(1994), pp. 568-593 and 643-673. 
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the USA and Soviet Union over the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba brought the 
two superpowers closer than they had ever been to war in October 1962.3  
In this climate of suspicion and anxiety, Southeast Asia loomed as one of the major 
ideological and, potentially violent, battlegrounds.  For both Cold War camps, no state in the 
region would be more important, or elusive, a partner than Indonesia.  The awareness of 
Indonesia’s key role as a swing state – one whose disposition could determine the balance of 
power in the entire region - was underscored as the US administration contemplated the 
expensive military scenarios of defeating communism on the ground.  There was a widespread 
view in Washington that a war in Vietnam would be a sideshow if Indonesia went communist 
and the USA was drawn into a civil war there.4   
But under Dwight D. Eisenhower, the USA was wary of committing troops to the fight 
against communism in Southeast Asia.  Although determined to stop the dominos of non-
communist states falling from Indochina to the Malay Archipelago, he preferred funding allies 
or using air and sea power to sending land forces to fight in the jungles and rice paddies.  If 
China did launch into war alongside the Viet Minh and push on through Indochina, the US 
military high command estimated the size of forces required for a static line of defence in 
Thailand and the Malay Peninsula would be prohibitive.  For this reason, the preference from 
Eisenhower down had been to strike blows at mainland China itself to blunt its offensive 
capability.  A 2 June 1954 meeting in the Oval Office was illustrative of the high stakes on the 
table.  Eisenhower warned overt aggression by China in support of the Viet Minh would require 
him to declare “a state of war” in which the air force and navy would have to “go in with full 
power, using new weapons”, presumably a euphemism for nuclear strikes.5 
Despite wariness over deploying ground forces to Southeast Asia, Eisenhower believed 
he could not stay on the sidelines in the conflicts sparked by decolonisation there, especially in 
Indochina.  He had popularised the idea of the Domino Theory – the spectre of Asian states 
falling from Japan to Indonesia if communism prevailed in Indochina.  Consequently, the USA 
had poured USD 1 billion into South Vietnam and deployed a growing number of military 
advisers by the end of the Eisenhower years.  But this commitment was inimical to America’s 
																																																						
3 A thorough account of the crisis from both sides is found in Alexsandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 
‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964, New York: Norton (1997). 
4 Secretary of State Dean Rusk was to voice this view some years later as the conflict in Vietnam grew 
in parallel with heightening tensions between communists and non-communists in Indonesia.  Summary 
Record of the 521st National Security Council Meeting, 7 January 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXVI, 1964-1968, 
document 8. 
5 Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to 
the Secretary of State, 2 June 1954, FRUS, Volume XII, 1952-1954, pp. 529-531. 
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self-perceptions and would taint the US image across the region.  Where the US saw a 
communist threat, Indonesians saw a war of nationalist liberation.  In 1954, Eisenhower had 
told an NSC meeting he did not want “the United States to stand alone before the world as an 
arbitrary power supporting colonialism in Asia”.6  But in Asian eyes, this is precisely how the 
US presence was frequently seen.  
The reluctance to commit large numbers of ground troops was overcome during the 
administrations of John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969).  The 
pair took the USA into the quagmire of Vietnam in a series of fateful and tragic escalations, 
each logically compelled by its predecessor.  The USA thus built from the advisory role in 
Vietnam from 900 personnel when Kennedy took office in 1961 to 16,263 at the time he was 
assassinated on 22 November 1963.7  After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the 
speed of the US military build-up accelerated.  Under Johnson, the number of soldiers in 
Vietnam would rise to more than half a million by 1965.8  These administrations presided at a 
time when the USA was bluffed into believing the capitalist West was losing the contest of 
power, ideas and production against communism.9  The effect was to in heighten concern in 
Washington over the strategic consequences of any significant defection to communism in the 
region, especially a state as important as Indonesia.  Sukarno was to prove adept at exploiting 
those US anxieties. 
But in the view of many, the US had failed to grasp what motivated Asian politics or 
the best means of countering communism.  Indonesians saw the Viet Minh as anti-colonial and 
nationalist, rather than as an agent for the territorial expansion of communism.  Sukarno 
believed that using force to deny the legitimate aspirations of the Viet Minh would only alienate 
other Asians and send them into the arms of communists.  In 1965, he expressed this sentiment 
in a rhetorical question to an international audience: “We ask ourselves today: would the 
vicious bombing raids now being perpetrated against the Vietnamese people twenty years after 
the end of the Second War, ever be launched if the nation being attacked were not of Asia, or 
Africa or Latin America?”10   
																																																						
6 Meeting of the National Security Council, 3 June 1954, FRUS, Vol. XII, 1952-1954, p. 533. 
7 “The Advisory Build-Up 1961-1967” in Evolution of the War, Counterinsurgency:  The Kennedy 
Commitments, 1961-1963, Pentagon Papers, Washington DC: NARA, p. 51. 
8 “Phase I in the Build-Up for US Forces, March-July 1965” in Evolution of the War, Direct Action: 
The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968, Pentagon Papers, Washington DC: NARA, p. 10. 
9 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991, London: Abacus (1994), p. 243. 
10 Feith and Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking, pp. 469-470 
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The US military build-up in Vietnam ran counter to the trend of European countries 
liquidating their Asian and African empires.  Notably, Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
continued its retreat from the Far East with moves to grant independence to its Malay, 
Singapore and Borneo colonies.  This was also mirrored in Britain’s growing wariness of 
military commitments in East Asia, which eventually resulted in a withdrawal east of Suez.  
Debilitated by the Second World War, Britain recognised the military and financial costs of 
empire were too great.  In contrast, critics could paint the Dutch, clinging to the territory of 
West New Guinea, and the Portuguese, ensconced in East Timor, as stubborn adherents to an 
antique idea. 
But even as colonial rulers were chased out or packed up and left, the realities of the 
Cold War ensured Southeast Asia remained central to the strategic game of the great powers.  
The main patterns and themes of international politics were still largely dictated by the great 
old states.  Sukarno and several like-minded leaders in Asia, Africa and the Middle East hoped 
for a new international order in which the new states had a stronger voice in global governance 
and greater opportunities to share in global wealth – an approach they had foreshadowed at 
Bandung.  Among the early concrete products of this thinking was the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), which held its founding meeting in Belgrade in 1961.  But the promise of Bandung 
also dissipated with the reality that “peaceful coexistence” was easier to put into conference 
resolutions than political practice.  China’s attack against India in the Himalayas in September 
1962, pitting the two star players of Bandung against each other, proved threats could be posed 
as easily by the new states as the extra regional great powers.  India, the voice of moderation 
within the non-aligned world, displayed its own appetite for military decision with the invasion 
in December 1961 of the enclaves of Portuguese Goa, Daman and Diu on the Arabian Sea.  It 
was an act not lost on other countries with territorial claims they portrayed as irredentist, 
including Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, there was some truth to a charge made by Sukarno that the bombs usually 
only fell on states on the periphery of power.  The great power antagonisms that defined world 
politics had a disproportionate impact on the underdeveloped, weak, and newly decolonised or 
decolonising states.  The Cold War produced a “zone of stability” in North America and 
Europe, but elsewhere conflict raged.  The Soviet Union under Khrushchev paid lip service to 
the cause of anti-imperialism in the Third World11, but strategically was far more concerned 
																																																						
11 As it was coined in 1952, the term Third World denoted states that were neither part of the Western 
capitalist nor Communist blocs.  But it is used here with the contemporary meaning of the developing 
countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Pacific and Latin America. 
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about the status quo in Europe.  By some estimates, four out of five casualties were civilians 
and most of them in Asia.12  The northern zone of stability owed itself in part to the character 
of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, an “admirable rough diamond” who was dismissed and 
underestimated by many of his contemporaries in the West.13   
In his early days, Khrushchev was known for thundering bombast about burying the 
West.  He had rejected Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” policy in 1955 to allow freedom of flight 
for reconnaissance aircraft as a confidence building measure and issued an ultimatum in 
November 1958 for the Western powers to evacuate Berlin, precipitating the second Berlin 
crisis and the construction of the wall.  A brief glimmer of détente in the promise of a Paris 
Summit between the leaders of the USA, Britain, France and the Soviet Union was abruptly 
cut short when Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane was shot down in May 1960.  Yet Khrushchev 
eventually did take steps towards peace with the West and contributed to the creation of “a 
relatively stabilised international system” in the last two years of his rule.14  After the crises 
over Cuba and Berlin, attempts at détente were revived and reached a peak in July-August 1963 
with the establishment of a hot line between the Oval Office and the Kremlin and the signing 
of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union.15    
This did not entirely alleviate the competition for influence in the Third World.  The 
impression of stability achieved in the global north during this time comes from the benefit of 
hindsight.  It was barely perceived at the time and cannot be applied to conditions in large parts 
of Asia.  Western, especially American, fears of communism were acute, the USA fretted that 
it was losing ground to the Soviet Union militarily and technologically, and states in Asia that 
were bystanders to their ideological struggle held legitimate concerns they would be the 
battleground should the Cold War turn hot.  In Southeast Asia, strategic vulnerability prompted 
a range of security solutions.  States maintained formal or informal alliances with extra-
																																																						
12 Clive Ponting, The 20th Century: A World History, New York: Henry Holt and Co., (1998), p. 287. 
13 Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 242.  An alternative appraisal was offered by British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, who expressed wonder that this “fat, vulgar man” could really lead millions of people in a 
vast country. Taubman, op. cit., p. 352. 
14 Ibid. p. 243.  See also “Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong”, 2 October 1959, 
Wilson Center Digital Archive, accessed at http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/112088.  
In this discussion Khrushchev repeatedly states his desire to avoid war with the USA, including through 
escalation of conflict in Southeast Asia – a position with which Mao was largely in accord. 
15 The series of initiatives in the second half of 1963 represented a distinct relaxation of tensions 
between Washington and Moscow, but in Rusk’s view did not amount to a “détente”.  See, Address by 
Secretary Rusk, Foreign Policy and the American Citizen, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, 
No. 1279, 30 December 1963, p. 994. 
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regional powers in both the Western and Communist camps.  Some, like Indonesia, tried to 
tread the tightrope of non-alignment.   
The major Cold War protagonists strenuously competed for allies and defended the line 
against the expansion of the opposing camp.  Starting in the mid-1950s under Khrushchev, the 
Soviet Union had been a major source of civil and military aid to developing states, mostly in 
the form of concessional loans.  The theory was that this would influence the path of political 
and economic development in countries that had been captured by neither the Communist bloc 
nor the West.16  Consequently, aid acted as an inducement to discourage Third World countries 
from becoming entangled with the USA.  After the emergence of détente between Moscow and 
Washington, Khrushchev was anxious to avoid the competition for influence in the Third 
World dragging the great powers into a proxy war and he was increasingly dissatisfied with 
the geopolitical returns from Soviet largesse.  The spirit of “gradualism and moderation” 
continued after the ousting of Khrushchev in October 1964 in the foreign policies of Leonid 
Brezhnev, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
and Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers.17  The Brezhnev and Kosygin 
Kremlin was even more inclined to question the efficacy of the aid program as a means of 
securing allies in the Third World.18  But the Soviet Union was not prepared to sacrifice its 
influence in the Third World or to vacate the field to rivals, which increasingly included its 
erstwhile friend, the People’s Republic of China. 
 The Sino-Soviet split, a combination of disagreements over ideology and 
foreign policy priorities, started tentatively in 1956 and steadily widened during the 1960s.  
One of the critical points of difference between Moscow and Beijing was how to manage the 
confrontation with the West.  Among numerous disputes, Soviet prudence conflicted with 
Chinese boldness in calling for revolutionary liberation movements in the Third World.19  The 
import for leftist or non-aligned states was that it further complicated their great power 
balancing act.  Indonesia’s PKI, like communist parties in other non-communist states, faced 
																																																						
16 Ragna Boden, “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia”, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 
10 No. 3, (2008), p. 125. 
17 Philip E. Mosley, “The Kremlin and the Third World”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64 (1967-68), p. 75. 
18 Bilveer Singh, “Soviet-Indonesian Relations, 1945-1968”, unpublished PhD dissertation, (1986), pp. 
228-229 
19 The record of discussion of a meeting between high Soviet and Chinese officials in Beijing in 1959 
provides a stark record of the extent of difference and the hostile tone of relations. “Discussion between 
N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong”, 2 October 1959, Wilson Center Digital Archive, accessed at 
http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/112088. 
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an invidious choice between the Moscow and Beijing lines.  Sukarno too had to weigh the 
attraction of China’s crusading opposition to imperialism against the Soviet Union’s greater 
conservatism, but bigger resources.  The contest between the two biggest communist states 
would add another important dynamic to the game of alignment.  
But the years from 1959 to 1966 in Southeast Asia also are noteworthy for the 
continuing evolution of a community of independent states.  This was not a smooth process, 
exposing conflicts over ideology, ethnicity and nationalism, which in many cases provoked 
civil violence, regime repression, cross border disputes and open warfare.  The regimes that 
took over in the new states were often fragile and at risk of falling to internal strife.  The danger 
to civilian governments everywhere in the developing world was underscored by a series of 
military coups in 1958 that toppled governments in Burma, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand and Sudan.  
Foreign intervention remained an abiding concern too, as with the overthrow of the government 
of João Goulart in Brazil in 1964, in which a US role was again suspected.  After the experience 
of the regional rebellions and standoffs with the army in the 1950s, Indonesian politicians could 
not assume they were immune from further such action.  In the midst of attempts at nation 
building, post-colonial governments had to contend with manifold threats that required hard 
choices about the right security partners and how to position themselves in the Cold War. 
 
Sukarno’s Balancing Act: Controlling the Army and Communist Party, 1959-1966 
 
While Southeast Asia was wracked by upheaval, Indonesia experienced an internal 
reckoning of its own.  The course of politics from 1959 was fundamentally altered by the bitter 
experience of the regional rebellions.  After large scale hostilities ended in 1958, guerrilla 
warfare persisted, but it posed no serious threat to Jakarta’s authority.  The outcome produced 
immediate winners and losers in the contest for national power.  The army, under Nasution, 
emerged with enhanced prestige and influence over national policy, underpinned by the 
continued state of martial law imposed at the outset of the rebellion.  The PKI too, as one of 
the most ardent supporters of the government’s suppression of the rebels, won kudos and 
continued to entrench its position as the strongest and best-organised political party.  
Meanwhile, Masyumi, many of whose leaders had joined the rebellion, was forced into 
increasing isolation and faced the risk of either internal disintegration or a government ban.  
Moreover, the atmosphere of politics shifted further against the perceived dysfunction of 
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parliamentary and party politics, strengthening the case of those who blamed Indonesia’s ills 
on the reigning constitutional order. 20   
The top of the political pyramid was occupied by Sukarno, who more than any other 
individual or group was a beneficiary of the loss of confidence the rebellion induced among 
elites and the political public over the way politics was conducted.  Still, Sukarno had no 
political organisation of his own and, although this permitted him to be nimble in the face of 
conflicting political currents, he was constrained to seek alliances with others.  Initially, 
Sukarno’s most important partner was the army, which under Nasution’s leadership had 
regained its cohesion and its pride.  The Chief of Staff was for the moment personally secure 
at the top of the army having seen off his main rivals, many of whom were then in the jungle.  
Yet Nasution was reluctant to openly challenge Sukarno over any differences, due “possibly to 
a lack of political nerve”.21  This would prove significant in the years to come. 
To offset the army’s structural power, Sukarno increasingly nurtured his links to the 
PKI, the right leaning army’s natural rival.  The ambiguous relationship Sukarno established 
with the communists encouraged the view in many quarters, particularly in the USA, that he 
was at the very least a communist sympathiser, if not a closet communist himself.  But the 
arrangement allowed Sukarno to over time to orchestrate domestic power to suit his own ends 
or at least preserve his leadership.  The political balance “prevented any one group gaining 
ascendency over him.”  He could “tilt it this way or that according to the prevailing winds or 
the requirements of his ambitions”.22 
There were two related effects on the course of Indonesian politics arising from this 
emerging configuration between 1958 and 1959.  The first was that a new hierarchy of power 
and alignment of forces would dominate the domestic political scene.  The second was that 
Sukarno was able to engineer the biggest change to the political system since independence, 
establishing the authoritarian institution of Guided Democracy and reinforcing his own place 
at the centre of politics.  Following the regional rebellions, the political forces most likely to 
effectively oppose Sukarno’s plans to curtail the influence of political parties and strengthen 
executive government were placed on the defensive.  The army was essentially on side with 
																																																						
20 A comprehensive account of these events can be found in Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 
pp. 153-192. 
21 Legge, Sukarno, p. 338. 
22 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, 
Singapore: Equinox (2006[1974]), p. 70.  For the three-cornered structure of Indonesian politics and 
Sukarno’s balancing act, see also Herbert Feith, “President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: 
The Triangle Changes Shape”, Asian Survey, Vol. IV, 9 September 1964, 969-980. 
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Sukarno: it was anti-political party and a strong supporter of centralised government.  The PKI 
stood to lose from the curtailment of political parties and was at first opposed to a system under 
which the president would be able to directly appoint to parliament representatives from 
various “functional groups”.  Eventually, it dropped its objections to Guided Democracy 
because all the momentum lay with Sukarno and it was potentially risky for the party to go it 
alone.23 
Thus, on 3 July 1959, Sukarno used the latitude he enjoyed to formally usher in Guided 
Democracy by presidential decree.  He abolished the temporary 1950 constitution, sacked the 
Constituent Assembly, which had been established to revise it, and restored the original 
constitution of 1945.24  The effect was to abridge the role of the parliament and establish a 
system in which Sukarno directly appointed the cabinet and simultaneously occupied the role 
of prime minister.  This was to give him his first real opportunity to exercise executive power.  
Gradually, he asserted his prerogatives, establishing a statist and corporatist structure of 
government in which he was advised by various councils and quasi-military commands.  In 
March 1960, he dissolved the elected parliament and replaced it with an appointed body.  The 
previous September he had succeeded in having parliamentary elections scheduled for late 
1959 postponed over alleged concerns about security and the integrity of the vote.25   Guided 
Democracy thus placed Sukarno at the centre of foreign policymaking, a position no single 
leader in the archipelago had occupied since the times of the great native empires.  This resulted 
in a highly personalised foreign policy and a drift towards increasing international radicalism, 
in which the symbols of the nationalist revolution became integral to state identity. 
Under Guided Democracy, all the political parties except the PKI were in retreat.  They 
might have been expected to oppose the postponement of the elections, but the strength of the 
PKI, particularly in Central and East Java, and also increasingly on Sumatra, prompted fears 
of the communists winning an outright electoral victory.  Consequently, the parties went along 
with Army-supervised controls that severely restricted their activities and opened them up to 
closer scrutiny.  From the start of open rebellion in 1958, Masyumi especially had been on the 
defensive.  It’s chairman, Natsir, the former prime minister, had joined the PRRI and yet 
																																																						
23 For the dynamics of this decision-making process see Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under 
Sukarno, pp. 71-74. 
24 Account of the elements of Guided Democracy can be found in Feith, Decline of Constitutional 
Democracy, pp. 592-595 and Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 295-307. 
 The degree contained the five points of Sukarno’s new political manifesto: The constitution of 1945, 
Indonesian socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, Indonesian identity. With his love for 
abbreviation Sukarno termed this policy USDEK, a combination of the first letters of the five points. 
25 See Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 189. 
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surprisingly remained in office in absentia until April 1959.26  The deathblow for the party 
came in August 1960.  Masyumi and the small but influential Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), 
which also counted prominent members of the PRRI in its ranks, were banned.27   
The man Sukarno chose to be his “first minister” to steer daily government under 
Guided Democracy – an appointment that reflected Sukarno’s distaste for the administrative 
detail of government – was the non-party technocrat, Djuanda Kartawidjaja.  As prime minister 
during the transition phase to Guided Democracy, Djuanda had tried to limit the extent of the 
power the president could exercise and ensure the new system retained as much democratic 
practice as possible.28  But Djuanda had the confidence of Sukarno.  He was a respected 
administrator who had served in almost every cabinet since independence.  This enabled him 
to survive as first minister until his death in office in November 1963, providing an unusually 
long period of stability at the top of government.  Importantly from the perspective of foreign 
policy Djuanda also had the confidence of the USA.  He was viewed as pro-Western and anti-
communist.  He had been ambassador Cochran’s most trusted cabinet source during the MSA 
crisis that had brought the Sukiman cabinet down. 
With the priority in Washington on preventing a drift to communism in Indonesia, the 
advent of Guided Democracy in itself was not regarded as a problem.  John Foster Dulles 
claimed he “did not quarrel with Guided Democracy” because Indonesia needed “more 
centralisation”.29  But the real appeal of the system to the USA was that shared by the political 
party rivals of the PKI:  Guided Democracy in non-communist hands might act as a break on 
the growth of support for communism, which almost certainly would have been the result of 
unfettered democracy.  Numerous US policy documents from the time refer to the advantages 
Guided Democracy offered for curtailing PKI strength.30  Despite doubts in Washington over 
Sukarno’s reliability, there were hopes he could be persuaded to see the benefits of at least tacit 
support for the “free world” and, failing this, the army might curb his renowned excesses.  US 
																																																						
26 Ibid. p. 157 
27 For an account of the various restrictions introduced under Guided Democracy see Feith, Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy, pp. 592-593. 
28 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, Oxford University 
Press, (1982), pp. 135-136. 
29 Memorandum of Conversation (Dulles and Murkarto), Washington, 23 May 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 
1958-1960, document 109, p. 198. 
30 See for example Memorandum from assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter 
Robertson, to acting Secretary of State, Christian Herter, Washington, 27 February 1959, ibid., 
document 184, pp. 352-354. 
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officials failed to foresee the shifts Guided Democracy would permit in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy orientation in the years ahead.   
In the absence of effective parliamentary opposition, Sukarno was free to challenge, 
even dispense with, the bebas-aktif principles as he pursued a foreign policy more in accord 
with his personal preferences.  He was confirmed as the preeminent Indonesian voice in 
international politics; he was the interpreter of the will of the Indonesian people and the 
formulator of the major themes in foreign policy.  As Sukarno embraced his new executive 
authority, foreign policy began to reflect the revolutionary creed he brought to domestic 
politics, replete with his love of symbols and gesture.  Indonesian foreign policy came to 
embody Sukarno’s belief that “the Indonesian revolution was a continuous effort to destroy the 
old and rebuild the new”.31  The decline and eventual prohibition of Masyumi and PSI removed 
from the political scene the two strongest political party supporters of a pro-Western foreign 
policy, centred on the maintenance of good relations with the USA and participation in the 
Western-elaborated system of international rules and institutions.  Masyumi and PSI were also 
the most fervently anti-communist of the political parties.  
Ironically, the demise of the two parties affected the political strength of the other major 
anti-communist force and supporter of a pro-Western orientation in foreign policy – the army.  
Masyumi and PSI had been consistent supporters of the army in conflicts with other forces.32  
During the first phase of Guided Democracy, the Sukarno-army relationship was characterised 
as a partnership based on a considerable degree of mutual dependence.  The presidency and the 
army command were the two main centres of power in Indonesia.  The army had been out in 
front of Sukarno in advocating the restoration of the 1945 constitution.  It had used its martial 
law powers aggressively to restrict political party activities, even before the advent of Guided 
Democracy.  In this sense, the “road to Guided Democracy was paved with military 
regulations”.33  But from the start of the partnership between Sukarno and the army, there were 
tensions.  Sukarno and Nasution shared the ideal of returning to the “spirit of the revolution”.34  
They both deplored the excesses of the political parties and sought stronger and more 
disciplined central government.  They were both firm advocates of taking West New Guinea 
from the Dutch. Yet they parted company on a variety of issues close to Sukarno’s heart:  
																																																						
31 Eduard Quiko, “The Role of Foreign Minister Subandrio in Indonesian Politics: An Analysis of 
Selected Indonesian Foreign Policies, 1957-1965”, Unpublished PhD thesis, Southern Illinois 
University, (1970), p. 26. 
32 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 123. 
33 Daves, The Indonesian Army, Volume 1, p. 429. 
34 Ibid. p. 451. 
	 177	
strident anti-imperialism, a high profile in international affairs, and a syncretic political 
environment that created room for prescribed political party activity, in particular by the PKI.  
In contrast, Nasution was less concerned about the symbolic and ideological dimensions of 
statehood and more concerned with achieving a rational approach to politics and economic 
development.35 
Within a year of launching Guided Democracy, Sukarno started to promote the concept 
of a so-called NASAKOM government, combining nationalist, religious and communist 
forces.36  Sukarno knew the inclusion of the PKI in government was anathema to the army, and 
the extent to which he genuinely wanted to give PKI power over state policy is debateable.37  
Yet clearly he sought to achieve a more even balance between the army and the PKI as a means 
of maintaining his own position at the fulcrum of power.  From mid-1962, Sukarno began to 
move against Nasution and the army in a series of manoeuvres aimed at reducing their power 
in politics and enhancing his own.  The reduction of the army’s power was achieved by moves 
to undermine both its Chief of Staff and its role in the structure of government.  Nasution, then 
considered the second most powerful man in Indonesia, was gradually eased out of positions 
of influence.  In effect, Sukarno’s strategy was to promote Nasution into obscurity.  In June 
1962, Sukarno used Nasution’s own ideas about recentralisation of military power against him.  
He re-established the post of armed forces Chief of Staff, appointing Nasution to it while 
simultaneously requiring him to relinquish his duties as army Chief of Staff, the real seat of the 
military’s domestic power.  Armed forces Chief of Staff was rendered an empty position 
because the service chiefs reported directly to Sukarno as commander-in-chief.38  Major 
General Achmad Yani, younger, less secure, and more pliable than Nasution became army 
Chief of Staff, although ironically Nasution remained loyal to the President and had rejected 
approaches from civilians and soldiers to stage a coup d’état “on principle”.39 
Nasution retained the position of Minister for Defence and Security, to which had been 
appointed in the first of the Guided Democracy working cabinets.  A series of administrative 
measures were then steadily introduced to limit the real influence of Nasution’s two offices 
and consolidate Sukarno’s role as Commander-in-Chief.  At the same time Nasution was being 
sidelined, the army lost its single most important instrument of domestic political power with 
																																																						
35 Sundhaussen op. cit., p. 165. 
36 NASAKOM stood for nationalisme, agama (religion), and Komunisme. 
37 See Legge, Sukarno, p. 369. 
38 Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Sydney: Allen & Unwn (1996), pp. 49-50. 
39 Ibid., p. 49.  For Yani’s background and relationship with Sukarno, see Daves, op. cit., pp. 481-484. 
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the end of martial law in May 1963.  The defeat of the regional rebellions and a separate Islamic 
rebellion centred on West Java instigated by Darul Islam had removed the remaining 
justification for an increasingly unpopular army role in civilian government.  The army was 
not entirely eased out of government because of Nasution’s “Middle Way” doctrine, which 
secured military influence through a guaranteed number of seats in parliament and appointment 
of active duty officers to various bureaucratic posts.40     
As Sukarno succeeded in eroding the power of the army, the biggest beneficiary aside 
from himself was the PKI.  PKI leaders only managed to obtain a handful of seats in the 
government’s advisory bodies and one fellow traveler was appointed Minister of Justice.  But 
its real strength lay in its capacity to shape the national debate on terms that suited its own 
ideological priorities and long-term growth.  It was able to do this because of a significant 
overlap in ideals shared with Sukarno and its ability to tailor its program to capture the zeitgeist 
of Indonesian politics.  The young PKI central committee, headed by D.N. Aidit, chose to 
“emphasise national unity and nationalist goals over class agitation and Communist claims to 
hegemony over the nationalist movement”.41  The decision to subjugate traditional communist 
priorities allowed the PKI to forge a common platform with Sukarno on anti-imperialism, anti-
colonialism and nationalism.  As Sukarno told the PKI’s sixth congress in September 1959, 
their shared goal was to build national unity and “sweep away the main enemy, political 
imperialism and economic imperialism”.42  Sukarno’s accommodation with PKI was made 
easier by his employment of a Marxist analysis of imperialism and his avowed socialism.  “I 
am a Socialist. I am a Leftist,” he declared in his autobiography.43  In public and in private, 
Sukarno continued to insist he was not a communist. 
Sukarno desired a large stage for the drama of his leadership, which was provided by 
international politics.  Placing imperialism and colonialism at the heart of foreign policy, the 
President could inspire nationalistic emotions among the masses and retain the support of the 
PKI.  But the first half of the 1960s was a tough time for the Indonesian economy.  Inflation 
spiraled out of control.  Export revenues fell sharply and the budget deficit blew out as key 
parts of the economy were nationalised. Growth stagnated.44  Technocrats like Djuanda 
																																																						
40 For an account of the “Middle Way” or “Dual Function” doctrine see Daves, op. cit., pp. 433-442. 
41 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 84 
42 Quoted in ibid. p. 85. 
43 Sukarno, Sukarno: An Autobiography, p. 75. 
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appreciated the need for Western support to restore the economy to health.  But rational 
economics took a back seat to anti-imperialism in what Sukarno termed Guided Economy.  
Foreign capital was subject to widespread hostility and several waves of seizure and 
nationalisation, often depicted as a response to popular outbursts.  In this way, management of 
the economy became a crucial issue affecting not only the domestic power balance – free 
market policies would have undermined the interests of the PKI – but the broader pattern of 
Indonesia’s international politics.45 
The strictures of Western-led economic solutions would have also crimped Sukarno’s 
freedom at a time when he was more interested in formulating his own version of the two-camp 
thesis, in which the world was divided between the so-called New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) 
and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS).  This was an extension of the views he had 
expressed at Bandung about the tide of history turning in favor of the newly independent states 
and nationalist movements.  In practical terms, the theory would be played out in his campaign 
to wrest control of West New Guinea.  Ultimately, Sukarno’s temperament made him unwilling 
to sacrifice foreign policy ambitions for the mundane activity of managing the economy.  
Indeed, the effects of economic hardship, and the political balancing act the President 
needed to execute to stay in power, far from restraining Sukarno, created an incentive for him 
to use foreign policy as a stage to reinforce his legitimacy, orchestrate and unify domestic 
politics, bolster national pride and provide the illusion of progress when national development 
faltered.  In the crudest terms, it was a convenient distraction.  As foreign minister, the 
President retained Subandrio, a former secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
ambassador to London and Moscow, who was well suited to Sukarno’s purposes.  Subandrio 
was first appointed to the position in 1957 and continued to serve in it for the entire Guided 
Democracy period.  A contemporary described him as ambitious, determined to seek higher 
office and, for those reasons, “a faithful executor” of Sukarno’s foreign policy vision.46 
Foreign policy in this era then is best understood as a combination of two factors:  first, 
its utility for the President in preserving his leadership and advancing his vision for a strong, 
independent and united nation, and, secondly, its significance as an ideological weapon in the 
power struggle waged between the PKI and the political right, led by the army.  Together they 
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were to have significant implications for Indonesia’s relations with the great powers and 
patterns of alignment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the domestic and international context in which Indonesia 
set its foreign policy, particularly its alignment decisions, between 1959 and 1965.  The events 
recorded here are essential to understanding the pressures on Sukarno as he exercised the 
immense power in foreign policy bestowed on him by Guided Democracy, but walked a fine 
line between opposed ideological forces at home and abroad.  The Guided Democracy years 
bore witness to a confluence of heightened ideological competition at the international and 
domestic levels.  But while at the international level the major fault line was between 
communism and Western capitalism, at the domestic level in Indonesia it was between 
communism and an array of indigenous beliefs and power configurations.  In other words, the 
ideological divide at the international level had its equivalent within Indonesia, but it was 
refracted by domestic circumstances.  Sukarno was at the apex of domestic ideological 
contention and added another layer of complexity by the pursuit of his own preferences and 
interests, most strikingly expressed as a world divided between the NEFO and OLDEFO.    
The ideological and power competitions, as they overlapped and interacted at the 
international and domestic levels, created the general environment in which Sukarno and his 
key advisers balanced the risks of different alignment choices.  They were times of escalating 
tensions in Indonesia’s immediate region and its domestic politics that would make the exercise 
in balancing risk increasingly difficult.  The remaining chapters will account for how this 
played out in practice in the years between 1959 and 1966. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Sukarno at the Apex of Power:  The Foreign 
Policy of Early Guided Democracy 
 
In the two years after 1959, Sukarno strengthened his grip on the institutions of 
power, resulting in a highly personalised rule.  Few political contemporaries were 
confident enough or strong enough to present a serious challenge to him.  In no arena was 
this more true than foreign policy.  Both in practice and in the perception of foreign 
powers, the key to understanding Indonesian foreign policy was the thinking of Sukarno 
himself.  Sukarno employed this freedom in foreign policy to multiple ends.  He forged 
pragmatic alignments with great powers to build Indonesia’s internal strength, he pursued 
an ideological crusade against colonialism and imperialism, he asserted Indonesia’s own 
ambitions, particularly its claim to West New Guinea, he attempted to turn a nascent 
multilateral diplomacy in the Third World into a new power bloc and he promoted 
national pride and dignity.  It was a time of great expansiveness in foreign policy in 
contrast to the modest goals of the governments of the constitutional democracy era.   
The episodes in this chapter chart the emergence of Sukarno’s foreign policy 
activism following the defeat of the regional rebellions to the articulation of his new 
paradigm for Indonesian foreign policy based on a dichotomy between the states of the 
developing world and older industrialised states.  This period marked the start of a shift 
away from earlier moderation and firm public neutrality in relations with the Cold War 
powers to a strident anti-imperialism, largely directed at the West, and an alignment with 
the Soviet Union and other communist states as new sources of economic and military aid.  
It incorporates the competition among rival great powers, sharpened by Guided 
Democracy, to woo Sukarno, the recrudescence and settlement of conflict with China over 
the place of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement 
and the crafting of a singular foreign policy vernacular. 
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But the episodes examined here also posed new challenges for the regime in 
balancing the international and domestic risks that accompanied alignment decisions.  
There were multiple challenges that pitted international and domestic priorities against 
each other.  As relationships were deepened with the Soviets and its eastern bloc allies to 
gain the resources needed to build Indonesia’s own strength, Jakarta had to try to minimise 
the risk of foreign capture.  The subsequent military build-up and attempts to establish an 
alternative system of alignment in the Third World required careful management to avoid 
straining ties with the West that remained vital to Indonesia’s development.  The perennial 
problem of the status of Sino-Indonesians put the goal of cultivating China as a potential 
ally in direct contradiction with a highly-emotive issue at home.  All this called for the 
refinement of strategies Indonesia had used effectively in the past, like hedging, 
competitive bidding, and Omnibalancing.  This chapter will conclude by analysing how 
Indonesia used this range of smart strategies to try to balance the domestic and 
international risks in managing its Cold War alignment. 
 
Struggle for Alignment:  Cold War Rivalries and Early Guided 
Democracy  
 
Backing the Right Horse: The Courting of Sukarno 
 
The advent of Guided Democracy and the steady increase in Sukarno’s personal 
authority narrowed the focus of the great powers competing for favor in Indonesia.  It was 
the President who would decide the broad directions of foreign policy and the patterns of 
future alignment.  This was something the USA had been unprepared for.  In the 
interregnum between the collapse of resistance by the USA’s client colonels and the 
introduction of Guided Democracy, the policy had been to focus the bulk of diplomatic 
effort on rebuilding relations with the army and other anti-communist forces on Java.  
Sukarno was to be kept happy, but he was viewed as too mercurial and too unreliable to be 
the sole target of cultivation.  The best that could be expected was to ensure he remained 
generally well disposed to the West within the framework of an Indonesian policy of 
even-handed neutrality.  But with the consolidation of Guided Democracy, the great 
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powers found themselves in an intense competition to win Sukarno’s personal approval.  
Sukarno knew he could play on the desires and fears of the two power blocs.  The 
strategic analysts all agreed Indonesia’s support would be a rich prize.  Sukarno proved 
adept at nurturing competitive tension between the great powers with the aim of extracting 
the best deal for himself and Indonesia. 
Some of the diplomatic efforts to woo Sukarno verged on the comical.  But the 
President’s vanity and ego could not to be dismissed.  Howard Jones, the US ambassador, 
regarded it as a victory to get Sukarno aboard a massive C-124 Globemaster military 
transport plane.  The purpose of the joy flight was to refute the idea that the USA was 
backing Nasution against Sukarno.  But the conclusion drawn from Sukarno’s pleasure at 
riding in a state-of-the-art aircraft was typically exaggerated.  Jones argued the simple act 
of taking the flight “tended to line up the President with the US in Indonesian eyes”.1  
Khrushchev also flattered Sukarno and pandered to his ego.  On a February-March 1960 
visit to Indonesia, the Soviet leader questioned Sukarno’s priorities in wanting to build a 
huge stadium in central Jakarta.  He told Sukarno the project was “not rational”.2  The 
Soviets built it anyway. 
Stunts and monuments aside, the competition to draw Indonesia into alignment 
was a serious affair.  It was intense, consumed substantial amounts of financial and 
diplomatic capital, and was viewed as winner take all.  The Communist bloc countries 
were estimated to have spent USD 375 million by early 1959 on military and economic 
aid, most of it in the previous year.3  On order were 115 aircraft, including MIG fighters, 
bombers, transports and trainers.4  In addition to the Soviet-designed aircraft, Indonesia 
																																																								
1 Letter from the Ambassador to Indonesia (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs (Robertson), 2 September 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 151, p. 
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2 Khrushchev, Memoirs, p. 788. 
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was to acquire four Polish-built destroyers and two submarines.  This “massive” build up 
would give Indonesia one of the most capable militaries in the region.5  
The USA lagged badly in the aid competition.  In the nine years to the start of 
1959, it spent $26 million in military aid and $282 million in economic aid.6  But most of 
the military aid was contained in a package approved in August 1958.  In a policy reversal 
that was breathtaking in both its speed and its audacity, the USA switched from supporting 
the regional rebels to supporting the armed forces with weapons and training within the 
space of two to three months.  Sukarno himself was stunned when he heard news of the 
American volte-face.  “The President’s reaction was one of disbelief followed by an 
expression of gratification,” is how Jones described it.7   
A memorandum on Indonesia policy from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-1958 
had captured the rationale behind new thinking in Washington.  The US military chiefs 
wanted an explicit public statement of support for Indonesian unity and independence, an 
“impact program” of economic aid and a “token” program of military aid.  With this, the 
USA could establish a “logical overt Cold War beachhead for future US operations in 
Indonesia”.  There was no certainty over the course of events in Indonesia with the 
seemingly relentless growth of the PKI, so there were advantages in supplying equipment 
that would establish a degree of dependency and consequently “an opportunity for some 
degree of continuing US influence over the Indonesian Armed Forces”.8  The army was 
the focus of American assistance on the grounds that it was the most anti-communist of 
the three services.9   																																																								
5 The Eastern bloc economic and weapons transfers came with a sizeable presence of personnel on 
the ground.  It was estimated there were 270 economic technicians and 130 military technicians.  
See, Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, Washington, 1 October 1958, ibid., document 156, p. 
289. 
6 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 5 March 1959, ibid., document 186, p. 
358. 
7 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 14 August 1958, 
ibid., p. 261. 
8 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense McElroy, 9 May 1959, 
ibid., document 88, p. 156. 
9 The military aid package was limited to USD 7 million to be phased in over a period. It supplied 
the army with small arms, radio sets and light vehicles – items judged as useful in defeating any 
future communist insurgency The decision to supply materiel and the types of materiel to be 
supplied was coordinated with the Dutch.  See, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Far 
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The Russians and the Americans assumed Sukarno was playing both sides of the 
Cold War conflict.  But the stakes were deemed to be too great to simply walk away from 
the contest for influence.  “Sukarno was balancing between us and the United States, 
trying to use both of us to achieve his aims,” Khrushchev remembered. “This indicates he 
was capable of constructing various combinations, engaging in elaborate manoeuvres.  
However, this action of his offended us.”10  The US National Security Council reached the 
same conclusion:  any non-communist Indonesian regime would follow a “neutralist” 
policy, “seeking aid on its own terms from both the West and the Bloc… balancing each 
off against the other”.11 
China had smaller coffers in the late 1950s and 1960s than its rivals for 
Indonesia’s allegiance.  But it too offered modest amounts of aid in the form of credits for 
the purchase of commodities such as rice and textiles.12  The bigger leverage for China 
came from its ability to find commonalities with the national experience of Indonesia and 
present itself as a source of ideas and inspiration.  This was buttressed by an effective 
propaganda campaign targeting elites and the grassroots. 13   An example of Beijing’s 
approach came during a visit to Indonesia by a People’s Liberation Army delegation head 
by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Yang Chengwu, in early 1959.  Yang’s delegation 
met Sukarno, Djuanda and all the senior armed forces commanders.  Yang told his hosts: 
 
[T]he armed forces of the two countries had many points in common:  both were 
brought up in the struggle for national independence and freedom; China’s Taiwan 
and Indonesia’s West Irian (New Guinea) are yet to be liberated and the security 
of the two countries is still being threatened by imperialism.14 																																																																																																																																																																							
Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, 30 July 1958, ibid., document 138, pp. 
252-254 and Editorial Note, ibid., document 142, pp. 260-261. 
10 Khrushchev, Memoirs, p. 792. 
11 National Security Council Report, NSC 5901, Statement of US Policy on Indonesia, 3 February 
1959, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 177, p. 335.  The idea that Indonesia was “playing 
both sides and making suckers of us” was widespread among US Indonesia watchers.  See, 
Telegram from the Department of State (Herter) to the Embassy in Indonesia, 20 August 1958, 
document 148, p. 269. 
12 For example, a USD 16 million trade credit was agreed by China and Indonesia on 17 April 
1958.  See Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p.145. 
13 For details of the Chinese propaganda campaign in Indonesia see Liu, op. cit., pp. 188-197. 
14 “Goodwill Mission to Indonesia”, Peking Review, Vol. 2 No. 19, 12 May 1959, p. 25.  
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The Chinese reached the conclusion sometime in the lead up to the Asia Africa 
conference that they could work with Sukarno, reversing the hostility that characterised 
Communist Chinese attitudes towards him from the time of the Madiun uprising.15  The 
success of Sukarno’s visit to China in 1956 and the significant impression the visit had left 
on his thinking about Indonesia’s own political system served to encourage the idea that 
China and Indonesia could join forces on some international objectives. Revelations of 
covert US support for the regional rebels in 1958 added momentum to efforts to forge a 
common platform against imperialism, for which the principle target would be the USA.  
China denounced the USA as the “hand behind the scenes” in the rebellion.  An editorial 
in the pro-government newspaper Ta Kung Pao on 26 February 1958 reflected the official 
line when it declared Washington was sponsoring the rebels in order to “overthrow the 
legitimate government of Indonesia, to drag it into the SEATO bloc and eventually turn it 
into an American military base”.16   
The regional rebellions helped China’s position in Indonesia in other ways.  In 
aiding the regional rebels, the USA had relied heavily on Taiwan as both a staging point 
for materiel and personnel and as a means of disguising the origins of the rebel’s support.  
The Kuomintang-controlled Republic of China proved an eager accomplice.  The head of 
the KMT government, Chiang Kai-shek, appeared more alarmed by the prospects of 
Indonesia going communist than the USA.  He warned the loss of Indonesia would be a 
strategic disaster.  “The whole world situation (would be) altered in favor of the 
Communists” and the “position and prestige of the US would be gravely affected”, he told 
the US Ambassador to Taipei, Everett F. Drumright.17  As the USA attempted to extricate 
itself from its commitments to the rebels after the downing of Allen Pope’s B-26, Chiang 
complicated life for the Americans by continuing the undeclared bombing operations and 
keeping open the supply lines in eastern Indonesia.  He even contemplated sending a 																																																								
15 The timing and the causes of this transition in Chinese thinking are imprecise.  But there was 
probably a confluence of factors that made Beijing realize it was possible to establish some 
common objectives with Sukarno, particularly in international relations.  For a discussion of the 
influences on Beijing’s thinking see Mozingo, Chinese Policy, pp. 146-156. 
16 Quoted in “Hands Off Indonesia!” Peking Review, Vol. 1 No. 1, 4 March 1958, p. 19 
17 Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China (Drumright) to the Department of State, 
Taipei, 22 May 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 108, p. 194. 
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regiment of marines and a squadron of aircraft to rebel-held areas.18  But Taiwan’s aid to 
the rebels was as difficult to conceal as American aid had been.  The Indonesian 
government, having satisfied itself of Taiwan’s complicity, launched a crackdown on 
KMT supporters and organisations in late 1958.19  The result was the “total destruction of 
the Kuomintang position in the Indonesian Chinese community” and a victory for 
Beijing.20  Pro-KMT newspapers and associations were banned and businesses and banks 
run by KMT sympathisers were confiscated.  The campaign against the KMT, and the 
growing stockpile of weapons originating from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and 
China, suggested the USA was gradually losing the battle for influence in Jakarta to the 
communists.   
Initially, Sukarno and his ministers appeared surprisingly restrained in their 
reaction to evidence of the massive scale of US intervention in support of the rebels.  Four 
days after Pope’s plane had been shot down on 18 May 1958, Sukarno went to lunch at 
Jones’ residence in an unusual display of favor.21  In response to Jones’ toast, Sukarno he 
wanted to “speak from the heart” about his friendship with Americans and his desire for a 
closer relationship with the USA.  At the time Sukarno and Jones lunched together, the 
Indonesian government was aware the aerial bombing of Ambon market the day before 
Pope was shot down had resulted in the deaths of 100 people, but it managed to conceal 
the death toll from the public elsewhere in Indonesia.22  The Indonesian government was 
clearly anxious to avoid a head-on confrontation with one of the great powers.  “Let us 
																																																								
18 Ibid. 
19 Foreign Minister Subandrio told Jones on 17 May 1958 that a battalion of Chinese troops had 
landed in Sulawesi to fight alongside the rebels.  This was an inaccurate claim, but Indonesia was 
correct when it assumed that bombing raids and aid supplies were being launched from airstrips in 
Taiwan. See, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 17 May 
1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 101, p. 182. 
20 Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p. 153. 
21 Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 106, p. 190.  However, Sukarno also 
maintained the protocols of neutrality by lunching three weeks later with Soviet ambassador 
Zhukov, see Mozingo, Chinese Policy, p. 173. 
22 Some estimates put the civilian death toll at about 700, while the government put the toll at six 
civilians and 17 troops. See Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, pp. 180-181. 
Subandrio also told Jones the bombing on a Sunday hit the market at the most crowded time when 
people were shopping and on their way to church.  This provoked an anti-American outburst 
among the Ambonese.  Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of 
State, 17 May 1958, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 101, pp. 182-183. 
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have no war, no war.  This would be bad for everybody,” Sukarno had told Jones gravely 
at the end of one meeting.23 
But the efforts of the Indonesian government to calm the situation by suppressing 
news on the full extent to which the USA had abetted the regional rebels were simply 
aimed at keeping Jakarta’s options open.  Privately, Djuanda and Subandrio warned 
Indonesia might have to accept volunteers and other military assistance from Soviet bloc 
countries if outside forces persisted in aiding the rebels, a move that US officials feared 
would be tantamount to alignment with international communism.24  The subsequent shift 
in US policy signalled by the approval of modest packages of food and military aid 
improved the mood of some high officials in Jakarta, but failed to alter the general trend of 
domestic politics.   
Attitudes in Indonesia to the USA were gradually cooling.  The PKI was effective 
in depicting pro-Western political elements in Indonesia as selling out to the USA. And, 
despite outward courtesies, Sukarno and even some politicians sympathetic to the 
Americans became disenchanted with the USA in the year after it withdrew active support 
from the regional rebels.  The communist states were quick to offer economic and political 
aid to Indonesia, in particular over its claims to West New Guinea.  By comparison, the 
USA appeared grudging and parsimonious in its levels of support.  An application to the 
US Export-Import Bank for a loan to buy three of the latest Lockheed Electra airliners was 
initially rejected on commercial grounds – a purchase of the highest priority to Sukarno as 
a show of national modernity and prestige.  The loan was eventually approved simply to 
appease Sukarno after the intervention of the State Department.25  The accumulation of 
these niggling disputes and Washington’s perceived failure to support Indonesia on the 
bigger issues – none bigger to Sukarno than his admitted “obsession” with West New 																																																								
23 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 21 July 1958, ibid., 
document 136, p. 248. 
24 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 12 May 1958, 
ibid., document 91, pp. 160-161 and Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the 
Department of State, 15 May 1958, ibid., document 97, pp. 174-175.  Subandrio also told Jones 
that Indonesia might be forced to make an appeal to the UN against foreign aggression because of 
the bombing raids by B-26 aircraft. This move could have put enormous public pressure on the US 
and resulted in release of incriminating information.  See, Telegram from the Embassy in 
Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 15 July 1958, ibid., document 134, p. 241. 
25 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 5 March 1959, ibid., document 186, pp. 355-358. 
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Guinea – contributed to the steady drift away from the USA on the part of the President 
through 1959 and 1960.26   
Throughout the early period of Guided Democracy, the USA pursued what might 
be described as a hedging strategy.  It would try to encourage the anti-communist forces in 
Indonesia, mainly in the army and among the remnants of the disbanded Masyumi, and it 
would try to keep Sukarno at least neutral.  But it would not relinquish the option of 
resuming the large-scale intervention in Indonesia that had already caused so much 
damage to bilateral relations.  Secretary Dulles’ distrust of Sukarno and his doubts about 
the willingness or ability of anti-communist forces to confront the PKI led him to advocate 
“keeping the embers (of the rebellions) warm so that they can be fanned into flames if 
necessary”.27  Indeed, the Dulles brothers were unrepentant over the failure of their covert 
war to do anything other than embarrass the USA.  John Foster Dulles told an NSC 
meeting in early 1959: “We had played the game pretty well and our policy may work out 
successfully.”  The record shows Eisenhower was unimpressed.  “We are on a better horse 
now,” he replied – a reference to the administration’s attempts to rebuild trust in Jakarta 
and garner the support of the army.28  The rebellions were not completely extinguished 
until 1961.  Secretary Dulles would not live to see the fighting end.  He died in office on 
24 May 1959.   
Following the disaster of the rebellions, it was patently clear Washington needed 
some new formal policy guidance.  But the mindset that had produced a preference for 
covert action and military-led solutions proved resistant to change.  According to NSC 
directive 5901, approved in February 1959, the “chief danger” in Indonesia was still the 
prospect of a communist takeover brought about by domestic instability, Sino-Soviet bloc 
economic and military aid and growing PKI strength.  The new Indonesia policy issued by 
the NSC authorised government agencies to “employ all feasible means”, including the 
use of armed forces if necessary “to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from falling 																																																								
26 Sukarno told Jones of his position on West New Guinea: “This is an obsession with me.”  
Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 21 July 1958, ibid., 
document 136, p. 247. 
27 Memorandum of Conversation (Dulles and J.H. van Roijen), Washington, 27 May 1958, ibid., 
document 116, pp. 211-212. 
28 Memorandum of Discussion at the National Security Council, Washington, 29 January 1959, see 
ibid, document 175, p. 329. 
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under communist control”.29  The continued appeal of covert action was reflected in an 
order to give priority to programs aimed at isolating the PKI and manipulating it into 
positions of open opposition to the government, thus creating “grounds for repressive 
measures politically justifiable in terms of Indonesia’s national self-interest”. 30   This 
policy of attempting by covert means to incite the PKI into taking pre-emptive anti-
government action would form a vital part of the strategy for undermining communism in 
the years ahead. 
The ultimate goal of the NSC policy was to move Indonesia into the Western 
camp.  In the meantime, the USA would accommodate Indonesia’s neutralist policy “as 
necessary”, while ensuring relations with the communist bloc were balanced by relations 
with the “Free World”.  But the new policy explicitly ruled out any change to American 
neutrality over the competing claims of the Indonesians and the Dutch to West New 
Guinea.31 
 
Awkward Ties: Khrushchev Comes to Town 
 
With Indonesian loyalties in the balance, competition between the great powers to 
draw it into alignment intensified in the early 1960s.  The Soviet Union, China and the 
USA all simultaneously believed there was an opportunity to befriend at least some 
elements of the Indonesian leadership.  Each nation strangely believed the country was 
ripe for alignment – if only the right strategy were employed.  Yet Indonesia was to prove 
an elusive and difficult partner for all three.   
The Soviet Union made a determined push to cultivate ties with Sukarno and the 
Indonesian body politic, showering the country with military and economic aid.  It sought 
to capitalise on weaknesses in the standing of the USA, and later China, to enhance its 
own credentials as a partner.  But the experience of Moscow in courting Indonesia was 
illustrative of the problems all the great powers faced.  Khrushchev would ultimately be 																																																								
29 “Statement of US policy on Indonesia”, NSC 5901, 3 February 1959, see FRUS, Vol. XVII, 
1958-1960, document 177, pp. 334-343. 
30 Ibid. p. 343. 
31 This was despite entreaties from Jones that it was time to rethink. He argued the time had come 
for the Dutch to get out of West New Guinea.  Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to 
the Department of State, 23 January 1959, ibid., document 174, pp. 323-325. 
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dissatisfied with the outcome and bewildered by some of Sukarno’s priorities and personal 
foibles.   
The crowning moment of the Soviet diplomatic push into Indonesia came in mid-
February 1960 when Khrushchev came to Indonesia for 13 days.32  The length of stay 
afforded him the opportunity to get a good measure of Sukarno.  On their first meeting in 
Moscow, Sukarno had impressed Khrushchev as an “educated” and “intelligent” man.33  
But after seeing Sukarno in Indonesia he admitted there was much about the Indonesian 
president that baffled him.  He was affronted by the very public way Sukarno carried on 
romantic affairs.  He could not understand “how an intelligent leader could engage in such 
‘escapades’ in his private life”.  He was also bemused by Sukarno’s potpourri of political 
philosophy.  He found it “hard to figure out what kind of socialism Sukarno was talking 
about”.34  The visit was not without some rancor.  Khrushchev allegedly offended his 
hosts by stating they were not true socialists and suggesting the government needed to 
exercise more discipline over the people.35  Given comments contained in Khrushchev’s 
memoirs, this is not implausible.  On another occasion, Sukarno is alleged to have told 
Subandrio: “I did not invite Khrushchev here to be insulted.  You take over.” 36  
Khrushchev himself openly referred to differences with Sukarno at a banquet in Jakarta.37   
These differences did not seep into public consciousness.  From a propaganda 
perspective, the visit was a victory.  Thousands of people lined the streets of Jakarta, 
Bandung and Surabaya to greet Khrushchev as he drove by in open-topped vehicles.  
Portraits of the Soviet leader were plastered on roadside billboards next to those of Marx 
and Sukarno.  The public success of the visit enhanced the image of communism and, 
therefore, also benefited the PKI.  Yet Khrushchev’s visit did not represent a manifestation 
of a communist United Front at work.  He travelled to serve the Soviet Union’s own 																																																								
32 This was part of a visit that included visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan. 
33 Khrushchev, Memoirs, p. 786. 
34 Ibid. p. 791. 
35 CIA director Allen Dulles told the National Security Council on 10 March that Khrushchev was 
“glum and irritable” throughout his trip and annoyed his hosts with condescension. Editorial Note, 
FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 244, p, 472.  
36 Ibid. It is not clear from the record what incident Sukarno was referring to. 
37 “Khrushchev Off On 1,1400 Mile Indonesia Tour”, Associated Press, 19 February 1960.  At the 
dinner, Khrushchev, with Sukarno seated beside him, is reported to have said: “There are 
differences of opinion between us and President Sukarno.  If you press me, these differences may 
grow wider.” 
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interests.  Although the People’s Daily praised the visit in an editorial, it took place amid 
the growing Sino-Soviet split and a chill in Jakarta-Beijing relations on the question of 
Chinese nationals.38   There is no doubt Khrushchev’s progress caused unease in Beijing.  
Djuanda observed that the visit “must have been unpleasant for the Chinese”.39   
The significance of the Khrushchev visit was not lost on the USA either.  Although 
CIA director, Allen Dulles, dismissed it as a “mild success”, the size of the Soviet 
commitment continued to expand.40  The Soviet Union agreed on an additional USD 250 
million credit over seven years in addition to the supply of new armaments.41  Khrushchev 
had reportedly been prepared to offer as much as $500 million.  It took Khrushchev and 
Sukarno just three minutes to agree on the economic package, according to one account.42  
Indonesian officials, consistent with the strategy of keeping all parties in the game, 
reassured Jones that Indonesia was not tilting in favor of the Soviet Union and Sukarno’s 
own views had not changed.43   
The army clearly remained staunchly pro-Western.  US military assessments 
concluded “friendship and mutual respect” had replaced the “reserve and suspicion” that 
existed following the regional rebellions.  This was put down to the extensive exposure to 
Americans in training programs.44  In the lead up to Khrushchev’s visit, Nasution had 
been true to his pro-Western leanings.  He and Djuanda set some parameters that they 
thought needed to be respected to avoid Indonesia being drawn into a state of dependency 
or alignment.  They included a ceiling of $100 million in new economic assistance, no 																																																								
38 “Khrushchev’s Visit to India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan”, People’s Daily, 6 March 
1960. 
39  Djuanda made this comment to Jones when reviewing the outcome of Khrushchev’s visit. 
Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 4 March 1960, 
FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 242, p. 469. 
40 Allen Dulles briefing to the National Security Council, Washington, 10 March 1960, Editorial 
Note, ibid., document 244, p. 472. 
41 Ibid. The credit was on top of $126 million already available, but Indonesia had only drawn $27 
million to that point. 
42  This account came from Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, although the source in 
Indonesia was unnamed. Editorial Note, ibid., document 244, p. 473. 
43 Djuanda claimed Sukarno’s views had not changed and Indonesia “remains where it was before” 
the Khrushchev visit.  Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of 
State, 4 March 1960, ibid., document 242, p. 469. 
44 Memorandum from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 
January 1960, ibid., document 238, p. 463.  But the Air Force was still regarded as being 
“seasoned heavily with Communists” and had rejected numerous offers of US aid. 
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military aid and no military bases for communist bloc countries.45  Only the last of these 
points was reflected in the outcome and Khrushchev wisely made no request for bases, 
although large numbers of Russian military technicians and instructors were to be 
deployed to Indonesia.  Nasution’s anti-communism was evident to Khrushchev.  He 
observed Nasution “unquestionably was hostile” to the Soviet Union.46  
None of this could obscure a continuing relative deterioration in the USA’s 
position during the course of the year.  By September, Jones had concluded: “Sukarno… 
harbors a fixation, based on what he considers ample evidence, that the U.S. is out to get 
him”.  The ambassador blamed the President’s growing animosity on “PKI propaganda 
and large-scale and effective Soviet blandishments” and the fact his internal enemies 
“clearly lean towards the West”.47  Sukarno also was peeved Eisenhower did not agree to 
visit Indonesia, despite traveling to the Philippines in June 1960.   
Rather than write Sukarno off, Jones proposed inviting him to again meet 
Eisenhower in Washington.  He suggested the White House take advantage of Sukarno’s 
presence in New York where he was scheduled to deliver a speech to the UN General 
Assembly on 29 September.  Yet the circumstances surrounding a leader’s meeting were 
complex on both sides.  Eisenhower was reluctant to see Sukarno amid general American 
disquiet at Indonesia’s cultivation of ties to Communist bloc countries.  As late as 23 
September, Jones was informed Eisenhower was yet to decide on whether a meeting 
should proceed.48  Eisenhower did not finally agree to a meeting until 5 October – the day 
before Sukarno departed the USA.49   
There were numerous arguments for and against Eisenhower acceding to meet.   
Despite fears of rewarding what the USA regarded as bad behavior, there were two 
determining factors.  First, refusal to see Sukarno when he was so close to Washington 																																																								
45  Sukendro briefed the US Embassy on a meeting between Djuanda and the armed forces 
members of cabinet in which these limits to a deal between Sukarno and Khrushchev were set.  
Telegram 2290 from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 19 February 1960, 
ibid., p. 467, n. 1. 
46 Khrushchev, Memoirs, p. 804. 
47 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 17 September 
1960, FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, document 278, pp. 537-539 
48 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 17 September 
1960, ibid., document 278, p. 539, n. 3. 
49 Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower, 5 October 1960, 
ibid., document 285, p. 553, n. 1. 
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would be perceived as a snub, which could push Indonesia further into the Soviet orbit.  
Second, the defence community had just feted Nasution on his own visit to Washington in 
late September.  It was feared Nasution would become a target should the White House 
rebuff his boss.  Nasution had been secretly assured he would receive significant military 
and economic support in the event of an open showdown with the PKI – a reassurance that 
figured in army calculations of how to deal with the communists in future years.50 
Sukarno also weighed a complex array of factors, although they all pointed in 
favor of seeing Eisenhower.  He was eager to demonstrate Indonesia’s neutrality, to keep 
alive the contest between the great powers for Indonesia’s favor and to underwrite his own 
international standing.  His ability to command and channel international relations was 
one of the most powerful tools at his disposal in the domestic political struggle.   
In the end, the last meeting between the pair before Eisenhower left office in 
January 1961 was marred by a little bit of Sukarno mischief.  Without informing his 
American hosts, Sukarno arrived at the White House on 6 October with PKI chief Aidit in 
his party.  The unexpected presence of the communist chief – a gesture Sukarno surely 
knew would cause annoyance – nonplussed White House officials who kept the 
Indonesians waiting while they figured out what to do.  The issue was resolved when 
Eisenhower agreed to Aidit’s inclusion.  The delay while Eisenhower was consulted lasted 
several minutes, but Sukarno later typically exaggerated the situation, claiming he was 
kept waiting for an hour. 51   The meeting itself proved of little substance – the real 
significance was its occurrence.  The US record shows Sukarno, surprisingly, did not even 
raise the issue of West New Guinea.52 
The business-like and perfunctory manner of Sukarno’s exchanges with US 
officials in Washington and New York contrasted poorly in his estimation with the crowds 
and ceremony he was feted with in communist states.  Sukarno waxed about the 150 
musicians who played the Indonesian national anthem on his arrival in Moscow in 1956, 
																																																								
50 Ibid. The implication was that Nasution and the army would also receive generous US support in 
the event of a military overthrow of Sukarno. 
51 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 295 
52  Memorandum of Conversation (Eisenhower and Sukarno), FRUS, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, 
Washington, 6 October 1960, document 286, pp. 555-559. 
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bringing “tears of pride to my eyes”. 53   In Beijing, on the same tour, he had been 
welcomed with “tremendous parades and gun salutes”.  The welcome in the USA suffered 
in comparison.  “Eisenhower didn’t meet my plane – OK,” Sukarno recorded.  “He didn’t 
greet me at the door of the White House – I guess that is still OK.  But when he had me 
wait outside in the anteroom cooling my heels that is definitely not OK.”54 
The briefing paper given to Eisenhower the day before his meeting with Sukarno 
referred to the Indonesian leader as “a vain and sensitive individual who responds 
markedly to personal attention”.55  But Eisenhower’s distaste for Sukarno had become 
increasingly apparent and there was a limit to his willingness to pander to his 
counterpart’s ego.  And, despite the fanfare heaped on Sukarno when he toured the 
communist world, he sensed there was a degree of artificiality to his reception.  Sukarno’s 
balancing act between the great powers was built on a fundamental distrust of their 
motives.  As he confided to one American visitor: “We don’t know how many friends we 
have in the world… We have more basic things in common with America than any other 
country.  Please don’t lose this game.”56 
 
The Chinese Question: Tensions Over Nationality Resurface 
 
The conflicts Indonesia experienced with the USA after the regional rebellions 
should have delivered a diplomatic windfall to China.  Of the three big powers vying for 
influence, China arguably had the strongest grounds for confidence it could draw 
Indonesia into alignment.  First, it could reasonably conclude it had the better formula for 
sustaining good relations.  Although it could not match US or Soviet aid dollars, it had 
pursued many of the same themes as Indonesia in international politics, notably anti-
imperialism, and the two countries shared parallel experiences of colonial subjugation, 
incomplete sovereignty and under development.  Second, China had a particularly strong 																																																								
53 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 295. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower, 5 October 1960, 
ibid., document 285, p. 553. 
56 Sukarno made the comment when he was visited by the director in Jakarta of the International 
Cooperation Administration. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department 
of State, ibid., document 165, pp. 306-307. 
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motivation for trying to win Indonesia over.  It needed allies to break its diplomatic 
isolation and enhance the international legitimacy of the Communist Party regime.  The 
People’s Republic of China was then still denied US diplomatic recognition and UN 
membership – both of which had been granted instead to the Republic of China 
government on Taiwan – and was subject to a US-led trade embargo.57  The sense of 
isolation was heightened by trouble on the Sino-Indian border, which eroded the goodwill 
established in Bandung, and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which produced 
more open competition between Beijing and Moscow for supporters in the Afro-Asian 
world.  Hence, Beijing was prepared to put more at stake in cultivating the relationship 
with Indonesia.   
But as conflicts with the West were “propelling the two powers together on anti-
imperialist issues” there were domestic forces “pushing them in opposite directions”.58  
These contradictions in the relationship became manifest in the second half of 1959.  The 
trigger for the re-emergence of conflict between Indonesia and China was the troubled 
status of the Sino-Indonesian population.  The signing of the Dual Nationality Treaty in 
1955 had failed to resolve the underlying grievances of much of the Indonesian 
population.  Indigenous business people remained envious and resentful of the success of 
their Chinese competitors – emotions that had periodically flared into open hostility.59  
The wheels of administration also had turned slowly on the issue.  Four years after the 
treaty was signed, Indonesia and China had still not swapped the instruments of 
ratification.60   
With the legal status of the Sino Indonesians unresolved and social antagonisms 
continuing to fester, the Indonesian Minister of Trade, Rachmat Muljomiseno, added an 																																																								
57 Washington and Beijing had regular diplomatic exchanges at the ambassador level between 
1954 and 1970 and established liaison offices in 1973.  Official diplomatic ties were launched with 
the opening of embassies in 1979.  The Republic of China on Taiwan absurdly held the permanent 
Chinese seat on the UN Security Council from 1949 to 1971. “A Guide to the United States’ 
History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: China”, 
Office of the Historian, Department of State, https://history.state.gov/countries/china. 
58 Mozingo, op. cit., p. 152. 
59 One movement to advance the interests of pribumi business people was headed by Assaat, a 
businessman and politician, who called for race-based regulation of the economy.  Feith, Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 481-482. 
60 China had ratified the treaty on 7 December 1957, but Indonesia had to that point failed to 
follow suit.  Mozingo, op. cit. p. 160. 
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incendiary ingredient to the overlapping domestic and international trends shaping 
Indonesia-China relations.  In May 1959, Muljomiseno issued a regulation banning so-
called “alien” small and retain trade enterprises outside the major cities and towns from 
the end of the year.  The regulation coincided with a separate regulation from the army 
entitling regional commanders to remove aliens from their places of residence in the 
countryside for “security reasons”.61  The targets of the ban were supposed to be non-
citizens of any nationality, although in practice it was aimed at the Chinese and authorities 
did not always make the distinction between the Chinese-born tokok and the peranakan, 
those whose families had been in Indonesia for generations. 
The regulation was issued while Sukarno was out of Indonesia on another of his 
extended, multi-country tours.  The President’s absence suggests he might not have been 
informed in advance.62  But in his 17 August Independence Day speech, Sukarno both 
confirmed and modified the commercial ban.  Outlining his so-called Political Manifesto, 
or Manipol, Sukarno said room would be found for “all forces, which have proved to be 
progressive”.  This would include “non-native” forces.  He then balanced the apparent 
concession to Chinese traders with his usual ambiguity.  Foreign businesses engaged in 
“counter-revolution” and “acts of economic sabotage” would be dealt with firmly.63  The 
tightrope Sukarno was walking between nationalists, including the army, on one side and 
the PKI and China on the other side was evident in this speech.   
The army was searching for a means to place the PKI on the defensive and erode 
the closeness of the relationship Sukarno was forging with China.  Under the best-case 
scenario, the army could draw the PKI out in open opposition to a policy that was popular 
with native Indonesians and use it as an excuse for measures to supress the party.  Either 
way, the PKI was in an invidious position because it would have to choose between 
supporting the Chinese minority or supporting a form of chauvinistic nationalism and 
antagonising China.  One argument is that the army controls on residency, which were 																																																								
61 Mozingo, op. cit., pp. 158-159, Mackie, “Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia”, pp. 83-84 and 
p. 86. 
62 Mozingo argues that Sukarno’s Independence Day speech confirmed “beyond any doubt” that 
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announced two days before the Ministry of Trade regulation, were designed specifically 
with these aims in mind and had been crafted with the encouragement of US officials.64  If 
it is true the US was prodding the army in this direction, it would fit with the guidance of 
NSC directive 5901 to isolate the PKI and manipulate it into positions of open opposition 
to the government.65 
The final version of the commerce ban came into effect on 16 November in the 
form of a presidential regulation.  In the hope of avoiding an international incident, 
Sukarno softened the ban in several ways, exempting various categories of business and 
postposing its start by several months.66  Simultaneously, the army’s official policy was 
softened to exclude Chinese who had applied for Indonesian citizenship before 4 May 
1959.  But in a clear sign that at least some elements of the army hoped to sabotage 
Sukarno’s attempts to calm the situation, the army commander in West Java, Colonel R.A. 
Kosasih, immediately started an operation to expel Chinese traders from the province’s 
villages.  Elsewhere in Indonesia, the implementation of residency controls was uneven.  
In some regions, including on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi, army commanders 
removed Chinese from their homes and transported them to temporary clearing centres; in 
others, the ban was either ignored altogether or implemented in token fashion.  
The implementation of the residence ban was the trigger for the dispute with China 
to burst into the open.  Until then, the Chinese had adopted public restraint in pursuing a 
diplomatic campaign to head off the commercial and residency controls.  Indeed, Chinese 
foreign minister, Chen Yi, made an appearance at a banquet in Beijing to celebrate 
Indonesian Independence Day, telling the audience there was “no conflict of interests 
between the two countries” because the overseas Chinese had long lived alongside native 
Indonesians and “devoted their efforts to Indonesia’s economic construction”.67   The 
Chinese government clearly hoped that, like so many other Indonesian public policies, the 																																																								
64 Mozingo claims elements of the army had been “encouraged by the Americans”, but does not 
provide specific evidence, see Mozingo, op. cit., p. 162. 
65 It should be recalled this directive urged the adoption of measures aiming at creating “grounds 
for repressive measures politically justifiable in terms of Indonesia’s national self-interest” against 
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implementation of controls on foreign-born Chinese would turn out to be more modest 
than the initial design.  However, there was growing anxiety in Beijing over the army’s 
intentions and the risk to both China’s international image and its entire relationship with 
Indonesia if the controls on the overseas Chinese were implemented aggressively.   
In October, Subandrio travelled to Beijing with the apparent aim of preserving the 
bilateral relationship.  The meetings between Subandrio and Chen resulted in an eight-
point communiqué, which served to outwardly maintain the appearance of amity.  They 
supported their respective territorial claims to West New Guinea and Taiwan, Indonesia 
supported China’s claims to a seat at the UN and they reaffirmed the “extreme 
importance” of continuing to strengthen their relationship.  On the question of the 
overseas Chinese, they adopted the formula Sukarno used in his Independence Day 
address.68  The private discussions in Beijing were less amicable.  According to some 
accounts, Zhou En-lai subjected Subandrio to a haranguing over the treatment of the 
Chinese, which left him “deeply shaken”.69   
Beijing’s strategy appeared to be to publicly avow friendship towards Jakarta and 
to privately warn of stern consequences should Indonesia infringe the rights of the 
overseas Chinese.   From China’s perspective, the best outcome would be for Sukarno to 
confront the military and right-wing nationalists to ensure the policy was either abandoned 
or weakly implemented.  The military’s defiance in West Java after the release of the 
presidential regulation posed a challenge to Sukarno.  But he evidently calculated the 
personal political consequences of a clash with the army were greater than a clash with 
China – his initial reaction to the expulsions was muted.   
 It left Beijing with no good choices.  It could either retreat, leaving the overseas 
Chinese to their fate, or it could challenge Jakarta, jeopardising a diplomatic relationship 
that it regarded as vital to its foreign policy objectives.  Of these two unpalatable 
alternatives, it initially chose the latter.  The reason owed a great deal to the psychology of 
the state.  China had its own history of foreign subjugation and a central narrative of the 
Communist Party was the restoration of national power and of national and ethnic pride, 																																																								
68 For the full text of the 11 October communiqué see “Sino-Indonesian Joint Communiqué”, 
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which had a pan-Sino dimension.  These themes had been on display during the 10th 
anniversary celebrations of the People’s Republic in October.  The risk to China in 
accepting Indonesia’s discriminatory policies against the overseas Chinese was a loss of 
prestige and possibly legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese diaspora, and perhaps its own 
population.  This calculation would have naturally conflated with the competition for 
allegiance with the KMT-controlled Republic of China.  
An editorial in the People’s Daily on 12 December provided a flavor of this 
thinking.  It warned Jakarta that it would be a “grave mistake” to believe the overseas 
Chinese were without support.  The days of “old China”, when overseas Chinese were 
often subjected to “discrimination, maltreatment and humiliation by imperialism and local 
reaction”, were now over.  It went on: 
 
Since the founding of the Chinese People’s Republic, this sad state of affairs has 
ended forever. A grievous mistake is being committed by those who look at 
things in the same old way, thinking that the overseas Chinese, as of old, have no 
support and have no other recourse than to earn their living in the country of their 
residence, and that the Chinese Government of the 650 million Chinese people 
will simply look on while their compatriots are subjected to unjustified 
discrimination and persecution abroad.70 
 
The editorial was almost certainly a reflection of official views.71 Lurid reports 
from inside Indonesia of the mistreatment of overseas Chinese helped arouse a mood of 
truculence.  The state news agency, Xinhua, told readers of the “ruthless and violent 
methods” of the troops and police in West Java, who in expelling overseas Chinese from 
the countryside were “firing shots, beating them up, and submitting them to all kinds of 
humiliations”.72  The response from Beijing was to encourage Chinese in Indonesia who 																																																								
70 “For an overall Statement of the Question of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia: Renmin Ribao”, 
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found they were suddenly homeless and without a livelihood to migrate to China.  Radio 
Peking ran a series of broadcasts from the middle of December advising these Chinese to 
return to the “motherland”.73  Beijing also hoped to attract those skilled workers who no 
longer felt secure in order to benefit the Chinese economy and send a message to 
Indonesia of the potential economic damage it was inflicting on itself.  One Chinese 
strategy paper outlined plans to encourage 50,000 skilled workers, including factory 
workers and intellectuals, to migrate so as to “put added pressure on Indonesia”. 74  
Conversely, the strategy document advised against any criticism of Sukarno “by name”, 
presumably because he still offered the best way out of the crisis.75  And, on the ground, 
Chinese diplomats tried to intervene to prevent evictions and even instructed Chinese to 
refuse to comply with instructions to leave their homes. 76   The conflicting policies 
suggested Beijing was grappling to come up with an adequate response.  The idea of a 
muscular China that could at last assert itself in international relations was undercut by the 
reality of practical impotence.   
Ultimately, China was forced to compromise.  Given its international isolation, and 
its growing conflict with the Soviet Union, the diplomatic costs of a rift with Indonesia 
complicated the trade-off between nationalistic vigor and foreign circumspection.  The 
bellicosity disguised weakness; it was a bluff for the consumption of Chinese everywhere 
that the state knew it could not fulfil in diplomatic practice.  Throughout the crisis, Beijing 
hedged, hoping to negotiate a solution while publicly projecting indignation at Jakarta’s 
failure to see the damage being done to its own interests by saboteurs from within.  Chen 
wrote twice to Subandrio on 9 December and 24 December urging the two countries find a 
settlement based on the immediate ratification of the Dual Nationality Treaty.  He wanted 
Jakarta to undertake to “protect the proper rights and interests” of overseas Chinese who 
																																																								
73 Mozingo, op. cit. p. 171. 
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remained in Indonesia and help facilitate the safe travel to China of those who wished to 
leave, permitting them to repatriate their wealth.77 
Chen feared that if the dispute were allowed to drag on anti-communist and pro-
Western forces in Indonesia would win a substantial victory.  His letters were sprinkled 
with warnings that the “imperialists” were taking advantage of the dispute to drive a 
wedge between the two countries.  Chinese politicians fretted that after the failure of the 
US-sponsored rebellions in Indonesia, the Americans were resorting to “sowing discord 
and scheming to create bad blood” between China and Indonesia.78 
Sukarno and Subandrio might well have sensed China’s relative weakness.  In 
response to Chen’s requests for an “overall settlement” of the whole overseas Chinese 
question, Subandrio agreed only to ratification of the treaty and refused to rescind the ban 
on small retail and trading businesses.  He simply ignored the matter of the residency ban 
being zealously imposed in regions such as West Java.  In justifying Indonesia’s actions, 
Subandrio questioned the loyalty of the overseas Chinese, referring to their “unpalatable 
attitude” toward native Indonesians during and after the revolution.  Subandrio also 
insisted on Indonesia’s rights to restrict the movement of Chinese diplomats, who he 
accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Indonesia by trying to obstruct the removal 
of overseas Chinese from their homes. 79  Chen had to be content with the exchange of 
instruments of ratification of the Dual Nationality Treaty, which occurred in Beijing on 20 
January 1960. 
The ratification of the treaty, and the creation of a joint committee to manage its 
implementation, presented the first glimmer of hope for a resolution.  China softened its 
stance and ceased trying to actively encourage the return of the overseas Chinese.  In a 
letter to Subandrio on 15 March, Chen said a “good start” had been made in resolving 
differences with Indonesia and a “fair and reasonable” settlement of the overseas Chinese 																																																								
77 The full text of the 9 December letter is published in Peking Review, Vol. II, No. 50, 15 
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question now could be gradually achieved.80  This was an optimistic appraisal because, as 
he wrote, Chinese reported they were being subject to persistent harassment, especially at 
immigration exit points where they suffered arbitrary confiscation of personal possessions.  
The extent of the army’s determination to reduce or eliminate the influence of 
Chinese commerce in the countryside, and to prevent reconciliation with China, became 
apparent the following month when the campaign of forced evacuations was 
reinvigorated.  The real end to the crisis did not come until July.  The trigger for a 
resolution was ironic, but probably not surprising: an act of army excess.  On 3 July, 
soldiers opened fire on Chinese resisting expulsion from their homes in Cimahi, West 
Java.  Two women were shot dead and several were wounded.81   After the Cimahi 
incident, China delivered another strongly worded protest to Indonesia, calling for a public 
apology, punishment of the killers and compensation for the families of the victims.82  
With relations now strained virtually to breaking point, Sukarno had the excuse he was 
probably looking for to rein in the army.  The exact means of the President’s intervention 
is unknown, but his hand is seen in subsequent moves to end the crisis. 83   Colonel 
Kosasih, the regional commander, was shortly after transferred to Central Sumatra, and 
the forced expulsions ceased.84  The army had overplayed its hand. 
The crisis had imposed an enormous cost on all parties.  In all, 119,000 Chinese 
chose to accept Beijing’s offer of assisted migration to China.85   But the diplomatic 
repercussions were surprisingly short-lived, despite the earlier vehemence of Chinese 
denunciations of Indonesian policy.  By August, Chen was playing down the affair, telling 
Indonesian journalists: “Our common cause of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism is a 
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main concern for us.”86  On 15 December, the committee established to implement the 
Dual Nationality Treaty finally signed an agreement on the procedures for Chinese to 
resolve citizenship. The symbolic consummation of the new détente came when Chen 
came to Jakarta in March-April 1961.  A photograph from that visit shows Sukarno and 
Chen dancing in a reception room of the presidential palace.  During Chen’s visit, 
Indonesia and China signed a Treaty of Friendship and a cultural cooperation agreement.87  
This paved the way for Sukarno to make a state visit to Beijing in June.  There, Chen told 
him: “The overseas Chinese problem is a small matter in the relationship between our two 
countries… and it has been resolved now”.88  
 
To Build the World Anew: Non-Alignment and the New Emerging Forces 
 
There was one diplomatic objective on which Indonesia and China were in hearty 
agreement.   They both wanted to reconvene a summit of Asian and African nations at the 
earliest opportunity.  When Chen visited Jakarta in 1961 at the start of the détente between 
China and Indonesia, he and Sukarno agreed to rally support for a second Bandung.89  The 
idea of another summit served their separate purposes.  Sukarno was increasingly 
ambitious for international recognition.  For China, the convocation of Asian and African 
leaders would create the opportunity to repeat the success of Bandung, where apparent 
moderation had allayed fears about its intentions and won it new friends.  By 1961, still 
locked out of the United Nations and facing rising tension with the Soviet Union, China’s 
foreign policy aimed to recruit supporters in the Third World.  
Sukarno hoped an Asia Africa summit would provide a platform to promote his 
vision of a new philosophical foundation for Indonesian foreign policy.  The first glimmer 
of his thinking had been presented at the United Nations General Assembly on 30 
September 1960, several months before Chen’s visit.  In a speech entitled To Build the 																																																								
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World Anew, Sukarno introduced the idea of a new global dichotomy in which nations 
were categorised as either “emerging” or “established”.90   Underlying this analytical 
construct was the idea that the established states of the old world, which mostly meant 
Europe and North America, were complicit in a historic act of injustice and exploitation 
perpetrated against the new world of emerging states.  Sukarno later crafted this, with the 
Indonesian love of acronym and metaphor, into a titanic struggle between the New 
Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO).  It was a 
companion to, and an extension of, his repeated denunciation of colonialism and 
imperialism; a world divided between the colonised and the colonisers.  
His UN speech was a tentative exploration of this new interpretation of bipolarity.   
He rejected the idea that capitalism and communism represented the fundamental division 
of international politics.  Instead, he argued the true divide was the clash between the 
nationalist aspirations of the new states and the reactionary attitude of the old states.91  
Another Asia Africa summit would offer the means to build an international constituency 
behind these ideas, a constituency Sukarno assumed he was well qualified to lead.  But the 
speech contained much more than Sukarno’s assertion of a world riven by conflict 
between the new aspirational poor and the old contented rich.  It was the most personally 
insightful, comprehensive and important statement of foreign policy he had made to that 
point.  It revealed a great deal about Sukarno’s state of mind, his self-image and the role 
he saw for Indonesia on the world stage.  In ranging across world affairs, he championed 
the representation of the People’s Republic of China – “the only real China” – in the UN, 
signalling his desire to restore relations with Beijing; he appealed for a more inclusive 
approach to peace and disarmament negotiations following the U-2 fiasco and the failure 
of the Paris summit; he expressed concern the “clashing interests of the big powers” 
would result in a war in which the new states might be the battleground; he warned Dutch 
occupation of West New Guinea was “a colonial sword poised over Indonesia”; and he 
advocated the relocation of the UN’s headquarters from New York to Asia or Africa. 
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Most tellingly, Sukarno portrayed himself and Indonesia as leading lights for Asia 
and Africa.  “I am conscious of speaking now for my Asian and African brothers,” 
Sukarno declared when he appealed for understanding of the nationalist aspirations of the 
developing countries.92  Sukarno’s notions of leadership were not confined to the new 
states.  He called for the UN Charter to be rewritten to place at its “foundation” 
Indonesia’s state ideology, Pancasila, which he erroneously claimed was the product of 
millennia of “Indonesian civilisation”.93  The incorporation of the Pancasila in the Charter 
would make it “stronger and better” and “greatly strengthen the United Nations”. 94  
Sukarno’s hubristic performance clearly signalled he was ready to play bigger role in 
international affairs.    
But as Indonesia and China came together to push for the recall of Asian and 
African leaders, the Yugoslav and Egyptian leaders, Josip Broz Tito and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, were exploring an alternative gathering.  A summit of Asian and African states 
would exclude Yugoslavia and require invitations being sent to several allies of the Cold 
War protagonists.  The solution Tito and Nasser arrived at was to determine participation 
not on the basis of geography but on adherence to the ideology of nonalignment.   There 
had already been resistance to the idea of another Asia Africa summit, notably from 
Nehru.  The first meeting at Bandung had struggled to reach agreement on the final 
communiqué and the points of difference between the participants had only widened in the 
ensuing years.  Nehru, who had been an eager sponsor of China’s first foray into 
multilateral diplomacy, no longer felt so benevolent.  Tensions had been growing over 
demarcation of the Sino-Indian border.  But Nehru, the world leader who had introduced 
the concept of nonalignment, was no more eager for a meeting of nonaligned states than a 
second Asia Africa meeting because of fears it would aggravate the worsening world 
security situation following the failure of the Paris summit.95 																																																								
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In contrast, Sukarno was an enthusiastic recruit to the idea.  When Tito and Nasser 
issued a joint call for a conference of nonaligned states in April 1961, Sukarno quickly 
offered to join them as a sponsor.  He was more concerned with obtaining a global 
platform for his leadership and ideas about a world divided between the new states and the 
old than about the specific modalities of the meeting.  Consequently, Indonesia embarked 
on a dual-track strategy for its multilateral diplomacy.  It supported an early meeting of 
nonaligned countries and pressed for it to be followed soon after by a second Asia Africa 
meeting, which would remain in Sukarno’s mind the main event.   
At a preparatory meeting in Cairo in June, Indonesia was influential in determining 
the criteria for attendance at the nonaligned summit.  Participating countries would need to 
be free of military obligations to the great powers.  This meant they had no foreign 
military bases on their soil, no military alliances or pacts concluded with either of the big 
power blocs and, if a member of a regional military alliance, the alliance must not have 
been formed within the context of great power rivalries.96  Conveniently for Tito, Nehru 
and Nasser, the criteria excluded China.  The Chinese had long been wary of Tito’s 
attempts to build his stature with developing countries and had opposed the nonaligned 
summit because they suspected it would play into the hands of the West.  Deng Xiaoping, 
then general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, had warned the “Yugoslav 
revisionists were now more dangerous than the Americans”.97 
The Belgrade summit was held between 1 and 6 September.  Sukarno, pursuing his 
ambitions for international leadership, gave the keynote address.  By then, he had 
sharpened his argument about the secondary importance of the ideological conflict 
between the great powers.  “There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man – 
the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of 
domination,” he said.98  Colonialism, he went on, had survived the rush to independence 
in Asia and Africa after the Second World War to be manifested in other forms of 
economic and political domination.  To Sukarno, the existence of an active conflict 																																																								
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between the new states and the old reoriented the nature of threat and provided the 
justification for a reinterpretation of the meaning of nonalignment.  It was not 
synonymous with neutrality or the passivity of a “buffer state” caught between “the two 
giant power blocs”.99  Sukarno preached activism on the part of the new states to break the 
“Gordian knots” binding international politics and the adoption of a “common approach” 
to international challenges.100   
Sukarno’s description of both the core problem of international relations and his 
ideas for the proper role of nonaligned states reflected a fundamental division of outlook 
within those countries.  The 25 states to attend the Belgrade meeting were roughly divided 
between moderate and militant camps.  India was the leading moderate voice and 
Indonesia the leading militant.  Nehru tried to maintain the focus on securing peace 
between the USA and the Soviet Union, dismissing “classic colonialism” as already dead.  
He argued the immediate problem was the state of relations between the “Big Two” and 
the pressing task of the Belgrade meeting was to help bring them together for meaningful 
negotiations. In Nehru’s opinion, Sukarno’s approach risked opening up new fronts of 
conflict and exacerbating global tensions.101  Sukarno’s advocacy of a common approach 
implied a level of coordination that Nehru opposed.102 
Nehru’s concern over the fragile state of relations between the great powers was 
underscored on the eve of the Belgrade meeting when Moscow resumed a series of 
nuclear weapons tests in defiance of the long-running negotiations for an atmospheric Test 
Ban Treaty.  He had even more reason to be concerned by the reaction of some of the 
leading nonaligned countries.  The host surprised almost everyone with a statement that 
was tantamount to an endorsement of the Soviet actions.  Tito laid much of blame for the 
Soviet action on the Western powers for failing to curb French testing.103  Critics also 
regretted Sukarno’s “reticent” response.104 
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Tito’s position on a range of issues then in contention between the West and 
Communist bloc colored the responses of those countries to the non-aligned meeting.  The 
USA, initially welcoming of the meeting, felt “keen disappointment” over the role 
Yugoslavia played.  The Soviet Union too reversed course, dropping its hostility to the 
meeting in the face of Tito’s “nonalignment with a strong pro-Soviet tilt”.105   
Tito’s unexpected move to repair relations with Khrushchev further complicated 
the task of forging a consensus between moderates and militants in Belgrade.  In the end, 
nonaligned countries were forced to compromise by issuing two closing documents.  One 
was a “Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace”, which urged fresh talks 
between the USA and Soviet Union and was favored by Nehru as the meeting’s main 
message.  The other was a summation of all the grievances of nonaligned leaders named 
the “Belgrade Declaration”.  It contained two core themes – respect for the integrity of 
new states and the urgency of “complete and general disarmament” of the great powers.106 
From the perspective of Indonesian foreign policy, Belgrade was a success.  
Sukarno ensured the Belgrade Declaration was sprinkled with references to his thesis that 
at the heart of global conflict was the clash between the old and new forces and that 
colonialism “in all its manifestations” was yet to be defeated.107  His only disappointment 
was the omission of a specific reference to the status of West New Guinea in the 
declaration.  But, more importantly, he was making visible strides with his ambition to 
elevate his status and that of Indonesia in international affairs.  His ideas about the 
essential nature of global conflict had gained credibility among many states, especially in 
Africa, and he was increasingly acknowledged as a spokesman for the Third World.   
Sukarno’s achievement in Belgrade gave momentum to a new direction in foreign 
policy.  It encouraged him to think in more ambitious and radical terms.  Foreign policy 
shifted away from moderation and balance in the original conception of the bebas-aktif 
policy. Following Belgrade, Sukarno’s rhetoric and actions became increasingly anti-
Western in tone.  They were revisionist in a way that suited China, yet not always the 
Soviet Union.  He continued to press for the convening of a second Asia Africa 																																																								
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conference.  But it appeared his real purpose was to create a counterweight to the 
American-led Western bloc and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet bloc.  His analysis of the 
international situation reflected a concern about the crude realities of unchecked power in 
the international system.  It was not capitalism or communism per se that alarmed him.  
As he had declared in Belgrade, ideology was “not the main problem of our time”; it was a 
matter for countries to pursue internally and manage peacefully.108  Unlike Americans, he 
regarded communism as neither monolithic nor intrinsically threatening.  The coincidence 
of international policy goals between Indonesia and China meant he could look beyond the 
ideological complexion of the regime in Beijing to the advantages he could obtain from 
China’s presence in the Asia Africa process. 
Although Sukarno tried to couch his advocacy of the rights of the new states in 
terms of a principled defence of the weak and universal respect for sovereignty, his actual 
foreign policy decision-making was imbued with a large dose of Realpolitik, as his 
attitude to China suggested.  Deng Xiaoping praised him for his sympathetic 
understanding of China’s takeover of Tibet.  In Deng’s words, Indonesia had taken “the 
best position” among the nationalist countries in Asia, which was “particularly evident in 
the example of Indonesia’s attitude toward events in Tibet”.109  Indonesia displayed the 
same tolerance towards China after it invaded India in October 1962 during their heated 
border dispute.110  The principles of solidarity among the new states and peaceful co-
existence were of less concern to Jakarta on that occasion than the risk the dispute posed 
to the possibility of holding another Asia-Africa conference.111   
From the early 1960s, Indonesia clearly adopted a harder demeanor towards 
achieving its goals.  This is exemplified by its advocacy of what Subandrio termed 																																																								
108 Modelski, op. cit., p. 43. 
109 From the Diary of P.F. Yudin, Report of Conversation with the General Secretary of the CC 
CCP, Deng Xiaoping, 27 May 1959, Wilson Center Digital Archive. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111506 
110 Subandrio went so far as to tell the Chinese ambassador that the battle had taught “India a 
lesson”.  Cable from Yao Zhongming, ‘The Sino-Indian Boundary Issue’, 27 November 1962. 
Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114777. 
111 A Foreign Ministry official told Li Jusheng supported measures to calm the Sino-Indian border 
dispute “hoping that it will create a good atmosphere and enable the second Asia-Africa 
Conference to be convened”.  Cable from Li Jusheng, ‘Report on handing over the Letter of the 
Premier to Sukarno’, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114769.  Also see, Agung, Twenty Years, p. 361. 
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“diplomacy as an instrument of revolution”.112  The revolution Sukarno and Subandrio had 
in mind was the achievement of what they regarded as justice on an international scale.  
But the idea of revolution inspired diplomatic means as well as ends.  It was to provide the 
intellectual underpinnings of a new coercive diplomacy of Konfrontasi, which would be 
manifest in the great foreign policy challenges of Sukarno’s remaining years – the 
denouement to the long struggle for control of West New Guinea, completing the missing 
piece of national sovereignty, and the assertion of Indonesia as a regional leader and, 
perhaps, a global power. 
 
Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
The defining event in foreign policy from 1959 was the advent of Guided 
Democracy.  Sukarno became the preeminent figure in foreign policymaking and arguably 
was free to dictate policy as he saw fit.  The impression that Sukarno was in command of 
foreign policy was reinforced by both the strong personal interest he took in the subject 
and his increasing profile as the voice of Indonesia as much as the structural shift in 
power.   
There were limits to the power Sukarno exercised.  His reliance on the army and 
the PKI as two mutually-antagonistic pillars of power was one of several arrangements 
that set boundaries on acceptable policy, especially in the early phase of Guided 
Democracy.  But to understand Indonesia’s alignment behavior after the abrogation of the 
1950 constitution it is necessary to understand the preferences and interests of Sukarno.  
US, Soviet and Chinese efforts to cultivate Indonesia as an ally, or to at least prevent it 
falling into the opposing camp, centred on winning Sukarno’s personal favor.  For all 
three, the Indonesian president remained an elusive partner.  His strategy appeared to be to 
obtain as many advantages as he could from the great power rivals without sacrificing 
Indonesia’s freedom to move.   
																																																								
112 Modelski, op. cit., p. 45. 
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Sukarno’s efforts to simultaneously engage the great powers and preserve 
Indonesia’s autonomy were assisted by the broad conditions prevailing at the time.  The 
focus of Cold War tension remained the northern hemisphere.  There were troubling 
developments for global security – the failure of the Paris summit, the second Berlin 
crisis, and the Cuban missile crisis – but they did not immediately implicate Indonesian 
security interests.  Closer to Indonesia, the growth of American assistance to South 
Vietnam was a cause for concern.  But the brewing crisis in Indochina was yet to 
transform into full-scale war.  Indeed, the arrival of Kennedy in the White House offered 
the promise of a fresh start.  Sukarno’s biggest external worry was the continued presence 
of the Dutch in West New Guinea, which he had characterised at the UN as a “sword” 
poised over Indonesia.  Still, the net effect of international conditions was to produce at 
most a moderate probability of Indonesia facing direct external threat. 
The same could be said of the internal environment.  The end of the regional 
rebellions and the gradual consolidation of Guided Democracy left Sukarno in a strong if 
not unassailable position as both head of state and of government.  He had seen off the 
political parties.  State institutions were gradually tamed.  The army, then the strongest of 
them, had been the leading advocate of Guided Democracy.  And, in any case, Sukarno 
was able to start to whittle away at army influence as he engineered his balancing act 
between the generals and the PKI.  
There are several salient features to the way Sukarno managed the alignment 
politics of early Guided Democracy.  First, alignment was a tool for building Indonesia’s 
national strength.  Second, it facilitated Sukarno’s efforts to pursue certain critical 
objectives – namely Indonesia’s territorial claim over West New Guinea and an 
international leadership role for Indonesia at the head of a grouping of new or nonaligned 
states.  Third, it was a means of managing conflicting international and domestic pressures 
that posed a challenge to Indonesia’s independence and the strength of his own grip on 
power.   
In addressing the first of these points, it should be noted that Indonesia’s primary 
motive for alignment was to build internal strength.  An essential rationale for the 
alignment strategies employed in the two years immediately following the adoption of 
Guided Democracy was the contribution they made to the rapid expansion of the 
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Indonesian armed forces.  This provided for the first time a serious deterrent to foreign 
intervention or the utilisation of dissident groups by foreign powers.  It also allowed 
Indonesia to back its own objectives with a credible display of power, most importantly 
the long-frustrated claim to West New Guinea.  When it came to the source of material 
gain, Sukarno was ideologically agnostic.  The army itself preferred US equipment.  
Sukarno simply wanted the best quality and most affordable armaments in sufficient 
quantities regardless of the supplier.   
The second priority was to use alignment, and the power Indonesia accrued from 
the deft management of it, to pursue certain international ambitions.  The growth of Soviet 
and Eastern bloc supplied weaponry laid the foundation for a more assertive campaign to 
wrest control of West New Guinea in the years ahead.  This was Sukarno’s top priority – 
something he admitted to being obsessed about.  But Sukarno had other international 
ambitions in which alignment politics would play a vital role and that was as a leader of 
the Third World.  There were two main dimensions to his international activism:  the first 
was ideological and the second was material.   
The primary focus of the ideological dimension was to promote anti-imperialism 
and anti-colonialism as the basis of a new order in which the Third World could enhance 
is security and economic welfare.  An essential companion to this was the desire to elevate 
the status of Indonesia and its leader.  This was reflected in Sukarno’s hubristic 
performance at the UN in 1960.  The material dimension of Sukarno’s activism was to 
bring together a sufficient number of Third World countries to form a counterbalancing 
bloc to the US-led Western capitalist and Soviet-led communist blocs.  Sukarno did not 
appear to be too concerned about the modalities, although he probably preferred the Asia 
Africa countries were the spearhead.  Indonesia was historically invested in the Asia 
Africa process and had better prospects of emerging as its leader.  The idea of a third bloc 
was a further reflection of the Realpolitik on display in Indonesia’s internal military build-
up.  The compelling logic was that it could create greater autonomy for Third World states 
and allow them to avoid becoming a battleground in a Cold War confrontation. 
But these internationalist objectives also illustrated the great unpredictability and 
complexity of alignment politics.  Although the People’s Republic of China was not in the 
same league as the USA and Soviet Union when it came to incentives for alignment, 
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Sukarno saw it as a valuable ally in the pursuit of his international activism.  It was 
unwavering on the right of Indonesia to incorporate West New Guinea.  It was just as 
committed as Indonesia to the fight against imperialism and colonialism.  And it was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Asia Africa process, including Sukarno’s ambitions to see a 
bigger role for the Third World that challenged the hegemony of the US and Soviet blocs.  
But the experience of Indonesia’s relations with China was to test Sukarno’s skill 
in managing the overlapping international and domestic risks of alignment policy.  
Scholars of the period believe the campaigns to force Sino-Indonesia traders out of 
business and residence in the countryside was an opportunistic move by anti-communists 
to drive a wedge between the government and the PKI or the government and China.113  
The evidence is circumstantial.   There also is ample evidence of improvisation and 
opportunism in the way the policy was developed and implemented.  But there is no doubt 
it was popular.   
If it was the deliberate purpose to wedge Sukarno, rather than simply the result of 
ad hoc decisions, the instigators had a considerable degree of success.  China felt 
compelled to present a combative response to Indonesia for the sake of its own domestic 
and foreign policy interests.  The PKI faced the choice of opposing the army and 
government on an issue popular in its own rural strongholds or seeing relations strained 
with China.  Sukarno, despite his growing authority and undoubted popularity, could not 
afford to take the chance of being portrayed as a defender of Sino-Indonesians against the 
preferences of the huge pribumi majority and key segments of the army.  For these 
reasons, an issue with immense implications for foreign policy was swept along by the 
current of domestic events.   
The President did not want to sacrifice relations with Beijing, and the contribution 
it could make to his foreign policy agenda, as much as he might have shared pribumi 
concerns over the role of Chinese traders in the economy.  So, in the midst of the domestic 
anti-Chinese campaign, Sukarno attempted to prevent the tide of popular sentiment 
determining the outcome of foreign policy.  In Beijing, Subandrio delivered the important 
messages that Indonesia backed China’s claim to Taiwan and saw the People’s Republic 
as the rightful claimant to the Chinese seat in the United Nations.  Jakarta hoped to 																																																								
113 Mackie, “Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia,” pp. 86-87. 
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disentangle the issue of the treatment of its own Chinese from the emerging partnership 
with China. In this way, Sukarno sought to balance the risks of policy choices at the 
domestic and international levels.  It was in essence a defensive strategy that had some 
echoes of Omnibalancing in that it sought to separate a domestic group at the centre of 
domestic contention from its main foreign sponsor. 
Sukarno’s dilemma over the China relationship underscores the third important 
feature of the politics of alignment during this period.  A key aspect of the alignment 
challenge was to reconcile often conflicting international and domestic priorities.  Just as 
in the crisis over the Chinese residency and trading bans, Sukarno had to manage the 
competition between the USA and Soviet Union for Indonesian allegiance in such a way 
that it did not inflame domestic tensions or compromise international interests, which 
included maintaining the freedom to pursue his growing independent international agenda. 
In this exercise, Sukarno demonstrated he was becoming more adept and confident 
at the strategy of competitive bidding, even as it appears to have annoyed Indonesia’s 
suitors.  Despite the regional rebellions, and the turn to the Soviet Union as the biggest 
source of military and economic aid, Sukarno worked to keep the USA engaged.  He 
applied pressure at the point of greatest American sensitivity – the fear Indonesia might 
drift into the communist camp – to extract what benefits he could.  The message was 
strengthened because of warnings from perceived internal allies of the USA, including 
respected figures like Djuanda and Nasution, that continued support for rebel holdouts or a 
revival the rebellions would force Indonesia to accept assistance on the ground from the 
Soviet bloc.  
The benefit Sukarno obtained was to soften US opposition to his leadership.  The 
change in American thinking was reflected in acts designed to personally appease him, 
like joy riding in a Globemaster and approval to buy the latest and most expensive 
airliners.  It also was reflected in acts with greater strategic significance, including a 
restoration of aid to the military and pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to drop the Republic of 
China’s support for the remaining rebels in Sulawesi. 
Although playing both sides offended sensibilities in Moscow and Washington, it 
was an effective strategy.  From the outside, competitive bidding could be viewed as 
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cynical, and it was not without some peril.  But it served to balance alignment risk not just 
at the international level, but at the domestic level too.  
At the international level, competitive bidding could act as a complement to 
neutrality.  In Sukarno’s hands, it was a variation of hedging or hiding.  But it was more 
proactive than those strategies:  Sukarno appeared to actively dangle the prospect of 
aligning with one of the two camps to keep them both engaged in either seeking 
Indonesia’s allegiance or its continued neutrality.  Under this scenario, neutrality could be 
contrived to appear as a victory in the main Cold War capitals.  For both Washington and 
Moscow, it increasingly became enough to deny Indonesia as a prize to the other side.  
But unlike in a simple hedging or hiding strategy, the act of pitting great power rivals 
against each other for Indonesia’s favor meant it could gain some of the advantages of 
alignment – substantial economic and military aid, commercial opportunities and support 
for certain foreign policy priorities – from mutually hostile partners. 
At a domestic level, competitive bidding was the foreign policy companion to the 
balancing act Sukarno conducted between the army and the PKI.  By maintaining positive 
relations with both the Cold War camps, he could hope to at least placate the left and the 
right in Indonesian politics.  If either side pushed too hard on the question of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy alignment, Sukarno could point to demonstrable gains.  
Underpinning this period of juggling great power relations, it is possible to 
construct a straightforward cost-benefit analysis.  Given that both the USA and the Soviet 
Union actively courted Indonesia, and given that Indonesia’s own interests were deemed 
to depend on an increase in material power without a significant loss of policy autonomy, 
the competitive bidding strategy made sense as long as it could be sustained.  Likewise, in 
the case of China, Sukarno’s strategy of appeasing China, while trying to soften some of 
the harsher features of the anti-Chinese campaign, was a rational means of minimising the 
inevitable international and domestic costs. 
Interestingly, Sukarno attempted to orchestrate a range of alignment strategies in 
unison.  He embraced the fluidity of international politics to adjust Indonesian foreign 
policy without too much regard for old diplomatic conventions.  As he deployed them, 
competitive bidding, hiding, Omnibalancing and balancing were unpredictable, but not 
altogether contradictory.   
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The behavior is most consistent with the hypothesis that a state facing little 
prospect of loss should adopt alignment strategies that support domestic group or 
individual preferences and interests in foreign policy. It is expected to employ various 
smart alignment strategies to maximise the benefits of international cooperation while 
minimizing the loss of policy autonomy.   
The evidence suggests Indonesia faced moderate levels of threat to its security.  
Although the Cold War produced spikes of anxiety over Berlin and Cuba and nuclear 
arsenals grew, Indonesia was removed from those conflicts.  It was relatively secure 
within its borders, but still had to be conscious of a repeat of the experience it had in 1958.  
Sukarno’s concerns about the Dutch position in West New Guinea were conflated as an 
external threat yet it would be hard for him to have concluded this from the size of the 
Dutch garrison.  The domestic environment also presented moderate levels of threat.  The 
defeat of the rebellions and the consolidation of Guided Democracy could give Sukarno 
confidence that he faced no serious challenge to his presidency.   
Still, the hypothesis also suggests that at these times states should prefer to avoid 
hard strategies like expansion of military capability and overt balancing and 
bandwagoning options.  Indonesia did pursue an aggressive military build-up.  And the 
explanation for this was the acute sense of loss felt over Dutch occupation of West New 
Guinea.  It underscores the reality that it is not always a simple matter to identify whether 
a decision maker perceives his or her reference point to be one of gains and losses.  For 
this reason, and because of the preference for explanatory simplicity, a rational choice 
explanation of alignment behavior in this period is preferred to a prospect theory 
explanation.   
Of the other hypotheses, shared ideological beliefs fared best.  Sukarno’s readiness 
to embrace NAM and his continued pursuit of an Asia Africa organisation were driven by 
the belief he could harness those states to the cause of anti-colonialism and the division of 
the world into the NEFO and OLDEFO.  The efforts to minimise the fallout from 
domestic anti-Chinese activities on the diplomatic relationship with China owed in large 
part to shared ideological commitments about the conduct of international politics.  But 
shared ideology, while providing meaningful insight into certain alignment choices, does 
not explain the totality of alignment decisions.  The record of alignment choices shows 
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that pragmatic considerations were of far greater relevance.  Even as Indonesia accepted 
growing levels of Soviet aid, Sukarno and his ministers were anxious to convince the USA 
that the transfers did not reflect an ideological repositioning in favor of communism. 
The pragmatic attitude to the sources of aid also affected the political leverage aid 
provided the donor country.  The USA had been the most consistent source of aid to 
Indonesia since independence, although levels dropped off in the late 1950s and were 
sharply overtaken by the Soviet Union and its allies.  The consistency of American aid had 
little impact on Indonesia’s determination of the national interest in foreign policy 
decision making.  Sukarno simply switched sponsors when the USA proved reluctant to 
supply the type of aid he wanted.  Equally, the Soviet Union did not reap any immediate 
reward from its largesse.  The generous amounts of civil and military support, including 
for symbolic projects of little economic value, could be seen as an investment in future 
relations.  But Khrushchev obviously even then has his doubts, expressing dissatisfaction 
with Sukarno’s attempts to play both sides and with the poor apprehension of socialism he 
saw in the Indonesian government.  There is thus modest evidence to support the 
proposition that aid increases the tendency to align and little evidence for the proposition 
that it increases the influence of the donor on the policies adopted by the recipient. 
The hypothesis that fared worst was in relation to the role of transnational political 
penetration.  The presence of a large ethnic Chinese population, which both the People’s 
Republic China and the Republic of China tried to cultivate, prove a liability to Beijing 
and Taipei.   The pro-KMT lobby in Jakarta became a focus of hostility once Taiwan’s 
role in the regional rebellions became apparent.  And the anti-trading and residency bans 
threatened to derail the work undertaken since the signing of the Dual Nationality Treaty 
to build international cooperation between Jakarta and Beijing.  Rather than proving an 
advantage for China, the wealth and economic influence of the diaspora made Indonesia 
wary over the dangers of its resident Chinese acting as a 5th column.  Although the Soviet 
Union and the USA attempted to bolster their influence through various forms of 
propaganda and cultivation of individuals, the overall impact on government policy was 
limited.  The opposing sides of the Cold War each had their natural constituencies in 
Indonesia – for the Soviet Union and China it was the PKI and for the USA it was the 
army and remnants of the political parties that had been associated with the rebellions, 
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particularly Masyumi and the PSI.  But this could only translate into influence to the 
extent those domestic forces were either in the ascendency of felt their interests coincided 
with the foreign powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The early years of Guided Democracy saw Sukarno take charge of the broad 
outlines of Indonesian foreign policy.  He more confidently asserted a leadership role for 
Indonesia in international politics, using forums like the United Nations General 
Assembly and NAM to do so.  Sukarno also started to launch Indonesia on a more radical 
course in foreign policy, where the idea of strict neutrality under the bebas-aktif policy 
gave way to an interpretation of the world divided between the wealthy established states 
and the poor emerging states.  Nonalignment in this vision of foreign policy was not about 
staying out of the Cold War and reducing tensions between the USA and Soviet Union, 
but forging an activist third bloc to advance the interests of the Third World. 
But there was a contradiction between Sukarno’s ambitions and the reality of 
Indonesia’s national strength.  Sukarno and Indonesia continued to need the great powers 
to contribute to Indonesia’s own development even as he criticised them for sponsoring or 
condoning imperialism and called for a more just international system.  The means he 
used to reduce the risk of capture by foreign powers was to pit them against each other.  
The hallmark of Indonesian alignment policy during this period was competitive bidding; 
a pragmatic solution to meeting Indonesia’s material needs while preserving its policy 
autonomy.  Although it was to cause some offence to the great power rivals for influence 
in Indonesia, the policy worked because the zero-sum calculations of the Cold War 
presented them with the choice of competing or abandoning Indonesia to the other side. 
Indonesia simultaneously looked to the future.  It drew on the support of the great 
powers, particularly the Soviet Union, to lay the groundwork for Realpolitik balancing.  
The acquisition of military firepower meant Indonesia was better prepared to defend itself 
against rebellions and foreign incursions and to pursue its own international ambitions; the 
paramount ambition being the ouster of the Dutch from West New Guinea.  Sukarno 
extended this balancing activity into alignment politics by conceiving of a new state bloc 
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founded on either NAM or the Asia Africa conference.  Thus, the early 1960s can be seen 
as the start of a transition in which the growth of military power underwrote a foreign 
policy where Indonesia could act more independently of the great powers and resist 
pressure to conform. 
Still, the complexities of managing great power relations were evident in 
Indonesia’s relations with China.  The crisis over the residency rights of Sino-Indonesians 
demonstrated the difficulties of balancing the risks in alignment politics simultaneously at 
the domestic and international levels.  Sukarno’s solution could be described as a variation 
of Omnibalancing – acquiescing to action against his local Chinese while trying to 
appease Beijing.  Ultimately, China’s desire not to be out manoeuvred in Indonesia by 
both the USA and Soviet Union led it to make peace and accept the inevitability of 
discrimination.  
The episodes described here provide support for the two hypotheses that domestic 
group or individual preferences and interests are prioritised when the prospect of state or 
regime loss is perceived to be low and hard or offensive policies are preferred when the 
prospect of losses to the regime or state is perceived to be high.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Test of Power:  Confrontation Over West  
New Guinea 
 
Two years after imposing Guided Democracy on Indonesia, Sukarno was 
relatively secure in office and ready to complete the vision for an Indonesian nation he 
had laid out in his Pancasila speech 16 years earlier.  After years of exasperating appeals 
to the UN and attempts to pressure the Dutch into bilateral negotiations, Indonesia had 
acquired sufficient power to try to force a solution to its claims over West New Guinea.  
For Sukarno, and Indonesians generally, the exercise of sovereignty over West New 
Guinea was the highest foreign policy priority.  Although Sukarno was secure at the head 
of government, victory over the Netherlands would have acted as a vindication of his 
leadership and even the system of Guided Democracy.  The continued Dutch occupation 
of the territory was regarded as one of the last pieces of unfinished business of the Round 
Table Agreements of 1949.  Passions were so high on this question that Indonesians 
would have been readily led to war by Sukarno to secure their objective. 
The events described in this chapter trace the final stages of Indonesia’s campaign 
to win sovereignty over West New Guinea.  It begins with the arrival in the White House 
of a young President who was ready to bring fresh thinking to the troubled relationship 
with Indonesia.  The key to the recovery of strained ties was deemed to be resolution of 
the West New Guinea conflict before it became a full-blown military crisis.  The chapter 
then traces the diplomatic negotiations leading to a final resolution of Indonesian claims.  
It ends with Indonesia at a crossroads, facing the choice between the pursuit of radical 
“revolutionary diplomacy” or adopting an orthodox Western-led program of economic 
development. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that continued Dutch occupation of West New 
Guinea represented a critical loss to the state and therefore invited a hard response that 
entailed high risks.  This resulted in a balancing strategy in which Indonesia continued to 
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expand its military capability and obtained explicit support, including the offer of combat 
support, from the Soviet Union.  But Sukarno cleverly managed Indonesia’s alignment 
posture to maximise the prospects for success over West New Guinea, while minimising 
the risks.  He did this by maintaining dialogue with the USA to keep open the prospect of 
Washington brokering a peaceful settlement.  He held out the hope of improved relations 
with the USA if it assisted Indonesia’s territorial ambitions.  In this way, he continued a 
pattern of playing both sides of the Cold War to the frequent discomfort of both the USA 
and the Soviet Union.  
 
Diplomacy and War Clouds 
 
A Fresh Start with America: At the Court of Camelot  
 
 Five days after John F. Kennedy was sworn in as President, Howard Jones made 
another pitch to Washington to seek a more positive relationship with Indonesia.  Jones, 
who had long advocated US interests were served by a policy of predictable and generous 
support to Indonesia, argued the change of administration provided an opportunity to 
reset relations after the vicissitudes of the Eisenhower years.  Jones’ overriding concern 
was that the USA was losing the game for influence in Indonesia to the Communist bloc.  
“Indonesia is now moving from a neutralist position to one of greater dependency on the 
bloc,” he warned in a telegram to the State Department.1   
Jones’ answer was a seven-point program, which aimed to settle the status of 
West New Guinea, establish a personal relationship between Presidents Kennedy and 
Sukarno, upgrade the economic and military aid relationship, and remove any doubts that 
the USA was firmly on the side of anti-colonialism.  Although he regarded the 
implementation of all seven items as essential to success, there clearly was urgency to the 
first two.  A solution to the conflict over West New Guinea would avert the outbreak of a 
war between the Netherlands and Indonesia in which America’s “entire position in Asia 
would be threatened”. 2   A personal rapport between Kennedy and Sukarno 
                                                
1 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, 
FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 143. 
2 Ibid. 
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unquestionably would “lead to greater US impact on Sukarno’s thinking and attitudes and 
could exert considerable influence on the course of events in Indonesia”.3  In pursuit of 
this latter goal, Jones proposed Kennedy write to Sukarno and propose an “informal” 
meeting at the White House during a planned visit by the Indonesian leader to the USA 
between 24 and 25 April.  It was hoped this would become a turning point in a troubled 
relationship. 
By the start of 1961, two interlinked features of Indonesia’s international relations 
with implications for the USA were crystallising.  The first was that the clash over 
rightful ownership of West New Guinea was coming to a head.  The second was that the 
attention the Soviet Union had lavished on Indonesia in terms of military and economic 
aid and diplomatic support since Khrushchev’s 1960 visit was reaping dividends.  It put 
Washington in a bind.  It was not ready to match Soviet largesse:  American estimates of 
the rival aid spend was USD 1.1 billion, comprising USD 593 million in military aid and 
the balance in economic aid.4  Competing with the Soviet aid program risked rewarding 
what the Americans regarded as bad behavior and offending Congress, many of whose 
leading foreign policy representatives viewed Sukarno as “personally obnoxious”. 5  
Washington could also not match Moscow’s open and unqualified support for 
Indonesia’s claims to West New Guinea without incurring the anger of close allies the 
Netherlands and Australia, even if it did regard those claims as either legitimate or 
expedient, which many did not.   
America’s frustration over West New Guinea was compounded by the fact it 
regarded the Dutch-administered territory as essentially worthless.  It had little 
appreciation of why the Dutch thought it merited the financial and diplomatic burden 
they had carried since the Round Table Conference of 1949.  One description in a paper 
sent to Kennedy dismissively described West New Guinea as “unexplored mountain-
jungle swampland”, inhabited by “semi-nomadic, stone age, Papuan tribesmen, speaking 
                                                
3 Telegram from Jones to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, ibid., document 144. 
4 Brief Prepared in the Defence Intelligence Agency, SNIE 55-61: Outlook in Indonesia with 
Special Reference to West New Guinea, 7 March 1961, ibid., document 151.  Hindley provides 
an extensive comparison of foreign aid based on official contemporary data.  See, Donald 
Hindley, “Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its Political Implications”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 
(1963), 109. 
5 Telegram from Jones to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, ibid., document 144. 
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a couple of hundred mutually-unintelligible tongues”.6  But there also was little sympathy 
for the Indonesian argument that the territory was intrinsically and naturally part of the 
Indonesian state.  A common theme in Washington going back to John Foster Dulles was 
that the Indonesians simply proposed supplanting one form of colonialism for another.7  
The Melanesians of Papua were viewed as having virtually no bond of either blood or 
culture with the dominant Malay races of the rest of Indonesia.   
Whatever the merits of these opinions, they were irrelevant to American ideas 
about how the dispute should be resolved.  The assessments made in Washington by the 
various agencies that weighed into the debate in the early weeks and months of the 
Kennedy administration were based purely on pragmatic strategic calculations.  US 
government agencies were split not over principles of self-determination or the rights of 
indigenous people, but over how national interests would best be served.  The purpose 
that united everyone in government was the rollback of international and domestic 
communist influence on the Indonesian government.  An expeditious West New Guinea 
policy was one that best contributed to that end.  It was over this pivotal objective the 
Washington policy community divided.  The Central Intelligence Agency’s deputy 
director for plans, Richard M. Bissell, concluded Indonesian control over West New 
Guinea would be harmful to US security interests as long as Sukarno remained in power.  
He warned: 
 
We consider it likely that Indonesia’s success in this particular instance will set 
in train the launching of other irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in 
lectures given by Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist, who however, is a 
member of the Indonesian cabinet close to President Sukarno.8 
 
                                                
6 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy 3 April 1961, ibid., document 
158. 
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Bissell made the prescient observation that Sukarno would portray victory in 
ousting the Dutch from West New Guinea as a combination of his own leadership, the 
“unflinching” support of the PKI and the threat of Soviet intervention, regardless of how 
instrumental the USA proved to be in the outcome.  The same tendency to minimise the 
US contribution would greet any increase in the volume of military and economic aid.  
“We should assume appeasement will buy us nothing,” he concluded.9   
At the other end of the spectrum of official opinion lay McGeorge Bundy’s 
National Security Council team.  Robert W. Komer, who has been described as one of the 
most ambitious of this bright cabal, dismissed Bissell’s position as “sterile 
oppositionism”. 10   Komer himself was a 15-year veteran of the CIA before being 
recruited onto Bundy’s staff.  He advocated the creation of a mechanism that ensured the 
transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia at the earliest date, while 
preserving a semblance of due process.  “I am sure we all agree that Indonesia will 
eventually get WNG, that we cannot afford to buck Sukarno on this issue while the 
Soviets back him and that the Dutch will have to give,” he argued.11  All the NSC staff 
working on the issue adopted the same line.  Some in the CIA also shared this conviction.  
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Amory, argued the USA should 
abandon its neutrality in favor of Indonesia.12 
In this debate, the leadership of the State Department and the embassy in Jakarta 
were close to the NSC position, but they set more store in a defensible process and 
deference to the idea of self-determination.  Their proposal was to place West New 
Guinea under a UN trusteeship for a fixed period with newly independent Malaya acting 
as the trustee because it was “the country nearest to Indonesia geographically, 
linguistically and racially”.13  If Malaya proved unable to fulfil the duties of trustee as 
part of a consortium of countries supplying financial and logistic support, the trusteeship 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
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Security Affairs, Walt Rostow, 5 April 1961, ibid., document 159. 
12 Simpson, Economists with Guns, p. 42. 
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should be managed directly by the UN.  The proposal was approved by Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk, on 7 April and recommended to Kennedy.   
But, regardless of the mechanism, two points were well understood:  first, the 
transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia was inevitable despite disagreement among agencies 
in Washington over the desirability of West New Guinea’s union with Indonesia and, 
second, American leadership held the key to an eventual resolution.  There was 
undoubted truth to this latter conclusion.  Certainly, Indonesia had effectively increased 
its bargaining power following the failure of successive efforts to have the issue inscribed 
on the UN agenda.  The rapid Soviet-backed military expansion and diplomatic support 
from Communist bloc and many non-aligned countries gave Jakarta more leverage than 
at any time since the Round Table Conference.  But the cost and operational challenges 
of ousting the Dutch by force meant an Indonesian invasion of West New Guinea was a 
poor alternative to diplomacy, despite Sukarno’s frequently bellicose rhetoric.  And it 
was obvious to everyone that there would be no diplomatic solution unless the USA 
played an active role in mediating between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 
It was against this background that Sukarno came to Washington in April 1961 
for his first meeting with Kennedy.  The State Department set four objectives for the 
Sukarno-Kennedy talks.  It hoped Kennedy could charm Sukarno, pandering to his 
renowned ego, to enliven “the somewhat distant tone” of US-Indonesian relations.  It 
wanted to express “friendly US interest and concern” in the West New Guinea dispute.  It 
sought to ensure Sukarno had a better understanding of the US position in the Cold War.  
And it wanted to dispel Sukarno’s apparent belief the USA opposed him personally and 
wanted him removed from office.14   
Kennedy accomplished the first of these objectives with ease, based on Sukarno’s 
subsequent account.  He acceded to Sukarno’s request to be met on arrival at National 
Airport in Washington, a gesture Sukarno believed would signify to an Indonesian 
audience the esteem Americans had for him.  Kennedy also unveiled a surprise gift – a 
Sikorsky helicopter of the type used to ferry US presidents from the south lawn of the 
                                                
14 Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles to President Kennedy, 20 April 
1961, ibid., document 158. 
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White House.15   Sukarno later reflected on the occasion, commenting that Kennedy 
“understood me”. 
 
One day he took me by the arm and we enjoyed a short, private flight in his 
helicopter.  I was so happy that the President of the United States of America and 
the President of the Republic of Indonesia were riding around together.  Then he 
asked if I’d be interested in owning a helicopter like this.  I still have it.  I still 
have photographs of him and his family in my home.16 
 
Sukarno was beguiled by such trifling gestures from foreign leaders, which was 
one of his weaknesses.  What’s more, he found the youth and glamor of the Kennedy 
White House to be an attractive contrast to the straight-laced and dour Eisenhower years.  
But Kennedy’s conviviality was just a sales pitch that followed the advice of the NSC.  
The reality was that Kennedy was disdainful of Sukarno’s extravagant rhetoric and 
indulgent lifestyle.  Jacqueline Kennedy recalled she and her husband inviting Sukarno to 
the private sitting room of the White House for an intimate chat.  The First Lady had 
sought to flatter the Indonesian president by ensuring a volume of his collected artwork 
was positioned prominently on the coffee table.  As they leafed through, Sukarno, seated 
on the sofa between Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy, displayed delight at the plates of Indonesian 
women naked to the waist.  “I caught Jack’s eye, and we were trying not to laugh at each 
other,” Jacqueline Kennedy recalled three years later.  “He was so terribly happy, and 
he’d say, ‘This is my second wife, and this was’…”  Her dislike for Sukarno was 
compounded by “a sort of lecherous look” that “left a bad taste in your mouth.”17      
On the subject of West New Guinea, Kennedy proved he was less amenable to the 
counsel he received from his NSC advisers.  During a 90-minute discussion at the White 
House on 24 April, Kennedy peppered Sukarno with questions on why Indonesia either 
wanted or felt entitled to claim West New Guinea, whose population was clearly of a 
different race to the majority of Indonesians. Sukarno at times appeared to struggle with 
his replies.  The following paraphrased exchange from the official record was indicative: 
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Kennedy:  What would the people of West Irian themselves choose? 
Sukarno:  Indonesia. 
Kennedy:  Then why not hold a plebiscite to determine this?  (At which point, 
Kennedy added the Dutch would have to accept the result). 
Sukarno: Why was this device necessary since the territory had always been 
Indonesian? 
Kennedy:  In the case of Hawaii, the people had themselves decided by popular 
vote that they wished to become Americans.18 
 
Despite the scepticism implicit in Kennedy’s questioning, his administration was 
moving inexorably in the direction of Indonesia.  The growing fear of armed conflict 
breaking out, the untenable position of the Dutch both politically and militarily, and the 
American desire to counter Soviet influence all pointed to a deal to transfer sovereignty 
over West New Guinea to Indonesia at the earliest opportunity.  The USA felt obliged to 
pay deference to the notion of self-determination, given its repeated insistence on this 
principle in its advocacy of European decolonisation.  Some like secretary Rusk were 
undoubtedly sincere in wanting the Papuans to participate in a genuine act of self-
determination.  But it was evident from the advice sent to Kennedy from his national 
security staff that any act of self-determination would have to be designed solely for the 
purposes of facilitating the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia and saving the 
Netherlands from embarrassment.  Robert H. Johnson, a specialist on Asia and already a 
veteran of the National Security Council when the Kennedy administration was elected, 
argued US interests were served by an Indonesian takeover.  “While we need a formula 
that will save face for the Dutch by making a bow in the direction of self-determination, 
we should not in the process delude ourselves or confuse the Indonesians as to our real 
objective,” he wrote in a memo to Rostow.19  The theme was taken up in Rostow’s 
subsequent advice to the President.  He told Kennedy the application of self-
determination was “meaningless” because “the stone age-Papuans cannot be prepared for 
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meaningful self-determination during any feasible UN trusteeship period; the problem 
will simply not sit that long”.20 
As the Kennedy administration weighed the best means to ensure a resolution in 
favor of the Indonesians, the Netherlands too was reappraising its position.  The financial 
costs and security threats that came with continued possession of West New Guinea were 
a source of growing domestic concern in the Netherlands.  Indonesia had broken off 
diplomatic relations completely in mid-1960 after the Netherlands deployed the aircraft 
carrier Karel Doorman and two destroyers to bolster West New Guinea’s defences.  The 
government of Prime Minister Jan de Quay concluded it was no longer feasible to plan on 
a long period of Dutch administration leading to self-determination.  The degree of Dutch 
anxiety was reflected in a decision to launch the boldest initiative in the decade since The 
Hague agreement – one that might have served as the basis of a settlement had it come 
years earlier.   
In September 1961, Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns proposed turning the 
administration of West New Guinea over to the United Nations to guide the Papuans to 
an eventual act of self-determination.  This was in principle a significant concession.  But 
Luns, who was persistently truculent in negotiations with the Indonesians, could not 
countenance eventual Indonesian sovereignty as an outcome from self-determination.21  
Rather than producing a thaw in relations between Jakarta and The Hague, the effect of 
the Luns plan was to fuel Indonesian suspicions that the real purpose of the Dutch was to 
frustrate Indonesia’s territorial claim.22  Subandrio’s response was to declare the only 
choice available to the Papuans should be the extent of autonomy within the Indonesian 
state.23 
In late November, the Netherlands prepared to put a resolution to the UN General 
Assembly to seek endorsement for its approach to relinquishing sovereignty.  But facing 
opposition from Indonesia, it was clear the Luns plan could not muster the two-thirds 
majority required and the resolution was withdrawn.  Two other resolutions were put to 
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the assembly for a vote and each failed to obtain the necessary support.  One was a US-
inspired compromise, officially proposed by French African states referred as the 
Brazzaville group.  It advocated a two-step approach in which a multi-state commission 
would review conditions in West New Guinea and pave the way for a period of UN 
administration.24  Indonesia would have access to the territory and the opportunity to 
build support for a vote for unification in an eventual plebiscite.  A majority of states 
backed this, but it fell short of a two-thirds majority.  The other resolution was proposed 
by India, supported by Indonesia, which called for bilateral talks.  The US supported the 
first resolution and opposed the second, leading Indonesia to accuse the US of 
abandoning its erstwhile neutrality for overt support of the Dutch.  The UN diplomacy 
was a debacle.  It left the West New Guinea issue in a dangerous limbo and raised doubts 
about whether the UN could play an effective role in orderly decolonisation.  The 
atmosphere was worsened with provocative statements and actions on both sides.  A 
Dutch decision to change the name of West New Guinea to West Papua and give the 
territory its own flag on 1 December was particularly inflammatory. 
Meanwhile, the diplomatic divide between Indonesia and the Netherlands was 
simultaneously hardening into a military confrontation.  The largely Soviet-enabled 
build-up of Indonesian armaments had produced by late 1961 the most powerful military 
in Asia outside China.  Each of the three services was dramatically upgraded at a heavy 
cost to the national budget.  Notwithstanding the generous terms of Soviet military aid, 
the military establishment accounted for almost half of national expenditure by 1961.25  
Indonesia’s air force was transformed from “a motley collection of World War II-era 
piston-engine aircraft into a strong modern force.”26  There were MIG-19 and MIG-21 
fighters and Tupolev and Ilyushin bombers armed with air-to-surface missiles.  The navy 
received six submarines, six destroyers, one Sverdlov-class cruiser, torpedo boats and 
landing craft.  And the army was upgraded with East European small arms, amphibious 
tanks and artillery and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.  Along with this 
powerful array of equipment came Soviet advisers and crews.  Although Indonesian air 
force and navy specialists received extensive training in the Soviet Union and eastern 
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bloc, submarines and some surface vessels were jointly crewed.  The Soviet Military 
Advisory Group, under the command of an admiral, numbered about 400.27 
Indonesia’s growing military muscle encouraged belligerence over its claims to 
West New Guinea.  From the end of 1961, the tone of public statements from Indonesian 
leaders, and Indonesia’s actions, became more threatening.  There were signs of 
irascibility and intemperance in Sukarno.  On 9 December, Kennedy wrote to Sukarno 
offering to intercede with the Dutch to try to find a peaceful solution and seeking to 
discourage Indonesia from resorting to force.  In an extraordinary interview with 
ambassador Jones two days later, Sukarno gesticulated, berated the Dutch and constantly 
interrupted with emotional outbursts.  He had slept little, watching a marathon Javanese 
morality play until the early morning – a habit when he weighed big decisions.  In an 
apparent reference to Dutch diplomatic manoeuvres, Sukarno declared: “I am fed up to 
here,” gesturing with his hands at eye level.  “I can’t stand any more of it.”  He distrusted 
the Dutch, especially Luns, who he branded as “full of hate” and a “scoundrel”.  On 
Dutch promises to relinquish control of West New Guinea, Sukarno, pressing his 
clenched fists against his temple, said: “I can’t believe it.  The Dutch won’t do it.”  
Sukarno continued in this vein throughout the interview.  He refused to accept the 
Papuans had a right to self-determination, comparing it to giving Texans the choice of 
seceding from the USA.  “You must understand I can’t accept self-determination for a 
part of our territory,” he said.  The only kind of plebiscite that was acceptable was one 
that reaffirmed Indonesian sovereignty after a period of Indonesian administration under 
the United Nations.28  At this time, Sukarno was not in good health, which might have 
contributed to the histrionics – he was recovering from recent kidney treatment in 
Vienna.29  Regardless of the cause, he was in a truculent frame of mind.  He passed on his 
thanks to Kennedy for his offer to intercede.  But he warned time was running out.   “The 
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only thing the Dutch understand is force,” Sukarno said.  He added: “Go to the Dutch and 
tell them (that).”30  
One of Sukarno’s parting comments to Jones was that the Indonesian people were 
impatient for progress on West New Guinea and they would think he was “getting soft” if 
he failed to take a decisive stand.31  Sukarno wanted to convey that he was captive of the 
public mood.  The reverse was more the case.  By this time, Sukarno was free to dictate 
foreign policy with little domestic challenge.  He had steadily built his authority under 
Guided Democracy to the point where he indisputably exercised “personal dominance in 
foreign policy”, nowhere more so than in relation to West New Guinea.32 
A week after his outburst with Jones, on 19 December, Sukarno gave a rallying 
speech in Yogyakarta where he stoked the mood of jingoism and demonstrated his 
resolve by sharpening the threat of armed conflict.  To a large crowd, he announced the 
formation of the “Three People’s Command” (Tri Komando Rakyat or Trikora) with a 
mission to mobilise all elements of society to wrest control of West New Guinea.  The 
military arm of this operation, named Mandala, was created on 2 January.  The future 
president Suharto was appointed as its commander and promoted to major general.33  
Sukarno set the goal of incorporating West New Guinea by Independence Day 1962.   
Low-level armed incursions into West New Guinea had been a longstanding 
Indonesian tactic to test Dutch defences and to establish a security dimension to the 
dispute.  Usually these had been no more than a nuisance to the Dutch and had ended in 
failure.  But the scale and tempo of military operations grew in tandem with Indonesian 
confidence over the strength of its military and diplomatic position.  The efficacy of 
military measures to achieve such claims was demonstrated by India’s invasion and swift 
occupation of Portuguese Goa on 17 December 1961. 34   The following January, 
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Indonesia attempted to stage one of its most daring raids on West New Guinea.  Using 
three fast torpedo boats, the army planned to insert more than 100 heavily armed soldiers 
and launch them against Dutch defences at Kaimana, in the Bird’s Head region.  Before 
the troops could land, two Dutch destroyers intercepted the force on 15 January.  In an 
exchange of gunfire, one of the torpedo boats sank, killing the deputy chief of the 
Indonesian navy, Commodore Yosaphat Sudarso.35  The incident ratcheted up tensions 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands and provoked fears in Washington over the 
potential for a cycle of escalating naval clashes leading to war.  Despite the embarrassing 
setback, Indonesia persisted with military incursions in increasingly large numbers 
throughout the first half of 1962.36  
In Moscow, Indonesia’s growing propensity to employ force was greeted with 
satisfaction, save for the poor execution.  Khrushchev later admitted to trying to coax 
Indonesia into seeking a military solution to its West New Guinea claim.  He recounted 
telling Subandrio in Moscow that he would be happy to actively support an Indonesian 
resort to arms against the Dutch.   
 
I said: ‘If the Dutch fail to display sober-mindedness and engage in military 
operations, this is a war that could to some extent serve as a proving ground for 
our pilots who are flying planes equipped with missiles.  We’ll see how well our 
missiles work.37 
 
Khrushchev spoke to Subandrio in secrecy and assumed his views would be 
shared with a limited circle in Indonesia.  He respected and trusted the former Indonesian 
ambassador to the Soviet Union.  Subandrio endeared himself by speaking Russian well 
enough not to require an interpreter and encouraging his wife to entertain Soviet officials 
by occasionally singing Russian songs at embassy receptions.  This warm regard 
compounded Khrushchev’s dismay when he claims Subandrio immediately proceeded to 
the USA where he revealed all the details of their conversation to the State Department.  
“I was dumbfounded,” Khrushchev recalled.  Khrushchev used official channels to 
complain to Sukarno, who was unmoved.  Sukarno’s apparent support for Subandrio led 
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Khrushchev to conclude Sukarno was “balancing between us and the United States, 
trying to use both of us to achieve his aims”.38   
The outbreak of war between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the remote 
battleground of West New Guinea would have suited the Soviet Union.   It would have 
driven a wedge between Indonesia and the West and increased Indonesia’s dependency 
on Soviet military, diplomatic and economic support.  The generosity of Soviet military 
supplies – Indonesia accounted for a third of all Soviet military aid to non-aligned 
countries – was undoubtedly intended to persuade Sukarno of the viability of a military 
solution.39  After the January naval clash, Rusk had sent a warning to Sukarno through 
diplomatic channels that the USA would be forced to oppose Indonesia in the UN should 
he provoke war with the Dutch.40  The USA was conscious its influence in Indonesia was 
ebbing away in favor of the communist bloc.  In October 1961, the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff offered a reminder to the National Security Council of what was at stake. 
 
The loss of Indonesia to the communists might well start a chain reaction that 
would culminate in the eventual relinquishment of the principle US military 
bases in the Far East, with consequent serious implications for the overall US 
military posture in the Western Pacific.41 
 
By the end of 1961, it was clear to the Kennedy administration that the risk of 
alienating Indonesia outweighed the risk of alienating the Dutch.  It was common practice 
for the Dutch, particularly Luns, to issue warnings about the Netherlands withdrawing 
from NATO in the event it had to commit larger forces to the defence of West New 
Guinea.  The Dutch warnings had resonated with the State Department, particularly 
within its European Bureau during the Dulles era, because Europe was seen as the main 
theatre of the Cold War.  But perceptions started to change in the last months of the 
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Eisenhower administration following the death of Dulles. One memo read by Kennedy 
put the trade-off succinctly:  no issue was more important in relations between Indonesia 
and the USA than West New Guinea, whereas a whole network of interests bound the 
USA to its allies the Netherlands and Australia.42   In other words, the Netherlands and 
Australia would get over it, especially if they were convinced that the transfer of control 
over West New Guinea would play a critical role in reducing the drift towards 
communism in Indonesia.  As a result, by early 1962, US strategy aimed to bring 
Indonesia and the Netherlands together for direct talks, mediated by a third party, but 
with the ultimate goal of ensuring Indonesia would obtain control of the territory within a 
relatively short time.  A mechanism would have to be found for the Netherlands to “save 
face” via an interim UN administration and a fig leaf act of self-determination.   
There was some urgency attached to reaching a settlement.  US intelligence 
calculated that Indonesia would have sufficient military strength and evidence of Dutch 
intransigence by the end of 1962 to give Sukarno his casus belli.43 The window for 
negotiations was thus limited to the first several months of the year.  Kennedy’s national 
security advisors recognised pressure would need to be placed on both sides to make 
concessions, although preponderantly on the Dutch, as they were being asked to 
relinquish a great deal more of their original negotiating position.  But getting the two 
sides to the negotiating table after years of mutual distrust would test the diplomatic skills 
of the Kennedy administration.   
Indonesia and the Netherlands were divided over two fundamental issues.  
Sukarno would agree to bilateral talks only on the basis he could be assured of the 
outcome in advance.  His pre-condition was that any talks focus on the modalities of the 
transfer of administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia.  Dutch policy, largely 
dictated by Luns, was to insist Papuans should have the right to decide their own future.  
Although the Dutch did not oppose the transfer of administration, they insisted it would 
have to be to a third party, preferably the UN.  An act of self-determination would follow 
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after a suitable period.  They could not countenance the “surrender” implied by a direct 
transfer of administration to Indonesia. 
The first task of the Kennedy administration was to try to get the two sides to drop 
their pre-conditions.  But this was purely based on the US assumption that once the talks 
were underway an agreement could be reached over the transfer of administration to 
Indonesia after a brief interim period under third party administration.  A period of third-
party administration would produce the face saving mechanism deemed necessary to 
satisfy the minimum Dutch negotiating position.  In principle, the Dutch accepted they 
could no longer maintain sovereignty over West New Guinea.  But the De Quay 
government attached sufficient importance to its domestic standing and its international 
prestige to risk the possibility of a military confrontation rather than cave in to Indonesian 
demands for a direct transfer of administration.  The Kennedy administration was baffled 
by the apparent Dutch willingness to risk hostilities over a territory it no longer wished to 
administer.  Kennedy and his advisers wanted the Dutch to focus on what the USA 
regarded as the “larger picture” – the strategic position of the free world in Asia versus 
the Communist Bloc.44  But there also were some fundamental questions at the tactical 
level.  Could West New Guinea be viable as an independent state?  Would Indonesia give 
up if West New Guinea became independent?  Was there any satisfactory outcome 
possible other than the transfer of administration to Indonesia with the guarantee of later 
self-determination?45  The answers all inexorably pointed to Indonesian control over 
West New Guinea. 
 
No Choice at All: Winning West New Guinea   
 
In February 1962, the USA took a gamble on direct high-level intervention to try 
to break the deadlock and set up a process by which Indonesia could be seen to 
legitimately obtain sovereignty over West New Guinea.  The US President appointed his 
brother, Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, as an emissary to encourage both sides to 
drop their preconditions and enter negotiations on the practicalities of the Netherlands 
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relinquishing sovereignty.  But the Kennedy mission only served to underscore how 
intractable the dispute had become and the dangers of it erupting in major war. 
Meeting Sukarno for 90 minutes in Jakarta on 14 February, Kennedy could not 
get him to compromise.  Even as Kennedy hinted strongly that the USA would press for 
an outcome that would satisfy Indonesia, Sukarno insisted repeatedly on “greater 
assurance” that the negotiations would not fail.46  The Kennedy visit is in some quarters 
portrayed as a positive turning point in the US efforts to find a peaceful resolution of the 
West New Guinea dispute.47  This probably overstates its significance and Kennedy’s 
ability as a diplomat.   
The most memorable aspect of the visit was an episode in a second meeting with 
Sukarno at the Bogor Palace on 18 February when Kennedy either lost his temper, or 
confected a loss of temper, with Sukarno.  The trigger was Sukarno’s refusal to commit 
on whether he would pardon and release the jailed CIA pilot Allen Pope, who was then 
under a sentence of death.  Kennedy allegedly stood and raised his voice with Sukarno, 
demanding to know whether Sukarno would keep an undertaking to release Pope made 
during his meetings in Washington with President Kennedy the previous April.  Kennedy 
apparently had been angered by Sukarno’s comment at their 14 February meeting that he 
would “bargain” Pope’s release for an assurance of US pressure on the Dutch.48  When 
Sukarno refused to be drawn on when he would release Pope at their second meeting, 
Kennedy raised his voice and asked Sukarno: “Could you tell me whether you are going 
to stand by your promise to the President of the United States?”  Dissatisfied, Kennedy 
stood, challenged Sukarno over whether he was “a man of his word”, and walked out on 
to a balcony. 49   
It is hard to assess the impact this had on Sukarno’s willingness to accede to the 
US request to him to drop pre-conditions on negotiations with the Dutch.  In a meeting 
                                                
46 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 14 February 1962, 
ibid., document 231. 
47 This was the view of Kennedy’s biographer. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jnr., Robert Kennedy 
and His Times, New York: Houghton Mifflin (1978), p. 570. 
48 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 14 February 1961, 
FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 233.  
49 A detailed account of this meeting can be found in Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 571-573.  Sukarno 
pardoned Pope in June and allowed him to return to the USA. Subandrio claimed Sukarno had 
already reached this decision at the time of the Kennedy visit but did not want to be seen as 
responding to US pressure. 
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the following week with Jones, Sukarno suggested he would “get over” his injured 
feelings, but he was adamant he would not agree to Robert Kennedy’s no-conditions 
proposition as the starting point for talks.50 
The Americans found the Dutch to be equally obstinate.  At a meeting in 
Washington on 2 March, Luns surprised President Kennedy by telling him the Dutch 
wanted to reinforce the fleet in West New Guinea with two destroyers and two 
submarines based on intelligence of an impending Indonesian attack.  The deployment 
would almost certainly have derailed the proposed talks.  In a strenuous appeal for Dutch 
moderation and flexibility, Kennedy warned Indonesia was in danger of going communist 
if war broke out.  “This would be a disaster for the free world position in Asia and would 
force us out of Vietnam,” he told Luns.  Kennedy added too great an emphasis on the 
“future of the Papuan population” obscured the bigger obligation the USA and the 
Netherlands shared to Asia and “free Europe”.  Keeping Indonesia out of the hands of the 
communists was a bigger moral obligation to both countries than allowing the Papuans to 
determine their own future.  “From a strategic point of view, we believe that West New 
Guinea as such is of little consequence,” he said.51  A Kennedy aide later referred to it as 
a “painful” meeting, revealing the Dutch position to be “tough and pinheaded”.52 
The trouble for the USA in acting as broker of West New Guinea’s future was 
that both the Indonesians and the Dutch had created little room for compromise with their 
own publics.  Years of political animosity and insults, of economic expropriations and 
expulsions, and of military manoeuvres and provocations, created an atmosphere in 
which negotiations over matters as simple as procedural points posed the potential for a 
loss of national prestige.  But the reality that the two countries were marching inexorably 
into a war as much out of wounded pride as principle or material gain must have provided 
sufficient motive to pause, even for two old politicians as wilful as Sukarno and Luns.  
Just as they appeared to be on a path to a violent showdown, they pulled back.  Indirect 
contacts between Indonesian envoys and influential Dutch citizens in European capitals, 
especially Bonn, played a role in encouraging both sides to soften their resistance to 
                                                
50 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 20 February 1962. 
FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 236. 
51 Memorandum of Conversation (Kennedy and Luns), 2 March 1962, ibid., document 244.   
52 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), ibid., document 245. 
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unconditional negotiations.53  To remind them of the risks, the USA had deliberately kept 
both sides guessing about how it would respond in the event conflict erupted.  But the 
legacy of distrust would make a solution elusive. 
On 4 March, Jones cabled Washington with the surprise news that Sukarno, at US 
instigation, had agreed to preliminary talks with the Dutch without pre-condition, as long 
as it was understood that the transfer of administration over West New Guinea would the 
first item raised by the Indonesians.54  The Dutch agreed to the talks as long as they were 
held in the presence of a third party.  Both sides favored some degree of secrecy.  
Sukarno had the most reason to avoid disclosure.  He had appealed to jingoism and 
marshalled the army and people for an impending armed conflict.  He did not want to risk 
another humiliation by staking too much on a negotiated solution.  Moreover, the PKI, 
happy with the tone of militancy that brought Indonesia closer to the Communist bloc, 
were likely to portray a willingness to negotiate as weakness.  The Soviet Union too 
would have been disturbed by news of negotiations after the quiet urging for Indonesia to 
remain resolute in its demands and resort to an armed solution if necessary.  
All this constrained the range of acceptable outcomes from the talks.  The window 
for compromise was small and would require significant concessions, mostly from the 
Dutch. Having stirred bellicose sentiments at home, Sukarno needed something that 
looked like a decisive victory.  Indonesia’s bottom line was to achieve recognition of its 
sovereignty over West New Guinea with as little delay as possible.  It opposed self-
determination in principle – Sukarno claimed the idea had been “invented” by the Dutch 
to frustrate Indonesia; he asserted Indonesian sovereignty should have been automatic in 
1949; and he was concerned the conduct of a plebiscite raised the question of whether the 
same right might be demanded by other regions of Indonesia.55  For the Dutch, the 
avoidance of a direct transfer to Indonesia and the conduct of a genuine plebiscite were 
equally essential outcomes.56  Talks finally started in secret on 20 March at a 19th century 
                                                
53 For an account of the back-channel contacts, see Penders, The West New Guinea Debacle, pp. 
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54 Telegram 1586 from the Embassy in Indonesia (Jones) to the Department of State, 4 March 
1962, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 246, n. 1. 
55  Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State (record of 
conversation between Sukarno and US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson), 16 September 
1961, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 191. 
56  The Dutch cabinet approved this position on 22 December. See, Penders, The West New 
Guinea Debacle, p.343. 
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mansion near the town of Middleburg, Virginia, 80 km west of Washington.  Ellsworth 
Bunker, a distinguished US diplomat, lawyer and businessman was chosen to mediate.  
But the difficulty of reconciling the two positions meant it would take many months of 
arduous meetings before a settlement could be reached.  Hanging over the affair was the 
constant threat that failure of negotiation inevitably meant war. 
During the opening round of talks, the lead negotiators for the two countries – 
Adam Malik, Indonesia’s ambassador to Moscow, and Herman van Roijen, the 
Netherlands ambassador to Washington – were under such constraints from their 
respective capitals they were incapable of meaningful dialogue.  Malik was authorised 
only to discuss the transfer of administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia in broad 
terms and the consequent normalisation of diplomatic relations.   His lack of authority 
precluded discussion of items that were “essential to agenda formulation”.  Van Roijen 
was there to discuss the nature of an interim administration and a plebiscite to ascertain 
the wishes of Papuans, not give the Indonesians a blank cheque.57  The talks quickly 
came to a standstill and were broken off.   
The stalemate in talks between the disputants threw responsibility back on their 
American hosts to find a way forward.  Kennedy’s national security advisers fretted the 
“crisis” would shift to “a new stage of escalation”.  “We are already so involved as 
middlemen, and risk to US strategic interests so great, that we can’t afford not to apply 
whatever pressures are necessary to bring the parties back together,” Komer observed.58  
Kennedy wrote to both Sukarno and de Quay urging them to return to the talks.  To de 
Quay, he warned of the “dire consequences of a Netherlands-Indonesia war in the Pacific 
that neither the Netherlands nor the West could win”.59   
It was left to Bunker to draft a proposal to break the impasse.  The position he 
adopted clearly favored Indonesia.  He advocated a period of UN administration lasting 
no longer than two years, after which Indonesia would assume administration of West 
New Guinea.  In the second year, UN officials would be gradually replaced with 
Indonesian officials.  After an unspecified period of Indonesian administration, Papuans 
                                                
57  The initial negotiating positions were spelled out by the Under Secretary of State Ball. 
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 21 March 1962, FRUS, Vol. 
XXIII, 1961-1963, document 250.  
58 Memo from Komer to Bundy, 28 March 1962, ibid., document 252, p. 1860. 
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would be permitted “freedom of choice” over whether to join the Indonesian state or 
adopt some other sovereign arrangement.60  From an American perspective, the Bunker 
plan was a means of handing West New Guinea to Indonesia while saving the 
Netherlands the embarrassment of making a direct transfer of authority.  Sukarno was 
quick to agree to resume talks on this basis.  But Luns exploded when he saw the details, 
sending a message to Rusk that he was “shocked and dismayed”.61  He was certainly 
correct is concluding an exercise of free choice after years of Indonesian administration 
would be a “mockery”.62  He wanted the UN administration to remain in place until a 
plebiscite was conducted.  He managed to convince the Dutch cabinet to resist American 
pressure to cave into the Indonesians and hold out for stronger guarantees of Papuan 
rights. 
After the Bunker plan was given to the parties, there was no turning back for the 
USA – it had effectively taken a position in favor of an early transfer of administration to 
Indonesia with only perfunctory regard for the right to self-determination.  It had no 
choice other than to mount increasing pressure on the Dutch to concede to Indonesia’s 
core demands.  The Dutch continued to prevaricate, seeking guarantees of various Papuan 
rights as a precondition for relinquishing the territory first to the UN and then to 
Indonesia.  US officials viewed Dutch concern for Papuan welfare with some cynicism, 
referring to political “tricks” such as the development of an “ersatz Papuan independence 
movement” and arranging a visit by a Papuan delegation to the UN.63   
Dutch delaying tactics produced an atmosphere of heightened crisis.  Indonesia 
stepped up airborne drops of troops inside West New Guinea during late April and May.  
Although all of these ended in failure, they kept pressure on the Dutch.  Indonesia also 
pressed ahead with preparations for a full-scale invasion scheduled for 14 August 
codenamed Operation Djayawidjaya (Glorious Victory) and the Dutch reinforced its 
West New Guinea garrison with ships, aircraft and troops.64  There were lingering doubts 
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over whether Sukarno really wanted a peaceful settlement.65  A military victory would 
have enhanced his stature within Indonesia and among many non-aligned countries and 
the Communist bloc.  But his army commander, Nasution, harbored doubts about the 
costs and the ability to sustain a large force with long and exposed supply lines.  Nasution 
was wise to be cautious.  Unknown to him, the Netherlands had established an impressive 
signals intelligence capability operating on Biak Island that had intercepted Indonesian 
operational communications of invasion preparations.  Indonesian forces would have 
attacked without the element of surprise and, even if eventually successful, would 
probably have suffered heavy losses.66 
By early July, the impending threat of a full-scale Indonesian invasion, and 
growing domestic opinion in the Netherlands in favor of extricating the country from the 
burden of West New Guinea, had convinced de Quay and Luns there was no alternative 
to adopting Bunker’s framework for a settlement.  The parties returned to Middleburg.  
But this time it was the Indonesians who were obdurate, insisting on various concessions 
before they would seal an agreement.  Indonesia now insisted on hastening the transfer of 
administration to ensure it occurred by the end of 1962 on the flimsy pretext that Sukarno 
had promised this in a speech.  It also was resisting strong UN oversight and control of an 
act of self-determination.  Subandrio told van Roijen privately that he regarded the UN 
conditions as representing excessive intervention and a degree of control that would be 
“humiliating to the Indonesian people”.  There was an element of intimidation in 
Indonesia’s stance.  When van Roijen resisted, Subandrio said he would return to Jakarta.  
Pressed on whether this constituted a decision to break off the talks, Subandrio simply 
shrugged his shoulders.67  The implication of Indonesia walking away from the talks was 
that a resort to armed force would inevitably follow. 
The surprising Indonesian intransigence on the cusp of a long-cherished victory 
fanned US concerns that Indonesia preferred to either win control of West New Guinea in 
an armed showdown or humiliate the Netherlands at the negotiating table.  A final US 
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push to seal an agreement then ensued.  Kennedy called Subandrio to a meeting at the 
White House and issued a blunt warning of severe consequences for Indonesia if it were 
to forsake a peaceful course when the opportunity of victory was so close.  Precisely what 
Kennedy said during the 27 July meeting is not clear, but Bunker observed the President 
had “scared the living daylights out of Subandrio”.68  Rusk offered a sanitised account in 
which Kennedy told Subandrio the world would not understand a resort to violence at this 
late stage.  A better flavor of the conversation came from Subandrio himself who later 
admitted with wry enjoyment that he had only been threatened twice in his professional 
life – once in Beijing by Mao and Zhou Enlai and once in Washington by Kennedy.69  
Subandrio was apparently reluctant to convey the substance of his conversation with 
Kennedy to Sukarno and requested Kennedy send Sukarno a letter.  This was a gentler 
communication; an appeal to compromise, couched in a “flowery appeal to Sukarno’s 
ego”.70   The flattery and pressure produced results.  On receiving Kennedy’s letter, 
Sukarno agreed to a settlement.  But his assent came at the price of several final 
compromises – the Indonesian flag would fly alongside the UN flag from 1 January 1963, 
the UN would be free to transfer administration to Indonesia from 1 May if it chose, and 
an act of free choice could be held as late as 1969.  With this final twist of pressure and 
humiliation for the Dutch, all that was left were the formalities. 
 
A Lesson in Power: The Aftermath of the West New Guinea Victory 
 
For the great powers, the issue of sovereignty over West New Guinea was from 
the start about Indonesia’s alignment in the Cold War rather than the merits of respective 
territorial claims or the manner of decolonisation.  The terms on which Indonesia 
obtained control over West New Guinea were far less important to the USA than the fact 
that the transfer occurred without the outbreak of war.  If the Dutch were annoyed, that 
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was bearable compared to the bigger goal of avoiding Indonesia’s drift into the 
Communist camp.  Subandrio admitted Indonesia could not have secured its diplomatic 
victory without US help, so Washington might have even hoped to obtain some small 
measure of gratitude from Jakarta.   
On the other hand, the Soviets stood to gain from continued tension over West 
New Guinea.  They could portray the West New Guinea dispute as a case of Western 
powers uniting to deny the aspirations of newly decolonised states.  If the dispute came to 
a clash of arms, then the Soviet Union would see Indonesia pulled more closely into its 
orbit.  Certainly, Indonesian dependence on Soviet military and economic aid would have 
increased.  The country was already being steadily bankrupted by arms expenditures, 
creating a debilitating cycle in which foreign economic aid was essential to keep the 
economy afloat.  The Soviet Union could feel reasonably confident it was winning the 
contest for influence in Indonesia.  News of the peaceful settlement altered those 
calculations, causing alarm in Moscow.  Its ambassador to Jakarta Nikolai Mikhailov was 
instructed to seek an explanation from Sukarno.  Mikhailov allegedly irritated 
Indonesians with his imperious tone and warnings about falling into an “American 
trap”.71   
The US-brokered settlement of the West New Guinea dispute avoided an 
escalating war between Indonesia and the Netherlands.72  Subandrio had told Robert 
Kennedy in July that war would involve the use of Soviet personnel and weapons and 
could not be restricted to the local area.73  The lesson Indonesian leaders took from the 
West New Guinea campaign was over the value of force in international relations.  
Diplomacy alone, without military pressure, had historically failed to secure Indonesia 
victory.  As Sukarno later recalled in his memoir, the military factor was key to 
convincing the Dutch and the Americans to cede to Indonesian demands. 
 
Always they sneer Sukarno is a big bluffer.  Well, let them see the build-up of 
arms ringing Irian and the ships in the water ready to attack and the 
concentration of troops primed to move at my command.  Let them report 
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Sukarno doesn’t just talk a good game, but that he’s set to go to war.  It was like 
magic.  Immediately the Dutch attitude changed.  Even the United States of 
America began smiling out way.74 
 
Indonesia had pleaded its case diplomatically since 1950 with no success.  The 
acquisition of Soviet armaments enabled dialogue and demarches to be buttressed by 
coercion.  Indonesia could finally give substance to its advocacy of revolutionary 
diplomacy.  This became manifest in the term it used for its policy in West New Guinea – 
Konfrontasi or Confrontation.  This novel addition to the vocabulary of international 
relations obtained its definition through the diplomatic improvisation of Sukarno himself, 
its chief architect.  It represented a new style of passive-aggressive interstate contention, 
employing a mix of “threats, brinkmanship and play-acting, which could be modulated at 
will to a pitch of fierce hostility at one extreme or, at the other, of patient acquiescence 
while waiting for favourable opportunities to resume the long-term struggle…”75  The 
experience left a profound impression on Sukarno.  His contemporary reflection was that 
“national struggle is a matter of strength, a matter of ‘formation and the utilisation of 
power’… and not at all a matter of ‘begging’.”76   
There were lessons for domestic politics too.  Sukarno saw the way he could use 
his decisive victory against the Dutch, without the necessity of fighting a major war, to 
bolster his own position within the Indonesian power structure.  He emerged from the 
West New Guinea settlement with enhanced stature and prestige and a freer hand to 
dictate the terms of the country’s political life.  Even as the West New Guinea 
negotiations haphazardly worked their way to a conclusion, Sukarno had manoeuvred out 
of the way the only national figure capable of presenting any rivalry to his authority, 
army commander Nasution.  A combination of personnel and structural changes to the 
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armed forces ensured the “institutional power of the army was effectively reduced” in 
Sukarno’s favor.77  The principle beneficiary, apart from Sukarno, was the PKI.  The 
army remained hostile to the PKI, but domestic trends were starting to move in a 
direction after the West New Guinea settlement that allowed the party to become more 
active in politics, commensurate with its huge membership base.78   
 By late 1962, Sukarno had been domestically and internationally empowered by 
his West New Guinea victory.  But he faced a momentous choice: should he focus on a 
pressing domestic agenda of economic development or should he harness the 
revolutionary spirit of the West New Guinea campaign to pursue an adventurous 
international policy, especially in opposition to colonialism and imperialism?  The former 
path would bring Indonesia back to the West; the latter path would consolidate the 
inroads made by the communist powers.  The answer Sukarno gave to that question in the 
coming months would shatter any US illusions that West New Guinea would be a turning 
point in a troubled relationship. 
 
Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
At the end of 1961, Sukarno was confident that conditions were right for a 
resolution of Indonesia’s oldest and greatest foreign policy objective.  Indonesia had 
acquired the military capability and cultivated the international relationships to back its 
demands for the transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea with coercion if 
necessary.  Sukarno used these powers to full effect.  His newly-crafted policy of 
Confrontation served to intimidate the Dutch, raise the price of its continued occupation, 
and prise it away from its main Western ally, the USA. 
International conditions were conducive to the effectiveness of this coercive 
diplomacy.  The failure of the Paris Summit, the raising of the Berlin Wall and the Sino-
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Soviet conflict sharpened the competition among the great powers for influence in 
Indonesia.  Both the big communist powers openly supported Indonesia’s claim to West 
New Guinea.  The success of the Belgrade conference to launch the Nonaligned 
Movement had broadened the base of support for Indonesia’s claim.  This made the 
longstanding US policy of neutrality between the Indonesian and Dutch claims, which in 
fact favored the status quo, increasingly untenable.  The death of the obdurate John Foster 
Dulles, the end of the Eisenhower administration, and the arrival of a younger, more 
imaginative, President in Kennedy contributed to a responsive policy climate in 
Washington.  The mentality of US policymakers was to do whatever was necessary to 
prevent Indonesia drifting into the communist camp. 
Certainly, tensions over international security had sharpened since May 1960 after 
the downing of Gary Powers’ U2 had led to the abandonment of the Paris Summit of the 
four nuclear powers.  But growing conflict in Vietnam aside, Indonesia’s immediate 
region caused Jakarta few security anxieties.  Sukarno could pursue his ambitions in 
foreign policy without fearing that he might face a serious external threat.  Moreover, he 
could potentially harness the renewed enthusiasm of the great powers to enlist Indonesia 
as an ally. 
Domestic conditions were conducive to a final resolution of the West New Guinea 
grievance too.  Support for Indonesia’s claims came from across the political spectrum.  
Although the army might have had worries about the dangers and costs of an armed 
solution to the dispute, it could not appear less nationalistic than the rival PKI.  Passions 
had been stirred among the public to the point where war against the Netherlands would 
have been greeted enthusiastically.  Sukarno had been principally responsible for creating 
this fevered mood, despite his claims to being forced along by popular sentiment.  The 
PKI also was beneficiary and instigator of the wave of jingoism that had been inspired by 
Sukarno’s creation of the Trikora and Mandala commands and subsequent military 
manoeuvres.  War might have suited the PKI.  It would have driven a wedge between 
Indonesia and the West, requiring the USA to choose between a NATO ally and the most 
strategically important state in Southeast Asia.  It also would have required the army to 
focus its energies and resources on a tough campaign in Indonesia’s east at a time when it 
still exercised martial law powers that enhanced its authority in domestic politics.  The 
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only downside for the PKI would have been a quick military victory that provided the 
army with even greater stature.  
But newly-acquired military power was the real source of Indonesia’s confidence 
in pressing its claims to West New Guinea.  The rapid growth in the quality and quantity 
of offensive naval and air weapons for the first time gave Indonesia a credible invasion 
force.  Sukarno seized on Indonesia’s status as a regional military power to shift away 
from what he characterised as the beggar diplomacy of bilateral negotiations with the 
Dutch and appeals for UN intervention to an implacable insistence on the unconditional 
surrender of sovereignty.  The anxiety this created in Washington and The Hague, and its 
eventual success in delivering Indonesia its objective, was vindication of the decision 
soon after the advent of Guided Democracy to acquire military firepower.  For the first 
time, Indonesia could inject an element of Realpolitik into its foreign policy.   
In the process, Sukarno weakened the bebas-aktif policy but the results gave him 
all the justification he needed.  Still, the old wariness of dependency on any of the great 
powers remained.  As the level of Soviet equipment and personnel grew, Sukarno kept 
open the dialogue with the USA aimed at finding a political solution to the West New 
Guinea dispute.  He cleverly used American anxiety over the growing closeness of 
Indonesia to the Soviet Union to maximise his leverage.  The threat of explicit alignment 
with the Soviet Union thus put pressure on the USA to work harder to avoid losing 
Indonesia to communism or seeing a country it wanted to befriend going to war with an 
ally it might have to defend.  Indonesia encouraged the USA to believe that a pro-
Western or more strictly neutral orientation to foreign policy was possible if a diplomatic 
solution to the status of West New Guinea could be found.  Sukarno underscored this 
with his desire for a good personal relationship with Kennedy, which he clearly regarded 
as important.  To Khrushchev’s chagrin, Subandrio, with Sukarno’s apparent approval, 
went so far as to brief the USA on Soviet plans to assist Indonesia in the event of war. 
Competitive bidding, therefore, continued to play a critical role in Indonesian 
strategies for obtaining great power support for its foreign policy objectives alongside 
what could be characterised as hiding or hedging to reduce the loss of policy autonomy.  
In trying to draw the USA away from the Netherlands, Indonesia also practiced a 
wedging strategy.  The range of strategies demonstrated Sukarno’s desire to use both 
great power camps to serve his own ends.  For while the Soviet Union was the vital 
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source military aid, the USA held the key to a diplomatic solution.  By playing on US 
fears Indonesia increased the likelihood of winning control of West New Guinea without 
the resort to arms.  The Soviets might have been irked by Indonesia’s persistent habit of 
pitting the great powers against each other, but there was little it could do short of ceding 
ground to the USA.  In the aftermath of the West New Guinea crisis, Indonesia did take 
steps that encouraged the belief it would veer to the West by focusing on economic 
development that followed a US-drafted script.  This was the cause of some annoyance to 
the Soviet Union. 
In all these events, China was left a bystander.  It had been consistently vocal in 
its support of Indonesia’s claim for West New Guinea.  But it had no material 
contribution to make to the outcome.  It looked on as Moscow claimed victory in this 
phase of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the USA won kudos for being the diplomatic 
ringmaster of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty.  Yet the realisation that the Soviets and 
the Americans had gained an advantage in the competition for Indonesian favor added 
impetus to Chinese efforts to restore relations damaged by the bitter affair over residency 
and trading bans on Sino-Indonesians.  In the year after the West New Guinea settlement, 
Beijing would seek to step up campaigns of elite cultivation and propaganda within 
Indonesia in response.  Its eagerness to challenge the position of the rival great powers is 
testament to the effectiveness of how Sukarno constructed the competition. 
In the calculus of balancing risk, Sukarno’s handling of the culmination of the 
West New Guinea campaign highlights the importance of how a prospective gain or loss 
is framed and how risks are assessed.  The enormous significance Indonesia attached to 
wresting control of West New Guinea from the Netherlands meant there was little doubt 
that plans for a full-scale invasion would have been enacted had the Middleberg talks 
failed.  For Indonesia, the status quo represented a loss that was equivalent to foreign 
occupation of its sovereign territory.  It elicited a visceral response from Indonesians of 
all political persuasions that Sukarno later equated to losing a limb.  This meant Sukarno 
was prepared to adopt high-risk policies to meet his objective.   
But even as Sukarno adopted an increasingly belligerent tone, pushing the Dutch 
for concessions after he had secured the essence of victory, the use of armed force was 
always a last resort.  The big risks were to Indonesia’s international relations rather than 
to the regime’s domestic standing.  A war over West New Guinea would have forced 
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Indonesia into dependency on the Soviet Union, pitched Indonesia into a confrontation 
with the West, and might have alienated some of its friends in the Third World, 
especially those close to the USA.  There was the potential for a revival of the kind of 
interference Indonesia had experienced during the regional rebellions.  Most importantly, 
the balancing act Sukarno had been conducting between the communist and Western 
blocs would have been shattered.  Although what Kennedy said to Subandrio at their 
White House meeting on 27 July 1962 is unknown, US threats clearly had a bracing 
effect.  In short, the acquisition of West New Guinea was non-negotiable.  A violent 
solution was an option.  Access to the means of warfare required a close relationship with 
the Soviet Union.  But diplomacy was the wiser course for other than altruistic reasons. 
The episode shows there are benefits to both a rational choice and psychological 
analysis of Sukarno’s decision-making process.  While the above sequence of events can 
be accounted for by calculation of costs and benefits, it is only by grasping the deep 
emotions informing decision-making that it is possible to comprehend the level of risk 
Sukarno was prepared to take.  The incorporation of West New Guinea was central to the 
idea of national identity that Sukarno had crafted in his 1 June 1945 speech in which he 
unveiled the Pancasila.  It’s continued occupation by the Dutch was a manifest loss.  The 
Dutch did not pose a security threat to Indonesia in the conventional sense, despite 
Sukarno’s fanciful attempts to portray the small Dutch garrison as a colonial “sword” 
poised over Indonesia.  It was Indonesia in its attempts to gain control of West New 
Guinea that was posing the only serious threat to regional peace.   
Yet, as already noted, the willingness to adopt hard policies implies risk 
acceptance, not a preference for risk taking.  Sukarno’s ability to adopt a tough line on 
West New Guinea was greatly enhanced by the relatively conducive conditions facing the 
security of the state and regime at the time.  This allowed him to pursue an alignment 
strategy aimed at maintaining policy autonomy – competitive bidding, coupled with 
hiding or hedging – while obtaining the policy objective without the resort to force.  So, 
while Indonesia strengthened its alignment with the Soviet Union to become one of the 
biggest recipients of Soviet military aid, it did not wish to sacrifice policy flexibility or be 
seen to cast its lot with one side of the Cold War.  The alignment policy of Indonesia, 
therefore, was short of explicit balancing, although the military build-up amounted to 
internal balancing. 
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The resolution of the West New Guinea conflict thus lends some support to the 
hypothesis that when the prospect of critical loss is perceived to be high states should 
prefer hard policies, including alignment strategies with firm commitments.  There also is 
some evidence to support the fourth hypothesis that the strength of a state’s balancing 
response escalates in tandem with the prospect of incurring loss, manifesting in a 
tightening of alignment commitments and attempts to grow state power.  If Indonesia’s 
behavior is assessed over a longer period, it is clear that attempts to find a diplomatic 
solution via the UN had generated increasing frustration.  The desire to use military 
power to strengthen Indonesia’s bargaining position over West New Guinea correlates 
closely with perceptions that there was little likelihood of diplomacy succeeding.  In 
other words, the resolution of the West New Guinea conflict was not simply a by-product 
of growing military power, but a primary motivation for the acquisition of that power.  
Covert US support for the regional rebellions also surely provided another strong 
incentive to strengthen state power.  Closer alignment with Soviet Union was the 
indispensable corollary of that activity. 
Less evidence can be found to support the other three hypotheses on aid, ideology 
and transnational penetration.  The strongest evidence can be found in support of aid.  
The necessity to obtain military and economic aid to underwrite the growth of national 
power and prosperity left Indonesian leaders no choice other than to cultivate relations 
with the great powers.  Because of Sukarno’s reluctance to rein in the PKI to the 
satisfaction of the USA and to openly declare himself to be anti-communist, Indonesia 
was forced to rely on the Soviet Union for the bulk of that assistance.  But the generous 
Soviet assistance did not result in Indonesia complying with Soviet preferences.  
Khrushchev admitted his chagrin over way Indonesia continued to engage with the USA 
and reveal Soviet offers to commit to combat operations.  Soviet annoyance was 
compounded when Indonesia agreed to a diplomatic settlement that would ensure at least 
part of the kudos for the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia was shared with the 
USA. 
Even less explanatory weight can be attributed to ideology and transnational 
penetration.  The major ideological theme of Indonesian foreign policy was anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism.  In the early 1960s, it shared that priority with more 
radical states in the Third World and with China.  The Soviet Union supported individual 
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cases of decolonisation or irredentist demands.  But it had no interest in Sukarno’s 
attempts to portray the world as divided between the established industrial states and the 
new developing states.  From the Indonesian perspective, the alignment with the Soviet 
Union was a pragmatic decision to obtain the resources needed to increase national 
power; from the Soviet perspective, it was about gaining a strategic advantage over the 
USA and China.  Likewise, there is little basis on which to attribute any explanatory 
weight to national penetration.  It is not easy to measure the impact of the information 
and propaganda efforts of the great powers, including the blandishments offered to 
Sukarno personally.  In the case of the Soviet Union, the Khrushchev visit and Sukarno’s 
reception in Moscow certainly eased the way for Soviet aid.  But these considerations 
were secondary to the main goal of building the national strength necessary for Indonesia 
to achieve its own foreign policy priorities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Indonesia won control of West New Guinea because for the first time it was 
capable of backing diplomacy with credible military force.  The acquisition of that force 
required an increasingly close alignment with the Soviet Union.  On one level, it 
represented a classic act of internal balancing in which the principle adversary was the 
Netherlands, but memories of the regional rebellions acted as motivation for the military 
expansion too.  The necessity of closer alignment with the Soviet Union to obtain access 
to aid required Indonesia to move away from a strict interpretation of neutrality and the 
bebas-aktif policy.  But on another level Sukarno sought to offset the risk of capture by 
the Soviet Union by persisting with the smart strategy of competitive bidding.  This 
strategy also served to keep alive channels for a diplomatic settlement over West New 
Guinea.   
Underpinning the military build-up and the competitive bidding strategy were 
judgments about risk.  The critical nature of the conflict over West New Guinea meant 
Indonesia was prepared to take exceptional risks to succeed.  But it sought to minimise 
unnecessary risk by keeping its options open for a negotiated outcome and an improved 
relationship with the USA.  This latter prospect would be important if foreign policy was 
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reoriented to support economic development after the objective of incorporating West 
New Guinea was accomplished.   
The pattern of risk taking supported the first hypothesis that the prospect of 
critical losses would encourage risk taking and strong alignment commitments.  But the 
experience also demonstrated that the use of alignment strategies was not mutually 
exclusive.  Internal balancing and competitive bidding were used in tandem to mitigate 
the risk of pursuing an uncompromising approach to the takeover of West New Guinea.  
In this, Indonesia was undoubtedly assisted by relatively benign domestic and 
international conditions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
  
Confronting Malaysia 
 
 The Sukarno years reached a climatic point between 1963 and 1965.  Flushed by 
the victory to claim West New Guinea, Sukarno faced a choice between diverting his 
ebullient energy to arguably the biggest national challenge – the parlous state of the 
economy – or to the pursuit of further foreign policy adventures.  Since the advent of 
Guided Democracy, Sukarno had gained stature as a world figure, particularly among 
Nonaligned and Asia-Africa states.  Foreign policy was a field that gave him the kind of 
grand platform he most enjoyed.  Not surprisingly, he chose the latter path. 
More by circumstance than design, Sukarno took Indonesia on an ill-fated venture 
to defeat the creation of a new state of Malaysia to be formed out of the remnants of 
Britain’s Southeast Asian empire.  This chapter charts the diplomacy and military actions 
that gave the policy of Confrontation, developed in the campaign over West New Guinea, 
its fullest expression.  It describes the events leading up to Indonesia’s decision to oppose 
Malaysia and depart from an American-drafted script to stabilise the economy.  It outlines 
how Confrontation evolved as a diplomatic and military practice and the events leading to 
a fundamental rupture in relations with the West.  It then provides an account of Indonesia’s 
gradual entry into a “symbolic alliance” with China. 
The chapter argues that Sukarno attempted to maintain policy autonomy and 
maximise benefits to the state by persisting with the strategy of competitive bidding 
between the great powers.  But after Confrontation against Malaysia was launched, and as 
the stakes in the conflict grew, Indonesia was drawn into a policy of hard balancing.  In the 
absence of support from other great powers and nonaligned states, Sukarno turned to China 
in an alignment made for pragmatic reasons, but which he characterised as a natural 
ideological fit. Although explicitly aligning with China was a potentially dangerous move 
for both international and domestic reasons, Sukarno by then had invested so much in 
Confrontation that any alignment that might help him obtain his objectives in opposing 
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Malaysia was deemed worth the risk.  The pattern of alignment was consistent with 
predictions of a hardening of alignment posture in tandem with the prospect of incurring 
critical losses. 
 
Opening Salvos  
 
Confrontation: The Search for Motive 
 
Within months of the West New Guinea settlement, it was apparent that the 
proponents of economic repair and regeneration would encounter a serious challenge from 
those who stood to gain from the path of revolutionary diplomacy.  Sukarno himself 
appeared to drift between those two poles.  But eventually it would be the revolutionary 
road that would win, dictating the most fundamental shift in the orientation of Indonesian 
foreign policy and its alignment since independence.  This shift would profoundly affect 
the course of domestic as well as international politics and, in many ways, determine the 
fate of Sukarno’s leadership. 
The catalyst for a further shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy away from its declared 
neutrality was the decision by Malaya and Britain to create the independent state of 
Malaysia, encompassing Malaya – independent since 1957 – and the British colonial 
remnants of Singapore, North Borneo1, Sarawak and the sultanate of Brunei.  Indonesia 
rejected this formulation, although it followed a similar logical pattern to the creation of 
the Indonesian state itself.2  
No single foreign policy event in the 20 years of crisis that followed Indonesia’s 
declaration of independence would have more effect on its patterns of alignment.  It 
sharpened ideas about the uses of alignment and the nature of international politics that had 
been forming in Sukarno’s mind since the late 1950s.  It allowed for the extension of 
                                                
1 North Borneo was later renamed Sabah Province. 
2 While it could be argued the Malay and Chinese inhabitants of the peninsula had little 
ethnographically in common with the inhabitants of the northern Borneo territories, they could be 
hardly less different in those terms than the Papuans from the rest of Indonesia.  There was also a 
substantial Chinese population already resident in Sarawak and North Borneo.  The commonality 
between the formation of Indonesia and Malaysia is that they followed pre-existing colonial 
borders. 
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concepts he had trialled during the West New Guinea campaign.  It led to the final 
abandonment in practice of the bebas-aktif policy.  It recast, at least for Sukarno, the 
meaning of nonalignment.  And it produced a clearer understanding of Indonesia’s place 
in the world, of the nature and limits of state power, and of how state power could be 
applied.  But it also exposed the cleavages in the political elite over the broad conduct of 
Indonesia’s international relations. 
Plans to create Malaysia out of the disparate pieces of British colonial property on 
the Malay Peninsula and Borneo began to take shape from May 1961.  In a speech in 
Singapore, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, acknowledged the 
possibility of an eventual “understanding” between Malaya, Britain and its remaining 
colonies in the area.3  The Tunku had initially been wary of the idea of a merger of these 
territories.  His reticence was overcome when a sharp rise in communist activity in 
Singapore evinced fears over the emergence of a “Chinese Cuba” on Malaya’s doorstep.4  
During the course of that year, the idea of Malaysia gathered momentum to the point where 
a definite date was set for it to be founded – 31 August 1963. 
 At first, Indonesia appeared sanguine at the prospect of a new, and relatively large, 
neighbor, comprising lands that it regarded as “ethnologically and geographically” closer 
to it than Malaya.  Subandrio told the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1961:   
 
We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East 
Indies, though they are of the same island, but – more than that – when Malaya 
told us of its intentions to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of 
Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that 
we had no objections and that we wished them success…5 
 
The circumstances of Subandrio’s speech were not suited to an expression of 
sincere opinion.  He then was campaigning for Indonesia’s claim to West New Guinea and 
anxious to convince doubters of “Indonesia’s honesty and lack of expansionist intent”.6  In 
                                                
3 Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 38-41.  
4 Ibid., p. 38. 
5 Quoted in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “The Troubled Birth of Malaysia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, 
No. 4 (1963), p. 683. 
6 Ibid.  Letter published in The New York Times on 13 November 1961. 
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fact, Indonesians had long harbored misgivings about British plans for the future of its 
colonies in maritime Southeast Asia.  Mohammad Hatta claimed he had argued against 
Malaysia as far back as November 1949 during a dinner in Johore Baru with the British 
High Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald. Hatta then feared the high 
proportion of Chinese in the British colonies, and their relative economic success compared 
to Malays, would see any new state combining the colonies become “a second China, 
dominated both politically and economically by the Chinese”.7  Hatta said that as Prime 
Minister he had ordered his diplomats to lobby for the formation of three separate states as 
“one of the most important aspects of our Government’s foreign policy”.8   
The Tunku understood Indonesian misgivings. From the time Malaya achieved 
independence in 1957, it had acted to assert Malay dominance of local politics and assuage 
concern over its strategic role in the region.  Malaya had avoided following Britain into 
SEATO despite relying on the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement as the main pillar of its 
external security.  Under a revised defence agreement covering Malaysia, the Tunku had 
extracted a commitment from Britain not to use its bases at Singapore for SEATO 
purposes.9  Then again, Indonesia was unlikely to be comfortable with the way Malaysia’s 
defence arrangements would entrench Britain’s presence in Singapore, especially in 
consequence of the role played by British personnel and facilities there during the regional 
rebellions of 1958.  And, despite pledges from Kuala Lumpur to practice foreign policy 
independence, the Tunku’s government was firmly anti-communist.10 
Despite a mix of recent and longstanding reasons for apprehension in Indonesia 
about uniting the Malay peninsula and the Borneo territories, there was little inkling the 
                                                
7 Mohammad Hatta, “One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue”, Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3 
(1965), p. 140.  According to Hatta, MacDonald revealed the British preference was for one state 
rather than three. 
8 Ibid., p. 141. 
9 For Malaya’s objections to SEATO, see for example London Talks: Minutes of the First Meeting 
Held at Admiralty House at 11 a.m. with Mr. Macmillan in the Chair, 20 November 1961, British 
Documents on the End of Empire, “Malaysia”, A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Series B, Vol. 8, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London: TSO (2004), document 79, pp. 245-249. 
10 With the aid of British forces, Malaya had recently defeated a 12-year communist insurgency – 
a victory presumably welcome to the Indonesian army and fellow anti-communists, but sure to earn 
the enmity of the PKI and its numerous supporters. See, R. W. Komer, “The Malayan Emergency 
in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort”, Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, R-957, Santa Monica, CA: Rand (1972). 
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creation of Malaysia might cause serious trouble until the end of 1962.  The situation 
changed with an incident on 8 December in the Sultanate of Brunei.  Armed supporters of 
the Brunei People’s Party (Partai Rakyat), led by its left-leaning chairman A.M. Azahari, 
staged a revolt aimed at creating an independent state of North Borneo, with the Sultan of 
Brunei as its constitutional monarch.  On the surface, it was Lilliputian rebellion, rapidly 
suppressed by British forces.  But the failed uprising evoked sympathy in Indonesia for 
what was depicted as a native rebellion against colonial authority.  Leftist and nationalist 
groups staged mass rallies, portraying the Malaysia project as a neo-colonialist exercise, 
contrary the wishes of the people. 
At a governmental level, the build-up of sentiment in Indonesia in support of the 
rebellion crystallised with a statement from Subandrio on 20 January that Indonesia would 
“adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaya” because it was acting as an agent of “neo-
imperialism and neo-colonialism”.11  This was the first hint that Indonesia might try to 
replicate the type of pressure tactics employed in the West New Guinea campaign.  But at 
that stage, Subandrio’s statement, coming in response to vague Malayan claims that 
Indonesia had actively assisted Azahari, reflected Indonesian indignation more than a fully, 
or even partially, elaborated policy.  Indeed, contemporary observers found it hard to define 
exactly what policy Indonesia was pursuing over Malaysia such were the ambiguities.12  
In the first months of 1962, the consensus in Washington was that Sukarno 
remained committed to restructuring the economy, or at least there was an overwhelming 
desire to believe he would.  Officials clung to this position even as Sukarno gradually 
ratcheted up public criticism of the Tunku’s plans.  In early January 1963, British diplomats 
in Jakarta delivered a demarche over Sukarno’s remarks at a rally that Indonesians who did 
not support the rebels in Brunei were “traitors to their own souls”.13  Yet while the British 
became increasingly agitated over the potential for Indonesia to complicate their 
                                                
11 Matthew Jones, Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United 
States, Indonesia and the creation of Malaysia, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
(2002), p. 126. 
12 Donald Hindley, “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives”, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 4, No. 6 (1964), pp. 904-913. 
13 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 124. 
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decolonisation and exit plans in Southeast Asia, the Americans were determined to stick to 
the policy of economic collaboration with Indonesia.  
The reluctance to alienate Indonesia was evident from the hostility that Kennedy’s 
circle of national security advisers exhibited to anyone who doubted the country was 
sincere in carrying out economic reform and who proposed a tough response to the 
emerging policy of Confrontation.  The influential Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, Averell Harriman, literally “blew up” when he read a paper prepared for RAND 
Corporation by Guy Pauker, a renowned scholar of Indonesia.  Pauker had warned the 
continued Soviet-sponsored build-up of Indonesia’s military strengthened the PKI and 
contributed to expansionist tendencies.  He had advocated the USA take a tough line in 
resisting Indonesian attempts to speed up the transfer of administration in West New 
Guinea and in preventing what he feared would be an attempt to absorb Malaya, the Borneo 
territories and Portuguese Timor.14  
Despite the hostility such ideas evoked, the suspicion that the acquisition of West 
New Guinea had not entirely sated Indonesia’s appetite for territory was widespread at the 
time. US intelligence sources detected preparations in late 1962 and early 1963, after the 
settlement of the West New Guinea issue, for an invasion and takeover of the small 
Portuguese outpost on the island of Timor, half of which belonged to Indonesia.  A memo 
to Harriman in February 1963 informed him: “We are aware of the fact that they are 
undertaking certain preparatory measures directed against Portuguese Timor… While it 
appears that the Indonesians have not yet decided upon a timetable of action, intelligence 
reports and Indonesian actions during the last year indicate that preparations are in an active 
state.”15  Some years later, Nasution and Roselan Abdulgani confirmed a proposal for an 
invasion had been drawn up by army commander Yani and taken to cabinet on 16 August 
1962, the day after the agreement to transfer West New Guinea was announced.  Sukarno 
had rejected the idea because he had no intention of giving himself “a headache similar to 
                                                
14 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 16 January 1963, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-
1963, document 300. 
15 Memorandum from Rostow to Harriman, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, 5 February 1963, 
the NSA, George Washington University, pp. 6-7.  Accessed at 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/423.pdf  
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the one caused by West Irian”.16  More plausibly, he was not then ready to risk another 
major clash with the Western powers for a prize of dubious merit.17 
Regardless of whether Indonesia then actually harbored any ambitions to takeover 
Portuguese Timor, one Indonesian army officer expressed his views on how such a 
territorial incorporation could be managed without the resort to force.  “If the people of 
Timor today or tomorrow started a revolution… we would support them… After 
independence, if they want to stay independent, fine… If they want to join Indonesia, we 
will talk it over.”18  Although Indonesia persistently denied territorial ambitions, there was 
a suspicion that this kind of formula might also be applied to the British Borneo territories.  
That was certainly the view of the British Foreign Office.  Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign 
Secretary, believed Sukarno's “ultimate objective” was to “round off his empire” by 
absorbing the three British Borneo territories.19  
Related to the depiction of Indonesia as an expansionist state was the idea it sought 
strategic primacy in Southeast Asia, making it a potential rival to Western powers.  One 
US intelligence estimate on 20 February, concluded the “real motives” for Sukarno's anti-
Malaysia position were probably “a desire to extend hegemony over Malay peoples and 
advance his ambitions for great power status”.20  
One of the reasons for the proliferation of concerns that Indonesia harbored 
expansionist aims or sought hegemony in Southeast Asia was the ambiguity of its motives 
                                                
16 Bilveer Singh, “Soviet-Indonesian Relations, 1945-1968”, unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Canberra: Australian National University (August 1986), pp. 207-208. 
17 After the Indian action in Goa, it was tempting to see Portuguese Timor as a scrappy loose end 
to the task of securing Indonesia’s borders.  US intelligence believed invasion preparations 
continued despite Sukarno’s purported reaction in Cabinet. See, Memorandum from Rostow to 
Harriman, “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor”, pp. 3-4. 
18 Quoted in Bernard K. Gordon, “The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism”, Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 36, No. 4 (winter 1963-1964), p. 392. Brig. General Mokoginta made the comment in an 
interview with The Washington Post reporter Warren Una, published 10 May 1963. 
19 Telegram from Lord Home to Theophilus Peters, British charge in Manila, 2 August 1963, 
Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire, document 202, p. 543. 
20 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 54/59-63, 20 February 1963, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 
1961-1963, document 330.  As was common with formal intelligence advice to the President the 
Central Intelligence Agency; the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defence, 
the Army, and the Air Force; and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of 
the estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred with it with the exception of 
the Representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation who 
abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 
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for opposing Malaysia.  But there were other compelling explanations for Indonesia’s 
behavior beyond the desires to acquire territory, of which it had ample quantities at a time 
when the population numbered 92.5 million, or to dictate the foreign policy of its 
neighbors.  Confrontation could be easily ascribed to a combination of other interconnected 
international and domestic perceptions and realities.   
At the international level, it could be argued that Indonesia saw the creation of 
Malaysia as a threat to its external security.  It also could be argued Indonesia was 
motivated by a genuine philosophical-ideological belief that Malaysia was not a 
manifestation of true independence, but an exercise in neo-colonialism and a means for 
Britain to continue to exert military and economic power in the region.  At the domestic 
level, the launch of another foreign adventure was a fillip to popular morale at a time of 
increasing economic hardship.  He also could use it as a tool of internal power management 
to direct the energies of the political forces arrayed around him and restrain the intense 
competition between them, especially the army and the PKI.  From a personal perspective, 
the waging of an inspirational international campaign enhanced Sukarno’s prestige at home 
and abroad, and contributed to a sense of national pride.21 
 In all likelihood, each of the popular international and domestic theories explains 
the beliefs of different actors at different times.  The record suggests the motives of the key 
actors – principally Sukarno – evolved as the crisis over Malaysia dragged on.  From their 
public and private statements and actions, it becomes increasingly hard to disentangle 
individual motives, which might serve as a guide to behavior.  Indonesia’s policy looks 
less a reflection of a master narrative and more an example of improvisation and 
opportunism.   
 Of the above explanations for Indonesia’s decision to oppose the joint British-
Malay scheme for decolonisation, it is worth considering the idea of Malaysia-as-threat in 
somewhat more detail.  Whether or not Indonesian policymakers genuinely perceived a 
threat, or simply played on the theme of threat as a convenient means of justifying their 
actions, threat in various guises litters the discourse of the time.  Less than a month after 
Subandrio first suggested Indonesia might invoke a policy of confrontation, Sukarno told 
                                                
21 In canvassing the numerous motives asserted from Confrontation, Mackie identified three 
categorises of theory – “expansionist, diversionist and ideological”.  Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 326. 
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a rally in Jakarta that the country was “being encircled” and added his voice to the calls for 
confrontation against Malaysia.”22   
If there were genuine fears for Indonesian security, the persistence of British bases 
under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was likely to be taken as proof that 
colonial institutions could outlive a formal transfer of sovereignty.  As Jamie Mackie saw 
it, the idea of encirclement was potentially authenticated by the activities of “the Americans 
with their bases in the Philippines and the Australians, who were allowing the British V-
bombers to use Darwin.”23  This was one dimension of threat; more commonly threat was 
viewed in political and ideological terms as a struggle against “interference, intervention, 
sabotage, and subversion”.24 
Indeed, Indonesia had ample experience of the threat from within.  There also was 
the risk that Malaysia would become a beacon for Indonesians disaffected with Sukarno’s 
revolutionary road.  Malaya was already outperforming Indonesia economically and this 
success might have provided the basis for some uncomfortable comparisons with the 
performance of Guided Democracy.  Malaya's deputy prime minister and foreign minister 
Tun Abdul Razak told Kennedy at a meeting at the White House in late April that Malaya's 
relative success in creating national prosperity was a “blow to Indonesian pride”.25   
Hatta’s earlier warnings about Malaysia also pointed to the wide range of threat 
perceptions.  Hatta’s worries about a “second China” reflected Indonesia’s own difficulties 
in managing relations between the pribumi and the ethnic Chinese.  Hatta believed a 
Malaysia dominated from within by its Chinese “would probably become an accomplice 
and an ally of mainland China, since it was well known that expatriate Chinese customarily 
maintain a strong feeling of kinship with their home country”.26  Regardless of whether 
China did harbor ambitions for influence in the area, in Hatta's conception the basis of the 
                                                
22 Modelski, New Emerging Forces, pp. 74-75.  The speech was made to the opening of the 
conference of National Front committees on 13 February 1963. In another example of the threat 
narrative, Nasution described Malaysia as a “direct threat” in speeches while touring the border 
regions in Kalimantan.  Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 156. 
23 Ibid., p. 205. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Memorandum of Conversation, Tun Adbul Razak and President Kennedy, 23 April 1963, FRUS, 
Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 331. 
26 Hatta, “One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue”, pp. 140-141. 
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Malaysian state, and how it allied itself, was not just a matter of high politics between 
states.  It also had implications for Indonesia’s internal security and stability.  
 
President for Life, Sukarno Weighs His Options 
 
In the early months of 1963, Sukarno appeared uncertain about how vigorously he 
wanted to prosecute the case against Malaysia.  He conducted an awkward balancing act 
between placating anti-Malaysia sentiment within Indonesia and adhering to the demands 
of economic reform.  To satisfy the opponents of Malaysia, he engaged in niggling gestures 
against Kuala Lumpur and sardonic commentary on the Tunku.  Malayan delegates were 
excluded at Indonesia’s behest from some minor Asia-Africa events.  The first serious 
probe by armed Indonesian “volunteers” across the border into Sarawak came near the 
Tebedu checkpoint in April.  But Sukarno simultaneously laid the foundation for economic 
stabilisation measures that would have a harsh effect on his political base.  On 28 March, 
he unveiled an Economic Declaration, or Dekon, to provide a “legal and moral” basis for 
economic policy.27  Then, on 26 May first minister Djuanda released a series of economic 
regulations that followed an International Monetary Fund (IMF) formula for austerity 
measures aimed at tackling runaway inflation.28   
The effect of the IMF program was to reduce subsidies and force up the price of 
many basic goods and services.  From the perspective of international relations, the 
significance of economic stabilisation was to make Indonesia more dependent on Western 
sources of capital.  The IMF and Western donors were ready to offer substantial assistance 
to Indonesia, but on the condition the government would focus on economic rather than 
foreign policy priorities.29 
                                                
27 Farabi Fakih, “The Rise of the Managerial State in Indonesia: Institutional Transition During the 
Early Independence Period”, unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden University (2014), p. 312.  As Fakih 
points out, the political effectiveness of the Dekon was undermined by compromises designed to 
satisfy Sukarno’s ideal of a NASAKOM coalition.  The PKI found enough of its own ideas in the 
document to later accuse economic technocrats of straying from Sukarno’s principles. 
28 Annual inflation never dropped below 100 percent in the final years of Guided Democracy.  
Between 1961 and 1966, food prices increased 40 times, causing enormous hardship to the 
population. See ibid. p. 316. 
29 Ibid. p. 328.  For a detailed account of prevailing economic conditions and the measures in the 
26 May regulations see ibid, pp. 311-349. 
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Preoccupied with managing the domestic politics of a painful economic adjustment, 
Sukarno at first appeared to follow the West's preferred script.  He cautiously embraced a 
Philippines initiative in March for the Malaysia question to be addressed in officials’ talks 
under the umbrella of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).30  Kuala Lumpur, wary of 
being forced into concessions over its timetable for unifying the three regions, was 
tentative, but convinced to participate in part by the desire to clarify why Indonesia was 
objecting to Malaysia.  An ASA conference on 4 April set in motion a series of conferences 
under the umbrella of the three ethnic Malay states – a so-called Maphilindo grouping.  The 
Philippines had its own interests in the creation of Malaysia.  It maintained a historic claim 
to the territory of Sabah, administration over which the Sultan of Sulu had ceded to the 
British North Borneo Company in 1878.31 
Although the 4 April conference skirted the issue of Malaysia, it succeeded in 
creating a pathway to a peaceful settlement.  Senior officials from the Maphilindo states 
were to meet again within days, to be followed a month later by their foreign ministers.  
Still, the ambiguities typical of Indonesian foreign policy at this time persisted: a week 
later the incursion at Tebedu occurred and within the month, during a visit to Indonesia by 
Chinese President Liu Shao chi, Sukarno rehearsed a stridently anti-Malaysia position to a 
public rally.  Indonesia followed this with a request for a delay in the foreign ministers' 
talks from mid-May to early June, leaving in doubt whether any meeting would be held. 
Then, as if to underscore the mercurial character of Indonesian policy, Sukarno just 
as abruptly softened his public approach to the Tunku to coincide with the release of the 
26 May economic regulations, inviting the prime minister to a meeting in Tokyo.32  In the 
convivial climate of Japan's late Spring, the pair resolved to press ahead with the foreign 
ministers’ meeting between 7 and 11 June as a prelude to a possible summit of heads of 
government.  The sudden shift in Sukarno’s attitude was confirmed by a decision to resolve 
                                                
30 The ASA was an initiative of the Tunku.  Between 1961 and 1963, Malay, Thailand and the 
Philippines enlisted to the organization.  See Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in 
Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 2nd. Ed, Singapore: ISEAS (2010), p. 73. 
31 The Philippines believed sovereignty should revert to it as the successor state to the sultanate 
once Britain relinquished rights held by the company.  See ibid, p. 138. 
32 Sukarno and the Tunku met on 31 May and 1 June. 
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a long-running dispute with the USA over the treatment of oil companies operating in 
Indonesia.33 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that at this point Sukarno's decision making was 
mostly tactical, short-term and based on maximising his room to manoeuvre within the 
shifting confluence of domestic and international affairs.  And yet the evident progress on 
a solution to the Malaysia dispute and the rights of foreign oil companies produced the 
hope, if not absolute conviction, that Indonesia had turned a corner and was ready to tackle 
its manifold economic problems in earnest.  The ardent Washington advocates of 
engagement with Indonesia could point to real evidence that after years of turmoil, 
Indonesia was finally getting its house in order.  During May 1963, Indonesia also finally 
ended seven years of martial law, internal order having been restored by the army a year 
earlier.  The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) commemorated the formal transfer of 
administration over West New Guinea.34  And, in a burst of gratitude, the MPR declared 
Sukarno President for life. 
The Maphilindo diplomacy was to produce some dividends.  It generated optimism 
that differences could be managed, and Malaysia brought into existence, in a manner that 
addressed Indonesia’s objections.  The foreign minister’s talks in Manila in June carried 
forward the momentum from Tokyo, confirming “complete agreement” on four key aspects 
of the Malaysia problem.35  First, the ministers agreed the three countries should share 
primary responsibility for maintenance of stability and security in the region to keep it free 
from subversion - an apparent concession to Indonesian concerns over the alliances Malaya 
had with Britain and the Philippines had with the USA.  Second, they agreed to explore 
Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal's plan for the Malay states to form the 
                                                
33 Memorandum from Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President 
Kennedy, 10 June 1963, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 309. This document describes 
the successful outcome of negotiations in Tokyo on 29 May between Sukarno and Wilson W. 
Wyatt, Kennedy’s envoy on the issue. 
34 Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 166.  Martial law, referred to as a “state of war and siege”, lasted 
from March 1957 until May 1963.  Its end came with the defeat of the Darul Islam, the PRRI-
Permesta rebellions and the Republic of South Malacca (RMS) rebellion.  Sukarno had declared 
the previous August that the end of internal security challenges and the victory over West New 
Guinea enabled him to focus on economic problems. 
35 Government of Indonesia, “Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made ‘Malaysia’”, Jakarta: 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, (September 1964), p. 33. 
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Maphilindo organisation.  Third, they agreed the Philippines claim to Sabah should not be 
prejudiced by acquiescence to the formation of Malaysia.  Fourth, they agreed on the 
principle of self-determination, although what that exactly meant was open to interpretation 
by all the parties.  It was Malaya’s commitment to ensure the views of the people of North 
Borneo were “ascertained by an independent and impartial authority” that had enabled 
Indonesia and the Philippines to hold out the prospect “they would welcome the formation 
of Malaysia”.36  But the foreign ministers agreed to leave the details of how local opinion 
would be assessed to a summit of leaders to be held in Manila by the end of July.   
The manner of determining the opinion of the residents of the Borneo territories, 
and its bearing on the eventual outcome, was to become a source of furious disagreement 
between the signatories to the Manila Accord.  Britain was determined to adhere to a tight 
timetable for the establishment of Malaysia.  It was clear both London and Kuala Lumpur 
regarded the mention of self-determination in the Manila Accord as no more than a 
perfunctory obligation.  A month after reaching a comfortingly vague agreement in Manila 
on the form of popular consultation, the Tunku went to London where the British and 
Malay governments reaffirmed their intention to found Malaysia on 31 August and to 
extend the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement to the new state.  The so-called London 
agreement immediately drew a hostile reaction from Indonesia.  On 10 July, a day after it 
was signed by the Tunku and Prime Minister Harold Macmillian, Sukarno launched into 
another tirade, disparaging the Malay Prime Minister as a man who did not keep his word.37  
The plan for a leaders’ summit looked increasingly in doubt.   
In a later analysis, the Indonesian government accused the British of interference 
in the negotiations, which resulted in the “spectacle of agreements reached in good faith 
being broken almost before the ink was dry on the signatures”.38  But, for the Indonesians, 
there was another, likely bigger, reason to object to the London agreement.  Article VI gave 
Britain the right to use its Singapore bases, as it “may consider necessary for the purpose 
of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the 
                                                
36 For the full text of the accord, see ibid., Manila Accord, Annex I, pp. 121-124. 
37 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 154. 
38 Government of Indonesia, “Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made ‘Malaysia’”, p. 34. 
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preservation of peace in Southeast Asia”.39  The wording eliminated a requirement of the 
1957 Anglo-Malay Defence Agreement to seek the consent of the host government to 
deploy British forces.  This virtually unfettered right to use the Singapore bases, and a self-
appointed remit to preserve the peace in Southeast Asia, was accompanied by an appendix 
to the London agreement that gave Britain 999-year leases over several of its navy, air and 
army facilities.40   
It was acknowledged in London that the military and strategic imperatives behind 
the creation of Malaysia far outweighed other determinants.  A paper prepared for the 
British cabinet in early 1963 found it “inescapable that our defence expenditure in the Far 
East is now out of all proportion to our economic stake there”.41  Still, Britain regarded the 
maintenance of its Singapore bases as “vital to the discharge” of all its formal and informal 
alliance obligations in the region, including SEATO, the defence of Malaya, the forward 
defence of Australia and New Zealand and the defence of Hong Kong and other remaining 
colonies.42  It also regarded its ability to exercise influence over the policies of the USA in 
Asia as inexorably linked to the presence of British forces in Singapore; a case of showing 
“we are sharing the load”.43  And it had come to the conclusion that Malaysia offered not 
only the best means of ensuring a viable future for Singapore and the North Borneo 
territories, but also “the best prospect of keeping our base”.44 
It therefore should have come as no surprise that one of the principal criticisms 
Indonesians levelled at Malaysia was the nature of the new Anglo-Malay defence 
arrangements.  The extraordinary thousand-year leases on the bases and the freedom of 
action granted to Britain in their use, presumably in support of SEATO, permitted 
Indonesia to claim, with some justification, that Malaysia was a “British neo-colonialist 
                                                
39 “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, 
North Borneo and Singapore, Agreement Relating to Malaysia”, London, 9 July 1963, United 
Nations Treaty Series, (1970), accessed on 5 February 2016 at  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20750/volume-750-i-10760-english.pdf 
40 Ibid., pp. 193-206.  
41 “Defence of the Far East about 1970”, memorandum from Sir Arthur Snelling to Cabinet Oversea 
Coordinating Committee, 19 March 1963, Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire, 
document 166, p. 459. 
42 Ibid., p. 462. 
43 Ibid., p. 460. 
44 Ibid., p. 462. 
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project”.45  Having fought a revolution against colonialism, it was certainly an affront that 
a fading colonial power should reserve for itself the role of policeman.  Whether Indonesia 
sought territorial aggrandisement or regional hegemony, as many Britons and Americans 
thought, it seems clear that it expected at the very least to assume a leadership role for the 
Malay or littoral states of Southeast Asia. 
 The irony of Indonesian hostility to the creation of Malaysia was that it provoked 
Britain to redouble its military commitment to Southeast Asia just as pressures were 
mounting to reduce the size of the deployment east of Suez.  The growing cost of 
maintaining in Singapore a force equal to one quarter of Britain's total military strength 
raised inevitable questions over the economic or strategic value of such a large deployment 
so far from home.  According to a review presented to the British Cabinet in March 1963, 
there were strong doubts “expressed by the Prime Minister, Ministers and officials about 
the whole scale of our defence effort in the Far East”.46  
Confrontation presented Britain with a “second front” in Southeast Asia, which 
required a military response and drew its attention away from containing communist 
China.47  Whitehall believed Britain needed to concentrate on containing Indonesia, while 
the USA assumed that responsibility in relation to communist China.  It certainly suited 
the USA to leave Britain to handle Indonesia’s opposition to Malaysia.  Dean Rusk, the 
Secretary of State, had told Lord Home during SEATO talks in Paris on 7 April that the 
problem of Indonesia’s attitude to Malaysia was something for Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand to handle.  The USA wanted to “take a back seat” – a position some high-ranking 
British officials found “disappointingly negative”.48 
 
 
 
 
                                                
45 Government of Indonesia, “Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made ‘Malaysia’”, p. 23.  
46  Defence in the Far East about 1970: Memorandum by Sir A. Snelling for the Official Oversea 
Coordinating Committee, 19 March 1963, Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire, 
document 166, pp. 459-460. 
47 “‘Future Defence of Malaysia’: Minute from Lord Home to Mr. Macmillan”, 16 April 1963, 
ibid., document 169, p. 478. 
48 Ibid., p. 477. 
 269 
Black September: The Failure of Maphilindo Diplomacy 
 
 It was against the backdrop of British concern over the implications of its military 
commitments to Malaysia, deep mutual suspicion of the motives of the respective parties, 
and the complexities of regional alliance politics, that the Maphilindo leaders were to meet 
in Manila to resolve their differences over acceptable terms for the formation of Malaysia.  
But a firm British conviction that there was no alternative for the future of its Borneo 
colonies than to federate with Malaya, and a belief that any delay to the formation of the 
federation could jeopardise the whole project, left the Tunku limited room to negotiate.49  
British disinterest in Indonesia’s views on when or if Malaysia would be formed were 
clearly signalled by the decision to designate 31 August as “Malaysia Day” in the London 
agreement.  Predictably, Indonesia regarded this as an act of “bad faith”, which negated the 
results of the earlier foreign minister’s meeting.50 
 Nonetheless, after considerable uncertainty, Sukarno agreed to attend the leaders’ 
summit between 30 July and 5 August.  Over the course of that week, Sukarno, the Tunku 
and Macapagal were to flesh out several agreements.  The central issue was how to satisfy 
Indonesia’s demand for self-determination.  The Tunku had the task of winning agreement 
to a mechanism for ascertaining the opinion of the peoples of the Borneo territories that 
did not entail either a plebiscite or a referendum.  The debates among the three leaders on 
the matter of Bornean opinion were rancorous and only resolved after frantic negotiations 
with UN Secretary General U Thant.  The eventual agreement was founded on a simple 
trade off:  the Tunku agreed to a short delay in the declaration of the Malaysian federation 
in exchange for Indonesia dropping demands for a ballot of Bornean citizens. 
The delay of Malaysia Day deeply perturbed Whitehall.51  But it was grudgingly 
accepted as a gesture to show allies and the UN – not Indonesia – that Britain was being 
                                                
49 Britain’s reasons for wanting to avoid delays in creating Malaysia had more to do with internal 
tensions within the states of the proposed federation than with Indonesian hostility.  As early as 
December 1961, Colonial Office officials had urged Malaysia “should not be prolonged a day 
longer than is absolutely necessary”.  See, Letter from Lord Selkirk to Macmillian, ibid., document 
87, p. 264. 
50 Government of Indonesia, “Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made ‘Malaysia’”, p. 34. 
51 For British objections to any delay in the formation of Malaysia, see Manila Summit: Cabinet 
Conclusions, Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire, document 200, pp. 541-542. 
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reasonable.  While the summit was underway, Kennedy had sent a telegram to Macmillan 
urging him to agree to briefly postpone Malaysia Day to avoid the collapse of the talks, 
despite recognising that “kow-towing to Sukarno is a risky enterprise”.52  Britain had no 
intention of deviating from plans to form Malaysia regardless of what others judged 
Bornean opinion to be.  Fortunately for Britain and Malaya, Indonesia had agreed to a 
formula that simply required U Thant to verify that local council elections held in North 
Borneo and Sarawak in late 1962 and early 1963 were free and fair and a reflection of the 
desire of voters to federate with Malaya.  U Thant confirmed that UN teams could carry 
out the assessment before mid-September.53 
The flaws in the Manila compromise were soon revealed.54  The UN ascertainment 
of Bornean opinion proceeded against a backdrop of squabbling over the size and activities 
of observer delegations.  It was also marred by evidence that Britain and Malaya were 
determined to create Malaysia regardless of what the UN mission uncovered.  The Tunku 
made the irrevocability of the Malaysia plan patently clear to the Colonial Office soon after 
the signing of the Manila agreements, conveying his “absolutely firm undertaking” to 
proceed on “whatever later date may now be agreed” with London.  His own preference 
was to declare Malaysia on 16 September “irrespective of the nature of the (UN) Secretary 
General report”.55  An amendment was duly made to the London agreements and signed in 
Singapore by representatives from Britain, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak 
on 28 August.   Surprisingly, this provocative act did not immediately elicit protests from 
Jakarta, but it did later.56 
                                                
52 Telegram from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, 3 August 1963, FRUS, Vol. 
XXIII, 1961-1963, document 333. 
53 For an account of the debate over Bornean self-determination in Manila, see Mackie, 
Konfrontasi, pp. 157-165.  For details of local elections and politics in North Borneo (Sabah) and 
Sarawak, see ibid., 61-76. 
54 A full text of thre agreement can be found at, “Philippines, Federation of Malaya and Indonesia, 
Joint Statement”, Manila, 5 August 1963, United Nations Treaty Series, (1965), accessed on 5 
February 2016 at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20550/volume-550-i-8029-
english.pdf  
55 Telegram from Sir G. Tory to Mr. Sandys, reporting the Tunku’s attitude, 9 August 1963. Ibid, 
document 211, p. 550.  The British had also applied pressure on the Tunku to stay firm on the date 
of Malaysia Day.  See, Manila Summit: Cabinet Conclusions, 1 August 1963, ibid., document 200, 
p. 542. 
56 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 174.  Malaya sent Inche (later Tan Sri) Ghazali bin Shafie, the permanent 
secretary of the Department of External Affairs, to Jakarta on 29 August, the day the new founding 
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 When U Thant announced the findings of the UN mission on 14 September, he 
paused to note the “misunderstanding, confusion and even resentment” caused by the 
decision to fix a date for the establishment of Malaysia before he had reached and 
announced his conclusions.  He also expressed “regret” about the speed of the consultation. 
But the Secretary General granted his imprimatur:  he was in “no doubt about the wishes 
of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join the Federation of 
Malaysia”.57   
 The next day after a meeting of Sukarno's Supreme Operations Command 
(Komando Tertinggi or KOTI) Indonesia announced its refusal to recognise the new state, 
prompting a sharp escalation in the diplomatic conflict.58  On 16 September, rowdy, stone-
throwing protestors rallied at the British and Malayan embassies in Jakarta.  That day, 
Subandrio told the ambassador in Jakarta of newly-constituted Malaysia “you have no 
status here”.59  On 17 September, Kuala Lumpur withdrew its ambassador and gave 
Indonesian diplomatic personnel seven days to pack and leave.  The Indonesians used this 
act to claim it was Malaysia that severed diplomatic relations.  Following the decision to 
break diplomatic ties, the Tunku, was allegedly seen stamping his feet on Indonesian state 
symbols at a demonstration in Kuala Lumpur.60  In Jakarta, workers, mostly PKI-affiliated, 
started a campaign to takeover British enterprises.61  On 18 September, events in Indonesia 
upped the ante again.  In a more violent demonstration, a mob of about 5000 sacked and 
                                                
date for Malaysia was announced.  Rather than protest this action, Subandrio repeated a suggestion 
to hold the first Maphilindo consultation in Kuala Lumpur in October as a gesture of friendship 
from Sukarno to the Tunku.  It took five days for Jakarta to send an official protest to Kuala 
Lumpur, describing the Malaysia Day announcement as a "unilateral action", which violated the 
Manila agreements. 
57 Report of the UN Mission to Malaysia, 13 September 1963, Stockwell, British Documents on the 
End of Empire, document 225, pp. 574-578. 
58 KOTI was a kitchen Cabinet headed by Sukarno as Commander in Chief. 
59 The Origins and Formation of Malaysia, FCO Research Department Memorandum, 10 July 1970, 
Stockwell, British Documents on the End of Empire, Appendix, p. 658. 
60 The Indonesians made a great hubbub over this incident, although Kuala Lumpur claimed the 
Tunku was bodily lifted onto the Indonesian flag by young demonstrators.  See Mackie, 
Konfrontasi, p. 188. 
61 The most prominent of the seizures involved Shell Oil Company facilities, but British banks and 
trading companies were also targeted.  See ibid., pp. 191-192. 
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burned the British Embassy. Elsewhere, the homes and cars of British residents were 
attacked in what had the appearance of orchestration.62  
 The next morning, Sukarno, in a “savage mood”, launched a tirade against the 
Tunku.  “When did a head of state ever grind his heal into the state seal of another nation?” 
he asked Ambassador Jones, who had come to the palace seeking an expression of 
contrition and guarantees there would be no repeat of the violence.63  The government did 
release a statement expressing regret, but it was far from the unequivocal apology the State 
Department demanded.64  By 21 September there was no turning back.  On the 
recommendation of a government economic committee, the Supreme Economic Command 
(Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi or KOTOE), Sukarno agreed to cut trade and 
financial contacts with Malaysia.  This effectively put an end to the economic stabilisation 
plan.  By 24 September, the USA had decided to halt aid earmarked for plan and urge the 
IMF to do the same.65  The new mood of belligerence was crowned on 25 September when 
Sukarno told a rally in Yogyakarta that Indonesia would “crush” (ganjang) Malaysia.66  
 Around this time, Sukarno claimed to have told Jones: “Indonesia has been duped 
and humiliated in the eyes of the world.”  He was “infuriated,” he recorded, by the “high-
handed announcement” of a date for Malaysia Day while the ascertainment was still in its 
opening stages.67  Sukarno claimed not to fear Malaysia itself – its population was too 
small.  But he did point to the British bases as a pervasive threat.  His views on this are 
worthy of elaboration: 
 
Fresh in our minds are those demonstrations of foreign pilots who operated from 
bases surrounding us - bases like that in Singapore; British territory; territory 
governed by Tunku Abdul Rahman, an avowed anti-Indonesian who protected, 
                                                
62 See Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 188-189. 
63 Telegram from Jones to State Department, 19 September 1963, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, 
document 314. 
64 Ibid, n. 1. 
65 US officials were uncertain how hard to press Indonesia.  Ambassador Howard Jones counseled 
moderation in order to retain access and buy time.  He viewed it a “serious mistake” to publicly 
attack or isolate Sukarno.  See Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Indonesia, 
24 September 1963, FRUS, Vol. XXIII, 1961-1963, document 316, n. 1.  
66 Sukarno, “Crush Malaysia”, in Modelski, New Emerging Forces, p. 80. 
67 Sukarno, Sukarno, pp. 301-301. 
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subsidised, and still shelters in Kuala Lumpur many rebels who revolted against 
me in 1958.  Is that not ground for us to be on our guard, particularly when these 
colonies which ring us have been hastily and hostilely cemented together by 
steamroller tactics?... Have we not to safeguard our borders?68  
 
 These calculations would resonate as the events of September 1963 transformed 
Confrontation from a largely diplomatic dispute, interspersed with periodic low-level 
military forays, to something much more perilous for all parties. In consequence for 
alignment, the impact of Confrontation became greatest in the period after this as Sukarno 
and Indonesia gradually turned away from the West to more sympathetic partners in the 
Communist and socialist world.  Despite determined American efforts to pull Indonesia 
back to its idea of a more virtuous path, the die was cast in September, symbolically sealed 
by the demise of the economic stabilisation program.  The long brooded over risk of 
Indonesia falling into the Communist camp started to appear in the West to be disturbing 
real. 
 
Living Dangerously: Breaking with the West 
 
The ‘Third Camp’: China Edges Out its Rivals 
 
From the start, China exhibited sympathy for the cause of the rebels in Brunei.69  It 
also was the only major state to openly support the use of aggression in resolving the 
dispute.  Beijing saw in Confrontation an unrivalled opportunity to consolidate its often-
fraught relationship with Jakarta while simultaneously driving a wedge between Indonesia 
and the West.  The orientation of the PKI, which gradually shifted away from Moscow to 
Beijing during the early phases of Confrontation, meant the consolidation of the diplomatic 
relationship also would enhance the standing of its strongest domestic ally in Indonesia.  
Moreover, the rationale for the consolidation fitted with China’s then prevailing 
                                                
68 Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
69 See, for example, the statement of the statement of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian 
Solidarity on the “just demand” of the Brunei people, quoted in “Uprising in Brunei”, Peking 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 51, 21 December 1962. 
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worldview.  China’s theories about revolutionary liberation movements in the Third World 
and the universal struggle against imperialism had an essentially militaristic component to 
them.  This presented another benefit to China: the events generating closer ties suited 
China’s purposes better than those of the Soviet Union.  Not only could China edge out 
Western influence, it might be able to edge out Soviet influence too. 
 Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union was far more concerned about the status quo 
in Europe than the cause of anti-imperialism. Caught between doves and hawks in the 
Kremlin, Khrushchev was alternately hard line and moderate in his relations with the West.  
This resulted in various overtures to the USA during the Eisenhower years, before things 
turned sour over the downing of Gary Power’s U-2 and later, under Kennedy, over the Bay 
of Pigs, the missile crisis and the Berlin Crisis.  The period of increased US-Soviet tensions 
had coincided with Sukarno’s decision to force a resolution of the West New Guinea issue.  
But after Cuba and Berlin, the attempts at détente were revived and reached a peak in July-
August 1963 with the establishment of a hot line between the Oval Office and the Kremlin 
and the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the USA, Britain and the 
Soviet Union.70  
These initiatives, and especially the NTBT, sharpened the Sino-Soviet split.  
Beijing saw it as evidence that Moscow was prepared to strike an accommodation with the 
West that jeopardised Chinese security interests.71  A flavor of the thinking was captured 
in a People’s Daily editorial that claimed the “tripartite treaty is aimed at tying China’s 
hands” and was evidence of a “U.S.-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple”.72  But 
there were deeper, and more longstanding, differences fuelling the Sino-Soviet split.  
                                                
70 The series of initiatives in the second half of 1963 represented a distinct relaxation of tensions 
between Washington and Moscow, but in Rusk’s view did not amount to a “détente”.  See Address 
by Secretary Rusk, Foreign Policy and the American Citizen, The Department of State Bulletin, 30 
December 1963, p. 994. 
71 China at the time was developing its own atom bomb which it intended to test.  See, Thomas C. 
Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its 
Proliferation, Minneapolis, MN: Zenith (2009), pp. 84-112. 
72 Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] editorial reprinted as “A Betrayal of the Soviet People”, Peking 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 32, 9 August 1963, p. 11. 
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Among them were starkly different views over whether to agitate for rebellions against 
colonial or Western-oriented regimes in the Third World.73   
 It meant that by late 1963, when tensions over the formation of Malaysia started to 
peak, the Soviet Union had lost its appetite for encouraging a collision between Indonesia 
and the West.  The general trend of de-confliction would have a significant impact on the 
approaches of the two big communist powers to Confrontation.  Moscow’s emerging 
détente with Washington and the complexities of Sino-Soviet relations counselled 
moderation.  In contrast, Beijing pinned its hopes of breaking out of foreign policy isolation 
and challenging US and Soviet dominance on the creation of a “third camp”.74  
Membership of this international united front would be determined by opposition to the 
two big global powers rather than a shared ideology or a common vision of what would 
replace bipolarity.  Still, until September 1963, it remained unclear how hard Indonesia 
would press its grievances over Malaysia and whether it might be receptive to Chinese 
overtures.  
From the outbreak of the rebellion in Brunei, China had cast the issue in terms of a 
global anti-imperialist crusade.  Although Chinese rhetoric matched Sukarno’s Manichean 
vision of New Emerging Forces versus Old Established Forces, the lack of clarity over his 
intentions for most of the following year, while the Maphilindo diplomacy played out, 
meant there were limits to how effectively China could use the Malaysia dispute to nurture 
closer relations.  On a visit to Indonesia in April 1963, the chairman of the People’s 
Republic, Liu Shao-chi, praised the country for rejecting the “neo-colonialist scheme of 
Malaysia”.75  But the official communiqué from the visit – the first by a Chinese head of 
state to an Asian country – only made passing mention of Malaysia.  Nonetheless, the seeds 
of an alliance were there in a common view of several global issues –  the communiqué 
supported the struggles of the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans for “reunification”, 
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opposed outside intervention in the Sino-Indian border dispute, and voiced sympathy for 
the “gallant Cuban people”.76  
The signs of accord aside, China would require forbearance in dealing with 
Indonesia.  Less than a month after the signing of the communiqué, anti-Chinese riots broke 
out again on Java, causing widespread property destruction and several deaths.  To Sukarno 
and the Chinese, it was an obvious attempt to sabotage any partnership between Jakarta 
and Beijing.  They blamed counter revolutionary forces – code for anti-communist 
elements in the army and Muslims linked to groups such as the outlawed Masyumi.  
Regardless, fears of a Sino-Indonesian alliance were then premature.  An alliance would 
have to wait for Indonesia to decisively part ways not only with the USA, but also the 
Soviet Union.  The events of September 1963 provided the first real prospect of such an 
irreconcilable rupture occurring.   
 
The USA’s need to preserve relations with allies Britain and Australia, the hostility 
the US Congress directed at Sukarno personally, and the desire to avoid rewarding bad 
behavior, dictated that it take a firm line against the escalation of Confrontation.  Some of 
the verbal attacks on Sukarno were extreme and, reaching his ears, caused him deep injury.  
Terms like “dictator”, “blackmailer”, and “junior grade Hitler” were bandied about in 
Congress.77  But the USA was not about to surrender its position in Indonesia.  There were 
still a good number of Kennedy advisers who counselled against denigrating or isolating 
Sukarno.  Taunts and insults, it was reasoned, would only force him into the hands of the 
communists.  Kennedy had been planning a trip to Asia in the early part of 1964.  An offer 
to add a stop in Indonesia to the itinerary was viewed as one of the best forms of remaining 
leverage available to Washington.   
When Jones called on Sukarno in early November prior to returning to Washington 
for consultations, he found the President effusive over the idea of a Kennedy visit.  He 
promised he would give Kennedy “the grandest reception anyone ever received here”.  
Sukarno made an effort to allay any worries that might scupper the visit, repeating he had 
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no expansionist aims in Malaysia, no plan to give the PKI a cabinet seat, and no desire to 
use military force against Malaysia.78  While Kennedy publicly appeared to face off against 
Sukarno, making the exaggerated claim at a press conference on 14 November that the 
USA had “suspended” all aid to Indonesia, he continued to entertain ways of avoiding an 
irreconcilable break.79   
In Washington on 19 November, Jones and Kennedy met at the White House where 
they discussed a possible package of inducements to bring Sukarno back to the negotiating 
table with the Tunku.  In exchange for agreeing to settle the Malaysia dispute peacefully, 
withdraw Indonesian forces from the border in Borneo and cease support for guerrilla 
activity, the USA would use its influence to ensure the success of a Maphilindo dialogue, 
resume economic stabilisation aid, increase rice aid and plan a presidential visit to 
Indonesia at the earliest opportunity.80 
But three days later Kennedy was assassinated and the USA suddenly had a 
President far less inclined to give Sukarno the benefit of the doubt.  Almost immediately, 
new President Lyndon B. Johnson had to start to address Indonesia policy by virtue of a 
meeting at the White House with Indonesian Defence Minister Nasution, described to him 
by the State Department as the closest thing the USA had to a friend at “Sukarno's court”.81  
Nasution had come straight from Moscow where Khrushchev had feted him with “red 
carpet treatment”.82  The talks at the White House allowed Nasution to air well-rehearsed 
grievances over the manner and outcome of the UN ascertainment, but at least they did 
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elicit Indonesia’s interest in a return to negotiations.83  Elsewhere, Nasution made the more 
revealing observation to his American hosts that Malaysia would not be a viable state and 
“would fall under domination of resident Chinese and thus provide [a] Communist Chinese 
beachhead”.84  The Nasution visit served to reinforce the view that the USA needed to keep 
a “foot in the door” in Indonesia via the maintenance of some level of aid.85 
But then two things happened.  First, in mid-December, the Foreign Assistance Act 
was amended to require the President to sign a determination that aid to Indonesia was in 
US national interests before it could be released.86  This substantially curtailed the 
President's flexibility in adjusting aid flows to meet foreign policy priorities.  And, second, 
confrontation took a turn for the worse after Indonesian troops and irregulars launched the 
first major assault on military positions inside British Borneo, at Kalabakan, on the night 
of 29 December.87  The problem of Indonesia and confrontation thus became one of the 
first big international tests for Johnson. 
The action at Kalabakan no doubt served to deepen Johnson's suspicions about 
Sukarno.  His thinking was strikingly illustrated in a telephone conversation on 2 January 
with Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara.  As the raid on Kalabakan continued to play 
out, with British and Malaysian forces hunting the infiltrators, Johnson told McNamara he 
                                                
83 Memorandum of Conversation (Johnson and Nasution), Washington, 29 November 1963, ibid., 
document 323. 
84 Telegram from the Department of State (Rusk) to the Embassy in Indonesia, 7 December 1963, 
ibid., document 324.  
85 Summary Record of the 521st National Security Council Meeting, 7 January 1964, ibid., 
document 8. 
86  The amendment was the work of Republican congressman William Broomfield.  In order to 
receive aid Indonesia had to provide assurances of peaceful intentions and the President had to 
determine aid grants were in the US national interest.  See Usha Mahajani, “Soviet and American 
Aid to Indonesia, 1949-1968”, Papers in International Studies, Athens, Ohio: Ohio Center for 
International Studies (1970), pp. 23-25. 
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been fighting Congress over attempts to slash the 
size of the foreign aid vote.  While Congressional attempts to restrain aid to Indonesia had specific 
intent in relation to Jakarta’s foreign policy, they reflected a general congressional turn against 
foreign aid. See Our Obligations to the Family of Man, Remarks by President Kennedy, The 
Department of State Bulletin, 25 November 1963, Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, pp. 806-810; and President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Urge Full Appropriations for 
Foreign Aid, ibid., 30 December 1963, pp. 999-1004. 
87 For an account of the Kalabakan raid, see Nick van der Bijl, Confrontation: The War with 
Indonesia 1962-1966, Pen & Sword: Barnsley, UK (2007), pp. 94-98.  The toll of eight Malaysian 
soldiers killed, including a company commander, and 16 wounded was the greatest number from a 
single attack on Commonwealth forces during confrontation. 
 279 
“ought to be impeached” if he signed the determination for an aid allocation to Indonesia 
in 1964.88  Describing Sukarno, Johnson said: “When you let a bully come in and start 
raiding you in your front yard, if you run, he'll come in and run you out of your bedroom 
the next night.”89  The President's personal distaste for Sukarno would conflate with events 
on the ground in 1964 to produce a significant hardening of US policy towards Indonesia.  
At the start of that year, Rusk wrote to the embassy in Jakarta that US-Indonesia relations 
had reached a “point of crisis”.90 
 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union too struggled with a dilemma.  If Moscow reprised 
the support it demonstrated for Indonesia’s brinkmanship over West New Guinea, it might 
pay the price of disturbing its emerging détente with the USA, irritating countries like 
Egypt and India that had recognised Malaysia, and facing accusations it was advocating 
the export of rebellion.91  This last point had been one of the fundamental differences over 
global strategy that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split.  If, on the other hand, the Soviets 
condemned Indonesia’s actions, it risked abandoning Indonesia to the China camp.  It 
walked the same fine line as the USA.   
But Moscow’s disapproval of Confrontation could be measured by its tepid 
response.  It made “no official public statement” on confrontation akin to the stance it took 
over West New Guinea.  Soviet media devoted little coverage to it.  And there were no 
further arms transfers, “not even small-scale ones”.92  The irony of all this was that the 
USA and Soviet Union - each still in competition for influence in Jakarta - shared a similar 
attitude to Sukarno's priorities and a similar fear of turning Indonesia over to China’s 
sphere of influence.   
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Living Dangerously 
 
The course of events in 1964 would only compound American and Soviet fears that 
China was edging them out of the competition for influence.  While Sukarno appeared to 
entertain the idea of a peaceful settlement at the start of the year, the window for negotiation 
gradually closed.  That year, the militancy evident in the outburst after the declaration of 
the UN's findings deepened and became a pattern.  The USA made its last meaningful 
attempt at reconciliation in January when Johnson dispatched a reluctant Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy to the capitals of the protagonists.  Kennedy's initial distaste for this 
mission was compounded by the fact Sukarno was one of the world leaders he most 
disliked.93  But the animus was set aside and in a meeting in Tokyo on 17 January Kennedy 
managed to win Sukarno's agreement for a ceasefire.  A halt to “military confrontation” 
would be announced within days in Jakarta if Kennedy could obtain a commitment from 
the Philippines and Malaysia for tripartite talks.94 
Kennedy accomplished three things on his 13-day mission: by winning agreement 
to a ceasefire, he exploited an inchoate desire among the Maphilindo states to find a 
dignified way out; he kept Washington’s influence in Jakarta alive; and he had started a 
process that might have allowed Johnson to sign an aid determination without sparking a 
row with Congress.  But lasting solution could only come from the parties themselves, 
without being dictated by outside great powers.  The idea of an “Asian solution”, as it was 
repeatedly described in Washington, was not without risks to the West.  Britain feared the 
price of peace might be Malaysia's acquiescence to ending the Anglo-Malaysia Defence 
Agreement and terminating the Singapore bases.  It preferred an Asian solution that was 
tempered by discreet Western guidance.95 Rusk had remarked to the NSC that there was 
more “involved in Indonesia with its 100 million people than is at stake in Vietnam”.96  The 
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USA shared Britain's concerns about the fate of alliances: a minimum requirement of for 
the Kennedy initiative was that the “basic orientation [of] Malaysia and Philippines as 
members [of the] Free World system of alliances must not be compromised in fact or by 
implication”.97  
As it transpired, such an Asian solution proved elusive.  When the Maphilindo 
foreign ministers met in Bangkok on 5 to 10 February to pave the way for a leaders’ 
summit, they quickly became bogged down over the meaning of the ceasefire agreement.  
The Malaysians wanted all Indonesian forces withdrawn from their side of the border in 
Borneo; the Indonesians interpreted the ceasefire as a stand-fast order.  The differences 
dragged on into a second round of foreign ministers’ talks in Bangkok on 2 to 4 March 
where Malaysian foreign minister Razak insisted Indonesia withdraw its forces.98  Failing 
to receive a commitment from Subandrio, he declared the talks at an end.  Razak went to 
the airport, but was persuaded to get off his plane and return to the city to await 
developments.99  The Malaysians then declared the ceasefire dead because of what they 
claimed were repeated violations by the Indonesians.  Despite the relatively manageable 
military threat Indonesia posed at that point, suspicions over the sincerity of Jakarta’s 
commitment to a peaceful settlement were hard to dispel. 
The principal American fear was that the failure of the Bangkok peace efforts, 
leading to the escalation of Confrontation into open warfare, would draw US forces into 
direct action against Indonesia and an irrevocable breach in the bilateral relationship.  It 
would have opened a second rear front for the USA in Southeast Asia as it fought in 
Vietnam.  The mechanism for a commitment of US armed force would be the ANZUS 
Treaty with Australia and New Zealand.  On his return home, Kennedy had publicly 
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warned that ANZUS obligations could be triggered, meaning that “the war, without any 
doubt, can and will spread if it continues”.100   
The trouble in Bangkok ensured the Attorney General’s peacemaking enjoyed 
short-lived success.  In March, Indonesia and Malaysia had reached an impasse that boiled 
down to this:  Indonesia would not withdraw its forces from Malaysian soil without a clear 
understanding Kuala Lumpur would then agree to discuss Indonesia’s substantive concerns 
and the Malaysians did not wish to talk until Indonesia carried out the withdrawals.101 
There was a growing feeling in Washington that its goodwill, and even its capacity to help, 
was being exhausted.  
Thinking increasingly turned to the prospect of life after Sukarno, and what might 
be done to hasten that day.  On the eve of the second Bangkok conference, Rusk had put 
his name to State Department advice that it was time for US officials in Jakarta to reach 
out to the army with the aim of seeking increased pressure on Sukarno from that quarter 
for a shift in Indonesian foreign policy.102  Rusk feared the full resumption of Confrontation 
would instigate a “complete breach between Indonesia and the free world” and perhaps see 
the country wind up as a “supplicant of the bloc”.103  The notion of the physical ouster of 
Sukarno, although unstated, loomed in the background.  In a meeting between Jones and 
Nasution on 6 March, the defence minister “avoided like the plague any discussion of the 
possibility of a military takeover, even though this hovered in the air throughout the 
talk”.104  Jones, probably the strongest US advocate of accommodating Sukarno, dropped 
pregnant hints of US support for the army in the event of such a crisis.  It was yet another 
marker that US policy was at tipping point.  
The extent of the deterioration was demonstrated within days. Giving testimony on 
the Indonesian aid program to a congressional committee in late March, Rusk declared the 
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administration would provide no new aid to Indonesia as long as it maintained its 
belligerence over Malaysia.  The Secretary of State’s comments were immediately, and 
widely, reported in Jakarta.  At a public ceremony in Jakarta on 25 March, Sukarno pointed 
at Jones, seated metres from him, and said: “There is one country threatening to stop its 
foreign aid to Indonesia.  That country thinks it can scare Indonesia.  I say go to hell with 
your aid.”105  The context of Sukarno’s comments – that it was a rejection of aid as a tool 
of American influence rather than a rejection of American aid itself – has been often 
overlooked in the retelling.   
But behind the scenes hopes of peace had not completely faded.  On 17 March, at 
a meeting in Jakarta with Jones, Sukarno and Subandrio agreed to a formula hatched by 
the Philippines Foreign Secretary Salvador Lopez that essentially called for 
“disengagement” of forces – to be read as gradual withdrawal – in parallel with a renewal 
of political discussions, concluding in a leader’s summit.  The only proviso they attached 
was that the process be kept secret; if there were any disclosure, Indonesia would deny the 
existence of an agreement.106 Sukarno’s insistence on secrecy enabled him to appear 
sanguine in private and truculent in public.  A day later, Nasution had confidentially 
expressed the view that Sukarno needed to continue confrontation “in order to induce his 
people to accept [the] hardships of [the] current economic situation”.107  Nasution 
acknowledged he was keeping a back-channel open to the Malaysian army to avoid 
confrontation escalating into open conflict.  
The mixed messages in March 1964 made it hard for anyone trying to make sense 
of Indonesian policy.  Two weeks after dismissing US aid, Sukarno played down the 
severity of Confrontation in a meeting with Jones, casually suggesting that, “the whole 
mess can be cleared up by one simple act”.108  All Sukarno said he wanted was for the 
Tunku to allow some room for a compromise.  As he put it: “Tell the Tunku to put a little 
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water in the wine.”109  His position was that he would prefer to see Sarawak and Sabah as 
free nations within the framework of Maphilindo, but if those two provinces demonstrated 
a clear desire to join Malaysia, implying a further ascertainment, Sukarno too would 
recognise Malaysia.   
These quiet signals served to keep negotiations alive despite the impasse reached 
in Bangkok over the meaning of ceasefire.  Indeed, by then, Sukarno appeared more eager 
than the Tunku to keep talking.  The Tunku’s confidence in Malaysia’s capacity to resist 
confrontation grew during 1964 and received a boost on 25 April when parliamentary 
elections in Malaysia gave his Alliance Party a resounding victory.110  This represented 
more than personal vindication for the Tunku; it rebutted Indonesian claims that the 
federation was unpopular and imposed from the top.  The result probably reduced the 
ability of the Tunku to offer concessions, even if he had the inclination.111   
Yet, once again, prodded by outside parties, Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to a 
leaders’ summit set for Tokyo in mid-June.  The price was a token concession:  pro-
Indonesian guerrillas would begin to withdraw simultaneously with the opening of leaders’ 
talks; compliance was to be monitored by Thai observers.112  Neither side wanted to be 
accused of being the instigator of a terminal break.  Both Indonesia and Malaysia were 
vying for the status of aggrieved party in the eyes of the world, particularly the nonaligned 
and Afro-Asian states. Britain too was softening somewhat.  On a visit to Manila in May, 
Rab Butler, the Foreign Secretary, told Macapagal that Britain endorsed the concept of an 
Asian solution and would accept Malaysia being part of Maphilindo.113  At the same time, 
the USA was showing a little impatience with the Tunku.  Rusk told Australia’s Minister 
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for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, that the Johnson administration was “not going to 
put in boys from Nebraska and Kansas just because the Tunku won’t go to a meeting”.114  
The idea that Indonesia and Malaysia were each borne to the Tokyo talks by a desire not 
to be seen as spoiler came with the corollary that both had little in the way of genuine 
compromise to offer.    
When the leaders gathered on 20 June, the rancour surfaced quickly.  They met for 
a single day and issued a communiqué comprising eight points, three of which were taken 
up in thanking various parties for assistance.  The brevity and emptiness of the 
communiqué pointed to the depth of discord.  The only meaningful initiative was 
Macapagal’s proposal for a four-member Afro-Asian Commission to study the problems 
between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines and submit recommendations to solve 
them.  Sukarno agreed to this proposal and to abide by the commission’s recommendations.  
The Tunku agreed only on the condition “all acts of hostilities against Malaysia must cease 
forthwith”.115  They asked their foreign ministers to study the proposal further.  But overall 
the differences probably had been sharpened in Tokyo.  A posture of “injured 
righteousness”, on Malaysia’s part, and “arrogant and meretricious” statements and a 19 
June cross-border attack by guerrillas, on Indonesia’s part, contributed to a sour 
atmosphere.116 
The failure of the summit to settle on a convincing roadmap for peace set in train a 
series of events that would see Indonesia become increasingly alienated from the West. 
Following the Tokyo summit, the State Department instructed Jones to inform Sukarno 
that the current trend of events placed “the basic fabric of our relationship in jeopardy”.117  
The problem was not just Malaysia, but a persistent anti-American propaganda campaign 
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inside Indonesia and several foreign policy stances Jakarta had taken that were sympathetic 
to the communist bloc.118  When he was confronted with these views, Sukarno came across 
as impatient and irritable.119   
The Johnson administration then took an action that would prove decisive: it 
reinforced its displeasure with Sukarno by inviting the Tunku for a meeting at the White 
House.  In a one-on-one meeting with the Tunku on 22 July, Johnson offered Malaysia 
military training and loans for weapons purchases.  The statement at the end of the visit 
deliberately avoided mention of Indonesia by name; instead it referred to the activities of 
a “neighboring state in violation of the territorial integrity of Malaysia.”120  But Johnson 
committed the US support to a “free and independent Malaysia” and publicly confirmed 
the offer of military cooperation.121   
The Indonesian riposte came on in its Independence Day in both words and actions.  
In a combative speech, Sukarno shifted the tone of domestic politics and foreign policy 
further to the left.  Speaking directly to an imagined Western audience, Sukarno referred 
to himself as a “comrade in arms” with various anti-Western nationalists and leftists, 
including Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro.  He described himself 
at one point as “a friend of the communists” and went on to declare the southern parts of 
Korea and Vietnam as “not free”.122  Earlier, on 10 August, Indonesia had provided official 
diplomatic recognition to Hanoi in a calculated slap at Washington.  The Independence 
Day speech was the occasion on which Sukarno famously proclaimed 1965 as “Tahun 
Vivere Pericoloso” (the year of living dangerously).  Certainly, that prophetic description 
fitted the American interpretation of where Sukarno was taking Indonesia.  Following the 
speech, a US intelligence analysis concluded that Sukarno’s “long-range intent will remain 
unchanged: get the US out of Southeast Asia.”123 
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 On the same morning Sukarno delivered his speech, a mixed force of 108 
Indonesian paratroopers and marines and irregulars landed at Pontian, in Johore state, on 
the Malay Peninsula.  Operation Liver, as it was called, was the first strike into Western 
Malaysia and signalled a sharp escalation in the military dimensions of confrontation.  
Operation Lilac, in which 96 paratroopers were dropped at Labis, also in Johore, followed 
on 2 September. 124   Both these operations were failures.  But they raised alarm over the 
prospect of major operations against Malaysia.  Kuala Lumpur decided, with the urging of 
Whitehall, to refer the issue to the UN Security Council and Britain drew up plans for the 
possibility of retaliatory attacks on Indonesia.125   
Simultaneously, the USA came under more direct pressure in Indonesia.  On 15 
August, the USIS library in Yogyakarta was seized and ransacked.  The PKI and its 
affiliated unions threatened takeovers or boycotts of US private interests. And Sukarno 
gave his blessing to a movement to ban American films and other forms of Western cultural 
penetration.  A US Senator – John Tower, a Texas Republican – injected another element 
into this febrile mix by sponsoring an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act banning 
all US assistance to Indonesia, including military training.126  It passed the Senate with 
overwhelming support and, although later buried by the administration, the damage was 
done as much by Tower’s public comments and media coverage as the amendment itself – 
US aid was already very small. 
The events of July to September 1964 were the culmination of a long hollowing of 
the US-Indonesia relationship.  The failure of US diplomacy to prevent the sharp 
militarisation of Confrontation in September 1963, and the coincident end of the economic 
stabilisation plan, can be cited reasonably as the tipping point.  But the series of events in 
the second half of 1964 took the relationship to a low point from which it did not recover 
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for the remainder of Sukarno’s time in office.  With the estrangement between the USA 
and Indonesia and the Soviet Union at best lukewarm on Confrontation, Sukarno was left 
with few choices in the search for friends and allies.   
 
Exiting the UN: Indonesia Goes It Alone 
 
By the start of 1965, Indonesia looked increasingly isolated.  It could count on little 
sympathy, even within the Asia-Africa group for its hard line over Malaysia.  One of the 
few sources of reliable support was China and a small number of states headed by like-
minded, radical regimes.  Indonesia was locked on a path that would drive it further away 
from its old sources of aid and political support – the USA and Soviet Union.  One major 
signpost of the new trajectory in Indonesian foreign policy came in January when Indonesia 
dramatically withdrew from the United Nations.  Sukarno appeared to take this bold 
decision alone in response to the appointment of Malaysia to a one-year seat on the UN 
Security Council from 31 December in fulfilment of a longstanding agreement.127  
Although the decision was naturally welcomed on the left of politics, the army, fearing 
Indonesia’s isolation from all the major Western powers, was opposed.  Even Subandrio, 
usually in lockstep with Sukarno on foreign policy, admitted it caused him some sleepless 
nights.128 
There were two immediate consequences to the Indonesian withdrawal from the 
UN.  It gave momentum to a developing relationship with China, then also excluded from 
the world body, and it invigorated the promotion of Sukarno’s concept of the division 
between New Emerging Forces and Old Established Forces.  Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
greeted the decision as “a lofty and just revolutionary move”.129  The Chinese had reason 
to celebrate.  From the start of 1965, it was increasingly apparent that Indonesia and China 
                                                
127 The selection of Malaysia to split the normal two-year term with Czechoslovakia following a 
deadlocked vote dated back to 1963.  But Sukarno’s grievances dated back several years and were 
amplified in his 1960 speech to the UN General Assembly. The “stunned” expression on the face 
of Subandrio when Sukarno broke the news of his plans to a meeting of KOTI in late December 
betrayed the foreign minister’s own surprise. Franklin Weinstein, “The Uses of Foreign Policy in 
Indonesia”, PhD thesis, Cornell University, (1972), p. 593, n. 51. 
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were headed towards a “symbolic alliance”.130  In the early stages, the accord between them 
was largely limited to coordination of foreign policies.  But over time the military 
implications would become increasingly clear.  The official policy of nonalignment was to 
be a screen behind which the reality of Indonesian foreign policy was communist 
sympathising. 
In tandem with Indonesia’s exit from the UN, Sukarno intensified his campaign to 
secure the leadership of those states he counted among the New Emerging Forces.  On 7 
January, he announced plans to found a Conference of the New Emerging Forces 
(CONEFO) with a headquarters complex to be built in Jakarta.131   Initially, the only other 
members were China, North Korea and North Vietnam.  But Sukarno hoped to establish a 
rival to the UN comprising a mix of Asia-Africa and NAM states.132   
For Beijing, the prospect of a concord with Indonesia was a reward for years of 
patient diplomacy.  It had made a deliberate decision to cultivate Indonesia in the aftermath 
of the Sino-Soviet conflict.  There were several reasons for pursuing this strategy.  The two 
main ones were to reduce its isolation in the context of the dispute with the Soviet Union 
and to give impetus to efforts to break US and Soviet dominance of the international system 
at a time when China lacked nuclear weapons.133  This latter ambition was articulated in 
Mao Zedong’s conception of “two intermediate zones” – the first in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America and the second comprising parts of Europe – where he asserted countries were 
unhappy with the US-Soviet bipolar order and their attempts “to dominate the world”.134  
Mao’s analysis underpinned a Chinese policy of supporting indigenous communist parties 
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in non-communist states and seeking friendship with states espousing revolutionary 
ideologies.  Indonesia presented China with an immensely valuable partner in the quest to 
attain its two big foreign policy goals because of its strategic importance and large 
communist party. A strong Sino-Indonesian partnership also could contribute directly to 
Chinese security by presenting a more formidable challenge to US and European power in 
Southeast Asia.  It could “counterbalance the American military presence across China’s 
southern border in Vietnam and Laos”.135    
But the formation of the Sino-Indonesian alliance was a slow process that had both 
international and domestic dimensions.  It was far from inevitable Sukarno would place 
Indonesia so explicitly in alignment with China, even as he frequently adopted positions 
China favored.  Indeed, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials in Jakarta and Beijing 
frequently doubted whether Sukarno was serious about an alignment.  This was evident on 
several occasions in 1964.  When Indonesia accepted the Kennedy proposal for a ceasefire 
with Malaysia, Chinese officials suspected Sukarno was searching “for common interests 
with the reactionaries in Malaysia and the Philippines”.136  This, of course, would be a 
setback for Chinese diplomacy, which aimed to drive a wedge between Indonesia and the 
West. 
Even after the rupture in relations between Indonesia and the USA in mid 1964, 
China was dubious about whether Indonesia was ready to defy the established great 
powers.  An interesting illustration is the politics surrounding the explosion of China’s first 
atomic bomb on 16 October 1964.  The praise from Indonesia for China’s feat was effusive.  
Sukarno personally offered his congratulations to the Chinese ambassador.137  But 
Indonesia was less enthusiastic about a proposal from Zhou Enlai the day after China’s 
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nuclear test for a conference of all nations to consider “the complete prohibition and 
thorough destruction of atomic weapons”.138  Regarding this to be impractical, Subandrio 
instead suggested to Chinese ambassador Yao Zhongming that China join the UN 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.   With China denied a seat at the UN, it was bound 
to find the idea of negotiations under the aegis of a UN agency unacceptable.  The episode 
is revealing not for the minor disagreement over the tactics of international negotiation, but 
for how furiously the Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted to Subandrio’s rebuff.  In a cable 
to provide instructions to Yao on 27 October, the Foreign Ministry lashed at Subandrio for 
“collaborating with the imperialists” in a conspiracy to oppose Chinese nuclear tests.  “We 
have to resolutely destroy his trickery,” the cable advised.139  All this underscored the 
ambivalence felt by friend and foe alike over where Indonesia was headed, and also the 
capriciousness of Indonesian diplomacy – only a few months later Indonesia itself was out 
of the UN.  
But Sukarno’s publicly declared foreign policy doctrine was for the most part in 
tune with Chinese thinking.  At the time of the Chinese nuclear test, he was on an extended 
trip abroad in which he attended the second NAM leaders’ summit in Cairo, leaving 
Subandrio at home as acting President.140  In Cairo, he had hoped to cajole NAM into 
adopting a strong anti-imperialist message compatible with his New Emerging Forces 
doctrine and simultaneously isolate Malaysia.  He used his speech to heads of government 
on 6 October to depict confrontation as a global battle against imperialism and colonialism, 
of which the Malaysia dispute was only a part.  This exhorted NAM leaders to grasp that 
the battle between the new revisionist states and the old reactionary states of the 
industrialised West could not be waged passively but necessitated the resort to arms.  
Although Sukarno suffered a setback in the final conference declaration, which 
called for states to “respect frontiers” and refrain from “all use or threat of force” against 
another’s territory, his radical reinterpretation of nonalignment would have been very 
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gratifying to Chinese ears.141  Sukarno dismissed the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, 
which had been lauded as the diplomatic triumph of Bandung a decade earlier, in favor of 
a formulation that challenged the very essence of nonalignment.  “Peaceful coexistence 
must be, and always will be, practiced in the concrete condition of the balance of forces,” 
he said.  “There will be peaceful coexistence between the developing countries and the 
imperialist states only when we can face them with equal strength.”142  To that end, he 
suggested the nonaligned states effectively club together as a third bloc. 
Both Indonesia and China would have preferred to convene a second Asia-Africa 
conference in place of a NAM summit, which excluded China. Countries, including India, 
happy with that state of affairs, had diplomatically outmanoeuvred them by convening the 
Cairo conference.  Sukarno was annoyed, yet he was obliged to attend. That, coupled with 
the fact Indonesia arguably suffered a rebuff over Confrontation, meant Cairo for him was 
in many respects a disappointment.  The summit declaration notably made no mention of 
Malaysia despite offering comment on several global flashpoints.  But the summit did 
confirm to an international audience the extent to which Indonesia was adopting “the 
Chinese line”.143  A circular US State Department memorandum to several diplomatic posts 
observed: “[The] present Indonesian environment [is] probably more hostile to the West 
than almost any outside China and its satellites.”144 
The momentum for closer Sino-Indonesian relations was demonstrated again the 
following month when Sukarno made a surprise overnight visit to Shanghai, which 
prompted a series of diplomatic exchanges of increasing intensity.  In Shanghai on 4 
November, Sukarno and Zhou held talks that appear to have laid the basis of the Sino-
Indonesian entente.  No record of that meeting has emerged.  But US intelligence gathered 
some insight from sources in Jakarta.  It concluded the Chinese had sought to encourage 
the intensification of Confrontation with what amounted to a USD 50 million “bribe to 
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keep Sukarno in tow”.  The long-term, interest-free loan included USD 10 million to be 
paid to Sukarno personally.145   
From the public statements and reports at the time it seems clear Sukarno and Zhou 
reached agreement to closely coordinate their foreign policies, such as a joint push to 
convene a second Asia-Africa conference, and to seek ways to cooperate in other fields.  
The Shanghai talks have been described as Sukarno’s “first step toward the Chinese 
camp”.146  It was surely a critical juncture in an evolutionary process of aligning with 
China.  He probably had been goaded along this path by the less than resounding reception 
his ideas received at the NAM summit.  He also was no doubt genuinely impressed by what 
China’s nuclear weapon test might mean for the power equation in Asia.  But partnership 
with China inevitably would come at a cost.  He would lose the flexibility he had long 
enjoyed in playing the great powers off against each other.147 
For the Chinese, Sukarno’s overture was a significant victory and they moved 
quickly to exploit the opening.  Chen Yi flew to Jakarta on 27 November for a week of 
talks with Sukarno and other ministers.  At the end of the visit, they issued a joint press 
statement that committed the parties, more explicitly than ever before, to international 
collaboration.  They acknowledged the two countries had reached “common 
understanding” on a range of international issues and would strive to find ways to 
synchronise their foreign policies.  China offered its “full support” to Indonesia in its 
conflict with Malaysia.148  This meant that by the time Indonesia withdrew from the UN 
the following January, China was poised to exploit the opportunity to move to what state 
media termed “a new phase in Sino-Indonesian comradeship in arms”.149   
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With Indonesia out of the UN, Sukarno was eager to establish a formal basis for the 
relationship with China.  On 23 January, Sukarno dispatched Subandrio to Beijing where 
the foreign minister removed any remaining doubt over where Indonesia stood in the Cold 
War.  “We have a common enemy – imperialism headed by the United States and Britain,” 
he told a banquet in the Great Hall.150  Subandrio might have experienced misgivings over 
Indonesia’s departure from the UN and repeatedly reassured American visitors that he 
would strive to contain domestic communism, but by the start of 1965 he was a fervent 
convert to alignment with China. 
The mission Sukarno sent him on was to obtain explicit undertakings from the 
Chinese over military support should Confrontation escalate.  According to the CIA’s 
sources in Jakarta, the aim was to seek a “military pact which could be publicised and, as 
a consequence have a greater deterrent effect than any dialectical (or phoney) promises the 
Chinese might make privately”.151  Chen Yi had spoken of the availability of a force of 15 
divisions that could be deployed to the Malaysia conflict through Indonesia when he visited 
Jakarta in November-December.  But this would have been hard for China to logistically 
support and, perhaps, just as hard for Sukarno to sell, especially to his own military.  A 
commitment in the event of a crisis appears to have been preferable to a large pre-emptive 
deployment. 152  In the end, Subandrio only extracted a commitment for China “to send 
‘some’ guerrilla warfare instructors, to train Indonesian troops, and some equipment for 
the army and marine corps”.153  China was averse to overextending itself.  Indonesia’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito later privately recounted that the Chinese had referred to 
their need to keep forces available in the event of being drawn into hostilities on the North 
Korea and North Vietnam fronts.  Any assistance would be conditional on what action 
Britain and the USA might take against Indonesia.  
It meant the verbal barrage directed against the West would be fiercer than the 
physical one.  The Sino-Indonesian joint statement issued on 28 January delivered an 
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extraordinary denunciation of the USA and its allies and was stark evidence of how far 
Indonesia had come in abandoning its friendship with Washington and posture of 
equidistance between the great powers.  The Sino-Indonesian joint statement lambasted the 
USA and Britain for their “crimes” and, via an explicit offer of support, placed Indonesia 
on the side of America's opponents in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  Numerous other 
points in the statement demonstrated the degree of Indonesia's alienation from the USA:  it 
observed that US “imperialist aid” undermined state sovereignty and independence; in 
condemning Malaysia, it committed China to “not sit idly by” should Indonesia come under 
direct attack; it insisted peaceful co-existence was impossible between imperialist and anti-
imperialist forces, reiterating the firebrand message of Sukarno at NAM; it condemned the 
UN as an American puppet organisation; and it pledged the two parties to “strengthen their 
friendly contacts in the military field”.154   
The affirmation of this “militant friendship” was the culmination of the overture 
Sukarno had made the previous November.  But as an impressive triumvirate – Zhou Enlai, 
Chen Yi and People’s Liberation Army chief Luo Ruiqing – bade farewell to Subandrio at 
Beijing airport the Indonesia-China relationship was still fragile.  There were inherent 
contradictions in their exploration of an alliance that would in time be sharply revealed. 
 
The End of Nonalignment: The Jakarta-Beijing Axis  
 
The delicate balancing act that characterised Indonesia's domestic politics – 
pitching the right, dominated by the military, against the left, dominated by the PKI, with 
Suharto serving as both adjudicator and sponsor – was from late 1964 under acute strain.  
The aggressiveness of the PKI in pursuing policies aimed at growing and rewarding its 
support base, most notably a land redistribution program, and fears Sukarno's health was 
failing fuelled speculation that a showdown might not be long in coming.  This, and the 
perpetual atmosphere of crisis created by Confrontation and economic hardship, meant 
Indonesian politics became especially volatile from that time onwards.  The tumult 
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undoubtedly suited the PKI leadership and it took full advantage of the uncertain political 
conditions to place its enemies on the defensive.    
Among the immediate, and easiest, targets were the institutional or symbolic 
remnants of the Western presence in Indonesia, especially those associated with the USA. 
As Sukarno cultivated relations with China in early 1965, Indonesia was roiled by a wave 
of anti-Americanism.  The targets included US Information Service libraries in Jakarta and 
a range of secondary cities and a variety of US-owned businesses.  Attacks on US facilities, 
especially the libraries, had occurred from early 1964.  But the US Embassy reported the 
campaign reached a “crescendo” within weeks of the Sino-Indonesian joint statement.155   
Over the course of several weeks from late February 11 US businesses, representing 
the majority of the value of US investment, had their management forcibly expelled and 
taken over by Indonesians.  The PKI was the major force for the attacks on US facilities 
and the business seizures.  But the US claimed to have evidence of the government’s 
complicity.  According to one intelligence report, Sukarno approved plans for the takeover 
of US-owned rubber plantations in Sumatra at a meeting on 8 December.  The plan called 
for “labor groups to create disorders on the US estates so that the Indonesians would be 
‘forced’ to take control”.156  Following weeks of escalating protests, the government issued 
a decree for the takeover of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and US Rubber Company 
properties on 26 February.  The big three foreign oil companies – Caltex, Stanvac and Shell 
– were the next to fall on 19 March.  In each case, the device the government used was to 
assume management control rather than ownership, which avoided the necessity to pay any 
compensation.157  Sukarno’s authority hovered over all anti-American actions, and he 
virtually admitted as much.  When ambassador Jones confronted him over the attacks on 
the USIS libraries, Sukarno replied that he regarded the mob action as retaliation for harsh 
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criticism of him and Indonesia in the US press.  “Can't your people understand that I am 
hurt, personally hurt, by these press attacks?” Sukarno asked.158 
The anti-American activity brought the two sides to the brink of a formal diplomatic 
break.159  The only course that appeared open to Washington was to draw down its presence 
in Indonesia.  Steadily the USA began pulling back in the first half of 1965; the libraries 
were closed, aid and military personnel were reduced to a skeleton staff, the Peace Corps 
withdrew.  The USA went as far as to consider preliminary arrangements for third power 
representation of its interests in Indonesia.  What became known as the “low posture” 
policy was confirmed after President Johnson sent Ellsworh Bunker to Indonesia to 
conduct an assessment of US policy options.  Bunker, who enjoyed high esteem in 
Indonesia for his mediation of the West New Guinea dispute, had several long 
conversations with Sukarno and other ministers during March-April.  He reported to 
Johnson on 23 April that the USA could only wait for the day when internal conditions 
allowed for a restoration of ties.  “Where aspects of our presence in Indonesia provide 
targets easily exploitable by the PKI, they should be quietly removed,” Bunker advised.160 
By then, everyone in the US government could agree the restoration of bilateral 
relations would have to await the end of Sukarno’s leadership.  In the meantime, one of the 
few remaining methods of US activism was covert political action.  In late 1964, US 
intelligence started dusting off and updating plans for a covert program designed to 
undermine the influence of the PKI and support the next generation of potential Indonesian 
leaders.  The result was a recommended plan of action that went to the NSC’s so-called 
303 committee, which oversaw special political action programs, in late February.  By 
engaging in covert collaboration with known anti-communist groups, US intelligence 
operatives would launch “black letter operations, media operations, including possibly 
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black radio, and political action within existing Indonesian organisations and 
institutions”.161   
If it succeeded, the political action program would exploit factionalism within the 
PKI, play on traditional Indonesian distrust of China and portray the PKI as an instrument 
of Chinese imperialism.  It would depict the PKI as a danger and create a cleavage between 
the PKI and the rest of Indonesian society.  In this way, it was envisioned the USA might 
“reduce the influence on Indonesian foreign and domestic policies of the PKI and the 
Government of Red China and to encourage and support existing non-Communist elements 
within Indonesia”.162  The report to the 303 Committee admitted the CIA had already 
distributed some funds to “key personalities” to bolster their resolve to pursue anti-
communist and pro-US policies.  On 4 March, the plan was approved.163 
US attempts to sponsor domestic anti-communists showed signs of bearing early 
fruit, even as the political momentum remained with Sukarno and the PKI and the army 
adopted a largely defensive posture.  Shortly before Jones concluded an unprecedented 
seven-year stint as ambassador, he wrote to Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs 
William Bundy on 23 April alerting him to the possibility of a mixed civilian-military coup.  
One of the alleged plotters had revealed the plans to Jones, which was due to be carried out 
while Sukarno was abroad.  Jones “conveyed clearly” his own sympathy with their 
objectives, despite insisting the USA could not actively participate.164  In any case, the 
coup was put off because the plotters could not organise in time for Sukarno's departure.  
Sukarno remained suspicious the CIA was conspiring to assassinate or oust him and 
persisted with public statements to that effect even after Jones made repeated denials165.  
While the covert action plan might have served the purpose of better positioning the USA 
for a post-Sukarno Indonesia, it is hard to escape the conclusion it also would have worked 
to hasten Sukarno’s demise.   
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The Soviet Union faced a similar challenge in Indonesia in 1965, although the 
position it found itself in was arguably more complex to manage, even if the outlook was 
not quite as bleak.  Moscow was comfortable at seeing the USA under stress – a 
circumstance that would normally bring rewards in the mostly zero-sum calculation of the 
Cold War.  But it was equally discomfited by Indonesia's embrace of China, which it had 
few opportunities to counter.  Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union had become wary of 
the “adventuristic slogans” coming out of Indonesia.166  Now the new Soviet leadership of 
Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin made the new mood in relations with Indonesia even 
more evident.167   
By time Sukarno launched Confrontation, the Soviet Union had lost its appetite for 
testing the mettle of its opponents in the West.  It meant Moscow was no longer inclined 
to goad Indonesia into settling its claims by force, as it did during the West New Guinea 
dispute.  The close collaboration nurtured during this first employment of Confrontation 
had been the “zenith” of Soviet-Indonesian relations.168  Moscow's diffidence over the 
second Confrontation was to set in train events that would take the bilateral relationship to 
“the lowest ebb since diplomatic representatives were exchanged in 1954”.169  Ironically, 
the positions of the USA and the Soviet Union declined in tandem for largely the same 
reasons. 
There were several factors driving the deterioration of relations between Moscow 
and Jakarta, although the main cause was the Soviet belief that Sukarno would have been 
wiser to focus his formidable energy on reviving Indonesia’s sick economy rather than 
another foreign adventure.  This also would have helped Indonesia repay its debts – an 
issue of mounting concern to the Soviets, who provided most of their aid as economic 
credits.  Another obvious point, not lost on the Soviet Union, was that Confrontation only 
served to keep foreign, especially British, forces engaged in Southeast Asia and justify 
instruments like SEATO and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.  Moreover, 
Confrontation challenged the idea of Third World solidarity by pitting two developing 
countries against each other.  These differences conflated with concerns that Sukarno’s 
                                                
166 Khrushchev, Memoirs, p. 806. 
167 Philip E. Mosley, “The Kremlin and the Third World”, p. 75. 
168 Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 23. 
169 Singh, “Soviet-Indonesian Relations”, p. 241. 
 300 
pursuit of the New Emerging Forces doctrine was contrary to Soviet interests because it 
played to a Chinese agenda and risked Soviet marginalisation.  Soviet displeasure at 
Indonesia's decision to leave the UN – expressed in a letter to Sukarno from Kosygin – was 
in part influenced by the view that isolation from the global mainstream would exacerbate 
all these negative trends.170  
In the meantime, the Soviet Union tried as best it could to protect its investment in 
Indonesia by conducting its own delicate balancing act.  This involved the expression of 
sufficient sympathy over Indonesia’s grievances in Confrontation to counter excessive 
Chinese influence, the use of covert political action to sustain the drift of Indonesia away 
from the West, and quiet steps to avoid Confrontation turning into full scale war, such as 
turning off the tap of military aid.171  These policies had negligible effect on the trajectory 
of Indonesian foreign policy.  To the extent Indonesia acted in a way that suited Soviet 
interests, it more likely was due to a coincidence of preferences than Soviet influence.  The 
unfortunate reality from Moscow's perspective was that the years of generous aid delivery 
purchased little real influence when it counted.172 
Evidence of Moscow’s weak influence over Jakarta was apparent in the 
machinations over a second Asia-Africa conference in June 1965 to coincide with the 10th 
anniversary of Bandung.  At a preparatory meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia and China joined 
forces to block Soviet participation in the conference planned for Algeria.173  The Soviet 
Union had not attended the first AA conference, but had offered its support.  By the time 
of the second conference, both the Soviet Union and India wanted to prevent Chinese and 
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Indonesian dominance of the organisation and Chinese advances in the Afro-Asian 
world.174    
As far back as 1958, the Soviet ambassador in Jakarta A. M. Volkov had 
complained to Subandrio that the Indonesian delegation to an AA economic conference in 
Cairo had objected to the presence of Soviet representatives because the Soviet Union was 
“not an Asian country”. Subandrio had apologised for this “unfriendly” act, promised to 
reprimand the mission in Cairo and confirmed it was not the position of the Indonesian 
government.175  The Indonesian volte-face by 1965 was a stark illustration of how far the 
Soviets had slipped and how greatly Jakarta valued China’s support for Confrontation.  The 
Soviet Union’s credentials to join the AA conference might have been debateable.176  But 
it was more difficult for Indonesia to argue for Malaysia’s exclusion.  Once again in concert 
with China, Indonesia came up with a ploy to scuttle Malaysian participation.  They 
succeed in having decisions on both the Soviet and the Malaysian questions deferred to the 
full conference.  As it turned out, the conference was cancelled when Algerian President 
Ahmed Ben Bella was overthrown in a coup. 
After the failure of the move to join the AA conference, A. I. Mikoyan, Soviet first 
deputy premier, came to Jakarta, presumably on a mission of reconciliation.  He told a rally 
in Jakarta on 25 June 1965 that Malaysia offered “an example of neo-colonialism 
camouflaged by independence”.177  But more importantly than Mikoyan’s expression of 
support for Indonesia was that pledges of military assistance on the visit never materialised.  
On the same visit, Mikoyan clashed sharply with PKI chairman D.N. Aidit as he tried to 
counter the Indonesian party’s tilt towards Beijing.178 
The USA and Soviet Union would finally witness the extent to which they had been 
displaced by China on Indonesian Independence Day.  The President’s annual speech – an 
Indonesian state of the nation address – had become known as an occasion for vitriolic 
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attacks on foreign enemies.  But even by Sukarno’s standards the 17 August speech was 
especially strident.  He denounced US “aggression” in Vietnam, which he described as a 
“grave danger” to international order.  “It would be as well for the USA to be aware that 
the one and only thing for them to do is to get out of the whole of Southeast Asia 
altogether,” he declared.179  There was a note of menace in Sukarno’s demand.  He recalled 
that the French withdrawal from Indochina was decided at Dien Bien Phu and the Dutch 
retreat from Indonesia decided in the jungles of West New Guinea.  Sukarno also embraced 
an idea that China and the PKI both advocated – the arming of Indonesian citizenry – to 
confront foreign threats.  
But, most importantly, the speech put the seal on the burgeoning relationship with 
China.  There were two aspects to this. The first was that Sukarno built on the theme he 
developed at the Cairo summit of NAM that nonalignment had to be interpreted as 
belligerent opposition to imperialism.  He referred to this as “revolutionary non-
alignment”.  The second was the declaration of what Sukarno termed the “axis of Djakarta-
Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang”.  Notably absent from this “natural” grouping of 
anti-imperialists was the Soviet Union.  With the speech, Sukarno formally cast Indonesia’s 
lot in with a China-centred alliance of communist or left-leaning states. 
 
Alignment Policy: A Critical Assessment 
 
Balancing Risk in Alignment Behavior 
 
The resolution of the West New Guinea dispute placed Indonesian foreign policy 
at a crossroads in the last quarter of 1962.  It could choose to persist with the ideas of 
radical diplomacy that Sukarno had started to craft in the context of waging his self-styled 
policy of Confrontation or it could adopt modest international ambitions, in accord with 
the preferences of Western aid donors, to focus on economic development.  The course of 
events showed that Sukarno was unsure of the path he wanted to take.  Technocrat ministers 
were permitted the latitude to pursue a largely US-designed economic stabilisation 
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program.  US officials convinced themselves Sukarno would stay the course.  But the 
outbreak of rebellion in the British-administered territory of Brunei contained the seeds of 
a dilemma for Sukarno.  Should he challenge the nature of Britain’s plans for the 
decolonisation of its Borneo territories, potentially provoking another clash with the West, 
or should he concentrate on the economy and stay in harmony with the Western powers?  
The answer to that question would determine the basic orientation of Indonesian foreign 
policy for the remainder of Sukarno’s time in office. 
The broad international conditions Sukarno looked out on from late 1962 had 
arguably deteriorated since he had launched the campaign of Confrontation over West New 
Guinea.  Despite the election of Kennedy and the hope for a new start on many protracted 
international disputes, the dividing lines of the Cold War never looked so entrenched or 
hostile.  Just weeks after the West New Guinea settlement, Kennedy and Khrushchev faced 
off in what is generally regarded as the most perilous affair of the entire Cold War, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The widening of the Sino-Soviet split made the Cold War a more 
complex, and potentially dangerous, three-cornered contest in which gains and losses were 
measured in the acquisition of allies or the number of like-minded states.  With the 
escalation of conflict in Indochina and the growth in US forces there, the Cold War looked 
less remote.  Indonesia too would find its security interests required greater focus on its 
own neighborhood than implied in Sukarno’s ideas about a world divided between the 
NEFO and OLDEFO. 
Domestically, the organisational strength and activism of the PKI sharpened the 
competition with soldiers and civilians disenfranchised by the new political arrangements.  
In conjunction with the international ideological struggle and a weak and deteriorating 
economy, domestic conditions became increasingly volatile.  Proclaimed as President for 
life, Sukarno nonetheless faced a more difficult balancing act between the left and right of 
Indonesian politics and the consequences of failure were far greater than at any time since 
the revolution.  Between late 1962 and early 1965, the mood changed to the point where 
both sides of the main divide in Indonesian politics felt a showdown was inevitable.   
All this made Confrontation against Malaysia was a high-risk strategy.   It was 
bound to elicit a categorical response from each of the great powers, especially the USA.  
It would keep alive the spirit of nationalism, but the distraction would come at the expense 
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of reforms needed to control ballooning inflation and an overstretched budget.  It would be 
the centrepiece of a foreign policy that had become essentially Realpolitik in character.  
The calculations Sukarno made about alignments increasingly emphasised their 
contribution to state power – a frame of mind reinforced by the experience of the West 
New Guinea struggle.  This thinking is best encapsulated by his remarks to the NAM 
conference in Cairo in October 1964, where he abandoned one of the key tenants of the 
Bandung Declaration and pronounced peaceful coexistence could only be achieved by a 
balance of power.  
Confrontation unfolded in various phases that resulted in Sukarno’s adjustment of 
alignment strategies.  In the first phase from the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion to the 
rupture with Malaysia in September 1963, Sukarno pursued the strategy of competitive 
bidding.  He sought to keep all the great powers engaged with Indonesia over its grievances.  
And he appeared to make a bet each way on whether to pursue a radical foreign policy or 
focus on the economy, in tune with the preferences of the West.  Diplomatic moves to 
resolve differences over the formation of Malaysia were accompanied by the first military 
probes across the border.  The second phase was between September 1963 and July 1964.  
Competitive bidding ceased to be an effective policy.  The military dimensions of 
Confrontation escalated.  But Sukarno kept open the possibility of a negotiated settlement 
and tried to play on Western fears of a rising communist tide in Indonesia as leverage to 
obtain a favorable outcome.  The third phase was from July 1964 until late 1965.  Sukarno 
decisively broke with the West and embarked on radical solutions.  He declared 1965 to be 
“the year of living dangerously” and spoke of leftist leaders as “comrades in arms”; he 
sought support from the NAM for the idea of a third power bloc; he started to embrace a 
hard alignment with China; and he took Indonesia out of the UN.  This culminated with 
the declaration of a symbolic alliance with China in his 1965 Independence Day speech 
and a serious breakdown in relations with the USA and Soviet Union. 
To explain these shifts in alignment behavior, it is useful to understand the 
significance Sukarno attached to Confrontation and his motives for it.  Clearly, alignment 
patterns changed in direct relation to Indonesia’s management of Confrontation.  But this 
is where the causal explanation becomes problematic.  There were several motives 
identified for what inspired Indonesia’s opposition to Malaysia and its escalation into 
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Confrontation.  The contemporary analyses in the USA and Britain that Malaysia was 
perceived as an obstacle to Indonesia’s own designs in Borneo or to its ambition of regional 
leadership, even hegemony, were credible based on the record.  But so too was the idea 
that Indonesia perceived Malaysia as a neo-colonial construct and a British satellite.  This 
was given weight by the extraordinary latitude provided to Britain under the Anglo-
Malaysia Defence Agreement.  The corollary of Malaysia as British puppet was Malaysia 
as potential threat.  There also is ample evidence to support the argument that Sukarno and 
his policymaking circle saw the formation of Malaysia as a threat on other levels, including 
the potential it offered for great power interference in Indonesia and as a counterpoint to 
highlight Indonesia’s internal conflicts and contradictions.  Confrontation against Malaysia 
might just have suited Sukarno’s disposition to adopt a bold foreign policy that rallied his 
people, kept alive the spirit of nationalism and revolution and gave the population hope at 
a time of economic hardship. 
Part of the problem of discerning motive is that Sukarno was never explicit about 
his conditions for ending Confrontation, hence obscuring his reasons for launching it.  This 
creates difficulties for theories of alignment that require an understanding of motivation to 
explain behavior.  Balance of threat would assume that Indonesia ultimately entered into 
alignment with China because it was the most willing to support Indonesia against a real 
and proximate threat posed by the new state.  The trouble with this analysis is that it fails 
to capture the complex process of alignment selection that Indonesia undertook before it 
eventually started to consolidate the relationship with China.  It also would be a big 
assumption, based on the available evidence, to say threat was Indonesia’s sole, or even 
primary, motivation for opposing Malaysia. 
Even in the absence of a clear answer about motive, a balance of risk approach 
might be more useful in explaining the pattern of alignment.  The key variable of criticality 
can be assessed somewhat more objectively.  In the early phases of the bid to establish 
Malaysia, Indonesia officially adopted a relatively relaxed view of the amalgamation of 
Malaya with the British Borneo territories.  Indonesia then followed the well-established 
policy of actively engaging with both the great power blocs to extract benefits from each.  
This policy was at least initially encouraged by the successful outcome of the West New 
Guinea dispute – Indonesia had simultaneously drawn on access to Soviet arms to mount 
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a credible military challenge and American goodwill to facilitate a diplomatic solution.  A 
competitive bidding strategy applied to the Malaysia question might have seen a repeat of 
the experience of West New Guinea.  Stirring public passions over Malaysia, and playing 
on US fears Confrontation would aid the communists, Sukarno might have forced the USA 
to intervene and help settle the issue on Indonesia’s terms.  But when it became clear it was 
harder to drive a wedge between the USA and Britain than it was between the USA and 
the Netherlands, competitive bidding ceased to become an effective strategy and the stakes 
went up.   
The first point of escalation came in September 1963. Indonesia then faced the 
choice of either dropping Confrontation, which would be a loss for Sukarno both 
domestically and internationally, or persisting with a policy that would alienate the West 
and jeopardise the economic reform plans launched by Djuanda.  Sukarno had made a great 
deal of the insults and indignities Indonesia had been subject to by the way the Malaysia 
plan was implemented.  This made it harder for him back down.  As time went by, and 
Indonesia dug in deeper with its opposition to Malaysia, the criticality of the issue to 
Sukarno and the country grew probably beyond its objective or realistic importance to the 
security of the state.  As for the likelihood of a threat emerging from Malaysia, Sukarno 
had made it a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Sukarno sensed the lack of objective rationality in 
Confrontation with his admission that it could not be allowed to drag on indefinitely and 
his private appeals for the Tunku to offer some face saving gestures to a deal, such as in 
his April 1964 conversation with Jones.  The military too had grasped this with its 
independent overtures to Malaysia. 
The second major point of escalation was the Tunku’s White House meeting with 
Johnson.  By then, the inability of Sukarno to back down lent itself to ever increasing risk 
taking, both in terms of bolder military operations like Liver and Lilac and alignment 
arrangements.  The move towards the use of alignment for hard balancing can be viewed 
as an almost involuntary outcome as Indonesia’s diplomatic options narrowed and events 
bore national policy along.  The absence of strong, explicit Soviet support for 
Confrontation was a surprise and a disappointment after the fulsome backing it had given 
the West New Guinea campaign.  At the start, Sukarno had expressed confidence in Soviet 
support.  The NAM states might have been an alternative source of at least diplomatic 
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legitimacy for Indonesia’s position, but they too proved reluctant to embrace Sukarno’s 
grand designs.  The decision to leave the UN can only be described as reckless – there was 
little Sukarno could gain.  He might have fancied such a bold gesture would rally some 
radical states to his side.  In practice, it left China as the sole major source of support.   
This led to the third major point of escalation – the declaration of an “axis” with 
China in August 1965.  Building close ties to China through the course of 1965 was another 
high-stakes gamble for several reasons that must have occurred to Sukarno.  Given the 
fraught history of relations between the pribumi and Sino-Indonesians, there was always 
the prospect alignment with China would spark a renewed outbreak of domestic anti-
Chinese violence.  Alignment with China also would heighten tensions between the army 
and the PKI.  It would likely strengthen the PKI’s standing within the power structures of 
Guided Democracy, in particular its influence over foreign policy.  Internationally, it might 
have acted as another form of leverage for Sukarno to achieve his objectives.  Both the 
USA and Britain were intent on containing China – the USA because of its commitments 
in Indochina and Britain because of its Far East commitments, especially Hong Kong.  
More likely, it would only increase Indonesia’s isolation and result in something Sukarno 
had always tried to avoid – excessive dependence on a single great power.  If Confrontation 
worsened, China would have to be the main source of military support.  This underscored 
the degree of Sukarno’s risk taking.  When it came time to explore the military options in 
1965, Beijing was uncertain what kind of formal commitment it was prepared to make. 
Sukarno believed they were risks worth taking because of the great significance the 
campaign against Malaysia had assumed to his and Indonesia’s credibility and to the 
country’s status as a regional power and leader.  None of his decision making is easy to 
reconcile with a rational choice analysis – Confrontation against Malaysia took on a 
significance beyond any reasonable evaluation of its importance to Indonesian security.  
As losses mounted, Sukarno was drawn into ever more risky policies and actions that could 
not be reconciled with any well-established definition of its national interest.  The behavior 
is consistent with a decision maker trying to recoup sunk costs. 
This picture of balancing risk is consistent with the first hypothesis that the prospect 
of critical loss encourages the adoption of hard or offensive policies.  For Sukarno, the key 
element of the balance of risk was between the prospective loss entailed in the creation of 
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Malaysia on its own terms versus the prospective loss of foreign policy autonomy in a 
closer alignment with China.  On another level, he had to weigh the risk that a de facto 
alliance with China would provoke a domestic and international backlash.  Against this, 
there was the very real prospect that a humiliating retreat over Malaysia would shake 
confidence in his rule.  He evidently decided the hardening of policy in the alignment with 
China was the lesser danger.  That policy hardened with the passage of time, and the growth 
in British and Malaysian resistance to Indonesia, is consistent with the fourth hypothesis 
that the strength of a state’s balancing response should escalate in tandem with the prospect 
of incurring loss. 
Of the other hypotheses, ideology at least superficially has the strongest 
explanatory power.  Indonesia’s “symbolic alliance” with China was a comfortable fit, at 
least for Sukarno, the PKI and left-leaning nationalists, because Jakarta and Beijing shared 
similar views of the international situation.  China’s attacks on imperialism and colonialism 
accorded with Indonesia’s continued emphasis on these topics.  Indonesia also had long 
endorsed China’s view on the status of Taiwan because of its own history in West New 
Guinea.  It was not too great a stretch to see the Vietnam and Korean conflicts as cases of 
anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, given the presence of large numbers of US troops 
in support of the southern regimes.  This then underpinned Sukarno’s decision in his 1965 
Independence Day speech to declare the “Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-
Pyongyang” axis. 
But ideology only buttressed a decision to align with China on pragmatic grounds.  
Sukarno was slow to embark on this alignment for reasons already stated.  When he did 
finally move into “symbolic alliance”, it was because he had run out of alternative sources 
of great power support for Confrontation.  It served his interests to promote the similarity 
of outlook between the two countries to broaden the legitimacy of the alignment, but the 
decision to align was driven by Indonesia’s material rather than ideational needs. 
Aid and transnational penetration offered little significant advantage to the 
initiators.  The experience of the USA is most illustrative.  The preparedness of the USA 
to underwrite Djuanda’s economic reform package provided weak leverage when it 
counted in discouraging the drift to Confrontation.  Given the longstanding reluctance of 
the USA to provide lethal military assistance, it relied on economic incentives as a major 
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source of influence.  It was one of several factors contributing to the USA’s ability to put 
its case to Sukarno, notably in the Kennedy mission to broker a ceasefire and pave the way 
for an “Asian solution”.  But when attempts were made to use aid to overtly pressure 
Indonesia, it had the reverse effect.  Sukarno’s famous admonition to the USA to “go to 
hell” with its aid is frequently misunderstood – it was a reactive comment to US threats 
rather than a rejection of the desirability of aid.  Still, it underscored the limited utility of 
aid in serving the foreign policy interests of the donor.   
The same can be seen of transnational penetration.  The USA invested considerable 
resources in education and propaganda.  Yet the USIS libraries, the centrepiece of the 
efforts to woo public opinion, simply became prominent targets after the launch of an anti-
American campaign.  Subtle forms of influence arguably encouraged like-minded officials 
like Djuanda to pursue orthodox Western policies.  But when those priorities clashed with 
objectives close to the hearts of nationalists they were easily overridden.  China too 
invested considerable resources in information and cultural exchanges and elite visits.  But 
the status of the Sino-Indonesians remained a source of conflict.  While China provided a 
“conceptual and practical inspiration” for Sukarno when he crafted Guided Democracy and 
continued to be a source of ideas in shaping foreign and domestic policy through the early 
1960s, the context of the key alignment decisions show that they were made by the practical 
requirements of Indonesian foreign policy.180 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the perspective of alignment, the period of Confrontation against Malaysia 
saw Indonesia explore several avenues of cooperation.  Initially, Sukarno held out the 
prospect of improved relations with the USA, which required abandoning foreign policy 
adventures to focus on economic development.  But Indonesia continued to manoeuvre to 
avoid dependence on any one great power by practicing the then well-developed strategy 
of competitive bidding. 
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As Confrontation deepened, Sukarno searched for international supporters as the 
relationship with the USA withered.  The first break with the USA occurred because of 
British and Malay insistence on setting a fixed date for the establishment of Malaysia.  
Although unknown to the Indonesians, Britain and Malaya intended to press ahead with 
their plans to incorporate the Borneo territories in a new state regardless of the outcome of 
a UN survey of opinion.  This led to the eruption of violent protest in Jakarta in September.  
The tit-for-tat diplomatic provocations and demonstrations that followed effectively ended 
the US-sponsored economic stabilisation program. 
Consequently, Sukarno moved to step up the military dimensions of Confrontation 
to pile pressure on the Western powers.  The opportunity for a diplomatic solution 
gradually faded during 1964 with the failure of the Kennedy mission and the Bangkok 
talks.  The second big break occurred after the failure of Asian diplomacy and the Tunku’s 
reception at the White House by Johnson.  From that point, there was little prospect of 
negotiating an end to hostilities.  Sukarno increased his efforts to find allies, first turning 
to NAM and then, when that failed, to China.  In doing so, Indonesia adopted a hard-
balancing posture. 
The experience of Confrontation revealed Sukarno to be a careful calculator of risk.  
In its first stage, he followed a similar pattern to the West New Guinea campaign.  But 
Sukarno miscalculated in the attempt to bluff the Western powers to back down to 
Indonesian demands over the terms for the creation of Malaysia.  This led to an escalation 
of Confrontation in which the previous alignment strategy of competitive bidding was 
replaced with hard balancing.  As the stakes in Confrontation became increasingly high, 
Sukarno hardened his alignment strategy from urging NAM countries to explicitly back 
Indonesia and form a third power bloc to eventually entering a “symbolic alliance” with 
China.  This is consistent with the first hypothesis that the prospect of severe loss 
encourages hard or offensive policies.  It also is consistent with the fourth hypothesis that 
the balancing response should escalate in tandem with the prospect of loss.  Hypotheses on 
the role of ideology, aid and transnational penetration showed they had a weak impact. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
The Balance of Risk in Indonesian 
(Non)alignment, 1945-1965 
 
 
The Republic of Indonesia was born at the dawn of the Cold War and its foreign 
relations were shaped by the incessant competition of that global rivalry.  In the 20 years after 
Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945, the great powers sought to either seduce or 
coerce it into aligning itself with one of the two opposing ideological camps – Soviet-led statist 
communism or US-led democratic capitalism.  After the rise of the People’s Republic of China, 
and with growing intensity after the Sino-Soviet split, a third force emerged to seek Indonesia’s 
allegiance.  For these three great powers, the contest in Indonesia was the key to foreign policy 
and strategic dominance in Southeast Asia. 
Why was the ideological orientation of Indonesia so great a prize?  While history 
accords greater attention to the wars in Indochina and on the Korean peninsula, the strategic 
significance of Indonesia made it the principal Asian battleground of the early Cold War.  The 
regional map reveals Indonesia’s strategic centrality in Southeast Asia: the archipelago 
stretches more than 5,000 kilometres from east to west, straddling essential sea lanes that 
connect the Indian and Pacific oceans.1  In the post-war years, natural resources like oil, rubber 
and tin were viewed as crucial in a future armed conflict between the great powers.  Just as 
importantly for them, Indonesia had the largest population in East Asia outside China.  It was 
overwhelmingly Muslim.  How it aligned had both a psychological and a material bearing on 
the global Cold War balance. 
As a new state, Indonesia needed an active partnership with the great powers. During 
the revolution against the Dutch, this was a matter of survival.  After the Republic secured its 
sovereignty in December 1949, great power cooperation was seen as essential to national 
security and development.  But Indonesia, then militarily and economically weak, was wary of 
being drawn into an international conflict that was divorced from its immediate national 
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interests.  The country also had a polity that was divided by class, religion, race and political 
ideology.  If the state sided with either the communist or capitalist blocs in the international 
struggle, it risked sparking domestic instability, even bloodshed. 
Instead, Indonesia elected to adopt an official policy of neutrality during the 
independence revolution, which it styled as a bebas-aktif or independent-and-active foreign 
policy.  Neutrality was later recast as nonalignment when this term was coined to describe 
those countries who were not in alliance with either the communist or capitalist blocs.  
However, successive Indonesian governments in practice departed from this founding precept 
of foreign policy.  The record of Indonesian foreign policy between 1945 and 1965 is one of 
considerable uncertainty over its alignment preferences.  Foreign policy shifted from pro-
American, to strictly neutral, pro-Soviet and, finally, pro-Chinese, even as these tendencies 
were palliated in public and private diplomacy with reassurances of friendship to all parties.  
The ambiguities left the great powers guessing over Indonesia’s true intentions.  Indonesia’s 
fluctuating alignment behavior often defied simple causal explanations.  
This work has sought to answer the question of what drove that behavior during the 
two decades after Indonesia declared independence.  It has attempted to record and explain 
how Indonesia responded to the great power rivalry to coax it into alignment.  It questioned 
whether standard approaches to analysing alignment behavior, in particular balance of power 
and balance of threat, could adequately account for the complexity of Indonesia’s changing 
patterns of alignment.  Instead, it sought to model the alignment decisions of policymakers as 
a balance of risk.  It depicted the fundamental choice facing policymakers as a trade-off:  lost 
policy autonomy and the possibility of provoking domestic and international tensions was 
weighed against the international and national political objectives to be served by alignment.  
The more critical the objective, especially the avoidance of what was perceived to be a 
significant state loss, the greater the tendency to make strong alignment commitments.  One 
risk (the consequences of the commitments, obligations and constraints of alignment) was 
balanced against another (the sacrifice of a critical political objective).  This was found to 
provide a superior explanation for Indonesia’s alignment conduct than balance of power and 
balance of threat.  It better explained alignment decisions on occasions when Indonesia itself 
could be viewed as the source of threat or when it was difficult to conclude external conditions 
presented any objective threat or change in the configuration of power.  
This concluding chapter will assess the explanatory value of a risk-focused analysis of 
alignment against the alternatives.  It will review the evidence from the record of Indonesian 
alignment behavior between 1945 and 1965 to assess main research findings against the seven 
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hypotheses presented in Chapter One.  It will then draw on the accumulated evidence to answer 
the research questions.  And it will conclude by suggesting future avenues of research. 
 
Balancing Risk or Balancing Threat in Indonesian Alignment 
 
The starting point for an analysis of alignments should be to ask, what purposes do they 
serve?  Why do states align?  The obvious answer is that alignments enable states to fulfil their 
political and economic objectives, most importantly enhanced security and prosperity.  In a 
world of complete security, there arguably would be no need for alignments outside economic 
and technical cooperation.   In such a world, states might prefer to minimise or completely 
avoid many military and political commitments, as they would prize their freedom and have 
no reason to bear the material and ideational costs of alignment, which can be evaluated in 
terms of lost policy autonomy.2  That basic proposition underpins the thinking behind seeing 
alignment decisions as an exercise in balancing risk.  It presupposes that the default position 
of states should be to prefer to avoid alignment commitments unless they are perceived to be 
absolutely necessary.  That was undoubtedly the case with Indonesia between 1945 and 1965. 
Indonesia’s official adoption of the bebas-aktif policy in 1948 was a deft means of 
handling a range of international and domestic pressures on the Republic during the revolution.  
It was designed to minimise opposition to the republican government at home and abroad and 
maintain the solidarity of the revolution.  But it also captured the zeitgeist of the revolution by 
enjoining the Indonesian people to stand on their own feet and demonstrate their independence 
in foreign policy.  The commitment to independence, activity and neutrality in the Cold War 
was a practical means of managing the politics of foreign policy.  But it also reflected a 
profound belief in the virtues of autonomous statehood.  “Independence means, in the first 
instance, avoiding dependence,” as Weinstein put it. “It is the task of foreign policymakers to 
assure that Indonesia does not rely so heavily on others as to jeopardise Jakarta’s ability to 
determine its own policies.”3 
This thinking paved the way for Indonesia to eventually identify as a nonaligned state.  
It became an ideal for measuring the legitimacy of foreign policy, even as policy in practice 
departed dramatically from the ideal mean.  The various alignment strategies employed in the 
20 years after the declaration of independence shared the common purpose of preserving, to 
                                                
2 The idea that states try to prioritise their autonomy is a viewed shared by those who argue alliances to 
balance power are an inevitable part of international politics. See, Waltz, op. cit., p. 194. 
3 Weinstein, Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, p. 30. 
 314 
the greatest extent possible, the independence of foreign policy, while maximising whatever 
benefits a particular alignment was perceived to impart.   
The balance of risk in alignment, therefore, was in the first place a balance between the 
risk of sacrificing the ideal of policy freedom and the perceived necessity of alignments to 
meet other national and international objectives.  But policymakers, particularly those in a state 
suffering from Indonesia’s manifold weaknesses, could ill-afford to provide grounds to 
empower or invent local and foreign enemies.  It meant that on a second level the balance of 
risk was between the significance of the objective and the risk of an alignment generating 
domestic and international opposition to the state and regime.  The sacrifice of policy 
autonomy and the prospect of international and domestic opposition – these were the broad 
categories of risk that policymakers sought to balance in the Indonesian case.  The basic 
proposition is modelled below.  It should be stressed that the arrow of causality points in both 
directions.  A central feature of this analysis is that alignment decisions are viewed as a 
function of interaction between domestic and international factors, mediated by individual 
policymakers.  Whether domestic or international factors assume precedence will be 
contingent on the circumstances and priorities of policymakers.  But alignment decision 
making should be seen as a continuous process, whereby an alignment choice can contribute 
to a feedback loop at both the domestic and international levels.   
 
                                              Balance of Risk Theory 
 
       Soft                                    Degree of alignment                                       Hard      
 
       Risk4                                      Smart strategies                                       Criticality 
                                                                                                               of Objective5 
 
Figure 1. Balance of risk theory 
 
                                                
4 The key risks to alignment are the loss of policy autonomy and/or inciting domestic and international 
opposition to a particular alignment orientation. 
5 This could alternatively be viewed as the “expected value” in expected utility theory.  But the term 
“criticality of objective” better captures the idea that policymakers attach a higher degree of importance 
or value to some objectives than others.  
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The key variable determining the nature and degree of alignment commitments is 
assumed to be the criticality of the objective.  This could range from the development of 
economic and security capacity to regime survival; from the assertion of a territorial claim to 
the preservation of territorial, political and economic independence; from an attempt to revise 
international rules and institutions to the promotion of international leadership and national 
stature.  Objectives could be broadly categorised as defensive (aimed at maintaining the status 
quo) or offensive (aimed at revising the status quo).6  This focus on the importance of the 
objective to policymakers creates scope for a broader range of alignment causes and behaviors 
than a focus on clear and present danger, as Walt effectively defines threat, or the existence of 
an imbalance in external power.7   
An alignment strategy can be proactive rather than simply reactive.  It can be 
precautionary – a response to uncertainty surrounding a critical objective.  It can reflect the 
fact policymakers cannot know the intentions of others far enough in advance to build adequate 
defensive strength from their own resources.  Accounting for the longevity of certain 
alignments or alignment strategies, through several fluctuating episodes of threat, might 
require them to be viewed as a form of insurance.8  Moreover, if alignment strategies are 
embedded for long enough, they can become a policy orthodoxy, acceptance of which 
                                                
6 Defensive objectives would include preventing territorial loss or existential threats to the regime or 
state; offensive objectives would include revision of international rules or regimes and the initiation of 
war to seize territory.  
7 As noted previously, Walt relies on evidence of “aggressive intentions”, alongside variables or power 
and geography to define the existence of a threat that causes alliance.  This implies armed conflict is 
imminent.  Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 22-28.  Again, as noted in the introduction, Waltz argues 
balances of power are the inevitable result of interaction between states in an anarchic (self-help) 
international system.  See, Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 116-123.  There are variations 
on this latter theme, such as so-called offensive realism, which argued states try to ensure their security 
by accruing as much power as possible. See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 3. 
8 Factors motivating insurance are complex.  Kanheman and Tversky, op. cit., p. 286 argue a 
comprehensive theory of insurance behavior is lacking and would need to consider attitudes to 
uncertainty and “such factors as the value of security, social norms and prudence, the aversiveness of a 
large number of small payments spread over time, information and misinformation regarding 
probabilities and outcomes, and many others”.  Still, it is possible to see the longevity of some alliance 
relationships as security insurance policies.  The ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States survived the end of the Cold War and a long peace in the Asia Pacific.  NATO also 
survived the Cold War and the long peace in Europe.  Another case is cited by J.J. Suh.  He finds the 
US-Korea alliance persisted during a period from the 1990s when several steps taken by Pyongyang 
lessened tensions.  He argues balance of threat fails to explain alliance persistence because of the decline 
in the North’s “aggressive intentions”.  See “The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism”, in 
J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson (eds.), Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power 
and Efficiency, Stanford University Press (2004), p. 140. 
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reinforces political legitimacy.9  In this case, a particular alignment strategy might have less to 
do with the reality of external circumstances than internal political dynamics.  The differences 
between a balance of risk and balance of power or balance of threat are illustrated below.  As 
depicted by Walt, the arrow of causality points one way; there is a linear causal relationship 
between the putative impulse and alignment outcome.  In both cases, alignment is determined 
to be a function purely of variables external to the state. 
 
                                                   Balance of Power Theory 
 
 
 
Imbalances of        cause    alliances against          
      power                                          the strongest state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    Balance of Threat Theory 
 
 
Imbalances of         cause                     alliances against the 
     threat                                                       most threatening state 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Balance of power versus Balance of threat theory10 
 
 
By placing emphasis on the significance of a state’s objectives, a balance of risk 
approach challenges whether imbalances of power or the emergence of threat are alone 
sufficient to account for changes in alignments.  Indonesian policymakers certainly had an 
acute awareness of the roles of power and threat.  Both underpinned Sukarno’s pressure tactics 
over West New Guinea and Malaysia.  Indonesia had witnessed the machinations of foreign 
                                                
9 Suh provides a good account of the mechanisms by which alliances become embedded in political 
practice.  See, ibid., pp. 150-164.  Arguably, this idea of alignment embedded via political and social 
practice applies to Indonesia’s bebas-aktif policy. 
10 This is how the two theories were modelled in Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 265. 
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powers from the Dutch before the war, to the Japanese during the war, and the allied powers 
after war as the Dutch tried to reimpose colonial rule.  The USA, which had been viewed as a 
potential champion for the new states, proved itself more concerned with the Cold War rivalry 
and the stability of Europe than winning the hearts and minds of decolonising peoples.  
Whether by preference or bitter experience, Sukarno became a skilled and committed 
practitioner of Realpolitik.  By the end of Guided Democracy, Sukarno had concluded that the 
only way to make the “Old Established Forces of the world respect Indonesia” was to “answer 
(them) with guns”.11 
But there is no evidence Indonesia’s changing patterns of alignment in the 1950s and 
1960s corresponded with either changes in a regional or global balance of power.  The USA 
and Britain remained the preponderant powers in Southeast Asia.  No regional power was 
capable of challenging them.  Notwithstanding the Soviet Union’s global struggle with the 
USA, it could not match the power projection of the West.  In Indonesia, it depended on the 
power of aid and ideology to compete.  But Jakarta steadfastly avoided being draw directly 
into the US-Soviet rivalry.  Alignment policy was geared to engagement with both sides of the 
Cold War divide to advance Indonesia’s own objectives and avoid being drawn in as a partisan 
of either one of the ideological camps.  In doing so, Indonesia neither balanced nor 
bandwagoned.  The only episode of overt balancing came as Confrontation against Malaysia 
reached a peak of intensity.  Indonesia walked out of the UN and formed a symbolic alliance 
with China.  But to attribute this manoeuvre to balancing power would overlook the obvious 
point that the regional power configuration Indonesia faced had not changed in the years since 
it had won independence.  What had changed was that Sukarno’s attempts to bluff and 
blackmail his opponents over Malaysia’s formation had failed.  He was then locked into a 
pattern of increasing risk taking as he ran out of options for alignments that would aid his 
cause. 
The focus on objectives also sheds a different light on what constitutes threat.  
Indonesians were able to find threat in situations that outsiders would not.  Neither Dutch 
occupation of West New Guinea nor the creation of the state of Malaysia were viewed as 
unambiguous threats to Indonesian security in Western capitals, including Washington, but 
they could be construed that way in Jakarta.  Communist states generally were happy to indulge 
Jakarta’s diffidence, even as the Soviet Union harbored its own doubts over the validity of 
Confrontation against Malaysia. 
                                                
11 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 288. 
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It would appear evident that the appetite policymakers have for risk-taking depends on 
the character of a given objective and the importance they accord it.  The case of Indonesia 
between 1945 and 1965 suggests the process of investing objectives with value is highly 
contingent on factors as diverse as a state’s history, identity, leadership characteristics, the 
political and economic structure they operate within and the nature of their interactions with 
other states.  It follows that a considerable amount of information is required to identify what 
objectives a state might regard as affecting its core interests.  But there are likely to be sources 
of contention – for example, a perception of incomplete sovereignty or a threat to regime 
survival – that will elicit similar reactions from all states.  And states tend to be open about 
profound grievances.  The depth of feeling can often be discerned from the public discourse – 
no one who followed Indonesian politics in the 1950s and 1960s was left in any doubt about 
the significance attached to absorbing West New Guinea. 
This will tell us something about how a risky choice over alignment is framed.  But, as 
was shown in the introduction, the key to understanding the way choices are made is a two-
step process.  While the first step is to identify framing, the second involves the complicated 
task of determining how it is evaluated.  Two methods have been considered here: a rational 
choice analysis and a psychological analysis, based on prospect theory.  If a rational choice 
explanation suffices, then decision making will be seen a cost-benefit analysis, leading to an 
outcome aimed at maximisation of value for the decision maker.  If a rational choice 
explanation is insufficient, a more complete explanation might lie in a psychological analysis.  
Prospect theory proposes that decision makers will be risk averse when facing certain gains 
and risk seeking when facing certain losses, with reaction to the prospect of losses being 
significantly overweighted.  The application of this approach entails the further critical task of 
determining the reference point the decision maker uses to assess the prospect or losses or 
gains.  While the reference point is usually the status quo, aspirations can set an alternative 
reference point and reference points might shift as gains and losses are experienced.  The 
greater simplicity of a rational choice approach probably should make this the preferred 
method of analysis where it is adequate.   
But there were occasions when it was evident a psychological analysis of risk 
evaluation offered a more complete description of alignment policy.  The West New Guinea 
and Malaysia campaigns manifested a degree of risk taking that could not be easily reconciled 
with rational choice.  The alignment balancing act Sukarno conducted over West New Guinea 
was between the desire to obtain the military capability necessary to assert Indonesia’s 
territorial claim – which could only come from the Soviet Union – and a combination of 
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domestic and international factors.  Those factors included the loss of policy freedom that was 
entailed in an increasingly close alignment with the Soviet Union, the unease that the 
Indonesian army and other right-wing forces had over excessive closeness to a communist 
great power, and the prospect of alienating the USA, which Indonesia valued as a diplomatic, 
economic and military partner.  How great a risk Sukarno was prepared to accept is evidenced 
by the fact Indonesia ultimately planned for war.  The actual and potential costs to Indonesia 
of building up its military and waging a war at a time when it faced enormous development 
challenges and a fragile economy would appear to outweigh any benefits that could possibly 
be derived from winning sovereignty over West New Guinea.  Sukarno himself played down 
the relative material significance of West New Guinea to the rest of Indonesia, describing it as 
a small “kelor leaf” compared to the size of the archipelago.12  Sukarno’s risk taking can only 
be understood if one appreciates the depth of feeling over the ‘loss’ of West New Guinea.  This 
is most powerfully conveyed in Sukarno’s impassioned reflection that the continued Dutch 
possession of West New Guinea was akin to losing a limb.  It was the extent of this loss that 
made Sukarno’s action seem reasonable to his fellow Indonesians.  There was never a foreign 
policy issue in the time frame of the case study that so completely united the political parties, 
the army and the people. 
A cost-benefit analysis also fails to adequately capture the decision-making in 
Confrontation against Malaysia, where an escalation in the stakes over time prompted an 
increasing pattern of risk taking on the part of Sukarno.  Even if the creation of Malaysia could 
be portrayed as a threat to Indonesia – which was at least one strand in a complex narrative – 
the pattern of risk taking was at odds with what a normative application of rational choice 
would recommend.  Sukarno isolated Indonesia from the international community and 
developed an increasingly close relationship with China – a power that could then offer little 
material assistance to Indonesia – as the crisis ratchetted up in such a way that a back down 
would have represented an unacceptable loss of status and prestige, and even endangered 
Sukarno’s leadership.  It might be worth noting at this point that risk propensities of individuals 
have been observed to vary according to their personality traits.13  Experiments in prospect 
theory reveal typical responses, but they do not prove there is a uniform attitude to risky choice 
among all actors.  The record suggests that Sukarno by nature was inclined to risk taking.  
                                                
12 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 287.  The kelor is the very small edible leaf of the fast growing Moringa tree.  
13 Paul Huth, D. Scott Bennett and Christopher Gelpi, “System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and 
International Conflict Among the Great Powers”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1992), 
pp. 282-283. 
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Certainly, in his rhetoric, most famously with reference to a year of living dangerously, he 
appeared to relish risk rather than be disconcerted by it. 
An assessment of Indonesian alignment behavior solely as a response to calculations 
of external power and threat would miss on another count.  It would not capture the subtlety 
of state policy throughout the 20-year period.  An important element of Indonesia’s balancing 
of risk was to avoid becoming wholly dependent on any one great power.  As noted above, 
Indonesia’s default preference was to avoid alignments because they impinged on policy 
freedom.  To this end, it pursued what have been referred to as smart strategies.  Unlike the 
predictions of the theories of balance of power and balance of threat that states will either 
balance or bandwagon, the experience of Indonesia shows that they can adopt a range of 
alignment strategies designed to minimise the risk of state capture.14  A wide variety of 
strategies have been described in the literature.15  Here two have been added that were 
commonly used by successive Indonesian governments – competitive bidding and undisclosed 
alignment.  For Indonesia’s circumstances, these were especially apposite.  Both helped 
minimise the polarisation of domestic debate over foreign policy.  Competitive bidding had 
the additional virtue of preserving a degree of policy autonomy, while maximising the return 
to Indonesia from multiple relationships.    
But all the smart alignment strategies employed, including hiding, hedging, wedging, 
transcending and Omnibalancing, served the purpose of managing risk.  They reduced the 
obligations and constraints that would have come with hard alignment and reduced the 
potential for a domestic or international backlash from forces that disputed a particular 
alignment.  One advantage of a balance of risk approach is that it potentially unites all the 
disparate smart strategies in a single coherent framework rather than treating them as discrete, 
loosely related instruments.  It also can account for alignment in the absence of manifest threat 
when policymakers’ estimations of long-term security objectives can lead to the use of 
alignment as a form of insurance. 
Still, there is no dispute that external power configurations and threat do have a seminal 
influence on alignment decisions.  Internal threat to the regime can too, especially when it 
conflates with an external threat.  Indeed, the whole tenor of foreign policy is likely to be 
                                                
14 As noted previously, Walt gives states the options of either balancing or bandwagoning against threat.  
See, Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning”, pp. 96-98.  However, he did subsequently 
acknowledge that this was too limited.  See, Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A 
Reply to Kaufmann and Labs”, pp. 448-482. 
15 Bock and Henneberg, “Why Balancing Fails: Theoretical reflections on Stephen M. Walt’s ‘Balance 
of Threat’ Theory”, pp. 10-17. 
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influenced by the character of the international-domestic threat environment, bearing on what 
objectives a state is prepared to pursue and when it might pursue them.  The absence of a 
preponderant regional power and low levels of threat to state and regime security do create 
greater space for foreign policy to be invested with individual and group preferences.  In 
contrast, in the midst of a region beset by interstate or civil war, or the likelihood of it, 
policymakers are likely to adopt a cautious foreign policy and focus on national security.  Their 
alignment policy will be geared towards minimising any external and internal dangers.  
Indonesia experienced such conditions in 1958 when a combination of domestic rebellion and 
covert US intervention threatened to split the country and destabilise the central government. 
This was a period of reduced ambition in foreign policy.  The alignment strategy of 
Omnibalancing (fighting the rebels while appeasing their foreign sponsor) was aimed at 
preserving regime and state integrity.  
But for most of the two decades after the Second World War, Indonesia was the 
beneficiary of relatively benign security conditions in its corner of Southeast Asia, even as 
domestic political competition was the source of frequent instability in government.  The big 
foreign policy initiatives of the era, notably the 1951 decision of the Sukiman government to 
sign the San Francisco Treaty and the US Mutual Security Act protocols, the 1955 convening 
of the Asia-Africa conference and the subsequent launch in 1961 of NAM, occurred in an 
environment in which policymakers had the confidence to pursue their ambitions, 
notwithstanding persistent domestic and international tensions.  The idea that it is easier to 
project state interests and preferences in times of stability is consistent with Walt’s observation 
that ideology “was most useful in explaining alliance decisions when the prevailing array of 
threats was either modest or indeterminate”.16  The same could be said of nonalignment and 
Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy.  Both were most likely to flourish in times of high state 
and regime security. 
Under these circumstances, the major foreign policy initiatives are often easier to 
understand in terms of rational choice calculations – Indonesian leaders enjoyed the political 
space they were accorded to advance what they perceived as national interests in terms of 
economic development, greater security or enhanced national stature.  The tilt towards the 
USA in 1951 was a calculated decision that supported both the domestic and international 
agendas of the Masyumi-led government of Sukiman Wirjosandjojo.  Although it proved a 
                                                
16 Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 266-267.  Walt concluded ideology played a bigger role in explaining 
superpower commitments because the two were “roughly equal in terms of their other characteristics”. 
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miscalculation that caused Sukiman’s downfall, the undoubted risk taking in the government’s 
pro-American policies was reasonable in the domestic and international circumstances and 
promised to serve its objectives.  Burhanuddin Harahap’s decision in 1955 to lean back towards 
the West to try to reach a negotiated settlement with the Dutch over West New Guinea was a 
rational assessment of the best avenue for achieving Indonesian goals.  Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
who presided over the most ambitious foreign policy of the constitutional democracy period, 
had a clear objective: in his own words, he wanted to give Indonesia a stronger voice in 
international politics and increase its stature.  His ends and means are consistent with a rational 
choice.   
 
Main Findings for Balance of Risk 
 
Hypothesis 1:  When the prospect of critical loss to the state or regime is perceived to 
be high, states should prefer hard or offensive policies, including building their own military 
strength and balancing alliances.  This should be the first preference in the event of a high risk 
of high loss.  
 
The strongest evidence for this hypothesis was found in the cases of Indonesia’s 
territorial claim over West New Guinea and its opposition to the formation of Malaysia.  In the 
case of West New Guinea, Chapters Seven and Eight showed how the refusal of the Dutch to 
relinquish what Indonesians regarded as an inalienable part of their territorial inheritance came 
over time to be manifested as a critical loss to the state.  There was no more important foreign 
policy objective during the 1950s and early 1960s than the absorption of the territory into the 
Indonesian state. 
 The West New Guinea claim drove Indonesia’s desire for a military build-up and the 
consequent tightening of relations with the Soviet Union.  There was a direct correlation 
between the depth of the grievance over denied sovereignty, the shift of alignment posture, and 
the acquisition of offensive military power.  But even as Sukarno sought to cultivate the Soviet 
Union for the purposes of winning military and diplomatic support for Indonesia’s territorial 
claim, he was conscious of maintaining a balancing act that preserved Indonesia’s policy 
freedom and avoided alienating anti-communist forces at home and abroad.  Sukarno thus 
persisted with a range of smart strategies, such as competitive bidding, hiding and hedging, 
that were designed to maximise his policy flexibility.   
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In refining his use of competitive bidding, Sukarno used the threat that Indonesia might 
drift further into the Soviet camp and launch a war that would compromise American interests 
in the region to try to force a diplomatic solution.  Simultaneously, he led the Soviets to believe 
that he was ready to take a confrontational approach to the resolution of the West New Guinea 
dispute that would have driven a wedge between Washington and Jakarta or caused a split 
within NATO.  This strategy proved effective because the USA still believed Indonesia could 
be saved from the communist camp and the Soviet Union perceived its best chance to swing a 
crucial Southeast Asian state to the communist camp.  Both understood the enormous 
significance to their respective positions in the region should Indonesia fall one way or the 
other.  
Sukarno enjoyed a relatively free hand in policymaking at this time because of the 
strong domestic support for the West New Guinea claim.  Indonesia also could count on greater 
international support following the founding of the NAM and the intensification of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, which had increased the desire of the great powers to befriend Indonesia.  
Notwithstanding the permissive conditions, the prospect of a negotiated settlement suited 
Sukarno too.  Although the incorporation of West New Guinea was regarded as a critical, non-
negotiable issue, and the status quo a manifest loss, the acceptance of risk implied by this 
framing of the issue did not mean Sukarno preferred to take risks.   
It is undoubtedly true that he was not bluffing with threats to launch major military 
action.  This was part of a move to drive a wedge between the USA and its ally the Netherlands.  
But he walked a fine line because if war did break out it would have represented the failure of 
his overall strategy, forcing Indonesia into a headlong conflict with the West and a more 
binding, dependent relationship with the Soviet Union.  Although Sukarno had adopted a 
relatively hard alignment with the Soviet Union as the price of building up its military power, 
he did not want to sacrifice Indonesia’s policy autonomy any more than necessary.  An 
alignment with the Soviet Union that was too close would likely have provoked tensions with 
the army, the strongest state institution.  It almost certainly would have rekindled the kind of 
covert intervention and destabilisation that occurred in 1958, including in Sukarno’s mind 
attempts on his life.   
For the above reasons, competitive bidding served to buttress an overall policy that 
could be described as hiding or hedging.  But the balancing of risks that resulted in these 
policies required multiple calculations.  On one plane, it required managing the risk of 
entrapment in Soviet foreign policy designs against the risk of losing the struggle with the 
Dutch for control of West New Guinea; on another plane, it required managing the risk of 
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hostility from domestic right-wing political forces and the Western powers against the 
desirability of accessing Soviet military capability. 
While the idea of balancing risk helps frame the choice problem, the explanation for 
the choices actually made between the competing priorities Sukarno faced requires a deeper 
look at his evaluations.  It is possible to view Sukarno’s preferences as the result of a cost-
benefit analysis.  But that assumes a reasonable independent observer would agree the goal of 
incorporating West New Guinea was critical to Indonesia’s security and prosperity, and indeed 
so critical that it was worth fighting a war over.  Washington certainly did not see it that way.  
It’s doubtful even the Soviets did, although they were happy to goad Sukarno into a conflict. 
A better explanation of Sukarno’s decisions comes from seeing them as driven by a 
subjective calculation of what represented gains and losses.  If we accept that Indonesia’s 
aspiration levels had been built to the point where the status quo of continued Dutch occupation 
of West New Guinea represented the realisation of a critical loss to the state, the subsequent 
brinkmanship and willingness to risk violence is more explicable.  Moreover, both Indonesia 
and the Netherlands would see concessions as losses – the Netherlands because of the 
endowment effect from clinging to this colonial remnant for more than a decade after 
Indonesian independence.  Therefore, the willingness to take risks was a feature of the 
bargaining on both sides, which is one of the reasons the USA found it so difficult to broker a 
negotiated settlement.  These factors give a psychological analysis of choice an edge over a 
rational analysis.  Of particular relevance here, the result of Sukarno’s calculations accorded 
with the hypothesis that the higher the prospect of losses or the more critical the objective is 
perceived to be the greater the tendency to adopt offensive policies, including hard alignments.   
The second experience of Confrontation over Malaysia, described in Chapter Nine, led 
to the greatest period of peril in Indonesian foreign policy in the 20 years after the declaration 
of independence.  There were several phases to the campaign to prevent the formation of 
Malaysia.  But from the perspective of alignment it is useful to divide the analysis in three 
parts:  the first covers the period from the Brunei rebellion in December 1962, which acted as 
a trigger for Indonesia to abandon its earlier sanguinity over the formation of Malaysia, to the 
eruption of violent protests and a break in diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur in 
September 1963; the second stretches until July 1964 when Johnson hosted the Tunku at the 
White House; the third until late 1965 when Sukarno declared am “axis” with China and 
several other communist states. 
In the period from December 1962 to September 1963, Indonesia persisted with the 
policy of competitive bidding.  As Sukarno hardened his opposition to the creation of Malaysia, 
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he employed the tactics that had worked well in obtaining Indonesia’s objectives in West New 
Guinea.  He used a combination of military pressure and warnings that the West was playing 
into the hands of domestic and international communists to force the acceptance of his 
demands.  In this period, Sukarno appeared to vacillate between the determined prosecution of 
Confrontation and adherence to a US-backed economic stabilisation plan.  The rupture in 
September 1963 ended competitive bidding as a viable policy.  Sukarno ditched the economic 
stabilisation plan.  But he continued to try to keep the USA engaged and mounted pressure for 
a diplomatic solution on terms that would at least provide a face-saving exit.  He increasingly 
explored options for support from other parties, including the NAM states and China.  This 
phase ended with the promise of US support for the Tunku in July 1964.  Sukarno then pursued 
the idea of a third power bloc, an increasingly hard alignment with China and took Indonesia 
out of the UN.  This phase reached a peak with the declaration of an “axis” with China in 
August 1965.  Indonesia’s alignment policies during the last period of Confrontation could be 
characterised as driven by ideas of Realpolitik that had been refined in the West New Guinea 
campaign.  
 The shift of alignment strategy from competitive bidding to hard alignment with China 
reflected a parallel escalation of risk taking by Sukarno and an escalation of the perceived 
stakes in Confrontation.  At the time Sukarno employed competitive bidding he had a 
reasonable expectation that the pressure he applied would have a similar result to the West 
New Guinea campaign.  He was in a position to set the tempo of events.  The balance of risk 
then favored preserving Indonesia’s policy autonomy and avoiding actions that could produce 
either a spike of opposition either at home or abroad.   
The hardening of alignment strategy was to be expected as Indonesia became 
increasingly isolated and Sukarno, who had invested a great deal of personal credibility in 
Confrontation, faced the potential of a humiliating defeat.  In other words, his prospect of 
losses continued to mount as Confrontation dragged on.  Indeed, Sukarno’s risk-taking in 
Confrontation was allowed to grow beyond any rational calculation of its importance to 
Indonesia’s security, emulating the gambler who tries to recover his sunk costs.  The risks of 
alignment with China included heightening domestic competition between the army and PKI, 
reviving domestic anti-Chinese sentiment, increasing Indonesia’s dependency on a single great 
power, and further alienating Western countries that had shown a propensity to intervene in 
domestic affairs.  The only advantage might be the additional pressure it would place on the 
USA, Britain and Malaysia to agree to a solution that met some minimum conditions for a deal.  
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It is hard to reconcile the pattern of decision making with rational choice.  The 
normative application of cost-benefit would suggest Sukarno should have cut his losses 
sometime in 1963 before emotions got out of hand later that year.  Sukarno’s domestic stocks 
were so high after the West New Guinea victory that a diplomatic device to retreat with 
minimal loss of face would not have seriously eroded his status.  But a retreat at any time 
before Indonesia withdrew from the UN and entered symbolic alliance with China would have 
been preferable to those decisions, which did not serve Indonesia’s security or economic 
interests. 
Sukarno’s decision making then is better understood through the lens of the 
psychological analysis suggested by prospect theory.  He had set the reference point for gains 
and losses in Confrontation when he insisted Malaysia should not be formed without a full 
plebiscite in the Borneo territories.  The determination of Malaya and Britain to proceed, 
regardless of what Bornean opinion was assessed to be, set the two sides on a collision course.  
It represented a direct challenge to the image Sukarno had of Indonesia as the region’s leading 
power, with an entitlement to be consulted on its geopolitical disposition.  As Sukarno moved 
further and further into the domain of losses, he tried to bluff, threaten and intimidate his 
opponents.  With his losses mounting, Sukarno felt he had to bid up the stakes.  But even he 
recognised there was diminishing utility in his brinkmanship, privately admitting as much to 
the US ambassador.  In the end, he reached a point of no return with his alignment with China 
– his last major foreign policy initiative.  It was a move that was bound to accentuate the risks 
of lost policy autonomy and heightened domestic and international opposition to foreign 
policy. 
The pattern of risk taking is consistent with the hypothesis that alignment posture ought 
to harden in proportion to the prospect of critical losses or the size of the stakes involved in a 
conflict.  The case of Confrontation over Malaysia provides a good example of the benefits of 
a balance of risk analysis over alternative explanations.  Sukarno’s motives for initiating and 
expanding Confrontation are unclear.  The depiction of Malaysia as threat is only one of several 
plausible explanations of motive.  And, in any case, Confrontation expanded in ways that 
obscured its origins.  Confrontation revealed was an evolutionary decision-making process that 
tied alignment posture to the growing prospect of the state and regime suffering critical losses. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  When the prospect of critical loss to state or regime is perceived to be 
high, yet it has no recourse to ‘hard’ balancing policies, it should prefer a variety of ‘smart’ 
 327 
alignment strategies or, as a last resort, to bandwagon with a threatening state.  This should 
apply only if balancing options are unavailable. 
 
The experience of the revolutionary years would appear to contradict the hypothesis 
that states or regimes facing the prospect of critical losses should adopt offensive strategies, 
including hard alignment.  In fact, the revolution simply demonstrated that hard alignment 
strategies, even when desirable, are not always feasible.  The newly-founded Republic of 
Indonesia faced an almost constant existential threat between 1945 and 1949.  It was obliged 
to meet that threat by a resort to arms and an activist diplomacy aimed at bringing pressure on 
the Netherlands to recognise the legitimacy of Indonesia’s independence aspirations.  It was 
clear that bandwagoning with the threatening party offered no relief.  The Republic faced two 
Dutch offensives.  In the second, its seat of government in Yogyakarta was overrun and 
republican leaders captured.  The only logical alternative was to combine armed resistance 
with an appeal for assistance from foreign powers. 
But the Republic failed to attract allies able, or willing, to apply coercive power to deter 
the Netherlands forces in Indonesia.  Chapter Three demonstrated how, initially, republican 
leaders looked to the West in the expectation that the victorious war powers would live up to 
lofty rhetoric about self-determination.  When the European power politics of the emerging 
Cold War was found to trump the rights of colonised peoples, a bitterly disappointed Republic 
found some modest comfort in Soviet interventions in the UN.  Thus, states able to apply 
decisive material pressure on the Dutch failed to act; states willing to act could not apply the 
pressure. 
This meant that the Republic’s political leadership would be forced to craft an 
alignment strategy that balanced numerous risks.  In the absence of explicit support from 
Western powers, the Republic sought ways to at least maximise the prospects of diplomatic 
support from as many foreign powers as possible.  Simultaneously, it needed to ensure that the 
Republic’s foreign policy did not become a source of internal friction between a religious right, 
centrist nationalists and a zealous left.  The compromise first proposed by Sjahrir and then 
declared as official policy by Hatta in September 1948 was the policy of neutrality between 
the great power blocs.  Hatta’s declaration came just as tensions between left and right in 
domestic politics mounted and were poised to erupt in rebellion. 
In essence, the policy of neutrality, which later came to be established as the bebas-
aktif policy, started to introduce ideas like competitive bidding, hiding and hedging into the 
conduct of Indonesian diplomacy.  By not declaring for either side of the Cold War, the 
 328 
Republic might have at least assuaged concerns that an independent Indonesia would be 
contrary to the interests of any of the big powers.  However, after the bloody suppression of 
communists and leftists in the Madiun rebellion, the USA immediately warmed to the Republic 
– a move that was critical to the eventual negotiated withdrawal of the Netherlands.  The USA 
took the Republic’s actions in supressing the left as a signal that it was essentially pro-Western.   
It is purely speculative, although reasonable to assume based on evidence such as Sjahrir’s 
1945 treatise Our Struggle, that Indonesia would have developed a close relationship with the 
USA, if not explicit alignment much earlier, had Washington perceived early Cold War politics 
somewhat differently. 
In any case, official neutrality served Indonesia well in navigating the perils of 
international politics.  After the final transfer of sovereignty, Joseph Stalin overruled the advice 
of his Foreign Ministry to give official diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Indonesia.  It 
indicated that the Soviet Union still believed there were opportunities in Indonesia despite the 
1948 left-wing crackdown.  Simultaneously, Harry Truman began pouring in aid in the belief 
the USA had won a victory with the character of Indonesian leaders to form government.  
Hence, the evidence from the revolutionary period offered some modest support for the second 
hypothesis that a state should prefer to adopt smart alignment strategies or to bandwagon as a 
last resort when the prospect of critical loss to state or regime is perceived to be high, but it has 
no recourse to hard balancing options.   
Nonetheless, some interesting questions remain over how the Republic’s leaders 
arrived at the conclusions they did.  It is possible to see the adoption of neutrality as the result 
of a pure cost-benefit analysis.  Facing the absence of material support from any great power 
in fighting the Dutch, and a domestic movement divided between Western and communist 
values, neutrality was the foreign policy least likely to cause trouble and most likely to accrue 
some benefits.  From the point of view of prospect theory, the revolutionary period highlights 
a dilemma.  It is hard to infer the reference point the Republic’s leaders had for what 
represented gains and losses.  The fact the Republic possessed some, albeit steadily 
diminishing territory, put it in the domain of gains.  The endowment effect might ensure that 
its priority was to preserve the gains already made.  But the aspiration was for a unified state 
based on the boundaries of the Netherlands East Indies.  The Dutch had blocked any further 
expansion of Republican territory and, in fact, threatened to extinguish the Republic 
completely by military means.  Given this, it is possible to frame the situation facing the 
Republic as one of severe loss.  The result is that the adoption of neutrality is not easily 
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explained as a risk acceptant or risk averse option.  In this case, a rational analysis of political 
choice is simpler and more useful than a psychological analysis. 
Another example of Indonesia avoiding balancing behavior despite the prospect of 
critical losses came in the case of the regional rebellions, described in Chapter Five.  Faced 
with mounting evidence of US support for rebels who were threatening to either split the 
country or bring down the government, Indonesia did not adopt an immediate balancing 
response against the USA.  Instead, Jakarta implemented a two-pronged strategy of fighting 
the rebels militarily and appeasing the USA diplomatically.  This was unmistakably a policy 
of Omnibalancing.  The simple rationale was that Jakarta was not then in a position to try to 
overtly balance against the USA by seeking a hard alignment with another power, presumably 
the Soviet Union, or to build up its military forces.  It did do this later and the experience of 
the regional rebellions provided ample motive. 
The outcome from this episode is likewise more easily explained in terms of a cost-
benefit calculation.  The Jakarta government made a decision to avoid an open confrontation 
with the USA that might have worsened its already precarious situation.  Diplomatic 
appeasement was the lesser of two evils.  The government was clearly in the domain of losses.  
But to adopt the high-risk course of openly challenging the USA at that point would not have 
solved the rebellion or helped immediately win new allies able to offset the costs entailed in a 
hostile relationship with the USA.  
The way choices were evaluated in deciding alignments during both the revolution and 
the regional rebellions illustrate that choice problems in international relations are not always 
straight forward.  States are constrained in the choices they make by the range of instruments 
available to them.   
 
Hypothesis 3: When the prospect of critical loss to the state or regime is perceived to 
be low, states should prefer alignment strategies that support domestic group or individual 
preferences and interests in foreign policy.  At such times, states are more likely to adopt soft 
or defensive policies such as various ‘smart’ alignment strategies that aim to maximise the 
benefits of international cooperation while minimizing the loss of policy autonomy.  They 
should prefer to avoid hard strategies like expansion of military capability and overt balancing 
and bandwagoning options.   
 
In the 1950s, fresh from the struggle for independence, Indonesians began to grapple 
for the first time with the challenges of governing a sovereign state.  Chapter Four charted the 
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course of the early post-independence governments, led by prime ministers with an anti-
communist or pro-Western bias from the Muslim party, Masyumi.  Their worldview was a 
consequence of democratic convictions, a belief that the West offered access to the aid, capital 
and markets Indonesia needed to develop, and religious beliefs that led them to oppose the 
atheism and state control of communism.  They were aided by the weakness of the PKI 
following Madiun.  But the difficulty in balancing a desire for good relations with the West 
with the demand for foreign policy autonomy in accord with the bebas-aktif policy resulted in 
attempts to establish a channel of undisclosed alignment that even Sukarno ascribed to for a 
time.  This proved to be an unsustainable strategy that produced one of Indonesia’s first major 
foreign policy crises – the outcry over the signing of the MSA protocols and the downfall of 
the Sukiman government. 
Later governments fared better in balancing alignment risks.  The government of Ali 
Sastroamidjojo succeeded in implementing the most adventurous foreign policy of the 
constitutional democracy era and enhancing his stature.  He vigorously pursued Indonesia’s 
claim to West New Guinea, taking the issue to the UN, and he exchanged ambassadors with 
Moscow and Beijing.  His foreign policy reached a peak with the Asia Africa conference in 
Bandung in 1955.  Ali’s active assertion of Indonesia as a neutral state served to elevate its 
international significance and its stature, which were the prime minister’s main objectives.  
Although Ali’s foreign policy came at the price of some weakening of Indonesia’s ties to the 
USA, he successfully tapped a wellspring of nationalism that validated his policy direction.  
And as a former ambassador to Washington, he understood the risks of this assertion of policy 
autonomy could be contained because of the value the USA placed on maintaining good 
relations with Indonesia. 
Ali employed a wide variety of strategies to balance alignment risks.  They included 
attempts to promote norms of peaceful dispute resolution (transcending), to avoid being drawn 
into a dispute between other powers (hiding), and to widen access to new product markets and 
sources of capital after the end of the Korean War boom (competitive bidding).  Together they 
served to maximise Indonesia’s foreign policy autonomy while maintaining business-like 
relations with Moscow, Beijing and Washington.  Ali and his predecessors benefited from 
relatively stable regional strategic conditions, which avoided the necessity of seeking hard 
alignments.  Although Ali enjoyed the additional benefit of greater stability in government 
than experienced by his predecessors, the biggest challenge to the security of governments of 
this era was internal. 
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The record of alignment management during the first phase of constitutional democracy 
was consistent with the expectations of the hypothesis that domestic group or individual 
preferences and interests ought to be given priority when the prospect of critical state or regime 
loss is perceived to be low.  Conditions at the international level obviated any necessity to 
contemplate hard alignments.  Governments could indulge their beliefs in the appropriate 
conduct of foreign policy, with consequent impact on alignment posture.  The biggest restraint 
on governments of this period was domestic pressure from opposition forces with a different 
vision for foreign policy.  For Sukiman, the miscalculation proved his downfall; for Ali, 
harnessing nationalist sentiment was an advantage. 
As was the case in the evaluations of policymakers during the revolution and regional 
rebellions, it is easy to interpret key alignment decisions during the early constitutional 
democracy period in terms of rational choice.  The Masyumi-led governments sought close 
ties to the USA because it was most able to provide Indonesia with the material support it 
needed.  It is unlikely the Sukiman government was fully aware of the extent of the domestic 
risks it was taking in aligning Indonesia with the USA, given the weakness of the left at the 
time.  The sharp domestic reaction to the tilt towards Washington can be seen as simply part 
of a learning curve for governments testing the extent of their authority in a new democracy. 
Ali demonstrated a much more deliberate appetite for risk than his predecessors. But Ali also 
was able to calculate and balance the risks of his more ambitious foreign policy.  His decision 
making is consistent with that of a rational actor. 
The last phase of constitutional democracy from late 1955 to mid 1958, which 
culminated in the regional rebellions, was covered in Chapter Five.  The governments of this 
period – Masyumi prime minister Burhanuddin Harahap and Ali, in his second term in office 
– represented the last gasps of the democratic experiment.  Both conducted foreign policies 
that were true to form.  Burhanuddin followed the pattern of his Masyumi predecessors in 
tilting towards the USA, although bitter experience had taught Masyumi-led governments that 
they needed to publicly assert the importance of policy autonomy.  When the government 
signalled friendship to the USA, it was careful ensure it was done in private.  Ali returned to 
his familiar advocacy of explicit neutrality.  But he too had learned from past experience and 
took steps to privately reassure the USA that this did not imply an anti-American foreign 
policy.  The emphasis he placed on foreign policy during his first term and accusations that he 
had moved too quickly to build relations with China had played a role in his downfall. 
The alignment strategies of the Burhanuddin and Ali governments did have one 
similarity.  Both tried to prevent disclosure of policies that favored the USA so as not to 
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provoke a domestic backlash.  But otherwise they reflected differences over how to conduct 
Indonesia’s international relations, with implications for alignment. 
Burhanuddin sought to embrace Westernised international habits and norms of 
diplomacy in a way that could not be concealed.  The soft alignment he pursued with the West 
was implicit in the way he sought to resolve differences over West New Guinea and the 
Netherlands-Indonesia Union by negotiation.  The extent of the domestic political gamble this 
entailed was evident when negotiations failed and his government responded by unilaterally 
abrogating the Union and its accompanying economic and financial agreements.  It was a 
reminder of the difficult balancing act entailed in foreign policy between domestic sentiment 
and international objectives.   
Although Ali’s foreign policy ambitions were more restrained the second time around, 
he took a symbolically more radical approach to the Dutch than Burhanuddin and completely 
abolished all the Round Table Conference agreements and abrogated outstanding debts.  In 
doing so, he mixed private reassurances to the USA with actions that appeared distinctly anti-
Western.  The reward came by way of the Eisenhower administration’s muted reaction.  With 
Sukarno traveling to the USA, Soviet Union and China soon after Ali’s appointment, Indonesia 
could be seen to strike a more deliberate, but less assertive Cold War neutrality.  Ali was 
somewhat constrained by presiding over a coalition with Masyumi and by not knowing what 
Sukarno would do.  In terms of alignment strategies, the result was that the country pursued a 
combination of hiding and competitive bidding. 
Domestic pressures aside, Burhanuddin and Ali, benefited from a reasonably stable 
external environment.  Ali, in particular, started out with a strong mandate – he headed the first 
government to be chosen after parliamentary elections.  The outcome of their initial alignment 
decisions is largely consistent with the hypothesis that faced with a low prospect of loss 
policymakers should be free to exercise their own preferences and interests, which translates 
into alignment strategies that maximise policy autonomy.   
But the experience of negotiating the fate of West New Guinea and the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union highlights the value of a closer examination of how choices are made.  The 
enormous effort and prestige the Burhanuddin government had invested in a successful 
negotiation with the Dutch ensured the failure of the West New Guinea and Union talks 
plunged it into a position of critical loss.  Masyumi had already performed badly in elections 
on Burhanuddin’s watch.  The collapse of the talks with the Netherlands would become a major 
contributor to his government’s downfall.  Faced with such losses, Burhanuddin adopted a risk 
acceptant response to the Netherlands in the final days of his government.   The strength of his 
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government’s reaction is not easily reconciled as a cost-benefit analysis.  The extent of the 
repudiation of the Dutch, and the risks this posed to Indonesia’s international reputation and 
welfare, probably exceeded the true costs to Indonesia of the failure of the talks.  But this was 
a popular move – Ali too unilaterally repudiated all agreements and obligations with the Dutch 
as one of his first acts on returning to government.  While they placed relations with the West 
at risk, Burhanuddin and Ali secured domestic support for foreign policy, including laying the 
groundwork for future alignments aimed at dislodging the Netherlands from West New 
Guinea.   
 
Hypothesis 4:   The strength of a state’s balancing response should escalate in tandem 
with the prospect of incurring loss.  This should manifest in a tightening of alignment 
commitments and attempts to grow state power. 
 
The strength of Indonesia’s alignment commitments grew sharply as the crises over 
West New Guinea and Malaysia deepened.  This pattern correlates closely with perceptions in 
Jakarta that the stakes, and the potential for losses, were increasing in both cases. 
Indonesia’s relationship with the Soviet Union was vital to obtaining the military power 
necessary to launch an invasion of West New Guinea planned for August 1962.  Even as 
Sukarno pressed the USA to find a diplomatic solution, Indonesia, starting in 1959, steadily 
acquired the weapons to force the issue.  As the size and capability of Indonesia’s armed forces 
grew, so did the presence of Soviet personnel on the ground and the frequency of high-level 
contacts between Moscow and Jakarta.  The Soviets had hoped that a military showdown over 
West New Guinea would produce an irreconcilable break between Indonesia and the West. 
Even so, Sukarno was conscious of balancing the risks of the conflict over the status of 
the territory.  He maintained cordial relations with Washington.  Indeed, he exhibited a singular 
warmth to Kennedy.  Sukarno’s goal was to win sovereignty over West New Guinea, not fight 
a war that would alienate him from sources of valuable support and increase Indonesia’s 
dependency on the Soviet Union.  The fact the war threat was credible underscored the 
significance Sukarno attached to winning control of West New Guinea.  It added urgency to 
US attempts to force concessions on the Dutch.  But Sukarno’s first preference was to play 
both sides of the Cold War to obtain Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives as cheaply as 
possible.   
The same pattern of cautious tightening of alignment commitments was evident as 
Confrontation over Malaysia intensified in 1964 and 1965.  Sukarno initially had tried to 
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resolve Indonesia’s grievances over Malaysia via diplomatic pressure and negotiation, hoping 
to once again employ competitive bidding to repeat the success of the West New Guinea 
campaign.  But after Confrontation entered a militarised phase, Indonesia started to explore 
alignments that would help bolster its campaign against the formation of Malaysia.   This 
culminated in the alignment with China. As noted earlier, the growing closeness between 
Jakarta and Beijing matched the increasing stakes in the conflict. 
The evaluation of the risks in both the West New Guinea and Malaysia cases reflects 
the phenomenon of sunk costs.  This is particularly true of Confrontation against Malaysia.  
Sukarno’s escalation of the conflict is a good example of how a combination of loss aversion 
and risk-seeking can lead states to “follow failing policies far longer than a standard cost-
benefit analysis might predict”.17  But even in the case of West New Guinea – which, unlike 
the Malaysia campaign, proved a success – Sukarno had reached the point where he had 
invested so much credibility that he would have had to fight a war regardless of the objective 
value of what stood to be gained in comparison to the material losses that might have imposed. 
The story of Confrontation against Malaysia is one of steady escalation as the stakes 
were raised on both sides and the costs of backing down for each of the belligerents grew.  For 
Sukarno, the risk-taking in Confrontation was allowed to grow beyond any rational calculation 
of its importance to Indonesia’s security.  This pattern of risk-taking is consistent with the 
hypothesis that alignment posture ought to harden in proportion to the prospect of critical 
losses or the size of the stakes involved in a conflict.   
 
Hypothesis 5:  States should prefer alignment partners that share the same ideology.  The 
ideological preferences of a state, or the effects of domestic political competition, are more 
likely to be reflected in alignment when external risks are low, that is, in the absence of 
existential threat to state or regime. 
 
Ideology superficially fared well in the case of Indonesia’s decision to pursue neutrality 
in 1948 under the bebas-aktif policy.  But, as we have seen, the decision to adopt neutrality 
was driven by the management of domestic and international pressures during the revolution.  
Nevertheless, it acquired significance as a state ideology over time.  Its main influence was as 
a benchmark for acceptable policy.  But in many respects, it was honored in the breach.  
Sukiman’s anti-communism and support for key US policies, along with the general pro-
                                                
17 Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations”, p. 286. 
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Western orientation of Masyumi-led governments of the 1950s, demonstrated policymakers 
would invest foreign relations with their preferences and interests – often tied to the state of 
domestic politics – when they could.  It was these governments that gave rise to the pattern of 
what has been termed undisclosed alignment to avoid a clash between actual policy and 
declared policy. 
Arguably, Ali was the prime minister to most faithfully pursue a policy of neutrality or 
nonalignment and was, consequently, assumed to be taking Indonesia to the left.  The Asia-
Africa conference, its codification of peaceful coexistence, and its contribution to the birth of 
NAM, were the outstanding achievements the bebas-aktif policy as ideology.  But the 1950s 
was a period when Indonesian policymakers enjoyed relatively non-threatening external 
conditions, even as shifting local allegiances caused frequent changes of government.  It tended 
to bear out the assumption that the higher the level a state’s security, the more latitude for 
ideology to affect alignment choices.18 
Under Guided Democracy, Indonesia pursued a more assertive foreign policy.  There 
was a strong ideological component to Sukarno’s campaign against colonialism and 
imperialism.  It drew him away from the bebas-aktif policy as he advocated creating a new 
bloc of Third World states.   But his key alignment decisions after the advent of Guided 
Democracy were to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union to obtain armaments and to maintain 
ties with the USA to preserve diplomatic leverage.  Neither of these moves reflected an 
ideological preference.   
The stakes in Confrontation over West New Guinea outweighed any considerations of 
ideological affinity in alignment choice.  The same was true of Confrontation against Malaysia, 
at least initially.  As the crush Malaysia campaign evolved, Sukarno started to explore a deeper 
relationship with China.  It extent of the embrace of China was underscored by the decision to 
walk away from the UN.  These actions fitted an ideological narrative that Sukarno was eager 
to emphasise, which possibly exaggerated the degree of an ideological rationale in the 
alignment process.  This was consistent with Walt’s expectations that the preference for 
ideological alliances would increase when regimes sought to bolster internal and external 
support and statesmen would have a tendency to embellish the degree of shared ideology with 
their allies and the degree of ideological difference with rivals.19 
                                                
18 This reflects Walt’s finding, in the case of ideology, that it was “most useful in explaining alliance 
decisions when the prevailing array of threats was either modest or indeterminate”. Walt, Origins of 
Alliances, pp. 266-267. 
19 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Still, the relationship with China was an inherently fragile because of the domestic 
tensions between communists and anti-communists.  As Walt noted, ideologies that entailed a 
shift in power to a foreign centre of authority, which was one of the main criticisms levelled 
by Indonesian anti-communists, are inherently unstable.20  The weight of evidence is that 
Indonesia’s most ideological alignment was based principally on other calculations. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Aid should increase the propensity for alignment and increase the 
influence of the aid donor on the policies adopted by the recipient.  The same should be true 
of access to commercial opportunities via trade and investment. 
 
The experience of aid donors to Indonesia demonstrated foreign transfers had mixed 
effects on alignment patterns.  Indonesia sought alignment partners that were capable of 
assisting it achieve its economic and security objectives.  For most of the 1950s, the essential 
source of the aid Indonesia needed was seen as the USA.  But aid failed to give the USA the 
kind of leverage over the Indonesian government that it desired.  The Sukiman government’s 
decisions to sign the San Francisco peace treaty and the Mutual Security Act were probably 
the best examples of the influence of US aid.  But in both cases a domestic backlash delayed 
or prevented ratification.  By the time of the Ali government, aid appeared to offer the donor 
little leverage.  The USA viewed Ali’s advocacy of explicit neutrality as an unwelcome shift 
towards the communist bloc.  It coincided with the resurrection of the PKI, which Sukarno and 
the government were reluctant to publicly oppose despite frequent reassurance to American 
officials in private that Indonesia would not succumb to communism.   
When the USA refused to supply the military aid Indonesia wanted, it turned to the 
Soviet Union rather than change its domestic or international policies.  Soviet aid brought an 
unprecedented level of foreign engagement with the Indonesian armed forces.  But the Soviets 
too were disappointed with the results.  Hopes that Indonesia would draw back from the USA 
and seek an armed solution to the West New Guinea dispute were dashed by the Middleberg 
agreement.  A Soviet decision to cut back on military aid and a US decision to end support for 
the economic stabilisation plan failed to discourage Confrontation against Malaysia.  Instead, 
Indonesia turned to China.  
Sukarno was particularly conscious of Indonesia’s status and image.  “I am not asking 
America to give money,” he wrote. “Let her remember we have begged all our lives.  We can 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 35. 
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do it no longer.”21  Sukarno was not opposed to aid; he was opposed to the conditions attached 
to aid that constrained Indonesia’s foreign policy autonomy.  Accordingly, it turns out that aid 
was largely self-selecting in its influence on alignment.  Indonesia partnered with those willing 
to offer what it needed.  But it provided little political return to the donor.  The influence of 
donors was greatest when their goals did not conflict with Indonesia’s or they could appeal to 
a sympathetic local audience.  This was the case with the concessions wrung from the Sukiman 
government in exchange for economic and security aid and under Djuanda with the 
implementation of economic stabilisation before it was derailed by Confrontation. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  The higher the transnational political penetration of one state by 
another state, the more likely the states are to seek alignment. 
 
The weakest of these three hypotheses was transnational political penetration.  There 
was insufficient evidence from the period of the case study to reach firm conclusions.  But, 
like aid, it appears to have been most effective when the objective of the penetration was shared 
by a powerful local audience.  Various technocrats and Masyumi and PSI politicians were 
receptive to US models for economic and democratic development.  The effort the USA put 
into a wide variety of engagement programs is likely to have reinforced the convictions of such 
sympathisers, but it is less likely to have won many converts.  The Soviet Union and China 
invested similar efforts in promoting their cause within Indonesia.  For example, China at the 
height of its information and propaganda campaign in 1964-65 produced newspapers, owned 
the largest Indonesian-language book publisher outside Indonesia, distributed films across the 
country and ran a tireless series of exchange visits.22  
The internationally-funded communist campaigns, which focused on national 
characteristics and shared experiences rather than ideology, dovetailed with the PKI’s efforts 
to win real political power.  The PKI was the fastest growing political party from the mid-
1950s, growth that continued during the Soviet and Chinese charm offensives in the early 
1960s.  But how much the PKI’s recruitment was assisted by foreign propaganda is hard to 
prove.  It might have had greater influence internally as the PKI gradually shifted over to the 
Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
                                                
21 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 297. 
22 The Chinese cultural, information and propaganda efforts were fully engaged since 1954 in the lead 
up to the Bandung conference.  See Liu, China and the Shaping of Indonesia, pp. 188-197. 
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More importantly, at the critical junctures in foreign policy decision making there is no 
evidence that big spending on information or the cultivation of domestic allies provided any 
leverage to the great powers. Indeed, an overt foreign presence at such times often appeared a 
liability.  The Chinese mission in Indonesia was a frequent target during anti-communist and 
anti-Chinese campaigns.  The prominence of US business investment and generous US funding 
for programs ranging from the Peace Corps to libraries and foreign visits and training provided 
targets for domestic hostility when foreign policy priorities conflicted.  Elsworth Bunker’s 
recommendation of a low-posture policy in 1965 was the ultimate admission of this failure. 
 
The Causes of Indonesian Alignment 
 
The case study of Indonesia’s interactions with the great powers between 1945 and 
1965 has sought to address one fundamental question. 
 
What are the causes of Indonesia’s alignment behavior?  
 
The findings of the case study show there is no single, binding cause of alignment that 
covers all contingencies during the two decades subject to analysis.  But the case study did 
reveal some distinct patterns.  Analytically, they can be divided into two categories.  The first 
pattern relates to the formula that Indonesian policymakers commonly used to determine 
alignment posture.  The second relates to the causes of the alignment decisions of individual 
governments or policymakers. 
As has been argued, a balance of risk determined alignment.  This assumed alignment 
was the result of a complex interplay between domestic and international factors.  The primary 
balance was between the desire for policy autonomy and the significance of the objective that 
an alignment was supposed to serve.  The more critical the objective, the greater tendency to 
align.  In determining criticality, prospective losses were seen to outweigh the significance of 
prospective gains.  Alignment also was determined along another axis of calculation that 
weighed the significance of the objective against the prospect of the domestic or international 
hostility a particular alignment might evoke.  The maintenance of official neutrality or 
nonalignment, especially for a weak and internally-divided state, was in general the safer 
course in the face of intense ideological competition at the domestic and international levels.  
Still, great powers were the alignment partners that consumed most policy energy because, by 
definition, they were the states most able to affect Indonesia’s material position. 
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When the balance of risk analysis was applied to the alignment decisions of individual 
governments, it became clear that in times of low risk – when the prospect of the state or regime 
suffering critical loss was low – policymakers largely followed their own preferences and 
interests.  Policy autonomy was a priority traded off against ideas about the best means of 
achieving economic development and national security or of securing ascendency in domestic 
affairs.  Under these conditions, ideological disposition played a substantial role.  In general, 
this meant during the constitutional democracy years staunchly anti-communist Masyumi 
governments preferred alignment with the West.  The more centrist PNI governments were 
stronger supporters of strict neutrality or nonalignment, but this veered from a passive 
interpretation under PNI prime minister Wilopo to an ambitious and assertive interpretation 
under Ali.   
With the emergence of Sukarno as the key policymaker during Guided Democracy, 
alignment decisions increasingly reflected his perceptions of the balance of risk.  Alignment 
choices were dictated by his orchestration of relationships among the great powers in which 
he turned to those most willing or able to serve Indonesia’s interests on a case-by-case basis.  
The more critical he judged the objective to be, such as the “loss” entailed in Dutch occupation 
of West New Guinea, the more likely Indonesia was to form a strong alignment.  Still, even as 
Sukarno occasionally found Indonesia’s interests best served by a hardening of alignment 
commitments, the preference for maximising autonomy remained apparent in his strategy of 
playing the great power ideological blocs off against each other.   
But such rational calculations of cost-benefit did not always drive the evaluation of 
risk.  Policymakers repeatedly demonstrated risk-seeking behavior when they perceived 
Indonesia faced losses in some critical dimension of statecraft.  In the 20 years studied here, 
these were principally territorial claims or matters of national influence and stature.  A closer 
examination of how risks were evaluated showed a psychological analysis of political choice 
offered greater insight than a rational choice analysis during times of crisis.  That is, when the 
prospect of losses was acute and risky choices were presented more starkly.  This was probably 
most clearly demonstrated by Sukarno’s repeated escalation of Confrontation against 
Malaysia, which alienated Indonesia from traditional sources of great power support.  Third 
World states, which Sukarno hoped to turn into a new bloc via either NAM or the Asia Africa 
group, were not viable partners.  Sukarno was left with an alignment with the People’s 
Republic of China, an arrangement that contained significant domestic and international risks 
and offered few of the material benefits Indonesia had obtained from the USA and Soviet 
Union.  The compromises implicit in the alignment with China were disguised to some extent 
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by Sukarno’s attempts to cast this alignment in the positive light of shared ideology.  By then 
the perception of the stakes involved in the Malaysia crisis had moved the issue beyond a 
rational calculation of its true significance for national security. 
 
What explains the persistence of Indonesia’s bebas-aktif foreign policy and refusal to 
enter military alliances?   
 
The bebas-aktif policy encapsulated an ideal, especially in regard to its stance on 
alignment, that went beyond the precise circumstances of its birth.  The reasons for the 
endurance of the policy through the 20 years of domestic and international contention 
following the declaration of independence in one sense explains the origins of nonalignment.  
Certainly, the ability of policymakers to interpret the bebas-aktif policy flexibly to suit 
prevailing exigencies – the fact that it was “amenable to frequent redefinition”23 – was one 
factor contributing to longevity.  But this common explanation only supplies part of the picture.    
A recurring desire to maximise autonomy in foreign policy marked even those episodes where 
Indonesian policymakers believed the objectives driving decisions to align outweighed any 
potential downside entailed in external dependency or obligations.  The desire of policymakers 
to assert autonomy was evident irrespective of ideological orientation.  This is consonant with 
Weinstein’s observation that Indonesians felt they “must remain ever alert to the danger of 
finding their formal independence a sham and their fate dictated by foreign forces”.24 
Consequently, it can be argued the bebas-aktif policy worked on two levels.  On one, 
it served a psychological purpose; it captured the zeitgeist of Indonesian attitudes to 
sovereignty.  As former foreign minister and Vice President Adam Malik once observed there 
was little interest in placing it under close scrutiny because it was “deeply rooted in our 
nation”.25 This statement hints at why the bebas-aktif policy retained its legitimacy.  It always 
was more aspirational than practical; it was the foreign policy complement to the deeper 
ambition for an independent Indonesia to stand on its own feet.  It, therefore, was not weakened 
even when it was breached.  
But the policy did offer something on a functional level as another tool of risk 
management.  As discussed earlier, it had the potential to defray competition between the 
political left and right within Indonesia that threatened to initially undermine the revolution 
                                                
23 Weinstein. Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, p. 161. 
24 Ibid., p. 30. 
25 Malik, In the Service of the Republic, p. 279. 
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and later national development.  It served a similar purpose at the international level in marking 
Indonesia as a nonpartisan power in the Cold War at a time when the Republic needed all the 
friends it could find.  But more than that, the concomitant refusal to host foreign military bases 
allowed Indonesia to advocate from a position of moral authority for the removal of foreign 
military bases from the immediate region.  It was a reasonable calculation that in the absence 
of alliances between regional states and extra-regional great powers and great power military 
bases it would be easier to maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia and enhance 
Indonesia’s own influence over regional affairs. 
This ability of the bebas-aktif policy to serve both psychological and material 
imperatives allowed it to retain its status as an ideal template for foreign policy action even 
when actual policy favored alignment with one of the two Cold War blocs. 
 
What roles have theories on the balance of power and the perception of external threat 
played in determining alignment?  
 
The case study demonstrated Indonesian policymakers were certainly conscious of 
imbalances of power and vigilant against the appearance of foreign threats that could take the 
form of either direct military intervention or clandestine intervention in alliance with domestic 
dissidents.  There were specific episodes in which power imbalances or overt threat appeared 
to be at the forefront of policymakers’ minds in seeking alignment solutions.   
When Sukarno proposed the NAM become a third bloc at its second summit in Cairo 
in 1964, he made the case in terms of a balance of power to resist the depredations of the 
imperialist states.  The Soviet-backed military build-up of the early 1960s came with an explicit 
recognition that past reliance on diplomacy without the capacity for coercion had failed to 
deliver Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives.  The focus on forging alignments with great 
powers itself was driven by the fact that they were the most eager to engage with Indonesia 
and the most able.   
External threat was part of the state narrative from the time of revolution.  From the 
existential challenge posed by the Netherlands in the 1940s to the covert intervention staged 
by the USA in support of rebellions in the 1950s, Indonesians had learned from bitter 
experience to stay alert to, and wary of, the designs of foreign powers.  Strategic location and 
abundant natural resources were seen as creating both vulnerability and motive to intervene.  
Not surprisingly, this sentiment was most pronounced among the military, who exhibited “a 
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natural inclination to search for external threats”.26  The justification for the two campaigns of 
Confrontation over West New Guinea and Malaysia, in which the military played prominent 
roles, was at least partially cast in terms of threat. 
But calculations of power and threat – the basis of much of the theorising in alignment 
studies – do not alone tell the story of why or how Indonesia pursued cooperation with the 
great powers.   
The idea that Indonesia might balance against preponderant power was initially negated 
by the decision to pursue neutrality.  When early governments sought a soft alignment with the 
West, testing what latitude they had under the official policy of neutrality, the purpose clearly 
was not to balance power.  During the 1950s, the USA and its Western allies had by far the 
strongest presence in Southeast Asia.  But nor could the actions of Indonesian policymakers 
be characterised as a tentative move to bandwagon for the purposes of minimising threat.  
Without doubt the most powerful influences on these policymakers were their anti-communism 
and desire to access Western markets and capital. 
Under the Wilopo and Ali governments, the pursuit of a more literal definition of 
neutrality entailed an implicit rejection of balance of power politics.  Opposition to Realpolitik 
solutions to international problems, such as the balance of power, was a thread that ran through 
the Asia Africa conference to the founding of the NAM.  It was an inspiration to many of the 
Third World states, including Indonesia, that saw themselves as historic victims of power 
politics and likely future battlegrounds should a balance of power fail to deter war.   
Sukarno came to explicitly embrace the significance of power balancing, yet it was a 
long journey.  In the campaign to finally resolve the West New Guinea question, Sukarno 
maintained close relationships with both the Soviet Union and the USA; the Soviets to provide 
a military option and the Americans to provide a diplomatic one.  By the time Sukarno did start 
to enter a hard alignment with China, in an explicit act of balancing Western powers in the 
region, he had run out of sources of alternative support.  It was less a bold move of strategy 
than an act of improvisation and risk-taking.  Sukarno’s alignment decisions were never 
without ambiguity.  As Liddle suggests, it would be “simplistic and misleading to see Sukarno 
as anti-Western because of his opposition to Malaysia or his promotion of a Beijing-Jakarta 
axis…”27 
                                                
26 Weinstein. Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence, p. 57. 
27 R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture, Sydney: Allen and Unwin (1996), p. 99. 
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A focus on threat as the principal motivator also fails to account for the totality of 
Indonesia’s alignment behavior.  Most obviously, many bold alignment decisions were made 
in the absence of discernible external threat.  As noted, benign external conditions helped give 
policymakers the space to pursue their own preferences and interests in foreign policy, 
including over alignment.  When in 1958 the state and regime did face a threat with an external 
dimension, there was considerable uncertainty over its nature and the appropriate response.  
This resulted in attempts to reassure and appease the source of foreign threat in an act of 
Omnibalancing.  In both incarnations of Confrontation, it was Indonesia that posed the threat 
by warning of or initiating the resort to armed force. 
One of the weaknesses of assuming alignment is determined via an analysis of threat 
is the great difficulty of knowing the intentions of a potential adversary.  The balance of risk 
better replicates the process undertaken by policymakers in managing the inherent uncertainty 
over another state’s intentions.  When it comes to the presumption of threat, it allows for the 
possibility of policymakers to adopting a precautionary approach to alignment decisions. 
 
What strategies has Indonesia adopted to enhance security in the absence of formal 
alliance? 
 
The act of balancing the state’s objectives in international relations, on the one hand, 
with the desire to preserve policy autonomy and to avoid inciting domestic and international 
opposition, on the other, required policymakers to be imaginative in the practice of alignment.  
It gave rise to what has been labelled here as smart alignment strategies. 
The most common of the smart strategies Indonesia employed was competitive 
bidding, which describes the act of playing the great powers off against each other.  Sukarno 
was its great exponent.  Summarising this pragmatic dictum, he recorded in his memoir: “A 
nation engaged in surviving must take help from all sides, accept whatever is useful and throw 
away the rest.”28  But its success depended on finesse; each side of the Cold War had to be 
enticed by the idea that it could secure Indonesian alignment or at least rescue it from the other 
camp. 
The same skill was needed to ensure Indonesia’s foreign policy obtained sufficient 
support from a fractious domestic polity.  Often the only way to do that was to avoid public 
disclosure of commitments being entered into.  This included the obligations the Sukiman 
                                                
28 Sukarno, Sukarno, p. 294. 
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government took on to contribute to the defence of the “free world” in exchange for American 
civil and security aid.  Eventual disclosure toppled the government and its successors 
exceedingly wary over the disclosure of any agreements for military training or weapons 
transfers.  But it did not stop them from negotiating military aid deals with the USA.  
Undisclosed alignment describes a pattern of secrecy that persisted throughout the 1950s and 
first half of the 1960s that had the purpose of concealing policy mainly from a domestic 
audience rather than foreign powers. 
But these were only two of the more common alignment strategies employed by 
Indonesian policymakers.  In Chapter One, several alignment strategies were described.  This 
was not an exhaustive list.29  It referred to those that had some relevance to the Indonesian 
case.  Hiding (the assertion of neutrality), transcending (promotion of rules-based dispute 
resolution), hedging (reassurance while building military and economic strength), wedging 
(seeking to divide threatening allies), and Omnibalancing (appeasing the foreign sponsor of 
domestic critics) were all used to manage alignment relations at one time or another.  The 
common thread connecting all these alignment strategies is that they served to mitigate risk.  
Each strategy could be used either separately or in concert, according to the circumstances of 
the state and the preferences and interests of those in power.  They contributed to the twin 
purposes of avoiding (1) an unnecessary sacrifice of policy autonomy or (2) a domestic or 
foreign backlash against the direction of foreign policy. 
But if there was one alignment strategy most closely associated with the Indonesian 
case, it was competitive bidding.  This suited Indonesia’s circumstances.  It needed foreign 
cooperation to obtain the economic and security assistance to build the country.  But depending 
on one great power posed the risk of entrapment.  In the fierce rivalry of the Cold War, it was 
evident that over reliance on one ideological camp would result in a loss of policy freedom. 
Competitive bidding kept both sides of the Cold War guessing, maximised the aid Indonesia 
could receive, and left it free to pursue key foreign policies in a manner that suited its interests 
rather than those of a great power sponsor.  It reached its peak in the lead up to the settlement 
of the West New Guinea dispute.  Soviet arms gave Indonesia the capability to bring the issue 
to a head.  But Indonesia was able to resist Soviet pressure for a military solution because it 
maintained good diplomatic channels to Washington and kept open the option of US-supported 
economic stabilisation policies should it achieve its objectives. 
                                                
29 Bock and Henneberg, op. cit., pp. 10-17.  Bock and Henneberg identified 19 different strategies which 
they divided between soft and hard, internal and external balancing. 
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The important point about the use of smart alignment strategies is that they highlight 
the range of options open to policymakers.  They show that policymakers have far more choice 
available to them than suggested by the theories of balance of power or balance of threat.  
Indeed, the application of smart strategies is a challenge to those theories because the 
explanatory power of both rests on the outcome:  states are presumed to pursue the hard 
alignment positions of either balancing or bandwagoning.  If states adopt soft alignments, it 
undermines the significance of power and threat as determinants of alignment.  In turn, it points 
to the desirability of developing theory that better captures the full array of alignment choices 
states make. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
This work has sought to shed fresh light on Indonesia’s history of alignment with the 
great powers.  In doing so, it has investigated patterns in both the processes and outcomes of 
alignment decisions.  It demonstrated that standard theories for alignment behavior – balance 
of power and balance of threat – failed to adequately explain the Indonesian case.  Instead, it 
proposed that a more complete explanation could be found by viewing alignment decisions as 
an exercise in balancing risk simultaneously at the domestic and international levels. 
In the 20 years after Indonesia declared independence in 1945, the country experienced 
the most tumultuous period of its modern history.  Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, 
Indonesia embarked on a project of nation-building that required at least the acquiescence, and 
desirably the cooperation, of the two global ideological camps, led by the USA and Soviet 
Union.  It was a manifold policy challenge:  engagement with the great powers would provide 
the resources required for national development, yet it would constrain Indonesia’s domestic 
and international policy choices, and it would potentially draw Indonesia into a conflict that 
did not serve its interests.  The policy dilemma was compounded by Indonesia’s divided 
domestic politics.  Secular nationalists, theocrats, and communists represented popular 
political currents.  But political elites could all agree that Indonesia had not fought a revolution, 
at great cost in Indonesian blood, only to fall victim to neo-colonialism.  Independence had to 
be measured by substance, not just form.  It was these competing demands that ensured foreign 
policy, from the moment it was fashioned, was an exercise in managing risks. 
But there are obvious limitations and caveats to proposing a balance of risk as a general 
explanation for alignment.  As a single case, the conclusions might be contingent on 
Indonesia’s particular circumstances between 1945 and 1965.  These were years of 
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considerable internal and external challenges.  The ideological divide of the early Cold War, 
and the level of global anxiety that accompanied that era, might have produced a degree of 
competition over alignment that was less pronounced in later times.  This, in turn, might have 
forced policymakers to make unusual calculations about the confluence of domestic and 
international factors and adopt unusual alignment strategies.  There also are occasions when a 
state’s motivation for alignment is likely to be the sharp rise in power of another state, and the 
anxiety and uncertainty that creates, or a manifest threat posed by another state.  Still, given 
the integral role of risk management in the policymaking process, those decisions too are likely 
to be accompanied by a conscious exercise of weighing risks.  
Therefore, confidence in the findings of this research would be enhanced by further 
inquiry. Evidence from the Indonesia case itself could be considered over a longer timeframe.  
The story of alignment under the New Order years of Suharto, and after the restoration of 
constitutional democracy during the so-called Reformasi period, promises to be no less 
interesting or informative.  Suharto switched Indonesia’s alignment back towards the West and 
placed a 23-year freeze on relations with China.  In Leifer’s words, he launched Indonesia on 
a “novel form (of) economic association with industrialised capitalist states which was, in 
effect, an alignment”.30  But the New Order gave up “neither opposition to membership of 
military alliances nor an aspiration to a pre-eminent role in regional affairs”.31  The 
manipulative alignment strategies, and the foreign policy juggling act between rival forces at 
home, appears to have played a smaller role under Suharto.  Still, Indonesia maintained a 
working relationship with the Soviet Union and tried to ensure its immediate region remained 
free of great power intervention by helping found the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).  It appears Suharto was no less conscious than Sukarno of balancing alignment 
risks.  For his successors, the balancing act is likely to have become increasingly acute with 
the return of strategic rivalry between the great powers in Asia. 
For the generic study of alignment, the ideas formulated about a balance of risk and the 
use of smart alignment strategies could be tested in a wider variety of contemporary and 
historic cases.  It would benefit from comparative study of other states to assess whether or not 
it provides a better explanation of alignment behavior than balance of power or balance of 
threat.  Still, there is no reason to assume Indonesia is a unique case despite the persistence of 
the bebas-aktif policy and official nonalignment.  Most states prize their policy autonomy and 
                                                
30 Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, p. 112 
31 Ibid. 
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face a delicate task in managing the domestic and international politics of alignment, especially 
when great power competition is intense.  The explanation of the behavior of other states with 
different traditions of thought about alignment might benefit from seeing alignment as an 
elaborate calculation of risk.   
Furthermore, it might worth asking whether there are common characteristics to how 
risk is calculated and, therefore, what states most value.  Do different states, and different types 
of states, have varying appetites for risk in deciding on whether and how to align?  Does the 
difference in domestic political structure between authoritarian and democratic states affect 
how they calculate alignment risk?  How do states determine what issues are critical enough 
to seek hard alignments?  Do all states place the same importance on policy autonomy?   
More broadly, if the idea that alignment decisions are framed as a balance of risk can 
be applied to other cases, it might provide insights into the conditions under which alignments 
are formed and dissolved.  This has particular relevance at a time when the efficacy and 
viability of many longstanding alignments are in question and in many contested regions states 
are trying to bolster their alignment networks.  In concluding The Origins of Alliances, Stephen 
M. Walt argued the USA should find the results of his work “heartening”.  His finding that 
balancing behavior was the most dominant tendency in international politics meant that the 
USA’s “position in the world and the most important causes of security cooperation among 
states combine to favor it”.32  A balance of risk would evoke a less confident prediction.  It 
would suggest states only engage in hard balancing and bandwagoning as a last resort.  Where 
possible, they would try to avoid too many onerous alignment commitments and try to establish 
as much flexibility as they can within the framework of their alignments.  In that event, 
alignments are likely to be far less dependable. 
 
                                                
32 Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 284. 
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